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# *The Political History of India*

*by K.N. Panikkar*  
**BRITISH DIPLOMACY IN NORTH INDIA**

*ASSOCIATED REPRINTS: ONE*

JOHN MALCOLM

THE POLITICAL HISTORY  
OF INDIA (1784 to 1823)

Volume 2

Edited by  
K.N. Panikkar

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Introduction, Notes and Index

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## CHAPTER 8

# *Political History of India*

BEFORE WE PROCEED to an examination of the many important points connected with the actual condition and government of India, it would appear expedient to take a summary view of the origin of our political power, giving particular attention to the characters of those by whom its foundations were laid, and to the astonishing rapidity of its growth from the days of Clive to the close of the administration of the Marquess of Hastings; a period of not more than seventy years, but which includes events and changes beyond those that usually occupy centuries in the history of other states.

From the time that the India Company first formed factories,<sup>1</sup> and carried on a commercial intercourse with the East, a century and a half elapsed before they attained political power. This great change in their condition is to be ascribed to the hostility of the French, more than to all other causes combined. The scheme of establishing an eastern empire for his nation was first formed by Dupleix, the most able and ambitious of the governors of Pondicherry; and this plan, which he prosecuted almost to completion, comprehended, as a certain consequence, the destruction of the India Company, who, in their struggle to defeat it, were fighting for existence.

The first great contest between the English and French, on the coast of Coromandel, which terminated in the complete overthrow of the latter, involved the India Company in all the complexity of political relations with the native states, whom they had supported, while it made them just objects of future apprehension to those whom they had opposed.

The sudden rise of the Company on the coast of Coromandel was followed by a still more rapid and greater stride to power in Bengal. The capture of Calcutta, the plunder of their factory, the imprisonment and consequent death of a great proportion of their servants, were events which left them only the alternative of abandoning the shores of that part of India, or the employ-



ment of all their military means to punish unprovoked aggression, and to establish themselves in a manner that should prevent its recurrence. They chose the latter; and the conduct of this great enterprise was intrusted to the talents and genius of Clive, who, aided by the skill and valour of Admiral Watson, not only recovered their possessions, but defeated and dethroned the sovereign by whom they had been attacked, establishing, in his place, a prince whose condition made him subservient to the dictates of those by whom he had been elevated.

Siraj-ud-daulah was deposed, and Mir Jafar created Nabob of Bengal, in 1757. The desire of sovereignty made the latter promise beyond his power of performance. This circumstance, and the protection afforded by the English to natives of rank, whom he desired to oppress, rendered him (even before Colonel Clive left Bengal) very impatient under the burdens and restrictions which had been the price of his throne. From these he desired to free himself, as far as he could. His principal objects were to elude the payment of what was due to the treasury of Calcutta, and to displace some of the official persons, for whose continuance in their situations both the British government and himself were pledged. "He endeavoured", a well-informed and intelligent writer observes, "to gain the concurrence of Clive in these points, by individual liberality towards that chief. But Clive, who had neither asked nor stipulated for the presents which he had personally received, inflexibly demanded a fulfilment of the treaty and accompanying engagements."<sup>2</sup>

While Colonel Clive opposed the attempts of Jafar to evade his obligations, he gave him an example of his own adherence to faith, in rejecting the overtures of the Shah Zada, or heir-apparent of the emperor of Delhi, who tempted his ambition by an offer of any terms he chose to dictate for the advantage of the Company and himself, provided he would desert Jafar, whose territories that prince had invaded.

A short period before he left India, the reputation of Colonel Clive was greatly increased by his destruction of a Dutch armament from Batavia, sent, as was suspected at the moment, and afterwards ascertained, in communication with the Nabob, and with the exclusive object of co-operating with him in the expulsion of the English from Bengal.

The disinterestedness, promptness, and energy, which Colonel Clive displayed on this occasion, places this act amongst the most brilliant of his life.<sup>3</sup> Besides the defeat of a daring attempt of an European rival, it had the salutary effect of putting an end, for the moment, to the intrigues of the Nabob, and of all other native princes, against the yet unsettled power of the English; but the departure of Clive from India, in 1761, was the signal for the recommencement of intrigue and the revival of hope in every enemy, secret or avowed, of the Company.

Mr. Holwell succeeded to the government till the arrival of Mr. Vansittart. The invasion of Bengal by the Mahrattas and by the emperor of Delhi, and several rebellions, spread terror and desolation throughout the country; and though in all the military operations which occurred, the British troops supported their character, our situation became every day more critical. Mr. Holwell, in the first instance, and Mr. Vansittart afterwards, entertained the strongest suspicions of Jafar Ali's fidelity, and were decided as to his personal incapacity for government. These impressions were heightened by the continued collision which took place at this period, in every part of his dominions, between the Nabob and his officers on one part, and the servants of the Company on the other. Unfortunately for the political interests of the government, the latter, from the commercial spirit which still pervaded all branches of the administration, were remunerated for their services by dues, presents, and privileges. The privilege of trading free of duty with every part of the interior was one of the most baneful.<sup>4</sup> It was hurtful to the revenue of the Nabob, oppressive to his subjects, and, from the daily complaints and recriminations to which it gave rise, subversive of all harmony between the two states.

Mr. Holwell was decided in his opinion, that it was not only injurious but dangerous to the interests of the Company to leave Jafar Ali any longer the possession of power; and his successor, Mr. Vansittart, was so strongly impressed with the same sentiments, that, within a month of his assuming charge of the Government,<sup>5</sup> a secret treaty<sup>6</sup> was concluded with Qasim Ali,<sup>7</sup> the son-in-law and general of the Nabob, by which he was guaranteed in full power as ruler of Bengal, under the title of Dewan or Minister. He agreed to cede to the Company, in pay-

ment for the troops with which they aided him, the provinces of Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong.

The treaty was carried into execution at Murshidabad by the governor in person. Though Jafar acknowledged his deficiencies, and represented Qasim Ali as the fittest person to introduce reform, force was necessary to make him resign his power, and he indignantly rejected the name of sovereignty when the substance was taken from him. All that he stipulated for was, to return to Calcutta and live with his family under the protection of the English.

Qasim Ali knew the violent opposition which many members of the English government had made to his elevation.<sup>8</sup> He tried to gain them to his interests, but in vain: the spirit of party in Bengal was at this juncture so strong among the members of council and military commanders, that it superseded all other considerations. Added to the apprehensions which these divisions created in the Nabob's mind, he appears, by his letters and representations, to have been goaded almost to desperation by the continual quarrels between his subjects and the servants of the Company. The claim of the latter to exemption from duties was extended to their native agents, who were also vested with judicial power; and every act of the Nabob, or of his local officers, that affected the interests of these privileged traders, was brought forward as an indirect attack upon the rights of the Company.<sup>9</sup> The measures taken by the Nabob, to remedy the evils of which he complained, were certainly too abrupt and violent: this was felt by Mr. Vansittart, who repaired to Monghyr, and, with the aid of Warren Hastings, negotiated a treaty, by which it was fixed that the dustucks or passports granted to Company's servants should be limited to foreign exports and imports, and that there should be, henceforward, no exclusive privileges in the inland trade. The duties on British goods were fixed by this treaty at a fair and moderate rate; and it was further stipulated, that the native agents of the English should cease to exercise any judicial power, or enjoy that privilege of person which they had assumed, but should prefer their complaints when aggrieved, and become amenable when they injured others, to the native magistrates of the country.

This effort to correct existing evils had a directly contrary

effect, owing to the violence of the Nabob and that of the majority of the council at Calcutta. The former, without waiting for that confirmation which he knew this treaty required, proclaimed it, the moment it was signed, as a triumph over his enemies. He sent orders for the execution of its stipulations, and his local officers, outstepping the imprudence and precipitation of their sovereign, furnished, by their acts of retaliative oppression, ample grounds to confirm the majority of the council in their resolution, to refuse their confirmation to the engagement which had been concluded by the governor. The Nabob, irritated at this proceeding, had immediate recourse to a very indiscreet and violent measure. He abolished all customs for two years. This was deemed an indirect breach of faith with the Company, for it destroyed the advantages of the exemption they enjoyed under former treaties. A deputation of two of their body, Mr. Amyat and Mr. Hall, was sent by the majority of the council to the Nabob, to demand the annulment of this order. The irritation of the parties was now, however, too much inflamed to admit of a peaceful termination of their disputes. Every event tended to accelerate a rupture, but above all the violent conduct of Mr. Ellis, chief of Patna. He had been avowedly averse to the elevation of Qasim Ali, and all his acts showed a very hostile feeling towards that prince, with whose local officers he was at constant variance.

Unfortunately, when affairs were in this state, two boats, laden with arms for the troops at Patna, happened to pass Monghyr; Qasim Ali, connecting this supply of arms with his belief of Mr. Ellis's designs, stopped the boats. It was in vain that the gentlemen who had been deputed to him remonstrated against this procedure. He added to it a demand that the English troops should be recalled from Patna; or, at all events, that Mr. Ellis should be relieved by a more temperate person.

The statement of these demands was considered by the deputies, and the majority in council who had deputed them, as almost tantamount to a proclamation of war; and the chief of Patna, Mr. Ellis, was vested with authority to seize upon the fort at that place, should he deem such a step necessary in anticipation of actual hostilities.

It was in vain that the Governor and Mr. Warren Hastings

recorded their dissent against such discretionary power being given to one who had shown himself so disposed to extremities. It destroyed, they stated, all hopes of an amicable settlement. Their prediction was fully verified. The Nabob, when war seemed certain, appears to have taken alarm, and released the boats laden with arms, and at the same time invited a renewal of negotiations; but the accounts he received from Patna made him withdraw this pacific overture: and the surprise of the fort at that place by the English troops, before any declaration of war, gave an apparent justification to all that he had anticipated.

The carelessness of the English at Patna allowed the Nabob's troops to surprise them in their turn, the day after they had taken the fort; and those who were not slain, on this occasion, were made prisoners.

One of the deputies, Mr. Hall, had been detained by the Nabob as a hostage, while the other, Mr. Amyat, was allowed to return to Calcutta; but he had only reached Murshidabad, when he was attacked and murdered, by order of the Nabob, who, from the hour the fort of Patna was surprised, had declared himself the irreconcilable enemy of the Company.

The first step taken by the Governor and council was, the restoration<sup>10</sup> of Mir Jafar to his dignities as Nabob. An army was pushed forward against Qasim Ali, who, after his troops had suffered some defeats, fled to Patna, having first put to death several of the principal Hindus of his kingdom, whom he suspected of being friendly to the English.

From Patna, Qasim Ali wrote to the English commander—"If you advance, I will cut off the heads of Mr. Ellis and the rest of your chiefs, and send them to you."<sup>11</sup>

There were at this time fifty gentlemen, and one hundred persons of lower rank, in confinement at Patna. Major Adams, feeling for their situation, addressed a letter to them, entreating that they would, at any price, obtain their release. Messrs. Ellis and Hay, to whom this letter was addressed, answered in a spirit that redeemed any errors they might have committed. "Their escape", they said, "was impossible, but they were resigned, and desired that operations might not be suspended for a moment on their account". This letter was transmitted to Mr. Vansittart, who wrote to Qasim Ali, deprecating his inten-

ded cruelty. He also addressed him with menaces of vengeance; but all was in vain. Every European in the power of this cruel chief was barbarously murdered, except one, Mr. Fullarton, a surgeon, who owed his escape to the respect entertained for his profession.

Patna was taken by storm, but Qasim Ali fled to the territories of the Vizier, who was called upon to surrender him, and the German Sumru, who had been the instrument of this horrible massacre. The Vizier of Oudh, Siraj-ud-daulah, not only refused to comply with these demands, but advanced at the head of a large force to attack the British army. He was repulsed near Patna, and soon afterwards suffered a signal defeat at Buxar.<sup>12</sup> The British army, now commanded by Major Munro, entered his dominions, and defeated the Mahratta chief, Malhar Rao, (Holkar) whom the Vizier had called to his aid. In this predicament Siraj-ud-daulah acted a part worthy of his former character. He could not consent to bring a stain upon his honour by sacrificing those who had sought his protection. Qasim Ali and Sumru were told to depart beyond his territory, and he repaired to the British camp, declaring that he threw himself unreservedly upon the clemency of that nation.

The state of Bengal, during the last three years, had caused the greatest anxiety and alarm in England; and the consequence was, that Colonel, now Lord Clive, had been nominated, with a select council, to re-assume the management of the public interests in that country. He arrived at this period, and to that complete confidence in his character, which Siraj-ud-daulah had in common with every native prince, may be ascribed the step which he took on this occasion; nor had he any cause to regret the reliance he placed on British generosity. A treaty was concluded with him by Lord Clive, aided by General Carnac, by which the Vizier, on paying fifty lacs of rupees towards the expenses of the war, and assigning the provinces of Kara and Allahabad for the support of the emperor of Delhi, was restored to all his dominions, inclusive of the country of Benares, which the king had granted to the Company.<sup>13</sup>

Jafar, the Nabob of Bengal, had died before Lord Clive's arrival,<sup>14</sup> and his son Najm-ud-daulah, a minor, had been raised to the musnad, with a stipulation that the administration of the

country should be intrusted to certain high officers named by the British government. Lord Clive, after he had settled the treaty with the Vizier of Oudh, negotiated an agreement with the emperor of Delhi, by which the dewanee, or administration of the countries of Bengal and Bihar, was vested in perpetuity in the English government, which, by a subsequent engagement with the Nabob of Bengal, agreed to pay him and his heirs the annual sum of fifty lacs of rupees.<sup>15</sup>

Previous to the submission of the Vizier, the emperor Shah Alam had joined the British camp, where, though only attended by a few followers, he had displayed the imperial standard. Major Munro had transmitted the emperor's propositions for an alliance with the Company; and the governor-in-council had not only entertained them, but promised him, under certain conditions, the territories of Oudh. Of this agreement Lord Clive highly disapproved. The emperor had personally no possessions, and his character was not such as promised success, either in the attainment or rule of a kingdom. His name, which was still revered and recognised as the source of power, might have been used by the English as a pretext for the extension of dominion, if such had been their object; but Lord Clive very justly deprecated any such baseless project, and while he obtained fame to the Company's government by the generous restoration to power of Siraj-ud-daulah, a monarch of high reputation, he laid the foundation of the future greatness of the British empire in the east by acquiring the direct rule of a compact territory, fertile in soil, and abundant in all the resources which could render its future improvement valuable to the commercial and political strength of his country.

The political power of the English in India, grounded as it now was upon great territorial possessions, had risen with all the celerity of an Asiatic conquest.<sup>16</sup>

In our endeavour to examine the real character of this extraordinary power, and to develop the causes which have since raised it to such magnitude, our first attention must be given to the opinions of Lord Clive, who contributed beyond all others to its establishment.

He ascribed the great change in our condition at Madras to the ambition of the French, and he appears to have deemed our

situation in Bengal as nearly similar; for there, as on the coast of Coromandel, our European were intimately connected with our Asiatic enemies.

Referring to this union, and the feelings which would be produced on the mind of Jafar Ali by the attack of the principal settlement of the French, he expressed his opinion very strongly to the committee intrusted with the management of affairs at Calcutta.

"If you attack Chandernagore," he observes, "you cannot stop there, you must go further; having established yourselves by force, and not by the consent of the Nabob, he, by force, will endeavour to drive you out again.

"We have at last arrived," he states in another letter, "at that critical period which I have long foreseen; I mean that period which renders it necessary for us to determine whether we can or shall take the whole to ourselves.

"I could have wished that our operations had been carried on upon a plan of more moderation, and that we had not been obliged to maintain any other military force than what might be sufficient to preserve and pursue our commercial advantages; but since our views are extended, and since commerce alone is not the whole of the Company's support, we must go forward; to retract is impossible."

Similar sentiments were afterwards expressed by Lord Clive and his council, in a letter to the court of directors.<sup>17</sup>

"The time now approaches," they observe, "when we may be able to determine with some degree of certainty, whether our remaining as merchants, subjected to the jurisdiction, encroachments, and insults of the country government, or the supporting your privileges and professions by the sword, are likely to prove most beneficial to the Company. Whatever may be the consequence, certain it is, that after having once begun, and proceeded to such lengths, we have been forced to go on from step to step, until your whole possessions were put to the risk by every revolution effected, and every battle fought."

Lord Clive, though satisfied that we were propelled in our career of empire by causes which were unavoidable, wisely endeavoured, by every effort, to render that progress slow and gradual. He tried to reconcile, as far as it was possible, the princes and



natives of India to the dominion of strangers, by making every sacrifice to their habits, prejudices, and feelings, that could be made, without abandoning that power which had now become necessary to our existence.

The system of rule he established had too many serious defects to be permanent, but it displays in every part the mind of a great practical statesman, who suited his work to his materials, and who, while he accommodated himself to circumstances which he could not control, was content to be reproached with having done too little, rather than hazard the benefits he had secured by attempting too much.

The difficulties he had to encounter were rendered greater by his want of instruments. There were some individuals of distinguished talent, but nothing could be more defective than the general condition of every branch of the civil and military service at this period. While he laboured to reform these, he endeavoured to rouse the Company's government in England to a proper sense of the extraordinary change that had taken place in their affairs.

"Circumstances are now widely different," he observes, "from what they were a few years since, when you confined your whole attention to commerce, and were happy in being able to complete your investments without insult or exaction from the country governments. You are now become the sovereigns of a rich and potent kingdom; your success is beheld with jealousy by the other European nations, who maintain settlements in India; and your interests are so extended, so complicated, and so connected with those of the several surrounding powers, as to form a nice and difficult system of politics."<sup>18</sup>

Lord Clive, in the same letter, after taking a comprehensive view of the condition of the Company's affairs in India, and referring to those feelings and sentiments which recent events had produced among the native princes, observes, "The princes of Hindustan will not readily imagine us capable of moderation, nor can we expect they will ever be attached to us by any other motive than fear. Meer Jaffier, Cossim Ali, and the Nabob of Arcot (the best Mussulman I ever knew), have afforded instances sufficient of their inclination to throw off the English superiority. No opportunity will ever be neglected that seems to

favour an attempt to extirpate us, though the consequences, while we keep our army complete, must be fatal to themselves. '19

We find in a letter, before noticed, nearly similar observations: "The very Nabobs," he remarks, "whom we support, would be either covetous of our possessions, or jealous of our power. Ambition, fear, avarice, would be daily watching to destroy us. A victory would be but a temporary relief to us; for the dethroning of the first Nabob would be followed by the setting up of another, who, from the same principles, would, when his treasure admitted of his keeping up an army, pursue the very path of his predecessor. We must, indeed, become Nabobs ourselves, in fact if not in name; perhaps totally so, without disguise."

It is impossible to peruse the history of India, during the last fifty years, without subscribing to the truth of every word here written. Events have verified all Lord Clive's predictions. These were made from a correct knowledge of human nature, combined with an intimate acquaintance with the feelings, sentiments and passions of the princes of India, and of the construction of Asiatic society and governments. His opinions, however, obtained little attention from men of whom a great part valued India only as it contributed to their own profit and that of their friends, or to the loss or increase of party influence.

Lord Clive, in his celebrated speech in the House of Commons, in 1772, adverting to the extent of the dominion which the English possessed when he left India, and of the light in which it had been viewed by the administration, observes: "The Company acquired an empire more extensive than any kingdom in Europe, France, and Russia excepted. They had acquired a revenue of four millions sterling, and a trade in proportion.

"It was natural to suppose that such an object would have merited the most serious attention of administration; that in concert with the court of directors they would have considered the nature of the Company's charter, and have adopted a plan adequate to such possessions. Did they take it into consideration? No, they did not. They treated it rather as a South Sea bubble, than as anything solid and substantial; they thought of nothing

but the present time, regardless of the future: they said, let us get what we can to-day, let to-morrow take care of itself: they thought of nothing but the immediate division of the loaves and fishes; nay, so anxious were they to lay their hands upon some immediate advantage, that they actually went so far as to influence a parcel of temporary proprietors to bully the directors into their terms. It was their duty to have called upon the directors for a plan; and if a plan, in consequence, had not been laid before them, it would then have become their duty, with the aid and assistance of parliament, to have formed one themselves. If administration had done their duty, we should not now have heard a speech from the throne, intimating the necessity of parliamentary interposition to save our possessions in India from impending ruin."

It will not be a matter of surprise that with such sentiments of the mismanagement of the affairs of the Company, Lord Clive became a strenuous advocate for parliamentary interference in the government of India. "If salvation can come to the Company, it must come through this house," were his emphatic words when opposing a petition which the directors had presented, praying against a bill which went to the limitation of their power.

Great efforts were made at the period in which he lived to detract from the opinions and authority of Lord Clive; and more recent writers, when referring to the various luminous records which he has left to illustrate the early history and government of British India, appear either to have given undue weight to the testimony of his enemies, or to have been incapable of appreciating the motives and views of this great statesman: but his character, as it tends to increase or diminish the value of his opinions, is too intimately connected with the examination of the progress of our political power to be passed over in silence.

The early part of Lord Clive's career meets from all parties with unqualified praise. It is, however, a great mistake to suppose that even during that period he displayed no qualities but those of a soldier: he evinced, from his first efforts in the public service, the most complete knowledge of the natives of India. He viewed, with a liberal and humane spirit, their weakness

and prejudices; he addressed himself to all their higher qualities; and, by granting them his confidence, gained as much admiration in the performance of his political and civil duties as by his heroic achievements.

The revolution and changes which Lord Clive effected in Bengal opened a new scene to his ambition, and raised him to great and sudden wealth.

In accordance with the usages of the Company's service in India, at that period, he received presents, as commander-in-chief, to a very large amount. His acceptance of this reward (as it was termed) of his labours and success was open and avowed;<sup>20</sup> and, though subsequently made the subject of a charge against him, we do not find that at the time any one arraigned either the amount of the donation or the principle of receiving it. The fact was, that, at this epoch of our Indian government, the public officers of the Company had very limited salaries. Their perquisites and advantages, when employed on civil, military, or political stations, appear to have been such as had been enjoyed by native functionaries performing the duties to which they, in times of conquest and revolution, had succeeded. These, on ordinary occasions, were derived from a percentage on particular branches of revenue, privileges of trade, or presents from inferiors, and were always considerable: but when such events occurred as negotiating a peace, or replacing a monarch upon a throne, the money, gifts, and territorial grants to the chief instruments of such changes, were limited only by the moderation of one party and the ability of the other.<sup>21</sup>

When the alarm of the Indian government in England led to Lord Clive's second appointment to Bengal, eight years after he had returned home to the enjoyment of the noble fortune which he had acquired, every arrangement made, and every act during his short administration, showed a mind as superior to the sordid influence of self-interest, or personal considerations, as it was above the dictates of fear.<sup>22</sup>

His knowledge of the true source of those growing evils and dangers which, at this period, shook to its foundation our unsettled power in India, led him to propose a plan (which was carried into execution) for binding himself, his successors, and all the officers of the Company's civil and military government

by oaths and covenants, not to derive emoluments from any sources except those fixed for their remuneration.

The condition of the public service, when Lord Clive arrived at Calcutta, is described in his letter to the court of directors so often quoted. In this he gives a forcible picture of the general demoralization of the civil and military servants of the Company, and of the speedy ruin that must result from a continuance of that laxity, insubordination, luxury, and rapacity which pervaded every branch of the administration, and influenced the conduct of almost every agent employed.

The situation in which he was placed by this state of affairs when he arrived in India is eloquently described in his speech in the House of Commons.<sup>23</sup>

"Three paths," he says, "were before me,—one was strewed with abundance of fair advantages—I might have put myself at the head of the government as I found it—I might have encouraged the resolution which the gentlemen had taken, not to execute the new covenants, which prohibited the receipt of presents; and although I had executed the covenants myself, I might have contrived to have returned to England with an immense fortune, infamously added to the one before honourably obtained: such an increase of wealth might have added to my weight in this country, but it would not have added to my peace of mind; because all men of honour and sentiments would have justly condemned me.

"Finding my powers thus disputed, I might, in despair, have given up the commonwealth, and have left Bengal, without making any effort to save it—such a conduct would have been deemed the effect of folly and cowardice.

"The third path was intricate: dangers and difficulties were on every side, but I resolved to pursue it. In short, I was determined to do my duty to the public, although I should incur the odium of the whole settlement. The welfare of the Company required a rigorous exertion, and I took the resolution of cleansing the Augean stable. It was that conduct which has occasioned the public papers to teem with scurrility and abuse against me, ever since my return to England. It was that conduct which occasioned these charges; it was that conduct which enables me now to lay my hand upon my heart, and most solemnly to

declare to this house, to the gallery, and to the world at large, that I never, in a single instance, lost sight of what I thought the honour and true interest of my country and the Company; that I was never guilty of any acts of violence or oppression, unless the bringing offenders to justice can be deemed so; that as to extortion, such an idea never entered into my mind; that I did not suffer those under me to commit any acts of violence, oppression, or extortion; that my influence was never employed for the advantage of any man, contrary to the strictest principles of honour and justice; and that so far from reaping any benefit myself from the expedition, I returned to England many thousand pounds out of pocket."

Lord Clive justly attributes the virulent attack which was made upon his character, and the attempt, with which it was associated, to deprive him of his fortune as well as his fame, to that host of enemies which his conduct on this memorable occasion had raised against him, all whom he had dismissed or superseded, and the list was numerous, and contained high names, both civil and military. All whom he had checked in their career of plunder, or had crossed in their path of ambition, combined against him; and, through the means of their fortune, their ability, their advocates, their friends, and their relations, they sought his ruin. He was described as a man wallowing in wealth gained by undue means, who had turned upon those who were pursuing the same road to fortune, and who desired, by informing against them, and by using the power vested in him for their punishment, to raise his character for honour and disinterestedness. His talents, both as a soldier and a statesman, were questioned, and his success was ascribed to those he had employed, to the weakness of the enemies he had conquered, and to a concurrence of fortuitous events.

The acquisition of great dominion by the Company in India had been so sudden, that we are not surprised to find the minds of those who directed their affairs in England did not keep pace with it. They clung to their commercial views, and looked with apprehensions at political power, one of the earliest results of which was to weaken the control over their servants; while the latter, in their intrigues and struggles against each other, sought, as their only means to avert supercession, or obtain ad-

vancement, the support of friends in England. From such causes, the public interests, even when comprehended, were often compromised, to raise or to depress individuals. The most extraordinary of all the measures to which these combined motives gave birth was, the nomination, in the year 1757, of what has been termed a rotation government for Bengal, in which four of their civil servants were appointed by the Directors to succeed each other every three months; and what rendered it more remarkable was, the omission of the name of Clive from this favoured list of periodical rulers. The changes which had taken place, subsequent to the date of this measure, rendered its execution impossible, without the most serious hazard to the public interests. Impressed with this feeling, the four gentlemen who had been nominated governors<sup>21</sup> (acting in a spirit of disinterestedness which does them high honour), in conjunction with the other members of the committee at Bengal, unanimously solicited Colonel Clive to take charge of the administration. He complied with their request, and their resignation in his favour proved an anticipation of the resolution which the court of directors came to on hearing of the victory of Plassey.

Lord Clive's second appointment to India, though called for by the proprietors and the public, was warmly opposed by a considerable party in the Direction; and his enemies in that body, recruiting their strength from all whom he had disgraced or punished, subsequently obtained a majority. Neither their efforts, however, nor the combined talent which was arrayed against him in Parliament, could daunt his courage, and he defended his own character with a manliness and eloquence that gave him a complete triumph over all his opponents.

The character of Lord Clive is associated with the rise of our power in India, and in that view merits much of our attention. Whether we consider his military or political career; the knowledge he displayed of the natives of India, their institutions, and government; his efforts to introduce order and principle into what was shapeless and without system; the promptness and courage with which he quelled a mutinous and insubordinate spirit in the military and civil officers of government; his use of victory; the efforts he made and recommended to consolidate the strength, and to improve the administration of our empire

in the East; we are equally astonished at the extraordinary extent of his powers of mind. Nevertheless, no man was ever more violently assailed and caluminated by his contemporaries. When events, over which he had no control, disappointed those hopes which his successes had raised, his opponents took advantage of the change in the public mind to reproach him with results which were chiefly to be attributed to their own factions and mismanagement. The prejudices excited by their efforts have been continued by orators and authors, who, treating Indian subjects without reference to those local circumstances and considerations which peculiarly embarrass them, have pleased and satisfied general and uninformed men, by reducing the most complex points of policy to an easy abstract question. The necessity under which those who exercise power in India act, the comparative dangers they have to encounter or avoid, the means they have of executing one plan, or the want of means for another, the feelings and character of princes, and of nations, which they may flatter or offend, are to such persons matters of little consequence. Their conclusions are drawn from simpler sources, and they reject, as prejudiced and polluted, that minute information and local experience, which, if admitted, might destroy their favourite theories, or cast a doubt upon the validity of those fixed rules and principles by which they consider that the wisdom of every measure ought to be tried and decided.

With these persons the scene of Indian warfare and policy is degraded to a low level, and the actors reduced to insignificance, when compared with those who appear on the stage in the western hemisphere. Nothing in India, if we refer to such authorities, is upon a great scale, except the errors and crimes of British rulers, to the actions of all of whom they apply a standard framed for a wholly different state of society and government. According to such self-constituted judges, the claim of Lord Clive to the admiration of posterity is very equivocal. But his fame will rise, the more the particulars of his eventful life are made known. These will prove that his qualities as a statesman almost surpassed those he displayed as a military commander.<sup>25</sup>

In a letter addressed by Lord Clive to those to whom he left the government, when impaired health compelled him to return



to England, he evinced great apprehension of the danger to which the empire would be exposed by the revival of that spirit of corruption and insubordination which he had with so much difficulty subdued.

"It has been too much the custom," he observes, "in this government to make orders and regulations, and thence to suppose the business done. To what end and purpose are they made, if they be not promulgated and enforced? No regulation can be carried into execution, no order obeyed, if you do not make rigorous examples of the disobedient. Upon this point I rest the welfare of the Company in Bengal. The servants are now brought to a proper sense of their duty; if you slacken the reins of government, affairs will soon revert to their former channel; anarchy and corruption will again prevail, and, elate with a new victory, be too headstrong for any future efforts of government. Recall to your memories the many attempts that have been made in the civil and military departments to overcome our authority, and to set up a kind of independency against the court of directors. Reflect also on the resolute measures we have pursued, and their wholesome effects. Disobedience to legal power is the first step of sedition; and palliative measures effect no cure. Every tender compliance, every condescension on your parts will only encourage more flagrant attacks, which will daily increase in strength, and be at last in vain resisted. Much of our time has been employed in correcting abuses. The important work has been prosecuted with zeal, diligence, and disinterestedness, and we have had the happiness to see our labours crowned with success. I leave the country in peace. I leave the civil and military departments under discipline and subordination: it is incumbent upon you to keep them so. You have power, you have abilities, you have integrity: let it not be said that you are deficient in resolution. I repeat that you must not fail to exact the most implicit obedience to your orders. Dismiss or suspend from the service any man who shall dare to dispute your authority.

"If you deviate from the principles upon which we have hitherto acted, and upon which you are conscious you ought to proceed; or if you do not make a proper use of that power with which you are invested, I shall hold myself acquitted, as I do now protest against the consequences."

Such was the parting advice which Lord Clive gave to his former colleagues; but the task of reform which he had commenced could have been completed by his own commanding talents alone, aided by the impression of his high personal character. It was far too great for the strength of those on whom it devolved.

The character of Mr. Verelst leaves no doubt of his disposition to pursue the path traced out to him; but he appears to have been too lenient, and to have early relaxed from that spirit of unyielding authority which Lord Clive had so forcibly inculcated. Had it been otherwise, it is not likely that he or any person could have long resisted the desire which the proprietors of East-India stock evinced at this period to control and paralyze the power of the local administration in India. Disappointment in their hopes of increased dividends, a wish to promote individuals, feelings of resentment for injuries real or supposed to their friends and relations, combined to render the general court at this period an arena of discord and violence, in which different interests alternately prevailed, till the majority agreed in the expedient of appointing three officers as supervisors, who were to proceed to India with powers equal to those exercised by the government at home, and from whose knowledge, virtue, and moderation, the greatest benefits were expected.

Some objections were raised to this measure. They were, however, overruled, and the supervisors left England. But the vessel in which they sailed perished at sea, and this event put an end to a plan which, notwithstanding the high qualities of the individuals<sup>86</sup> selected for its execution, was not likely to realize the sanguine anticipations of those by whom it was adopted.

In the settlement of the definitive treaty of Paris, in 1763, an article was introduced to terminate the disputes, and to define the rights of the two nations in India.

By this article, Mahmmad Ali Khan was acknowledged as lawful Nabob of the Carnatic, and Salbat Jang, as Subedar of the Deccan. The former was the ally of the English, the latter that of the French. Nothing could be more incongruous or more liable to error than this mixture of European with Indian diplomacy. The recognition of their ally, Mahmmad Ali Khan, was sought by the directors, and it was only at the suggestions of

Lord Clive, who took alarm at the terms of the article, that it was modified in such a manner as would probably have rendered it innoxious, had it not been converted by His Majesty's ministers into a pretext for one of the most unjustifiable and mischievous acts of interference with the powers of the Company that is to be found on the page of Indian history.

The pretext for investing Sir John Lindsay, the commander of His Majesty's squadron in India, with full powers as minister plenipotentiary to Mahmmad Ali Khan, in 1770, was, that the King of Great Britain, having become party to an article of a treaty, had a right, without communication with the directors, to take care that the article was properly executed. The real fact was, that the Nabob of the Carnatic had for some years used every endeavour to free himself from the restraints in which he was placed by his engagements with the local government of Madras; and the English gentlemen by whom he was surrounded, expecting their own importance and fortune would increase with that of their patron, stimulated his ambition to an attempt to cast off his dependence on the Company, through the establishment of a direct communication, if not an alliance with the King of England.

It is not surprising that Mahmmad Ali Khan should have been the dupe of such advisers. His object, the attainment of more power and consequence than he enjoyed, was fair and legitimate, nor can we wonder at the conduct of men, who, from a desire to raise their fortunes, encouraged him to such efforts; but where can we look for the motives, or rather the apology, of those who, by Sir John Lindsay's appointment, not only gave their countenance and support, but became principals in this attack upon the constituted authorities of their country! An able historian has drawn a true and forcible picture of this extraordinary transaction, and the subject has sufficient importance, not only as a record but as a lesson, to make us insert the passage:

"An ambassador, Sir John Lindsay," he observes, "with concealed powers, was deputed in the ostensible character of the commander of a frigate, and decorated with a ribbon and star of the order of the Bath, as a representative of the sovereign of Great Britain to Mahomed Ally. With these dignities the ambassador

burst at once upon the governor and council, as if by ambuscade, and became, from that time, a partisan of this foreign power, to which he was deputed against the delegated government of his own nation."<sup>27</sup>

The proceedings of the royal envoy were all directed to the same point, that of elevating the prince to whom he was deputed, and depressing, as far as he had the power, the local government. "The honour he sought on this occasion," the directors remark, "was that of humbling the Company before the throne of Mahomed Ali Khan."

Those who desire to be informed of the extent to which this extraordinary effort against our own power was carried must refer to the pages of the historians who have recorded the events of the period. It is mentioned here only to show the character of that interference which His Majesty's ministers then exercised in Indian affairs. This it is essential to understand, for it gave rise to struggles for patronage and power, the effects of which soon pervaded every part of our eastern empire.

During the heat of this violent collision of parties, in 1772, Warren Hastings was nominated Governor-general. This extraordinary man has recently paid the debt of nature. He outlived (in the full possession of all the faculties of his rich mind) that violent spirit of hostility which a combination of causes had raised against him; and towards the close of a life marked by singular events, he not only was honoured by his sovereign, but received an unexampled tribute of personal respect from the House of Commons, who, twenty-five years before, had voted his impeachment.<sup>28</sup>

The long period Mr. Hastings passed in India; the various offices he had filled from the commencement of his career, till he attained the high station of Governor-general; his acquaintance with the languages and usages of the natives of that country, added to the high qualities of his mind, gave him advantages without which he could hardly have saved the empire committed to his charge: but he, as well as Lord Clive, has been harshly judged by men who have listened to his enemies and accusers, and who, when drawing their general inferences from particular facts, have given little, if any, attention to the extraordinary circumstances in which he was placed, the necessity under which he acted, and the obstacles which he had to overcome.

The act of 1773 made the East India Company more dependent than before upon the King's ministers. Mr. Hastings was nominated Governor-general, but in the same commission three gentlemen<sup>29</sup> were appointed to council, who had learned the lessons on Indian government in England, and whose views were in direct opposition to his upon almost every point. The consequence was, that the administration passed into their hands as the majority in council, and remained with them, till the death of General Clavering restored the preponderance to the appointed head of the government. The effect of such a state of affairs may be imagined. The spirit of discord which prevailed at the council-board spread throughout every branch of the service, and the natives of India saw in our divisions a source of weakness from which they argued our downfall.

The intentions of those who created and maintained this evil might have been pure, but they possessed little knowledge of that tenure by which we hold India, or they would not have hazarded, as they did, the very existence of our power by such an effort to limit and control its local exercise. Mr. Hastings has drawn a forcible picture of his own situation. He may be objected to as an unfair evidence in his own case; but this only applies to facts and statements; general reflections, when drawn from admitted promises, and when grounded on experience and wisdom, do not alter their character, because they proceed from a partial quarter. On the contrary, we give opinions more weight, when the knowledge of those feelings which called them forth does not impair the impression of their truth. When describing the effect which the actual condition of the government had in obstructing reform, and perpetuating abuse, Mr. Hastings observes, "To enumerate every case would be endless. In a word, while the power of government is in the hands of many, and the smaller the number is, the greater is the evil in this case; while each hand holds an equal share of it; while the members of government retain their places by sufferance; and the terrors of dismission and disgrace are held out against them at home; when their accusers and the expectants of their places are the judges of their conduct, and preparers of the evidence on which it is to be tried; when the members of the government themselves are in disagreement, and that disagreement (with regret and

shame I suppose it) is excited by the voice of authority; when each member stands in need of support from home, and owes returns for the support which he receives; when each claims an indulgence from the others, and has it in his power to retaliate every disappointment, which may be easily understood, but can never be imputed; and lastly, when the most meritorious conduct is denied its credit, and even the sacrifices of interest are branded with the reproach of venality; from a government so constituted, what reformation can be expected?"

After these strong observations on the effects of an administration so constituted as that of which he was the head, in a subsequent part of the same memoir, he speculates on what would have been the result had a different system been adopted.

"If," he observes, "the same act of the legislature which confirmed me in my station of president over the Company's settlements in Bengal had invested me with a control as extensive as the new denomination I received by it indicated; if it had compelled the assistance of my associates in power, instead of giving me opponents; if, instead of creating new expectations which were to be accomplished by my dismissal from office, it had imposed silence on the interested clamours of faction, and taught the servants of the Company to place their dependance upon me, where it constitutionally rested; if, when it transferred the real control over the Company's affairs from the direction to the ministers, instead of extending, it had limited the claims of patronage, which every man possessing influence himself, or connected with those who possessed it, thought he had a right to exert; and if it had made my continuance in office to depend upon the rectitude of my intentions, and the vigour with which they were exerted, instead of annexing it to a compliance with those claims, I should have had little occasion, at this period, to claim the public indulgence for an avowal of duties undischarged. But the reverse took place in every instance.

"If the interests of the nation," he continues, "are truly consulted, a total change in the system must take place; for whilst private interests are allowed to stand in competition with, or in opposition to arrangements founded on the public good; whilst those who censure the concessions made to them, in all instances which have not a reference to themselves or to their connexions,

still persist in recommending them; and whilst the official existence, public reputation, and private fame, of the members of the government in Bengal are maintained or sacrificed in proportion to the concessions made or withheld, the interests of the British nation must in it verge to a decline.

“Enough has been said, to shew the pernicious consequences of this system, which is publicly proscribed, and privately supported; which no man dares avow, yet many combine to maintain. To discuss it more minutely would be invidious, and perhaps entail upon me resentments, which, though I do not fear, I would wish to avoid. I have made a sufficient sacrifice to truth: my successors in office may perhaps benefit by this confession. The duties and functions of the supreme government in India will never be well discharged unless it meets with the consideration due to it.”

Mr. Hastings, justly considering that our political strength depended chiefly upon the excellence of our internal administration, laboured against many local and practical difficulties, to give it some shape and solidity. He effected as much, perhaps, as any man could in his situation. A board of revenue was established—collectors appointed—regulations published—courts of civil and criminal judicature were instituted, and their powers defined.

These measures were a great advance towards the consolidation of our power. Lord Clive, at the period of his rule, could go no farther than an endeavour to fix the principles of our interference with dependant states, and to lay down general rules for the management of our own territories, correcting, as far as a very limited selection enabled him, the evils of a loose and corrupt system by the qualities of the individuals he employed. Mr. Hastings took the next step towards the introduction of a better order of affairs, and all persons minutely versed in Indian history, and who understand our condition and that of the natives of India at the epochs these changes were made, must be satisfied that those who effected them did as much as was practicable, without incurring the most serious hazard to the safety of the state by attempting too precipitate reforms.

Mr. Hastings, in a memoir which he published after his return to England, has given us a forcible and vivid description of the

origin and growth of our power in India. "The seed of this wonderful production (he observes) was sown by the hand of calamity. It was nourished by fortune, and cultivated and shaped (if I may venture to change the figure) by necessity. Its first existence was commercial; it obtained in its growth the sudden accession of military strength and territorial dominion to which its political adjunct was inevitable. It is useless to inquire whether the Company, or the nation, has derived any substantial benefit from the change, since it is impossible to retrace the perilous and wonderful paths by which they have attained their present elevation, and to re-descend to the humble and undreaded character of trading adventurers. Perhaps the term of the national existence in India may have become susceptible of a shorter duration by it; but it is that state which it must henceforth maintain, and it must, therefore, adopt those principles which are necessary to its preservation in that state."<sup>30</sup>

No one will doubt the truth of this description of the rise and actual condition of our Indian empire. In a subsequent passage in the same memoir, Mr. Hastings, drawing his deductions from personal experience of the system by which it was then governed, makes the following impressive observations:

"From the vehemence and the perseverance with which my immediate superiors laboured during the course of ten years to weaken my authority, to destroy my influence, and to embarrass all my measures, at a time when their affairs required the most powerful exertions to sustain them, which I alone, by my office, could direct; and from the great importance which they have ascribed to points, some of which had no relation to their interests, and others were even repugnant to them; I much fear that it is not understood as it ought to be, how near the Company's existence has, on many occasions, vibrated to the edge of perdition, and that it has been, at all times, suspended by a thread so fine, that the touch of chance might break, or the breath of opinion dissolve it; and instantaneous will be its fall, whenever it shall happen. May God, in His mercy, long avert it!

"I affirm, as a point incontestable, that the administration of the British government in Bengal, distant as it is from the reach of more than general instruction from the source of its autho-



*...rity, and liable to daily contingencies, which require both instant decision, and a consistency of system, cannot be ruled by a body of men variable in their succession, discordant in opinion, each jealous of his colleagues, and all united in common interest against their ostensible leader. Its powers are such, that, if directed by a firm and steady hand, they may be rendered equal to any given plan of operation; but may prove the very instruments of its destruction if they are left in the loose charge of unconnected individuals, whose interests, passions, or caprices may employ them in mutual contests, and a scramble for superiority.*

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“The inference to be drawn from these premises is, that whatever form of government may yet be established for these provinces, whether its control be extended to other presidencies, or confined to its own demesnes; it is necessary that the Governor, or first Executive Member, should possess a power absolute and complete within himself, and independent of actual control. Though the state of kingdoms is liable to dissolution, from causes as mortal as those which intercept the course of human life, and though my opinion of the distempers which threaten that of the British empire in Bengal may obtain credit from all who read it, yet I fear that few will yield to its impression. Like the stroke of death, which every man knows will come, but no man acts as if he felt the conviction which he avows and thinks he feels, the very magnitude of the catastrophe may, in this case, blunt the sense of those to whom it is visibly apparent.”

We cannot be surprised that sentiments recommended by information and experience, and so enforced by truth and eloquence, should have carried conviction even to the minds of those who were hostile to the writer; nor is it to be considered as the least of the obligations which the country owes this great man, that his advice pointed out the only scheme of rule by which we could hope to preserve our power in the East. No one ever better understood the materials of which that vast fabric is constructed than Warren Hastings, and no man ever appears to have looked with less confidence to its durability; but his opinions upon this subject were expressed at a moment when, from the constitutional jealousy of the government of England, he

did not anticipate the delegation of that absolute, but responsible authority to the Governor-general which he deemed indispensable, not only for the prosperity, but for the safety of our Indian possessions.

It is not meant to enter upon the merits of the political measures adopted by Mr. Hastings; these were violently opposed by his colleagues. We collect from a minute<sup>a</sup> of General Clavering, Mr. Francis, and Colonel Monson, (which was written a short period after their arrival in India,) the grounds on which they acted.

"The general principle", they observe, "on which we have acted, and which we mean to make the rule of our future policy and conduct, is no other than that which your authority and that of the legislature have equally prescribed to us—to maintain peace in India. The preservation of peace necessarily includes the vigorous defence of your own possessions, with such parts of the dominions of your allies as are guaranteed by treaty. On the other hand, it excludes every idea of conquest, either for yourselves or others. Adhering to this system, we never can engage your arms in any offensive operations for the aggrandizement of our Indian state, at the expense of another; much less could we have suffered the little states, which at the same time formed your barrier, and looked up to you for protection, to be swallowed up by the great ones."

Mr. Hastings was accused by his colleagues of making unjust wars, and these accusations were subsequently made articles of parliamentary impeachment. This is not the place to enter into the discussion of that question, but while the soundness and justice of the opinions (taking them in their general sense) given in the minute that has been quoted are admitted, none can deny the truth and wisdom of the principle which Mr. Hastings states as that which governed his conduct on such occasions. It is one applicable to all great states, and above all to India.

"Though I profess," he observes, "the doctrine of peace, I by no means pretend to have followed it with so implicit a devotion as to make sacrifices to it. I have never yielded a substantial right which I could assert, or submitted to a wrong which I could repel, with a moral assurance of success, proportioned to

the magnitude of either; and I can allude to instances in which I should have deemed it criminal not to have hazarded both the public safety and my own, in a crisis of uncommon and adequate emergency, or in an occasion of dangerous example.

"I have ever deemed it even more unsafe than dishonourable to sue for peace, and more consistent with the love of peace to be the aggressor in certain cases, than to see preparations of intended hostility, and wait for their maturity, and for their own effect, to repel it."

It appeared difficult to arrive at any correct conclusion from the general reasoning of Mr. Hastings, or his opponents, with respect to those principles which would best apply to our extended political relations in India, or to define, by any prescriptive line, the exact demarcation between acts of defensive and offensive policy; but the general impression in England was so strong, at this period, regarding the ambition of our Indian rulers, and the consequent necessity of restraining their power of engaging in war within the narrowest limits, that the House of Commons voted resolutions to that effect; and in the same act of the legislature which appointed the Board of Control, and granted the Governor-general power adequate to his sovereign functions, a clause was inserted, declaring, "that to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India, are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and the policy of Great Britain." It was further made unlawful, as has been already stated, for the supreme government to engage in hostilities with any state that had not commenced, or made preparations to commence, war upon them, or upon an ally whom we were bound by our engagements to protect, unless in cases where the previous sanction of the government in England had been obtained. The local government was also prohibited by this act from making any treaty guaranteeing the possessions of any native prince, except in cases where each party had engaged to aid the English in a war actually commenced, or about to commence.

The spirit and object of this law was just and wise; for the great danger we have had to encounter from the first was the too rapid extension of our empire; but our success in retarding, if we could not arrest the growth of our greatness, must evidently depend on the means we employed for this purpose, and the

letter of the act in question went to fetter our government in the exercise of the most essential of these means. It forbade the seasonable use of that power and influence which we possessed, to check combination or to counteract, while yet immature, the plans of ambition; and prescribed to a state situated amongst despotic princes, who recognised no objects but conquest and power, a course of policy they could not appreciate, nor even understand. These princes were, consequently, liable from their ignorance and their presumption to mistake our motives of action, to deem moderation and forbearance fear and weakness, and under that delusion to venture on a course of action which precipitated their ruin, and rendered our cautious and unwise policy productive of those very ends which it had been framed to avoid.

The preceding pages of this work have afforded abundant proofs of this fact; and a concise review of more recent events will bring it still more strongly under observation.

Lord Cornwallis had in his character an union of firmness and moderation, which gave the best promise of preserving peace with the native states, had that been possible. The aggression of Tipu Sultan, however, forced him into a war. Success led to his making a great accession to the Company's territories, and the alliance with the Nizam of the Deccan, into which he was compelled to enter in order to ensure the reduction of Tipu, became the fruitful source of political embarrassment to his successor. It was before remarked, that Lord Cornwallis, by a communication to Mahadaji Sindhia, kept "danger at a distance, by an alacrity to meet it." But it may be safely asserted that, had that nobleman felt himself at liberty to adopt measures of preventive policy, he might, with hardly a hazard of hostilities, have arrested the growth of a state which, within ten years of his leaving India, had accumulated means<sup>32</sup> which rendered it one of the most formidable enemies that the British government in the east ever had to encounter.

Lord Cornwallis, in abstaining from those measures which would have prevented the family of Sindhia from obtaining a power which was likely to be directed eventually against us, acted in conformity to the views and sentiments of his superiors in England, and to the provisions of the act of the legislature

already cited; but this nobleman took advantage of every occasion (as we have already shown) to satisfy the princes and chiefs of India that such conduct proceeded from motives of moderation, not of apprehension.

Lord Teignmouth acted throughout his administration with still more scrupulous conformity to the prevailing sentiments in England, and to the letter of parliamentary restrictions. He did this from a strict sense of duty, and with the full knowledge of all the evils which were likely to result from his non-interference; and his minutes and letters upon the political state of India at this period exhibit (like all the other productions of this virtuous nobleman) an intimate knowledge both of the condition of the British government, and that of the native states. The consequences of the efforts he made to preserve a system of rigid neutral policy have been fully described in the former chapters. Tipu Sultan wanted no motives to stimulate him to action, whenever he saw an opportunity favourable to his cherished designs against the British nation; but we may question whether the encouragement he received from our abandonment of the Nizam had not more weight in influencing him to the hostile measures he adopted than the advice of French emissaries, or the expected aid from the government of the Mauritius.

The reduction of Tipu; the restoration of a Hindu prince to the throne of his ancestors in Mysore; the alliance with the Nizam, which stipulated for the dismissal of a strong French corps in his service, and of his aid in the war with the Sultan, altered all our relations in the south of India. These were the first measures of Lord Wellesley, to the adoption of which he was compelled by a necessity that all admitted. The point to which success had carried him was one where he could not remain stationary. He must either retreat or advance. The first of these courses offered a temporary exemption from present evils, at the price of future security. The second led through difficulty and embarrassment to peace and prosperity. To enable him to subdue Tipu and his French allies, Lord Wellesley had been obliged to pledge himself to protect the Nizam against the Mahrattas. This, like every step towards the establishment of order and tranquillity, was an attack upon a nation whose ar-

mies were not, and could not, from their numbers and construction, be supported, except by the annual attack of their neighbours, and who for nearly a century had deemed the territories of the Nizam as an inheritance of plunder. Lord Wellesley, satisfied of this fact, determined to direct all his efforts to the abolition of a predatory system which, under recent changes, it was quite evident could not be coexistent with the British power in India. The view he took of this question has been fully given, as well as those means through which he carried his great plans to the very brink of completion; but his career was arrested in the hour of victory over the last of those Mahratta princes, who avowedly fought for the continuance of rapine and desolation.

The alarm taken by the authorities in England at this period was excessive. They arraigned the principles of the policy that had been pursued subsequent to the conquest of Tipu Sultan, the war with whom they acknowledged to be just and unavoidable. But in admitting so much, they admitted everything; for if the British faith was to be preserved, we had very little option as to the measures consequent to our alliance with the Nizam. The increase of our subsidiary force with that prince was the first step: the establishment of a similar force at Poona, the second; the great object of Lord Wellesley's policy was, to extend such alliances, and through them, as they afforded an increase of force without increase of expenditure, and gave us the most commanding military positions, to secure the general peace of India; which, as was proved by the fullest experience, could not be even partially disturbed without involving us in war, or placing us in a condition which, from its effect on our reputation and resources, was more embarrassing and dangerous than war itself.

Though there can be no doubt that subsidiary alliances gave us the means of success in the accomplishment of objects of policy, which we were compelled by pledges of faith and considerations of safety to pursue, it is equally a fact, that they involved us in great embarrassments, and that they had the effect of weakening the protected state, whose princes either lost their crowns in an effort to regain their independence, or sunk into a sloth and luxury which deteriorated every branch of their government.

But this was the consequence of the establishment and progress of our power in India, not of those alliances which formed the most moderate of all means by which we could regulate that march to conquest, on which we were propelled (as has been before shown) by causes and events far beyond our power to control.

Alliances of the same character as those formed by Lord Wellesley had been entered into by almost all his predecessors, and, from Lord Clive downwards, the chief motive had been to preserve as long as possible the existence of the native states with whom they were contracted. The frequency of the expedient is a proof of its wisdom and necessity. There has seldom been an alternative between its adoption and measures which must have terminated in the introduction of our direct rule, and with it all those sudden changes in society which, independent of the misery they bring, have been, from the first hour of our existence in India, to the present moment, pregnant with the greatest danger.

In consequence of the ascendancy in England of those who condemned Lord Wellesley's measures, the high name of Lord Cornwallis was sought and obtained to give character to an effort to revive a system of neutral policy. That venerable nobleman, worn out more by infirmities than age, dying soon after his arrival, was succeeded by Sir George Barlow; who, acting upon the principles which the authorities in England had prescribed, withdrew from every interference to which we were not specifically pledged by treaty. In one case, however, which has been noticed,<sup>33</sup> he found himself compelled to a departure from this course; and the arguments by which he justified his conduct on this occasion are a convincing comment of the impracticability of that system to promote which a sense of duty made him give the full aid of his great knowledge and experience.

The administration of Lord Minto presents us with a cautious, but gradual, return to the only principles by which our empire could be maintained. The tone in which he asserted the rights of the British government, whenever these were threatened, corrected, as far as was possible, the impressions daily made by the growing insolence and excesses of those free-

booters to whom we had abandoned all the central provinces of India as an arena, in which it was vainly imagined they would continue to war upon each other.

Lord Minto, foreseeing the results to which this state of affairs must lead, sought, like his predecessors, to strengthen the government he ruled, by returning to the system of subsidiary alliances, and it was a matter of regret to him, as well as to the government in England, that he failed in his efforts to conclude one with the Raja of Nagpur. This moderate and able nobleman, after describing with much truth and discrimination the nature and effect of such engagements, and pointing out, in the most forcible language, all their admitted evils (particularly as illustrated in the case of Hyderabad), concludes by observing: "It is not the intention of these remarks to question the policy of those subsidiary alliances, or their great and beneficial influence on the condition of the British empire in India, in time past, present, and to come. They have added, most materially, to our power and resources, and they have placed for ever at a distance dangers far greater than any to be apprehended from the evils above described. But these alliances, like all other human arrangements, bear within them the sources of their own decay, and require the application of corrective measures to obviate their natural and progressive tendency to disholution."<sup>34</sup>

Lord Hastings, in every political measure of his government, evinced his sense of the necessity of an early return to those principles which had distinguished the administration of Lord Wellesley, and of resting, as that nobleman had desired to do, the fame and prosperity of the British empire, upon the safe and honourable foundation of the general tranquillity of India, established and maintained by its commanding influence and power.

These sentiments were, as has been stated, fully expressed in a most able minute, in which this distinguished nobleman, after painting in warm colours the excessive misery and desolation which had been the consequence of the neutral system pursued by us for ten years past, takes a view of the different results which might be fairly anticipated from a contrary policy.

His powerful arguments, enforced as they were by illustrations drawn from the history of other countries, as well as of India,



might still have failed of effect, had they not been seconded by the occurrence of events which made it impossible for any person to advocate a system, the further adherence to which twelve years had proved to be impracticable.

The complete success of the war against the Pindaries and Mahrattas led Lord Hastings to proclaim the paramount power of the British government, and constitute it the arbiter of all disputes, and the conservator of the general peace of India. Such was the change of opinion in England, that not a voice was raised against a measure, the very contemplation of which, a few years before, had been denounced as a dream of ambition.<sup>35</sup> Events and fuller information have convinced the enlightened part of the public, that the opinions long prevalent in England, regarding the local administration in India, were founded in error. That the system prescribed by the legislature, however desirable, was altogether impracticable; for though parliament might dictate the course to be pursued by British rulers, its influence did not extend to the native states, with whom they were in constant collision, and whose despotic princes were urged by jealousy, by avarice, by ambition, by pride, and by love of independence, to continual efforts, secret or avowed, to destroy the English government, and to expel every individual of that nation from India. If this be the fact, who can doubt but that we have been impelled to the attainment of supreme power as the only means of maintaining our existence, in any shape, in that country.

The most eminent statesmen who have learnt their lessons in England, and those who have gained their experience in India, have uniformly concurred in the opinion, that extension of territory was not only undesirable, but hurtful. Those to whom the local government of our Eastern empire was intrusted, have had every motive to preserve peace, and to avoid war. Nevertheless, they have almost all engaged in war, and those who have avoided doing so, have confessedly left it as an inheritance to their successors; and let us add to this strong fact, that the different presidents of the board of control, the very institution of which was associated with the object of preventing the pursuit of schemes of aggrandizement, and the extension of dominion, have almost in every instance concurred<sup>36</sup> in the wisdom and necessity of those measures of the local administration which

have been attended with such results. This forces us to a conclusion, that all the English statesmen which this observation includes have either been, in their turns, tainted with that culpable ambition of which the Indian Governors are accused, or that their fuller information obliged them to give the sanction of their approbation to such wars, from being satisfied that they were just and expedient. There may be some cases where it is possible to prove that the temperament, or the judgment of individuals, has precipitated a contest; but on the other hand, it is clear that the most moderate have been compelled to the same course, and that the orders of superiors, and the enactments of law, have not only failed in the end proposed, that of arresting the growth of our power, but have actually caused it to be more rapid than it otherwise would have been.

These are the deductions which must be drawn from the events that have occurred; but the law which forbade conquest and interference is now a dead letter. We are the acknowledged lords of India; and there exists not a sovereign prince, or a chief, in that vast country, with whom we have not ties that imply friendship and protection on our part, and dependance, or allegiance on the other.

## CHAPTER 9

# *Administration of the Indian Government in England*

THE RETROSPECT of the origin and progress of our political power, in the preceding chapter, has been offered with no view of reviving useless discussions regarding the comparative merit of individuals, or of any measures which they advocated or adopted. Whatever men's sentiments may be upon these subjects, every one will agree that the question respecting our power in India has altogether changed its shape. We are arrived at the summit long dreaded by many;<sup>1</sup> and a knowledge of the paths by which we advanced, where our march was impeded, and where propelled with a velocity that we could not regulate, much less arrest, appears essential to enable us to understand the nature and character of the materials from which the fabric of our future power must be constructed; and we may rest satisfied that, unless the structure is suited to its component parts, it will not endure. We have conquered all our enemies on the continent of India, but that very consummation of our efforts exposes us to greater danger. In the facilities of improvement which our condition presents, we may find, if we do not use them aright, the seeds of early destruction.

Those who reflect upon the actual condition of our power in India will be satisfied, that the task of conquest was slight in comparison with that which awaits us, the preservation of the empire acquired. To the acquisition, men have been encouraged and impelled by the strongest of all the impulses of the human mind: fortune and fame have attended success; the preservation must be effected by that deep and penetrating wisdom, which, looking far to its objects, will oftener meet reproach than praise, and the very excellence of which will consist in the gradual and almost unseen operation of its measures.<sup>2</sup> It must not only take into consideration the actual state of the English public servants,

and residents in India, and that of the native population, but, judging from experience of the past, the general laws of our nature, the habits, prejudices and institutions of the rulers, as well as the ruled, it must calculate the various changes to which these communities are likely to be exposed, in order that care may be taken to avert those evils and misfortunes which the too sudden occurrence of such changes would inevitably occasion.

Sufficient has been said in the introduction to this work regarding the changes that the Indian administration in England had undergone previous to the year 1811. The act of parliament passed in 1813, renewing the Company's privileges for twenty years, did not directly make any material alteration in the power of that branch of the Indian government; but the measure of opening the trade with India, by creating a large commercial body with separate interests from those of the Company, greatly weakened the latter, while it proportionally increased the strength of the ministers. From the earliest period, the court of directors had sought influence in the House of Commons, and on many occasions they had successfully combated the ministers of the King; but the present act embodied a powerful party upon whose aid the latter could depend on all questions that went to a limitation of the Company's privileges and authority.

The right of nominating to the high offices of Governor-general, Governors, and Commanders-in-chief, at the different presidencies, was, by this act, as by former acts, vested in the court of directors, subject, however, to the approbation of the King. If that was withheld, a second person was to be nominated, and so on till the two authorities concurred: but to obviate the evil of a continued difference of opinion as to a proper person, a clause in the act provided that, on such appointment not being made by the court of directors within two months from the date of the vacancy being known, the right of nominating lapsed to the King.<sup>a</sup> This act supposes, and almost compels, agreement between the court of directors and His Majesty's ministers on this most essential of all points, as connected with the welfare and permanency of our Eastern empire; and though its provisions may appear calculated to produce embarrassment and weakness, by dividing responsibility, they are framed in the true

spirit of the British constitution. They impose a check, and no slight one, upon the abuse of patronage; and oblige the parties, when they differ, to come, to a certain degree, to the bar of public opinion. This must always do good, for we cannot anticipate the period when men exercising power in England can be indifferent to the sentiments of the public upon points which their acts force into discussion.

The court of directors, who, by this act, had the power<sup>4</sup> of recalling the Governor-general, Governor, or Commander-in-chief, as being their<sup>5</sup> officers or servants, without the concurrence of His Majesty's ministers, were by one of its clauses restrained, except with the consent of the commissioners of the India board, from appointing provisionally, or otherwise, to any offices in India, except members of council, generals on the staff, and a few other selections specifically left to their selection and nomination. The same concurrence and confirmation were rendered necessary to the exercise of the power, which they before enjoyed, of restoring civil and military officers who had been suspended or removed<sup>6</sup> by act of a local government.

Such limitation of the power of the directors was at once wise and salutary. Nothing could tend more to lessen the weight and authority of the local governments, and to discourage the efforts of those who laboured for their approbation, than appointments made from England, and the frequent restoration of persons who had been suspended the service, or removed from office in India. The present state of the law renders it difficult for either the court of directors, or the board of control, to interfere with the local governments abroad, on any points connected with the conduct or employment of public servants. This restriction of the authorities in England is equally beneficial as it checks the operation of private patronage, and limits undue personal influence, and as it directs the exclusive attention of public servants abroad to their local superiors.

The court of directors long owed their chief consideration to their having the management of the great commercial concerns of the East India Company: but these, of late years, have been quite secondary to their other duties; and it is upon their competency to the latter, and their importance as a constituent part of the Indian government, that it is intended to offer some observations.

The merits of every species of government are comparative, and it can be no ground for rejecting any form or substance of rule, that it is incompatible with received ideas; that it is contrary to general opinion, or even inconsistent with common maxims of rule: all these are good grounds for not establishing a particular government, but they are not conclusive for destroying one that is established. If we had to constitute an administration for British India, as it now exists, the man would justly be deemed insane who should propose the present system. But the case is widely altered when we recollect, that it has grown with our empire; that the managing partners of a body of merchants have gradually risen from the details of a factory to the charge of kingdoms: that their departments, in every branch of government, have kept pace with their enlarged functions; and that the result of the whole has been success and prosperity.<sup>7</sup> Those, indeed, who are hostile to the Company, ascribe this result to the interference of the legislature, and the institution of a board of control. Much, no doubt, of the great reform that has been effected is to be attributed to those causes; but because the board of control has proved a good instrument for the purposes for which it was instituted, we must not conclude that it is a safe depositary for greater power. In the exercise of all with which it has hitherto been intrusted, it has acted under a restraint as great as it has imposed. The court of directors, rendered jealous and vigilant by their reduced condition, have scrutinized every proceeding of the board, in a manner that has rendered them a very efficacious check against the abuse of its influence or authority.

When the pretensions of the East India Company to have continued to them the share they now enjoy in the civil, military, and political government of India were discussed, previous to the last renewal of their privileges,<sup>8</sup> several members of both houses of parliament were against that renewal; but the reasons they adduced for the abolition of the powers of this body were very different from the arguments brought forward thirty years before. They could no longer charge the Company, or their servants, with acts of tyranny or corruption; there was a happy and acknowledged change in the whole system: but the incompetency of the court of directors to their enlarged duties;

the anomaly of the whole frame of the government, and the magnitude of the evils likely to arise from continuing to rule so great an empire through such an inadequate body, were strongly urged. The opponents of the Company admitted that there was a difficulty in disposing of the patronage enjoyed by the directors, which (they were agreed) it would be unwise to give to the Crown; but various expedients were suggested, which, it was believed, would obviate any injury to the public interests from this cause. It was not difficult to reply to such general reasoning. The first admission made, namely, that a great change had taken place in the Company's government, proved that the defects of the system were not irremediable; and it is a maxim congenial to English legislation, not to destroy what is capable of improvement. With regard to the anomalous nature of this branch of our Indian government, it shared that character with all other parts of our free constitution; and as to its inadequacy to its enlarged duties, all that had occurred within the last twenty years was assuredly encouragement to proceed with ameliorations and reforms, instead of rushing upon the work of demolition, uncertain whether any authority could be substituted equally efficient.

Serious changes have taken place in the constitution of the Company, subsequent to the act of 1784; but none require more of our attention than those which have affected the court of proprietors. As long as the court of directors acted independently of the control of ministers, the proprietors interfered on almost all occasions, and frequently influenced nominations to high stations in India, as well as important political measures. But when the government became a party in the administration of Indian affairs, it was deemed necessary to prevent their arrangements being embarrassed by the general court, which was done by clauses in the enactments of the legislature very seriously curtailing its power.<sup>9</sup> Other circumstances have contributed, in no slight degree, to alter the views and principles of a great proportion of the proprietors, amongst which we may consider the opening of the trade with India as the most prominent. The directors used to recommend to the proprietors a candidate on any vacancy that occurred in the direction; this recommendation, supported as it was by their individual and collective efforts,

usually succeeded; and the new director came in with a strong feeling of gratitude towards the body of which he was a member, and with a disposition to maintain that principle of unity by which he had profited. For several years past the case has been very different; and candidates who are supported by some members of the direction, are frequently opposed by others. They consequently enter upon their duties with party feelings, which must have a tendency to break that union which was once the strength of this body.

These changes in England have extended their effect to India. The nature of those ties which formerly subsisted between the Company and their servants abroad, is greatly altered; and the latter no longer look exclusively to the court of directors.

A concurrence of events has tended, within the last thirty years, to bring the civil and military officers of the Indian service into general and prominent notice in England; and the consequence has been a very favourable impression of their character and advancement of their reputation. The army of India owes great obligations to the late Lord Buckinghamshire, for the manner in which he brought their claims to the notice of their sovereign, on the extension of the order of the Bath.<sup>10</sup> To Mr. Canning, when president of the board of control, the public are chiefly indebted for the appointment of the two distinguished men<sup>11</sup> who have, for several years past, filled the stations of governors at Madras and Bombay. Some solicitude was felt, and expressed, lest these appointments should effect the practice<sup>12</sup> of the court of directors to look rather to eminent men in England to fill such stations, than to the Company's servants; but the result of these selections must have satisfied all, that when the Indian service produces men like the individuals mentioned,<sup>13</sup> the practice which excludes them from a fair and equal competition for any honours or employments that it is in the power of their King and country to bestow must be as contrary to sound policy as to justice.

One of the common-place objections made in England to India candidates for high office abroad is, the too near connexions which they are supposed to have with the public servants of that country. There might be some ground for this objection, if it was probable that men of ordinary pretensions would be



raised to such stations; but as we can never expect, considering the disadvantages under which they labour, that any persons are likely to be brought forward by the authorities at home till they have outstripped others in the race abroad, it may be asked, what friendships or connexions are such men likely to have in India? Certainly none but with the ablest and best of their fellow servants. They must, no doubt, be personally acquainted with the abilities and deficiencies of those placed under their orders, and this cannot but give them incalculable advantages in the performance of their public duties. Standing distinguished amongst their compeers, they must be anxious to justify, by their conduct, the honour which their selection has conferred on the service to which they belong. Thus every motive arising out of the India connexions and acquaintances of men of superior character will tend to public benefit. Let their condition be contrasted with that of a person who has no previous knowledge of the scene on which he is to act, and no personal acquaintance or connexion whatever with any of those placed under his authority. Such a man, if he has attained any eminence, is likely to belong to a political party, and to have parliamentary interests; from such ties, independent of family claims, and of those of personal friendship, he must be exposed to solicitations in favour of many persons in India. If it is admitted that examples have been found of men who had public virtue sufficient to resist the influence of all such ties and claims, still, even this rare individual, as a stranger to India, must, for a period, be dependent upon others for all information regarding the character and qualifications of the men to whom his choice is limited, and upon the judicious selection of whom for the various duties they have to perform the success of his administration will chiefly depend.

The power exercised by British rulers in India has none of that prejudice in its favour which often supports hereditary monarchies and national governments, even at a period of decline. It can obtain respect only by the intrinsic qualities of the person by whom it is exercised: great talents and active virtue will always obtain the suffrage of both the European and native subjects of our Indian empire, and in all human probability preserve it in peace, or, at all events, overcome danger; but

moderate abilities, even though combined with information, will be found unequal to the great task in any times; and if the government of India ever passes into weak or inadequate hands, the high station will fall into disrepute, and all the dangers that flow from the contempt of a governing authority will be generated. The only safe view that Great Britain can take of her empire in India is, to consider it (as it really is) always in a state of danger, and to nominate persons to rule it competent from their knowledge of its interests, and from superior energy of character, to meet every emergency that can arise; for it appears quite impossible ever to introduce any system of government into our possessions in that country which will render them secure, except under the management of able and firm rulers. If a succession of men of great talents and virtues cannot be found, or if the operation of any influence or party feelings and principles prevents their being chosen, we must reconcile ourselves to the serious hazard of the early decline, if not the loss, of the great power we have founded in the east.

There has been much speculative opinion on the subject of such selections: some have conceived that military men were best qualified for these stations; others, that they should be exclusively filled by those who had risen in civil life. It has been argued, that noblemen, carrying with them the impression of high rank and birth, should be alone appointed; while many believe that they would be best filled by servants of the Company possessing local knowledge, and a large and detailed acquaintance with the affairs and the people of India.<sup>14</sup>

Any principle which excludes knowledge, talent, and virtue, in whatever rank or condition of life these qualities are found, from such fair and legitimate objects of honourable ambition, must destroy the competition necessary to form men for the government of British India: whether these be filled by persons who have risen in civil or military life, provided such be qualified for the duties they have to perform, appears to be a matter of indifference; when talent for civil rule and military command are found combined, there is an advantage perhaps in vesting both powers in the same individual. That the high rank of the person employed, as it adds to the impression which such stations require, is of some consequence, cannot be denied;

but that consequence can never be sufficient to supersede the claims of superior merit, or to remedy the defects of inefficiency. With regard to the servants of the Company, their local experience, unless attended with other qualifications, is but a poor recommendation to stations which do not so much require an acquaintance with details as that enlarged knowledge of human nature, that active energy of character, and that commanding talent for rule, which has, in all ages, distinguished those who have exercised power to the benefit of their country and mankind.

Whatever person is nominated, either to the high station of Governor-general, or to the governments of Madras or Bombay, should receive a full and liberal confidence from the authority by which he is appointed; nor should he be continued in his station one moment after that is withdrawn. The dangers which assail our empire in India from internal weakness are much greater than we can ever apprehend from external power; and these dangers will always increase, in an alarming degree, when the administration abroad has not the decided support of the government in England.

There is an acknowledged necessity for those persons who fill the highest offices in India being vested with a power which is offensive to the feelings of an Englishman, and hardly in unison with any part of the character of our free constitution. But we cannot assimilate the rules and principles of British government with those which are essential to the maintenance of our sovereignty, as foreign conquerors, over the vast population of the continent of India. We may and do cast a heavy responsibility<sup>15</sup> on those to whom almost absolute power is intrusted; but the checks which are placed on those in authority in England are incompatible with the condition of a ruler in India. Under such circumstances, we can contemplate no improvement of more consequence than one calculated to form men capable of fulfilling duties of a nature so peculiarly delicate and important, both as they respect the peace and happiness of our Indian subjects, and the rights and privileges of the European community in our eastern dominions; but before any plan is suggested for the promotion of this purpose, it will be useful to see how far the object is impeded or advanced by the existing system.

His Majesty's ministers have hitherto been, and will continue to be actuated, in all matters that relate to high appointments in India, by motives which must mix in their minds the objects of patronage and party interest with those of duty to the country; and it is from this cause that they will, in general, be found the advocates of a system, which, under various pleas, excludes (as much as possible) the pretensions of Indian service. To admit these to a fair and liberal competition would, in many cases, be fatal to their views of promoting friends, of rewarding services performed in other quarters of the globe, and of making arrangements essential to the continuance of their own power. These are considerations too intimately connected with the frame of the English government, and with the interests of the individuals by whom that is administered, ever to cease to operate; but that does not render their operation less baneful to the Indian empire. Their action is least pernicious when that empire appears in danger; but better knowledge would teach that it is, as already remarked, every moment in danger, and never more requires superior ability and energy to govern it, than when, apparently, in perfect peace; for that is the moment to take preventive measures to avert those troubles to which the very nature and magnitude of our possessions in the east renders them so liable, and of which nothing but the continued watchfulness and wisdom of those who rule them can prevent the recurrence.

Among the many grounds taken to palliate, if not excuse the appointment of persons to high stations in India, who are acknowledged to have little or no acquaintance with the interests of that empire, one of the most prominent is, the assumed information and competence of those servants of the Company who are in council, or who fill the subordinate and executive offices of the state: but those who assume this ground of confidence forget, that selecting and employing others is one of the first qualities of a superior mind; while incompetence too often takes alarm at talent, and is much more likely to rouse its resentment by neglect or jealousy, than to gain its support in aid of its own inefficiency.

It has been urged that, if His Majesty's ministers had the sole responsibility of appointments in India, their fear of public

opinion, and of attack in the House of Commons, would make them more guarded than when they have only, as at present, a concurrent or dissentient voice in the nomination of the court of directors. This might be true, if the affairs of the Indian government were as well understood, or excited the same interest as the affairs of Europe;<sup>16</sup> but as this is likely never to happen, and as ministers must be expected to continue treating all that relates to the former as secondary, there would appear a necessity for a more constant, as well as a more efficient, check, and that can alone be found in an improved system, which would bring forward talent; and, through respect for knowledge and weight of character, limit the improper action of prejudice, influence, or patronage, on points where the very existence of our Indian empire is at stake.

These observations refer, exclusively, to general principles; they have no allusion to any particular instances in the conduct of the court of directors, or of any set of ministers. Their choice of persons to fill the office of Governor-general, as these volumes have exhibited, has often fallen on men of great talent, who, aided by the able and well-qualified public officers they found in India, have advanced our power to that high but dangerous pinnacle which renders it more essential than ever to use the greatest caution and judgment in selecting those who are to govern it. The field of selection is very limited. The qualities requisite in the mere English statesman will seldom be found combined in any one individual; and, under present circumstances, the fitness of those whose chief claims rest upon Indian service will every day become more doubtful. The wars and negotiations of the last thirty years called into prominent action all the talent which belonged to that class, and the notice and applause bestowed upon individuals excited a high and honourable spirit of ambition; but this, if not cherished, must subside and perish. In ordinary times,<sup>17</sup> men soon fall into a lifeless routine of action, and those who return to England discouraged by the construction of the Indian government at home from all hope of pursuing that course of life in which they would be most useful, will either devote themselves to pleasure, lapse into indolence, or give the whole weight of their opinions and reputation against a system, which, by almost destroying their

hope of advancement, has generally the effect of arresting their public career exactly at the time when its continuance would be most beneficial to their country.

If this is admitted to be a true picture, the necessity of changes, opening wider the path of ambition to the servants of the Company, both in India and England, cannot be denied. Few would succeed, but all, by the objects being within their view, would be stimulated to efforts that could not fail of being essentially beneficial to the best interests of our Indian empire. Before, however, such changes as have been alluded to can be effected, many deep-rooted prejudices must be overcome. The interests of individuals and of classes of men must yield to those of the public, and some parts of our Indian administration, by many deemed fundamental, must be modified or altered: but the necessity is paramount; and it may be asserted that, unless changes are made for encouraging and elevating, instead of excluding and depressing those who acquire experience, knowledge, and reputation in India, our administration of that empire will never preserve the health and vigour necessary for its permanent prosperity.

According to the established form of the Indian government in England, the board of control consists of a president, two active members,<sup>18</sup> a secretary, who is in parliament, and clerks in every department.<sup>19</sup> We may assume that the four first stations of this board, to all of which liberal salaries are attached, are appointments which, generally speaking, will be given with more attention to the claims of those who form or support the administration, than with any reference to their peculiar qualifications for the situation. The office of president, though often filled by men of eminence, has not been considered as among the first in His Majesty's cabinet.<sup>20</sup> This is unfortunate, for it leads to frequent changes; and few persons have held the office long enough to attain the knowledge necessary for the fulfilment of its important functions.<sup>21</sup> It happened lately at a critical period, (and the occurrence was favourable to the public interests) that a distinguished nobleman<sup>22</sup> who had filled high station in India, presided at this board, and that he was ably aided by a near relative,<sup>23</sup> who had passed the early part of his life in the Company's service; but these nominations were to be referred to other causes

than the competence of the individuals in point of personal knowledge and experience. Generally speaking, the president of this board, on entering upon his duty, is compelled to look to others. The members are usually in the same situation as the president; they, like him, have their lesson to learn, and sometimes commence in complete ignorance of Indian affairs.

The parliamentary secretary of the board, being nominated on the same principle as the president and members, is not likely to be better informed. It is the clerks at the heads of departments on whom the board must depend. These are fixed; their sole attention is given to the duties of their respective offices, and the affairs under their superintendence are understood as well as it is possible to be by men who have only records to guide them: but supposing their industry and ability in their stations to be equal to that of any public functionaries in England, (and this is supposing no more than the truth,) still that system must be had where the recognised depositaries of information are subordinate and irresponsible. This, it will be asserted, is to a great extent the case in other offices of the state. But a knowledge of the duties of other offices is familiar, easily attained, and may be said to belong to the education of every English statesman, which is not the case with Indian affairs; they are foreign to the common studies of such persons, and, from their remote interest, can never be otherwise. It is consequently most desirable that there should be such a change in the composition of this board as would ensure to the state a greater portion of experience, and more accurate knowledge of Indian affairs. That can be done only by an arrangement which shall direct the hopes of those who have served with ability and distinction in India to the attainment of a share in this branch of the administration.

It will be urged, that the board of control is as open to those who have acquired experience and knowledge in our eastern empire as to any others; that there is no declared bar to their attainment of a seat, or even presiding at it, when returned from service in India, enjoying as they do the same rights as any other of His Majesty's subjects. But what are the facts?—for it is by these we must be guided in deciding upon practical questions. Those who enter the Indian service are seldom men of high family

connexion. Their early life is devoted to their public duties abroad, and they can therefore enjoy but few opportunities of forming those friendships with individuals, or those ties with parties, which so often help to bring into useful action men of information and talent. In former times the servants of the Company exclusively filled all the high stations,<sup>24</sup> in India, and the large and rapid fortunes they made in those stations, or in the exercise of military command, enabled them to come forward in parliament, and to establish influence through the means of wealth; but this is no longer the case. Riches are attained in India, as elsewhere, by commercial men, by agents, and by some few of the servants of the Company, who make that their chief or sole object. But it is a remarkable fact, that, amongst all who have been most distinguished during the last forty years, there is not one who possesses a fortune which can be deemed more than a competence; and several of them, after more than thirty years' service, have not acquired that. The reasons are obvious. Men seldom reach high office till after many years' service, and then their salaries, though liberal,<sup>25</sup> are not so considerable as to enable them to accumulate a large fortune, were that to become their pursuit: but their duties are of a character which raises the mind above the accumulation of money; and this high tone in those who fill the first stations in India has been wisely cherished, for the integrity of the service depends on their example.<sup>26</sup>

What has been stated will sufficiently account for persons of local experience and knowledge being most unlikely to attain any share in that branch of the administration of India which belongs to the Crown;<sup>27</sup> but the very circumstances which place them at a distance from such objects of ambition are those which, if the public interests were consulted, ought to approximate these objects. It is not more necessary to have naval lords at the Admiralty than to have Indian members of the board of control, nor indeed so much so; and, should a sense of its expedience ever introduce such a usage, its benefits would be very great.

Besides the aid which the minister of Indian affairs would receive from well-selected Indian members, the very prospect, however distant, of attaining such honourable stations at home would stimulate to action all the best talent in the Indian service. Those who obtained such distinction would receive and impart



knowledge, and while they enjoyed an opportunity of bringing themselves into a notice that might be attended with further preferment, if they were fit for it, they would be placed in a situation which would enable them to preserve and improve the information they had acquired in India, and to offer useful information and advice daily to those who are called upon to decide on the most important questions connected with our eastern empire.

The president and members of the board of control may, and no doubt often do, seek information and counsel from the most experienced of the Company's servants in England; but these are only casually and partially consulted. Their judgment is asked on insulated points, affected by many circumstances and events of which they have no knowledge. It is also to be recollected that our Indian empire is, and, from its composition, must be, always in a state of change. Men who retire from the service, and do not, either from want of inclination or of means, keep up their information, may be said to be out of date in a very few years; but being naturally tenacious of preconceived opinions, we may assert, with the fullest respect for well-acquired reputation, that such persons are often the most misleading advisers; and an appeal to such may become the more pernicious, from error being sanctioned by high name and authority.

The adoption of the measure suggested would do more than remedy this defect. It would produce a succession of men thoroughly informed, and with the opportunity as well as the ability of imparting their information to others. No good government can wish for mystery or concealment; such can be desirable only as veils to weakness and mismanagement. There never was a state to which publicity is calculated to be of more benefit, both as a check and as an encouragement to those by whom it is administered, than that we have established for India; but in order that the wise and just principles upon which it is conducted should be understood and appreciated, its real condition, and the nature of those peculiar circumstances under which it acts, should be fully before the public.

With reference to this principle, it is to be regretted that questions relating to India are so seldom agitated in parliament,

and that the annual budget for the financial affairs of that empire, which it was long the usage to bring before the House of Commons, has been discontinued.<sup>28</sup> This practice might have been attended with inconvenience, and perhaps occasional embarrassment, to the ministers of the Crown; but its disuse, inasmuch as it has a tendency to perpetuate ignorance and apathy on all that relates to Indian administration, is unfavourable to the interests of that country, and, consequently, to those of Great Britain. Without speculating upon the reasons which have led to past proceedings, it may be assumed, that men in official situations in England, who added to their practical knowledge of India the advantage of direct reference to the most authentic information in England concerning that country, would be able not only to correct errors and expose mis-statements, but to convey, when required, the most useful knowledge. Their minute acquaintance with persons, places, and circumstances in India would give them a confidence in the performance of such a duty far beyond what the mere study of records can ever impart; and on all such subjects they would receive an attention proportionate to the impression of their local experience, information, and judgment.

It has been asserted that the directors are more disposed to nominate, to the first and civil and military stations, persons who have acquired character at home, in the West Indies, or on the continent of Europe, than the officers of the Company. This belief, which is very general among their servants abroad, is not exactly grounded in fact. In such appointments, the directors alluded to are generally overruled by His Majesty's ministers, though there can be no doubt that the victory is in most cases not very difficult. This arises from their participation in the greater admiration which the public bestow on services performed, on scenes that are near than on those which are remote; from their yielding more respect to men whom they have seen, or met in the highest sphere of society in England, than they do to persons whom from, their original nomination and career, they almost deem beings of their own creation, and in some respects below them from, their habits and feelings making them less attentive to the qualities which fit individuals for high stations, than to those which give them a value as subordinate

instruments; and from being restrained, particularly in recommending for appointments to high military command, by a consideration of seniority,<sup>29</sup> which must, while persevered in, be fatal to the hopes of the Indian army.

Whatever may be the solid advantages of the Company's service, and they are neither few in number nor small in amount, all those who aspire at distinction must be hostile to a system which they believe unfavourable to their hopes of future elevation. Men of high and disinterested minds may occasionally divest themselves of self, so far as to advocate on general grounds what they feel as personally injurious; but such instances will be rare, and the ordinary motives of human nature will lead men to desire the abolition of an authority which they deem to be, either from its want of power or of disposition to support them, unfavourable to their advancement.

Mr. Pitt's Bill, though it subjected the court of directors to ministerial control in every branch of their administration, except in that which related to the management of the commercial concerns of the Company, made no changes either in the form of their election or the mode of executing such duties as were left to them: but one of the most important, the secret and political department, was, by this act, and a subsequent one, in a great degree taken out of their hands. This is one of the most delicate parts of the machinery of the present system, and, therefore, requires to be well understood.<sup>30</sup>

In all cases of political negotiation with native powers, involving questions of peace and war, and requiring secrecy, the responsibility rests with the board of control, who, by the law, are empowered to frame despatches upon those subjects; which despatches the secret committee<sup>31</sup> are bound to forward to India under their signature. The committee may remonstrate verbally, or in writing against instructions framed in opposition to their judgment; but their right to do so is not recognised by law,<sup>32</sup> as in the case of the public<sup>33</sup> despatches, and can, therefore, only be deemed one of courtesy and usage.

The proposed benefit of making the secret committee the medium for conveying orders in the secret and political department is, to uphold the authority of the Company in India, which, it is thought, would be injured by a direct official

correspondence between the board of control and the government in that country. The signing of such despatches, when contrary to their judgment is, however, stated by an act of parliament to be purely ministerial on the part of the committee; but though the latter have not a legal right to propose alterations, or to delay the transmission of the board's despatches, still their condition as the head of a branch of the Indian government, and the means which, as such, they must possess of aiding or obstructing the minor measures connected with any important resolution the board of control may adopt, must always make it a matter of solicitude and importance for the board to carry this committee along with them; and the latter must give an influence in such affairs proportionate to the information and talents of those of whom it is composed.

It is to be remarked, however, that the value of the privilege which courtesy and usage have given to the committee, of expressing, or even recording, dissentient opinions must, like many others that belong to the different parts of the Indian government, depend upon its rare and temperate exercise; for the frequency of that would convert a salutary restraint into a source of embarrassment; but if such consideration operates, as it no doubt does, to make the secret committee, in most cases, aid and promote, instead of weaken and impede, the action of that power which is vested in the superior board; the latter should, on the same principle, refrain, as much as possible, from interference in less important affairs. The right of control is much more exercised at present than it was for a long period after the Indian board was established. This has been occasioned by a variety of causes, and in many cases may have had a beneficial effect; but we must not overlook the great evils which may arise out of such gradual encroachment. If the interference of the board descends into every minute question, and its power of dictation is in frequent exercise, the court of directors will either sink into a mere channel for its orders, or the respect for the board will be diminished, and there will be an end of that feeling and good understanding which it is essential should subsist between these two authorities.

In such case, we might apprehend the complete fulfilment of Mr. Burke's prediction<sup>34</sup> of the result of the present form of our

Indian administration: that can alone be averted by the temper, moderation, and knowledge, of those at the head of its separate branches.

When the board of control was first instituted, the same general letters from the different presidencies contained every subject. This was changed. The correspondence was divided into four departments: the public, the revenue, the military, and the commercial. The convenience of this new arrangement was recognised by the supreme government; and, at its suggestion, a fifth or political department, which included all the correspondence, not secret, with or regarding European or native powers in India, was added to the other four.

The court of directors divide themselves, according to usage of long standing, into committees, for the performance of their various duties; those divisions have reference to seniority of standing in the direction, not the qualification and fitness of the individuals.

The chairmen are almost invariably chosen from the senior directors. The most important of the committees for affairs, not secret, is that of the correspondence, which is formed of eleven of the senior directors, inclusive of the chairman and deputy chairman. On this committee devolve the reading, examining, and answering of all the despatches from India, except those in the secret or commercial departments. Almost all measures of importance originate with them, and their opinion is, in most cases, a guide for the court.

Generally speaking, a period of at least ten years must elapse from the election of a director, before he can become a member of the committee of correspondence; previous to that, he is attached to one of the junior committees,<sup>35</sup> and his time is chiefly occupied with its duties of detail, having no concern with the larger questions that relate to the general administration of India, except when those are agitated in court. It is true that every member of the court has a right, not only to call for papers (not secret), but to originate measures. This right, however, is rarely exercised; for the sense of the inconvenience which must attend taking subjects out of those departments to which they belong creates a salutary forbearance from this course of proceeding.

From the mode in which the duties of the court of directors

are at present allotted, it is obvious that the election of an individual who, from the stations he may have filled abroad, possesses full and valuable information respecting the actual condition and government of that empire is, as far as the political interests of India are concerned, of little or no benefit to the public. On entering the direction, he is almost exclusively employed on duties of a totally opposite character to those which have occupied his past life; and when seniority advances him to a place in the committee of correspondence, or secret department, he carries with him, not that fresh and useful knowledge which he would have done had his mind gone along with events, but the bias of an attachment to old opinions, many of which may have become obsolete.

These facts cannot be controverted, and it follows as a consequence, that a minute knowledge of the affairs of India, and of the political interests of that country, is rarely possessed by any of the senior directors. It is possessed by the secretaries and head clerks, many of whom are men distinguished by talent, as well as industry; but to them, as the principle depositaries of knowledge, there exists the same objection as that which applies to the constitution of the board of control.

There are many causes which give a vacillating character to the proceedings of the court of directors, and tend, at times, to precipitate, and at others, to retard, measures of vital importance; but one of the most prominent is the shortness of the period that each chairman fills the chair. His business during that period is overwhelming, and much of it must be hurried through, or neglected, or transferred, half done, to his successor; who, very possibly, has different sentiments upon several of the points under consideration. We may add to this cause of frequent and sudden changes in their views, that of the annual retirement and re-election of six members<sup>36</sup> of this body. The ex-directors for the year having no right to see any papers, or to have access, to official documents during their recess, they return to their duties ignorant of the measures under discussion, or at least with the disadvantage of having the chain of information entirely broken.

The government of the court of directors is marked by strict attention to rule, and alarm at every measure contrary to usage,

or that can create a precedent for future deviation from it. These are good general maxims of ordinary administration, for limited and unchanging states; but, in an empire like that of India, their constant and cold observance must be fatal to that life and animation which ought to pervade the whole system. Every latent spark of honourable ambition should be kindled, and the anxiety should be to promote, by encouragement and by reward, the efforts of individuals to attain distinction in the public service. No government can be highly respected which, entrenching itself in forms, is more solicitous to avoid the reproach of injustice, than to inspire zealous exertion. Its acts may be just, and even liberal; but unless they are suited to the character of the individuals and classes subject to its authority, and evince complete competence in the rulers to go along with the rapid changes of the peculiar empire they have to rule, such government must fall into disrepute with those by whom they are served. That this has been the case with the court of directors, no man acquainted with facts can deny; and an increase of information and knowledge is not more necessary in that court to enable it to withstand the daily attempts made in England to lessen and degrade it, than to maintain its reputation with its servants abroad, many of whom, under the influence of personal feelings, contemplate the termination of the power of the Company with little reflection on the probable consequences of such an event to India, and to Great Britain.

This is not the place, nor is it, perhaps, the period to suggest the details of any plan of reform; but those who desire the continuance of the Company may be satisfied, that all who aim at its destruction will be enemies to any change in the constitution of the court of directors which shall tend to raise that body, by making it more efficient to the performance of its large and increasing duties. It is to a system of depression they trust for ultimate success; but nothing can be more hazardous to the interests of the Indian empire than this mode of killing, as it were, by inches, the body through whom it is governed. The court of directors should not only be maintained in all their rights and privileges, but elevated, if it is desired to render it a useful and efficient branch of the Indian government: if not, the sooner it is abolished the better. To understand this question, let us

look to its actual condition. The character of this court has undergone great alterations; the changes which have taken place in the views and sentiments of the proprietors have extended to the directors. A separate and extensive commercial interest has already gained the greater part of the trade of the Company's and threatens the remainder. That service, which once exclusively looked to them, no longer does so; the public press, which is every day becoming a more powerful engine of change, is, from many reasons, far from favourable to them: that all these causes have combined to lower the court of directors in public estimation cannot be denied; but there are others of equal, if not greater force. The acts of 1793 and 1813, by transferring almost all real territorial and political powers to the ministers of the Crown, deprived the court of directors of much of that consequence which they before enjoyed; and their unpopularity has been recently increased by the growing dislike of all monopolies, and an increasing desire for new openings of trade.<sup>37</sup> This desire, so far from being lessened, has been greatly augmented by the partial opening of the India trade; the benefit of which, to the public, is considered to be much impaired by the command which the Company still maintain over the foreign market. The consequence has been, that the Company, by ceasing to be rulers, and by remaining monopolists, have lost the consideration which belonged to their former character; while the odium ever attached to the latter has been increased.

No person, possessing a knowledge of the constitution of England, can desire to change the composition of the court of directors in any manner that would more approximate them to His Majesty's ministers. Their separation from the latter, even in the common intercourse of life, owing to their different occupation and connexions, has its importance; but the useful check which it constitutes must be weakened, if not destroyed, unless it is supported by personal character, and acknowledged information and talent. The deterioration of the court in public estimation must deteriorate it as respects the talent and character of its individual members. The office of director will every day become less an object of ambition to men of high feeling, and who have already obtained distinction.

Under the present circumstances, it appears difficult for the



Company to maintain their ground as an efficient branch of the administration of India; perhaps, indeed, impossible, unless changes take place which shall give to the court of directors, as a body, more weight and consideration than they now enjoy with the public: this weight and consideration, all who are favourable to their existence must desire to see them attain.

The limitation of the Company's monopoly in trade has produced considerable changes as to persons chosen for directors; but still no qualifications are required beyond the possession of a certain amount of stock; and the condition and avocation of a great majority of the voters of both sexes offer no security as to the fitness of a candidate for the direction. There existed, until lately, restrictions which barred any person<sup>38</sup> who continued in the service from being a director, notwithstanding he had acquired a right, unless specially called upon to reside in his native country. Such restrictions, which had their birth in that spirit of narrow and jealous policy that characterized the early days of the Company, are ill suited to its present condition, and at variance with the usage of the government of England. The latter admits unemployed officers to every office<sup>39</sup> of the state, wisely obtaining all the advantage it can from that increased knowledge and experience which the duties of their profession enable them to acquire; and even when these are not publicly employed, they are often officially called upon to give their opinions individually, or collectively in committees, upon points on which their professional experience, or recent knowledge, enables them to judge with accuracy. Such calls are seldom, if ever, made upon Indian civil or military officers who are retired, or on furlough in England; and yet it would be difficult to point out any government in the world, which, from the character of its duties, stands so much in need of this kind of aid. But until considerable changes are made in the construction, both of the India board and the court of directors, this assistance will never be attained in any degree that can render it beneficial to the country.

The increasing difficulties of governing such an empire as that we have established in the east imperiously call upon us to avail ourselves of all the means we possess to enable us to overcome them: but we must not deceive ourselves as to the real

cause of opposition to measures of alteration, such as have here been suggested. It is the alarm of individuals and classes of men lest injury should arise to their own interests; but in this conclusion they are assuredly deceived. The effect would be the reverse, for the admixture of men who have knowledge of India with those who have a knowledge of England would early destroy those baneful prejudices which both parties entertain towards each other; and, while it diffused correct information and just principles, would give strength and permanence to a system which cannot much longer exist on its present foundation.

In the actual condition of our Asiatic possessions, there is no principle in their administration of such consequence as that of keeping those who are employed abroad as much European as possible, consistent with their attainment of the qualities essential to fit them for their local duties in India. We can contemplate no danger equal to their looking to the latter as the country in which they are to pass their lives; such a sentiment, if ever it becomes prevalent amongst the public servants, must ultimately prove as fatal to the interests of England as of India. This is fully understood by the government at home; and whilst they have very properly done away those means of accumulating wealth which were at variance with our improved system of rule, they have recently made liberal arrangements to facilitate the return of those who have served a certain period, either in the civil or military service; but one effect of this branch of expenditure will be, to make numbers (many of whom are in the prime of life) pass the remainder of their days in an unprofitable manner, unless objects<sup>40</sup> are presented to their ambition both in India and in England. In the pursuit<sup>41</sup> of these in the latter country, men of information and talent would soon lose their limited and local feelings. Their importance with themselves and others would rise as the sphere of their utility became enlarged. Their patriotic attachment to their native land will be strengthened, and the weight and influence of their character will be the means of keeping alive such sentiments in others, who will give more ready assent to the wisdom and expediency of measures that are associated with names to which they have long and habitually given respect and confidence.

Some who admit that the mode proposed is the best by which prejudices can be removed, and attachment to their native country revived and strengthened, will perhaps startle at a plan that suggests the necessity of facilitating to those who have served abroad the attainment of employment in both branches of the Indian administration in England; but such objection stands on narrow, indefensible, and most unconstitutional grounds. Has any officer, political, civil, military, or naval, of His Majesty's service, when retired upon pension, half or full pay, ever been considered as less qualified to enter any department of the state, because he had been in a particular line of service, or might again be called upon to act in it if his country required? Do we not meet with persons of this description in various offices and stations? Do they not often fulfil duties which lead them not merely to differ with, but to control and censure those very authorities under whom they had formerly acted, and may again act? That such is the case cannot be denied: and who will contend that there is any principle in the administration of India which should constitute a difference to this practice.

Some will argue, that employment in India is reserved for a privileged few, and that those who enjoy it should not repine if it, in a great degree, throws them out of public life in their native country; and they will perhaps add, that the persons with whose prospects they might interfere, if such facilities were given as have been suggested towards their obtaining office in England, might justly complain unless the India service was opened to their ambition. Such arguments might have force, if the English public officers were qualified for stations in India, or if, in the administration at home, we could dispense with that information and knowledge which is alone possessed by India public officers. But we must not try this important question by a reference to the claims or privileges of individuals, or classes of men. It is one of state policy, and intimately connected with the preservation and good government of one of the most extraordinary empires that ever was founded in the universe. With all the means we can prepare and employ, we shall be too likely to fail in these objects; but that failure will be certain, if we allow our efforts for their attainment to be circumscribed by ordinary maxims, and rules adapted to the routine administra-

tion of petty colonies, or the regulated forms of the most admired national constitutions, which differ from that in question either by the temper and genius of the governed, or the principles and system of the government.

The education of the youth who enter the service in India is liberal: their occupations abroad are of a character to enlarge their minds. The evils and misfortunes they continually contemplate as arising from despotic rule must render them more attached to the free government of their native country; and no great class of men can be placed under circumstances more calculated to give them extended views of national policy, or to qualify them for different public duties. Acting in countries remote from each other, and whose inhabitants differ in language and customs as much as the nations of Europe, some members of this class rise to the exercise of almost kingly rule; others fill political, civil, judicial, fiscal, and military stations. Such a variety of occupation must in India, as elsewhere, produce an infinite variety of character, and qualify men to pursue the most opposite courses, if such are open to them in England. It is a sense of injury alone, at the operation of causes which virtually almost exclude them from public life, that can unite them in hostility against a system, which, under other circumstances, it must be their interest to support: nor would the prejudices they may have imbibed from a residence in India long survive their return to England, unless they found themselves placed under circumstances discouraging to their ambition, and almost compelled into a community of sentiments and feelings by being considered as a distinct class. This is, to a great degree, their present situation, and no reflecting man can doubt its injurious effects on the public interests, which require a mixture of Indian and European knowledge that can only be effectually obtained, by the union in public office as well as general society, of those whose lives, though passed in different hemispheres, have been directed to one object, the good of their country. The useful approximation of such persons to each other must, however, depend on a parity of condition, which, while it promotes intercourse, gives birth to that respect and attention which men do not readily entertain for the opinions of those whom they consider to be their inferiors in rank or in knowledge.

Amongst those whose industry and talent have contributed to the good government of India subsequent to the establishment of the board of control, the secretaries and clerks at the heads of departments of that board, as well as those of the India-House, must not be passed over. It would be difficult to point out any class of men in similar situations who have laboured harder, or more to the benefit of the public, or who have preserved a higher character for integrity and ability. The information and minute knowledge of Indian affairs which some of these have attained from the huge volumes of the records of our Eastern empire, is quite surprising; but the good that the public might derive from their labour and talents is diminished, not only (as noticed before) from the disadvantages inseparable from their own want of local knowledge and experience, but also from their superiors often but imperfectly understanding the details of the matter laid before them. The latter, even when they have the disposition and the leisure, must wade through a mass of writing on subjects, of which a minute knowledge is rendered more unattainable by the local references, and the very names of persons, places, and things, as foreign to the ear as confusing to the sense of the English reader. Any change of system, giving increase of knowledge to their superiors, must ultimately prove most beneficial to the interests of this class. Men who had confidence in their own competency could have no reserve as to the resources from which they derive assistance, and their experience and discriminating judgment would be favourable to the rise of all whose industry and talent rendered them conspicuous.<sup>42</sup>

Existing establishments must always be liable to attack, and in a free and enlightened nation like England we may trace much of their excellence to this cause. They are kept in a state of vigilance and activity by their assailants: the public opinion must go along with them, or they would soon cease to exist; but that public opinion is not to be taken from the speeches of members of parliament contending for victory; nor from the daily effusions of contradictory papers and publications; nor from the clamour of numbers acting under some momentary impulse; nor from the pages of philosophers, who theorize upon institutions that are to give a new character to the human race: but though no one of these is the representation of public opinion, they all

influence and help to form it, and as education is diffused they will daily gain more strength. Let us hope, however, that, as knowledge advances, the sound national sense of an English public will keep pace with it, and judge all questions that are constitutionally important, free from the party feeling, the interests, the passions, or the theories of those, from the active exercise of whose ambition, industry, talent, and enthusiasm, it derives its best lights.

Notwithstanding that happy tenacity of usage and respect, even for the forms of establishments, which characterizes the majority of Englishmen, there exists in the present state of society an expectation of their progressive improvement. Such improvements, however, must be made with great caution, lest more be sacrificed than gained; and we may lay it down as an axiom, that the true value of all institutions depends upon their being in unison with the community and government to which they belong. If we desire their stability, we must adapt them to the strength, the weakness, the prejudices, the virtues, the vices, all the qualities, in short, of those human beings for whose benefit they are founded.

That sound public opinion, which it is so essential to carry along with every branch of our free government, has been very partially exercised in respect to the administration of Indian affairs. The problem of the best mode of governing that country is so difficult to be solved, the interests affected by it so remote and complicated, that few have given it any deep attention. When the privileges of the Company were last renewed, the question was considered as being at rest for twenty years. The expiration of this term is not yet sufficiently near to excite the activity of those parties which that event will bring into collision; but it is most desirable that, before the arrival of that period, the subject should undergo the fullest investigation, for it involves questions of great national importance, the consideration and decision upon which should not be left to the hurried moment of a conflict between parties swayed by their respective interests, and striving to attain their objects through every means that temporary impressions can make upon minds uninformed of the nature and merits of the question which they are called to decide.

Viewing the actual establishments with reference to the facts and principles which have been stated, it should be calmly examined how far they are, or can be, rendered efficient to the purposes for which they were intended; considering that, of all governments, that is least likely to command respect, and gain strength, over which a sword is always suspended, and which holds existence under respite, it would be better either to abolish the Company as a medium of governing India, or to give to that body a broader, more solid, and more permanent foundation. To judge this point, it would be necessary to look minutely to the benefits which might be anticipated from its preservation; to its defects as an organ of rule; to the possibility of remedying these defects; to the practicability of substituting a better medium; and, lastly, to the probable consequences of placing our vast territories in the East under the direct rule of the King's government. In forming our judgment upon these important questions, we must never for one moment lose sight of the peculiar character of our empire in India, which bears little analogy to any power that ever existed in the universe. This compels us to look, almost exclusively, to its own history for those lessons which are to guide us through the difficulties we must expect to encounter in its future administration; and the experience which that affords is limited, for the government we have established has hardly one feature in common with that of former conquerors, most of whom became inhabitants of the land they had subdued. It would, however, fill a volume to treat these subjects in the manner their importance merits; and it is, perhaps, impossible at this distance of time to anticipate the changes in Europe or in India that may influence the question. It will suffice therefore, for the present, to offer some general observations on the more prominent points which have been brought under notice.

No government has ever evinced a greater disposition towards a just and humane rule than that of the East India Company. It has been as prompt to correct abuses as zealous and liberal in the support of all acts of the local authorities that promised benefit to the natives of its vast territories. An anxious desire to improve the finances has, at times, given a direction to the zeal of its servants not favourable to the increasing prosperity of the

country, from many parts of which too large a revenue has been exacted; but this desire has never led to the countenance of any violence or injustice. The same principle has given the authorities in England a strong but salutary prejudice against all those contests with native princes into which the governments abroad have been compelled to enter. This has had a happy operation; for though neither their instructions nor orders could prevent our attainment of that power which our condition in India forced upon us as a law of existence, the known disposition of the directors and the legislature certainly impeded the progress of conquest, and, by doing so, has, in all probability, given our dominion more solidity than it would have had if its conquest had been effected, as it might have been, in half the period.

The court of directors are in a great degree independent of the favours of the ministers of the Crown, who find it difficult to bend them to any purposes which they deem injurious to their reputation, or to the rights or privileges of those whom they consider as immediately under their protection. This renders them an invaluable shield, to guard from attack and encroachment the rights of the service abroad; but it is a remarkable fact that those whose interests, as a body, they are so prompt to defend, are not so sensible, as might be expected, of the safety they derive from this intermediate authority. The causes of this are obvious: the highest and most distinguished of these public officers, whose opinions and actions have a great influence over the rest, are too often discontented at their condition, and hostile to this branch of the Indian administration. The supposed disposition of the court to look chiefly to expenditure,<sup>43</sup> occasions every reduction either to be ascribed to them, or to a desire of conciliating their favour; while all acts of grace or liberality are referred either to the representations of local superiors in India, or to the interference of His Majesty's government. These conclusions are often unjust, but they are always made; and they operate to prevent those feelings of respect and attachment which it is so desirable men should entertain for that authority under which they are placed: those feelings, however, never can be maintained in large classes by a system that employs no means but those of circumscribed rules and cold, inanimate justice. There must be parts of the community lind'ed into



warmer sentiments than such means can ever inspire, or a government will never acquire the popularity which it is essential for it to possess. This ingredient of rule is singularly wanting in the Company's government. It has few if any zealous and active advocates, to meet those attacks with which it is continually assailed; and the consequence is, that, though serious reflection should teach the great body of those who are in its service that no change is likely to be for their advantage, all that they are in the daily habit of hearing and reading is calculated to make a different impression upon their minds.

The manner in which the directors exercise their great patronage has satisfied the public that it could not be in safer or more honourable hands; but it is to be regretted that this patronage should form the principal object in seeking the direction, and the chief reward after having attained it. The first circumstance induces some to become candidates for the office of director whose views are limited to the attainment of a provision for their families, relations, and friends; and the second deprives this government of one of the greatest means which all other governments possess, that of encouraging, rewarding, and attaching those by whom they are served, by admitting, to a certain extent, the claims of sons and near connexions of persons who have been distinguished in the public service. These are not only rejected by the directors in their corporate capacity, but their advancement is considered as an infringement of their most valued privilege. This is the fault of the system, not of the directors; they are paid in patronage, and a deduction from its amount would operate as a deduction from the wages of their labour. This fact clears them of all blame, but it does not render the evil less. It may, perhaps, be asserted that the interest and connexions of men in the service, combined with the humanity and consideration of individual directors, palliates, if it does not remedy, this defect of the system; but this is a mistake, for the very mode in which such favour is bestowed, though it may raise the reputation of him who confers it, lowers that of the body to which he belongs; besides, it is not seemly to see the sons of those who have stood the highest in the civil service of the Company, or of officers who have fallen in some memorable engagement, enter the list of common solicitors, or

carrying their petitions from door to door of those who preside for the season over the interests of that empire, the prosperity of which the parents of the supplicants have laboured with distinction, or died with glory, to promote.

The court of directors are often very generous to the widows and families of deceased officers of distinction left in distress, and they have always given a most liberal support to the funds instituted for their relief; but this liberality imparts little if any of that feeling which would be spread throughout the service by the son receiving such notice and protection on account of the services of his father. To estimate the value of this principle, we have only to look to its effects in the navy or army of England. Notwithstanding that eagerness for patronage which pervades these services, hereditary claims are seldom neglected or rejected, and the attention known to be given to them stimulates the highest minds to action in a degree beyond all other motives.

There is no part of the conduct of the directors in which they merit more praise than the attention paid of late years to the education of youth for the different branches of the service abroad. Different opinions may exist as to the modes they have taken of promoting that important object, but all are agreed in commending the spirit of liberality in which it has been pursued.

The court of proprietors is necessarily a popular body, and will always consist principally of that class which are termed the monied interest; but with this advantage, that almost all who return from India with fortunes purchase India stock, from the interest they take in the affairs of that country; and we may always look to this class as favourable to the pretensions of candidates for the direction whose claims are grounded on acknowledged talents and high reputation in the public service. The privilege possessed by the court of proprietors of investigating every act of the court of directors, or of those they employ abroad, which may in any way affect the prosperity of the corporation, gives a wide and useful range to their debates. Their confirmation being necessary to all pecuniary grants, above a small amount, renders their opinion of importance on all such measures; and there is a decided benefit in the publicity which the proceedings of the proprietors give to such questions. The utility of this body, as a check upon the abuse of power,

should be calculated, like other parts of our free constitution, less with reference to what they do, than to what they prevent others from doing. A great majority of the proprietors stands alike independent of ministers and the court of directors, and this position gives them much value as a branch of Indian legislature.

Many objections have been taken to the composition and form of the court of proprietors,<sup>44</sup> and some of them are no doubt well-grounded. Every question is discussed in open court, and decided by the majority of those present; but the minority may call for a ballot,<sup>45</sup> at which all proprietors, whatever be their sex or condition, are entitled to vote.

Sufficient has been said to enable us to judge, first, whether the government of the Company, as at present established, is competent to its increasing civil and political duties; and, secondly, if it is not, how far its form and constitution will admit of improvements which will better fit it for its sovereign functions. If it be determined, as it probably will be, that some alterations are indispensable, we may assume that the changes which have lately occurred, and those which are to be anticipated in its character, are most favourable to the making of any reforms that may be deemed expedient, either in the mode of election, the necessary qualification of candidates, or in the allotment of their duties after being nominated directors. Suffice it to say, that any plan for effecting such reforms will be incomplete, that does not unite the objects of improving the direction without taking from it that distinctive character which gives it a particular value, as part of our Indian legislature.

It is presumed that increase of knowledge, and more competence to the particular duties allotted to the different members of this body, would give them more weight and consequence, not only with all under their authority but with the public, than they enjoy at present; and it is believed this might be effected without any changes of a violent nature. Many motives which at present lead men to desire a seat in the direction might be lost, but others would be created, more suited to the altered condition of the Company and the Indian empire. Nor is there any part of such a reform that would materially affect the principles of the actual government, though it would

gradually introduce a considerable change in the duties of those by whom it was administered.

However we may be disposed to think that the Indian government in England, as now constituted, is not adequate to its increasing duties, we should not hurry to the extreme of its abolition, without calmly considering whether it is not capable of reform; but the consequence of preserving it under an improved system will be best established by a view of the most prominent of those evils which must inevitably result from its destruction.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the character and composition of any intermediate body that might be established in its place. The ingenuity of our ablest statesmen has been exhausted to devise plans for such an authority, and we should no doubt have a repetition of such expedients: but no rational being can doubt that the ministers who could desire the annihilation of the Company, and had strength to carry that measure into effect, would take care, in whatever manner they might mould their departments for the rule of India, to make the whole subservient to their own power. It is therefore necessary at present to offer some observations upon the probable consequences that would result from our vast eastern territories coming under the direct authority or influence of the Crown.

The first inevitable change on such an event would be in the different view taken of the Indian empire by the authority under which it was then placed. With the Company's government it has always been, and must remain, a primary consideration; with His Majesty's government it must be a secondary one. This has been too often shown, in cases where the latter had a right to interfere, to leave a doubt of the fact; and who can calculate the injury that would arise in India, when every measure which regarded that empire should be considered with reference to other and more immediate questions of expediency?<sup>46</sup>

The urgent desire of satisfying friends, and of disarming opponents, of conciliating the public, or of avoiding parliamentary discussions, would often outweigh all interests connected with our remote possessions in the minds of the wisest and strongest ministers; and at a period of weakness, the most serious evils might justly be apprehended from this source: nor could we

look to the House of Commons as that check which they form upon other occasions to any abuse or unwise exercise of power. Questions of a magnitude to excite the attention of that body would seldom be brought forward; and when they were, they would be so enveloped in details, that few would understand them; for a general and familiar acquaintance with the affairs of India can never be anticipated.

Under such circumstances, that great country might be treated as a colony, without having those defences against misgovernment which colonies, in general, possess. The West Indies, for instance, besides their local colonial assemblies, have an embodied interest, which is strong in parliament, and can advocate their rights whenever these are assailed; but we can look to no period when there can be any representation of the nations of India. On the contrary, we may look for associated interests against them, particularly when a system is adopted that will make every question connected with that country secondary to numerous other considerations.

The alarm taken by the public at the transfer of the patronage now enjoyed by the directors to the ministers of the Crown, has hitherto contributed, more than all the other reasons, to the preservation of the Company; and this is a rational and constitutional ground of fear, both as to its probable effects in India and England. The general view that has been taken of this subject, is, however, very limited. The actual patronage of the Company has been taken as that which, in the event of the abolition of the corporation, would fall to the Crown; but those who have computed in this manner, have forgotten the weakness of one party, and the strength of the other. It would not be difficult to arrange, without much increase of the influence of the Crown, for the disposal of the appointments of writers and cadets, nor is it of much consequence by whom, or how, these are selected, provided means are taken to ensure their possessing the requisite qualifications: but who will pretend to find a sufficient guard against the encroachments of the ministers on the rights and interests of the service abroad; and who, that understands this subject, but must be satisfied that the very existence of the empire depends upon every branch of that service being sufficiently protected? It will be asserted, that if India was under the

direct authority of the Crown, men of superior talent, who distinguished themselves in the country, would be brought much more forward, both at home and abroad, than they are at present, and that such a change would remedy this prominent defect in the actual system. This might be true; but though it is not meant to deny that His Majesty's ministers, as enlightened statesmen, would seek through such instruments to promote the good administration of our Eastern empire, can there be a doubt that they would also use this mean in aid of those efforts which their condition must compel them to make in order to extend their patronage?

The Indian government, when transferred entirely to the ministers of the Crown, would, even in England, present a much greater number of places than is at present imagined; and supposing, as no doubt would be the case, the departments abroad were defended by regulations and acts of parliament, numerous inroads nevertheless might, and would be, made upon them. There are many appointments, civil and military, which can hardly be said to belong to any particular branch of the service; these are dependant upon events, and the exigencies of the moment, and must be left, in a great degree, to the discretion of the local authorities. The latter, supposing such motives to exist at the fountain-head as those under which ministers are likely to act, might be multiplied to almost any extent; sinecures, now unknown, might be gradually introduced, and pensions multiplied. It may be asked, why all these abuses do not now take place: the reason is obvious; the local governments are checked in the exercise of every power that tends to the creation of such patronage by the directors, who, in their turn, are controlled by the India board, over which they watch with a vigilance that has in it almost a spirit of retaliation. Besides these checks, the ablest servants of the Company are forward to take alarm at the slightest acts of the local governments, or the authorities in England, which trench, in the most remote degree, upon what are deemed the exclusive rights of the different branches of the India service. This forms a chain of defence against the increase or abuse of patronage that cannot be broken; but there is no doubt that the Company is the most important link in this chain. If that

intermediate body did not exist, there would not be the smallest difficulty in reconciling those who filled the highest stations abroad to give their cordial aid to advance a system, in the benefits of which they would participate, and which would be favourable to their views of wealth and ambition; nor would this aid be limited to persons appointed from England. The price of distinction and high employment to men who had risen in the service in India, might often be the sanction of their names, and efforts to promote measures calculated to depress and injure that body to which they belonged, but from which their personal interests were separated.

With such aids to protect their patronage in a distant and ill-understood scene, who can believe that parliamentary interference would constitute an efficient check upon the proceedings of the ministers of the day, to defend which they had gained those who possessed the best talent and the most authentic sources of information.

It will not seem unfair to draw a conclusion of what would happen to our territories in India, if transferred to the Crown, from the history of those colonies which have been, and are, under its direct authority. It is believed that an investigation as to the mode in which patronage has been exercised in those distant possessions would not be favourable to the arguments of persons who advocate this change in our Indian government.<sup>47</sup>

If we desire that our rule over India should be permanent, we must take care that its constitution shall suit that of England; and we must view the operation of the latter, not at any moment when extraordinary causes produce extraordinary effects, but as it is in ordinary times. We cannot, for instance, calculate upon ministers remaining so long in office, and being so strongly supported by public opinion, as the present are. These circumstances may render them less dependent on patronage than any of their predecessors have been, or any of their successors are likely to be; but suppose opposing parties nearly balanced, will the successful party hesitate at any means within their power to maintain themselves? and when their adversaries prevail, what changes might we not anticipate? Such changes habit has rendered not merely familiar, but beneficial to England; but if they extended to India, their frequent occurrence would sap the

very foundations of our power; for it is not too much to add, that our hopes of preserving that empire must rest chiefly on our being able to keep its administration free from the certain injury consequent to its being subject to the influence of the politics in England.

The foregoing arguments are meant to show the evil effects which we may anticipate to India, and eventually to England, from the abolishing of the East India Company as a medium for the government of India; but the danger to be apprehended is not so much from the amount of patronage that would fall into the hands of the ministers of the Crown, as the manner in which the latter, from their obligations, and the frequent changes to which they are subject, would be likely to exercise it. The patronage of the Crown has, of late years, apparently greatly increased; but the strength gained by this part of our constitution has been more than counterbalanced by the increased influence of public opinion on every measure of the state. We have seen, however, that the salutary check which this constitutes neither does nor can apply in any efficient degree to the administration of India, that country being too remote, and its interests too imperfectly understood, to admit a hope of advantage from such influence. On the contrary, there is cause to fear that the action of public opinion at home might give rise to measures which, while they brought partial and doubtful benefit to Great Britain, would be productive of serious injury to India.



## CHAPTER 10

# *Local Government of India*

THE NEXT object of attention is the construction of our government in India. Mr. Pitt's Bill, however defective in other points, remedied a serious defect of the local administration of our eastern territories, by giving ample powers to the Governor-general-in-council of Bengal over the other presidencies.<sup>1</sup> It has been ascertained from the fullest experience, that the internal tranquillity of our possessions in India, as well as their security against external attack, has been very greatly promoted by the measure of placing one head over our wide territories in that quarter, which has put an end to contentions with subordinate authorities, and given combination to the resources of our empire.

Since this Bill was passed, many circumstances have occurred to increase the duties of the Governor-general in an extraordinary degree. They are, at present, more than almost any individual can perform. From this and other causes it would appear a very desirable improvement of the present system, to relieve this high public officer from details connected with the internal administration of the government of Bengal. His emancipation from those limited and local proceedings, in which much of his time is now consumed, would, in every way, be productive of public benefit, leaving him more at liberty than he now can be to attend to duties of higher importance, and to visit the distant parts of the empire he governs. The numerous occasions, during the last thirty years, in which the internal administration of Bengal has devolved upon a vice-president, has proved from experience that, as far as its internal rule is concerned, the interests of the Company would not suffer by such a change; indeed, a governor, who was confined to that duty alone, might be expected to fulfil it better than one whose attention is continually demanded by objects of more importance to the empire at large.

The clause<sup>2</sup> in the Act of Parliament which vests in the Governor-general the power of acting upon his own respons-

ibility, without the concurrence, or contrary to the opinion of his council, "in cases of high importance, and essentially affecting the public interest and welfare," had a particular reference to political measures which he may deem it his duty to adopt.<sup>3</sup> It would, therefore, be neither contrary to the principle nor to the usage of the present local government of India to devolve upon the Governor-general, personally, its complete political administration. In all measures of internal administration, he would act, with respect to Bengal, as he now does in the cases reported or referred for his approbation or decision from Madras and Bombay; and he would, consequently, as far as these were concerned, be more limited<sup>4</sup> in the personal exercise of power than he is at present. With regard to political affairs, he certainly would be less restrained; but then his direct responsibility to his superiors in England would be greater.

By such arrangement, the Governor-general would lose the benefit he derives from the information and experience of his present counsellors; but that deficiency would be well supplied by an arrangement that should give him the aid of the best talents the public service produced, to fill the highest situations in his establishment. That of political and foreign secretary, instead of being a station to which persons rise (as has been the usage) from labours in an office at Calcutta, should be placed upon a footing, both as to pay and rank, that would render it an office of ambition to the first officers in the political department. The same should be the case regarding the secretaries in the public, judicial, revenue, and military departments. If this plan were adopted, those high officers, and all who aid them, should be selected from the whole service, and not from any particular presidency. The benefit of this part of the arrangement would be incalculable. It would excite and reward talent, diffuse the best information of every part of India, elevate the services of Madras and Bombay (as far as pretension to these high employments went) to an equality with Bengal, remove jealousies, and make impressions favourable to the supreme authority. Its tendency would be to enlarge men's minds, and to carry them beyond the local, to a consideration of the general, interests of the empire; and, in this view, its effects would infallibly be productive of great good. There is no

disposition to detract from the merits of those<sup>5</sup> who have filled, or continue to fill, the high executive offices at Calcutta, some of whom have been distinguished men; but the constant residence of a great majority of this class on one spot, their feelings towards the particular services to which they belong, their natural attachment to institutions and establishments, to promote the success of which the best efforts of their lives have been devoted, must give them a bias which cannot but in some degree narrow the judgment on points that relate to the general administration of India. No objections could be offered to such a measure, on the ground of the public functionaries attached to the Governor-general not having the local knowledge of particular parts of India. That knowledge would be possessed by those who held similar offices under the subordinate governments, to whom would belong all the details. The secretaries of the departments, with the Governor-general, would be selected from their high ability and general acquaintance with the various interests and systems of the whole empire.

There is no cause produces such bad effects in our government in India as the continued efforts to apply<sup>6</sup> the same general rules, principles, and institutions, to every part of our extended and diversified empire; and no remedy could be applied so likely to obviate this evil as the arrangement now suggested: but it never could be adopted, unless the Governor-general's duties were separated from those that belong to the internal affairs of the presidency at which he resides.

There would be a further advantage in separating the duties of a Governor-general<sup>7</sup> from those of the local government of Bengal, in its withdrawing his high name from those minor acts which must always agitate a community composed like that of Calcutta. This separation would in no material degree diminish his power, but it would prevent the necessity of its daily exercise, in any manner that could lessen or injure those general impressions of respect which are so essential to the success of his administration. But, in forming this and other parts of the plan, great care must be taken that no diminution be made of the Governor-general's influence and patronage. These are necessary for the performance of his large duties, inasmuch as they increase that consideration and power which it is essential the person filling this high station should enjoy.

Under the present system, the Governor-general, when at Madras or Bombay, has the right of presiding at the council-board; and the objects proposed in Bengal might be effected without any material change of system, by the nomination of a permanent vice-president, to whom the details of the presidency would belong; leaving, however, the Governor-general the option of presiding on all occasions on which he might deem his doing so of importance.<sup>8</sup> This arrangement would prevent the collision which, under other circumstances, might, perhaps, be apprehended from the constant or frequent residence of the Governor-general at Calcutta.

Recent events have carried our direct or controlling power to the remotest parts of India, and a change is imperiously called for in the form of the administration of these distant possessions. This subject has been very fully treated in another work,<sup>9</sup> in which the appointment of a Lieutenant-governor for Malwa, and the adjoining countries, is strongly recommended;<sup>10</sup> suffice it here to say, that, in the actual state of our empire, it appears not only expedient to introduce a new system of local government into Central India, but into other<sup>11</sup> parts of our vast possessions. Such a measure would tend, in a very great degree, to inspire confidence in our subjects, promote tranquillity, and suppress danger when it arose. It may be added to these great advantages, that it would enable us to effect, with much more facility than we can at present, such improvements in our internal system as are recommended by experience, and are required by the difference of character and condition in the inhabitants of the countries we have to govern from those of the provinces for whose benefit our established institutions were framed. Nor is it unimportant to state, that this scheme of rule, while it gave strength to our power, would ultimately be attended with economy; for, through it, we might expect to diminish our most expensive establishments, by arrangements which would be favourable not only to the preservation of whatever of rank or high feeling still remains among the natives of India subject to our power and control, but to the desirable object of employing them in our internal government. Many persons who profess a great desire to enlighten and improve the natives of India, exclaim against plans which are calculated to confer upon these

natives high and confidential employment on the ground of their being, as a people, ignorant, corrupt, and immoral. Allowing for a moment this melancholy picture to be correct, can it enter into the mind of any man who has the slightest knowledge of human nature or of human communities, that mere instruction, whether moral or religious, will ever advance men in civilization while they are excluded<sup>12</sup> from all that stimulates the mind to good and great actions? We may teach them to understand, better than they now do, their own depressed and degraded condition; but if we wish that, as they acquire knowledge, they should maintain their allegiance and attachment to those by whom it is imparted, we must grant them confidence and respect; and if we succeed in giving them consequence in their own estimation, they will soon attain it in that of others.

It is not to be expected that we can ever completely succeed in establishing any cordial or social union with the natives of India. We are, as foreigners differing in manners, language, religion and feelings, too much opposed to them to admit of our ever realizing such hopes; but our efforts should nevertheless be continually directed to the object of reconciling them to their condition. Nothing can tend so much to this as their employment. The character of our government debars us from intrusting them with military or political power; but this is the strongest of all reasons for bringing them forward in every manner that is unattended with danger. The acquisition of knowledge, under a system which almost excludes the higher classes of our native subjects from any participation in the government of their own country, must either rouse them to efforts against our authority, or sink them into a state of abject submission, and leave them with few objects in life beyond indolence and sensual indulgence.

The great evil of our Indian administration, throughout all its branches, arises out of the endeavour to simplify, through the means of uniform systems, the whole scheme of our government over the natives. This, by rendering a knowledge of its details apparently easy, gives to those employed at the seat of government a confidence in their competency to minute superintendence, which renders them adverse to all deviations and changes from prescribed rules, however such may be recommended by local circumstances. It is to this feeling, and a natural love

of power, that we must ascribe the dislike evinced to any delegation of authority which lessens their consequence, by investing an individual with that rank and station which gives him a latitude of action beyond their daily check and control. The period, however, is arrived when all minor considerations must give way to the great object of securing the peace and promoting the prosperity of our extended territories; and full experience leads us to a conclusion, that no one measure would contribute more to these ends than that which has been here suggested.

### *JUDICIAL SYSTEM*

What has been said naturally leads to observations upon the system of judicature, which was first established in Bengal, and afterwards extended to Madras and Bombay. A minute examination of the merits of this system would occupy a volume. It is here meant to limit inquiry to one important point, which is, not whether the existing courts of judicature within our former possessions should undergo a change or reform, but whether they should be extended to our newly acquired territories.

The parliament of Great Britain decreed that the natives of India should be governed by their own laws and customs. The supreme government of Bengal established the existing system, on the ground, no doubt, of its being best suited to the country of Bengal, where Mahomedan rule had been for a long time established. They were probably induced to give the Mahomedan code<sup>13</sup> with all its defects, the preference over that of the Hindus, from the latter having nothing that can be well termed a defined and comprehensive system of jurisprudence upon which any courts of justice under our authority could act. But the situation of Bengal, in which this measure was first adopted, was widely different from other parts of India, which, it cannot be too often repeated, consist not of one but many nations, and has not one but many systems of rule and of law. Almost every province has different established customs, or, in other words, laws, from that next to it. These were not written, it is true; but observance of them from time immemorial has given them all the sanction and authority of laws, and their very forms are

associated with the most ancient and revered of the Hindu usages and institutions. The Mahomedan conquest of India was never complete. The Hindu princes and chiefs, though tributary, maintained the internal management of a great proportion of India; and even in other parts of the empire, Hindu usages were seldom interfered with, except for purposes of extortion or oppression. It may, therefore, be assumed, that, notwithstanding that spirit of domination, and that contempt for infidels, which marked the Mahomedan rulers, their law was never more than formally introduced<sup>14</sup> among their Hindu subjects, who continued, in almost all cases, to be governed by their own usages.

Subsequent to the introduction of the judicial system, the original law has been almost buried under volumes of regulations and ordinances, rendered necessary to adapt it to our principles of rule. The best talents of the civil service of the Company have been devoted to the judicial department; but it may be remarked that, although the courts of justice have been supported by the most liberal expenditure, and although those who preside in them are, generally speaking, as remarkable for their laborious application and abilities, as for their integrity, the establishment has never become popular among that people, in conformity to whose real or supposed prejudices it was constituted.

What has been stated will sufficiently account for this impression amongst the Hindus;<sup>15</sup> and we may affirm of the Mahomedans, that the numerous changes necessarily made both in the civil and criminal code, and the circumstance of a Christian judge presiding in the court, must have effaced much of that respect and awe which he may be conceived to have for a system of law founded on the Koran. Concluding such to be the general feeling of all classes, we cannot, considering the condition of society in which we found them, be surprised that a considerable proportion of the higher ranks of our native subjects, both Hindu and Mahomedan, should have felt dissatisfied at the introduction of a system which, in seeking the ends of rigid and impartial justice, give more attention to general principles and strict forms than to persons and prejudices.

The nature of the present work will not admit of entering at

any length upon a subject on which the opinions of able men are so divided as that of our judicial establishments. It is a much easier task to detect the errors of a system than to point out a remedy by establishing the superiority of one that is untried. There are some defects, however, of our judicature, on which almost all appear agreed.

The delays and expenses attendant upon the courts we have instituted form a very constant subject of complaint; and, while the purity of the English judges is recognised by all, there is an universal impression of the insolence and venality of their subordinate native officers, whose exercise of the authority in which they are clothed has been rendered more unpopular from their being often taken from persons in the lowest ranks of society.

The prejudices which exist against our courts of judicature in the country of Rohilkhand, where a great proportion of the inhabitants are Mahomedans, have been already noticed.<sup>16</sup> The opinion of the commissioners and of several of the judges in that country was given in very strong and decided language; and many other names of the best-informed and ablest civil servants in Bengal might be brought forward to establish the fact, that, in the countries under that government, where alone the system as had a full trial, there has been considerable disappointment; and that, notwithstanding the improvements which have been introduced, much remains to be done before our judicial institutions can be made to fulfil the objects contemplated by their benevolent founder. It is not meant to state that great good has not resulted from the institution of our courts of justice: with such principles as government has acted upon; with such industry and talent as have been applied to promote this system; and with the blessing of undisturbed tranquillity for forty years in the provinces of Bengal and Bihar, it was impossible that any system of judicature administered during so long a period should not have been productive of good. It is also admitted that our present subjects in the countries mentioned must now be more reconciled to this system than they were at first, and that to introduce any change subversive of an institution so long established, would on every ground be most unwise and impolitic; but on the other hand, all



must agree that it is our duty to continue our unwearied efforts to remedy its defects.<sup>17</sup>

The furnishing<sup>18</sup> of native law officers with the best means of instruction; the obliging of them to possess certain qualifications and respectability of character; and the increased employment and more extended jurisdiction of the courts of native commissioners<sup>19</sup> and Panchayats,<sup>20</sup> will be found the best mode of diminishing delays and expense: but the most essential of all measures would be, a complete revision of the whole of the laws and regulations, and the formation of an almost new code. To the accomplishment of such a task the very highest talents in the service should be directed; and it would not so much require superiority of legal skill in those employed<sup>21</sup> upon it, as that they should be endowed with minds unfettered by prejudice for or against any particular system, and be disposed to take the fullest advantage of the facts and experience which late years have accumulated. No expense would be too great to incur for the completion of such an object; but it is not likely this general code could be very large, for unless we continue a desire to impose, at all hazards, the same rules and regulations upon the whole of India, each division of our empire should have a subsidiary code of its own, framed with attention to the particular character and usage of its inhabitants.

It is here to be remarked, that we cannot be too careful how we extend our judicial system. Bengal Proper, from the character of its submissive inhabitants, was the safest part of our dominion upon which we could make such an experiment. Its introduction into Hindustan became more dangerous; and the Hindu inhabitants of Malwa and Rajputana, whose habits and customs have never undergone any great changes, even under the Mahomedan government, would ill receive such an intended benefit: but this subject has been treated elsewhere, and a plan has been suggested<sup>22</sup> for administering justice, which is believed to be better suited to the actual condition of those countries. We cannot better illustrate the principles of this plan, than by quoting the work to which we have alluded.

"Supposing," the author observes, "a local government established over Central India every way efficient for its permanent administration, the manner in which it should exercise its

functions ought (as far as general principles are concerned) to be settled. The first question would be, the mode in which it should administer justice, both in cases occurring in its own territories, and in those referred to its arbitration and decision by dependent states. It will however, before we treat this part of the subject, be useful to offer some general observations that have particular application to countries in the situation of Central India.

“The most serious part of this question, and one which lies at the very threshold, is, whether we are, in the shape and substance of our administration of justice, to pay most attention to our own rules, principles, and prejudices, or to those of the nation, or rather nations, we have to govern? We may lay it down as a first principle, that no system can be good that is not thoroughly understood and appreciated by those for whose benefit it is intended. The minds of men can never be tranquillized, much less attached, until they are at repose regarding the intentions of the authority under which they live, which they never can be till all classes see and comprehend its principles of government. If our system is in advance of the community, if it is founded on principles not comprehended by them, and has forms and usages adverse to their habits and feelings, we shall experience no adequate return of confidence and allegiance. To secure these results, we must associate ourselves with our subjects. We could never have conquered India without the assistance of the natives of that country, and by them alone can we preserve it. Our actual condition makes this necessity more imperative. We are not called upon to lower ourselves to their standard, but we must descend so far from the real or supposed eminence on which we stand as to induce them to accompany us in the work of improvement. Great and beneficial alterations in society, to be complete, must be produced within the society itself; they cannot be the mere fabrication of its superiors, or of a few who deem themselves enlightened. Every chord of the instrument must be in tune, or there will be no good harmony. This compels men, who desire real reforms in large communities, to dread what is often termed reason, because the majority, whom it is desired to benefit, are not rational, in the abstract and refined acceptation of the word;

and because no projected benefit can be operative till it is understood and recognised as such by those for whose good it is intended. This reasoning applies to all the legislative measures that we have adopted, or may hereafter adopt, in our eastern empire; but it is meant in this place to limit the deductions from it to those which appear expedient for Central India. The great majority of the inhabitants of that country are Hindus:—to introduce therefore, a jurisdiction grounded, even in its forms, on the imperfect code of the Mahomedans, who do not bear a proportion<sup>33</sup> to the whole population of five to the hundred, would be an innovation almost as great as the introduction of the English law, and one, from causes which have already been stated, much more repugnant to the feelings of the inhabitants. If we desire to conciliate the latter, or to benefit by their aid, we must adopt a system that is familiar and intelligible to them; and, as the groundwork of that, we must preserve and restore the courts of Panchayet."

## *POLICE*

The passive character and quiet domestic habits of a great proportion of our Indian subjects, leads them to place as much, if not more, value than any other nation upon an efficient police, to secure them in the enjoyment of that peaceful routine of life which they so generally prefer. Their respect for the government under which they live is measured more by the success with which it protects them from the thief, the plunderer, and the murderer, than by any other of its acts. The arrangements for the duties of police, introduced in Bengal at the period of the permanent settlement, were far from successful.<sup>34</sup> At one period, indeed, the failure of this system was quite alarming: opinions were divided whether this proceeded from the inactivity or inefficiency of those intrusted with its execution, or the radical defects of the system; but one point was clear, that while we prided ourselves in the liberal and just general principles upon which our judicial and revenue systems were grounded, the district all around Calcutta became infested with robbers and murderers in a degree that rendered, for many years, life and property more insecure than they were in the most barbarous

countries.<sup>25</sup> Efficient measures were adopted to correct this great evil, and the subject of police has since received much attention, both from the government at home and abroad.

A question has been long agitated, whether we should employ the collector of the revenue as a magistrate or not.<sup>26</sup> The objections to our doing so have their foundation on general reasoning, drawn from analogy of the practice of other states, and in that jealousy of the misapplication of power which belongs to the constitution of England, and which it is good to preserve in our administration of India, as far as we can without injury to our means for its efficient government. It is on the latter ground that the advocates for employing the collector rest their chief arguments.<sup>27</sup> They assert that the duties of the collector must lead to an intercourse with the inhabitants of his district, which will give him the means of preventing crime, and of seizing criminals, beyond what any other can possess. Without denying that the influence and power which he possesses as magistrate may be sometimes abused, they argue, that no evil is likely to arise from such occasional misconduct which can in any way balance the benefit to be derived from his agency in the efficient administration of police.

The above arguments have certainly more of Asiatic than of English principles, but they are not on that account less worthy of attention; for, after all, the question is not, what is most consonant to our own views and feelings, but what will be productive of the greatest good, and tend most to the happiness and security of our eastern subjects.<sup>28</sup>

The employment of civil servant having no other functions, as a magistrate, has this strong objection; that if his talents render him capable of efficiently fulfilling the important duties attached to that office, he must be early promoted to other stations, and there is no line in which experience is of so much consequence as in the department of police. The best recommendation of this plan is, that it forms a good education for a person who is to rise to the office of judge, but such instruction is only necessary when the judicial and revenue lines are kept distinct. Where the contrary is the case, there is no such school for judicial duties as the office of a collector. It has been justly observed<sup>29</sup> by a distinguished civil officer, "that the assistant

of the collector comes in daily colloquial intercourse with the cultivators and proprietors of the soil. In every ministerial act, he gains an insight into their domestic habits, their social dependance, and their more public concerns. He discovers the origin of their individual influence, of their mutual necessities, of their reciprocal dependance, and of their ultimate connexion with the government. He thus acquires a notice of the springs and motives which actuate them, and, by the nature of his duty, is engaged rather in conciliating and arbitrating, than in dictating and enforcing his opinions.

"But how widely different," he adds, "is the situation of an assistant to the magistrate, who instantly begins by being a judge in every case, before he has an opportunity of forming even any very general ideas on the nature of the affairs he must daily determine. After a course of practice, he may establish rules for his guidance, founded on the uniformity of his own decisions, or by other means; but, at starting, he can have had no elements to regulate their principles; every thing is necessarily new and strange to him, from a want of any previous familiarity with the propensities and peculiarities of the people. To begin, then, by first deciding, and afterwards learning the matter, is surely preposterous.

"The revenue assistant," he concludes, "commences his course by placing himself among the people in an easy and unreserved manner; the judicial, by elevating himself above them with a distant and commanding air. The former is first employed in learning, from its springs and ties, the rudiments of a novel species of policy; the latter, without any lights, in determining its rights and usages."

What has been quoted from this long and able despatch is merely to establish that, even if a regard for general principles, and alarm at the possible abuse of power, may prevent our blending magisterial duties with those of the collector, we may rest satisfied that the former will, when intrusted to youth, be best performed by those who have been schooled in the revenue department.<sup>30</sup> It is in its minute details that a true knowledge of the art of Indian administration can alone be learnt; and whenever this branch of the government is thoroughly well-administered, and those to whom the police is committed are every way

efficient to their duties, a great burden will be taken from the higher branches of the judicial department, and our subjects will become more satisfied with our rule when the effects of our system are to repress, not to produce litigation; and to prevent crimes by decreasing the hope of escaping detection and punishment.

The introduction of a new system of police in Bengal was contemporaneous with the permanent settlement of the revenue, and was framed, in a great degree, to meet the changes which that measure made in the community. The fluctuating state of the revenue of the provinces which it was desired to settle; the great abuses which prevailed among all clothed in authority, from the highest Zemindar to the lowest officer of a village, suggested the complete abolition of their power, as the most effectual remedy of the evils which resulted from the tyranny and oppression of this host of petty authorities. The motives that led to this sweeping act can never be doubted: it was dictated by a pure spirit of benevolence and justice; but a better and more minute knowledge of the interior of the frame of Hindu communities would have prevented our casting away such means of preserving the internal peace of the country. It would have led to an effort to reform those, whose place in the society in which they were born would have rendered them, if we had succeeded, as efficient instruments of good as, under a different system, they had been of bad order; but no such effort was made, and a police establishment was given to each magistrate of persons taken indiscriminately from the population of the country.

The failure of the system in the province of Bengal has led to great efforts at improving the police in that part of India; and, to a certain extent, they have been successful. In Cuttack, where the village establishments have been reformed and renovated, and every power, consistent with the principles of our rule, delegated to the principal natives, the effects have been most happy to the peace of the country.<sup>11</sup>

An improved and more effective system of police has been introduced into several of our recently-acquired possessions. We may, however, lay it down as a maxim, that our success in this, as in other branches of our rule, will chiefly depend on our preserving those institutions and gradations of society which we

found established, and on our giving to the most respectable of our native subjects local employment of description that will raise instead of lower them in the community to which they belong; nor are we to expect any health or efficiency in our internal system, till it thus encourages this class of our subjects to the most active personal exertions for the preservation of the public peace of their native districts.

It has often been proposed<sup>32</sup> to employ a proportion of the native officers and men of our army in the duties of the police, and no plan could be more calculated to encourage and reward a class of men on whose fidelity and valour the duration of our empire must depend. This subject, however, will be noticed hereafter; suffice it here to state, that we must not allow ourselves to be deterred from the adoption of the measure (which is much more important in a political than a financial view) by any arguments that do not prove it to be an injustice to our other subjects, or pregnant with danger instead of security to the internal peace of the country and the general interests of the empire.

European officers are employed at the Thana<sup>33</sup> establishment of Bengal, and would be required wherever similar institutions are made; but an important question would arise, how far their services might be essential in the event of a change of system, that should improve the whole police establishment of India, and convert it into means of encouraging and rewarding the native soldiery. There is one fact connected with this question which must not be omitted. The feelings and principles imbibed by military habits are distinct from all others, and it may be asserted that it very rarely happens that a person educated and employed in civil life understands how to treat soldiers. This particularly applies in India, where the change produced on the natives from entering our army is very considerable. The nature of the duty devolved on native soldiers employed in the police, would require their being kept under strict order; and, perhaps, the best mode of securing the success of such an arrangement would be to select from the army well-qualified officers,<sup>34</sup> of a certain standing, as superintendents of police, or as magistrates. This would not be depriving the civil service of employments that are or ever can be objects of profit or ambition; and they

would soon discover the advantage of relief from a mass of petty and vexatious duties, which, if sedulously attended to, must interfere with other and higher labours, and which, on the other hand, cannot be neglected, even for a moment, without danger to the property and, perhaps, the life of some member of the community.

Many objections may be made to this plan. It will be urged that the very rapidity of execution, which forms the excellence of military officers in the field, would be a serious fault when they were acting as civil officers; that from habit they would be prone in peace to a vigour beyond the law; and that a clashing with the civil authorities might be apprehended. It may, perhaps, be added, that in the event of the European officers of the army ever forgetting their duty to government, they would find aid instead of obstruction from those to whom, by this plan, the charge of the public peace would be confided.

In this question, as in every other of any magnitude connected with the government of India, measures must be decided by the balance of the advantages against their defects. It is always a choice of difficulties. If, from a consideration of the public safety, it is indispensable to employ any part of the native soldiery in the police, and if it is expedient to have this description of persons commanded by those who are accustomed to them, means must be adopted to render the system as little hurtful as possible to the other parts of the administration, and to obviate all apprehension of its ever being attended with danger to the state. To effect this, a complete separation perhaps of those who entered the police department from the army might be necessary; in such case, they might be selected for the lower situations of this new line as soon as qualified for them, and rise by merit and exertion to the higher gradations of the department. The army would in fact become an ordeal of character, while to a certain extent it formed the habits of men who would constitute, what is much required, a second class of civil officers, limited to specific and subordinate duties. It would perhaps be better to commence by trying this plan on a **limited scale**, and if it succeeded, it could easily be extended.



*REVENUE*

The limits of this work will admit only a few general observations on the collection of the revenue of our Indian empire. This question, which is of primary consequence to our prosperity in a financial view, acquires still more importance from its intimate connexion with the subjects that have been previously treated; for it may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that, as we succeed or fail in our revenue settlements, we shall increase or decrease litigation and crime. The real fact is, that from the character and construction of Indian communities, the happiness and comfort of nine-tenths of the population depends more upon our fiscal than our judicial or political arrangements.

From time immemorial the inhabitants of India have been an agricultural people; thence that extraordinary and minute division of land, and of all the claims and rights which are connected with it, from the share of the sovereign of the country, and the dues of his officers, down to the smaller portions which belong by hereditary right to the lowest among those who form part of the village community, or who cultivate the soil. The period of such division of the land cannot be exactly traced, but it probably existed for many centuries before the Mahomedan invasion. These conquerors, if they could spread their power, appear to have been content, with few exceptions, not only to leave the Hindu institutions undisturbed, but to incorporate them in their own government. It was not however to be expected, amid the wars and revolutions with which India has so often been afflicted, that her provinces would continue under an uniform system, even if they ever had one. The change in population of some, the complete desolation of others, could not but alter the forms as well as the principles of the most ancient and revered institutions; but still, from the extremity of Cape Comorin to the north-western limits of India, a striking similarity of general features may be found in all that regards the culture of the soil and the rights attached to it.

Where the sword of the conqueror has not violated the rights of the proprietor or the cultivator, he claims the land of his fathers, (subject to the land tax, or government share) as well as all that belongs to his condition in his native district, as his

indefeasible inheritance; and where violence and usurpation have destroyed these rights, they have generally been re-created by the tendency of the inhabitants to return to the ways of their progenitors, or by the policy of their rulers, who saw in those institutions aids to their own government.

The new head of the village, where such was the case, and all under him, had claims or rights conferred upon them, more or less, as circumstances dictated, resembling their former shape; and the mere fact that his ancestors had, for two or three generations, tilled certain fields, established the right of the cultivator in the soil he cultivated, which nothing but injustice and tyranny could violate. The local differences in the value and extent of such rights were numerous; but everywhere they existed, and were so well understood and sanctioned by usage, that they not only formed the foundation of every revenue arrangement, but preserved, amid wars and changes, amid rapine and plunder, ties and principles which had an effect in restoring order and prosperity that could hardly be credited, except by those by whom it has been witnessed.<sup>35</sup>

The first great and decisive step of the English government towards establishing a fixed revenue system in India, was the permanent settlement made of the territories of Bengal, in 1789. This measure, the merits of which have given rise to great discussion,<sup>36</sup> is now admitted, by its warmest advocates, to have been too much hurried, and to have been adopted with very incomplete information, both as to the extent and resources of the countries settled, and to the various claims, rights, and relations of its inhabitants.

It is not meant to enter upon this large question further than is necessary to determine, how far, and in what mode, it may be expedient to extend the permanent settlement to more recently-acquired territories.<sup>37</sup>

The fundamental principles of this measure are, to facilitate the collection of the revenue, to put an end to all fluctuations in our receipts from the land, and to encourage improvements, by giving the benefit of them to those by whom they are made. It was assumed by Lord Cornwallis, when he introduced this system, that, supposing the right of the zemindar<sup>38</sup> to the soil not to be the best, (which he believed it to be) it was expedient,

for many reasons connected with the improvement of the country, to vest it in him, or some other person: "it being (to use his own words) immaterial to government what individual possesses the land, provided he cultivates it, protects the ryot, and pays the revenue."

The above is sufficient to show the character of that fundamental general principle upon which Lord Cornwallis acted. Experience, and more intimate acquaintance with the usages, the feelings, and the institutions of the natives of India, led his colleague, Sir John Shore, to make every effort to obtain delay in a measure of which he foresaw the evils; but the ardent desire of Lord Cornwallis to confer what he believed would prove a blessing to our subjects, and a benefit to government, made him overrule every objection to the immediate accomplishment of his favourite plan.<sup>39</sup>

This great measure was confessedly adopted without a minute or correct notion of the actual state of property, and the rights of the various classes of the inhabitants, particularly those of the lower orders. It seems to have been expected that certain broad general principles which simplified the revenue system, and combined the interests of great landholders with the prosperity of the country, would produce such good as to make amends for all the minor evils that were anticipated. How far these expectations have been confirmed will be judged by those who attentively peruse the volumes of official documents which have been published on this important subject.

The zemindars, whom it was the desire of this system to elevate, became its earliest victims. Ill suited, from their habits and character, to fulfil the duties which their new condition required, they abused the power it conferred upon them, to oppress the minor proprietors and cultivators. The latter were loud in their complaints, and pleaded prescriptive usages. Their plea was listened to. Regulation upon regulation was brought forth to defend them. Presuming upon this support, they fortified themselves with volumes of law, and, in their turn, resisted the zemindar, who could only recover by suits, which incurred great delay and expense, that rent, which, according to his tenure, he must pay, or, in default of payment, expose his land to be sold. The government vested itself with

a power it had denied him, to proceed by a summary process, and without expense. It is hardly necessary to add, that, in consequence of this regulation, and their general character and habits, almost the whole of the zemindars of Bengal who had been confirmed in their real or supposed rights were swept away, and their estates purchased by another class; who possessed wealth, but had seldom any previous connexion with the cultivators of the soil. This unhappy result was chiefly referrible to the precipitance with which the permanent settlement was introduced, and to a want of that intimate knowledge of the constitution and rights of the different classes of the society which should have preceded a change, which, affecting as it did all the rights of landed property, was, perhaps, the greatest ever made in any country by a mere act of legislation.

The principal motive to the permanent settlement was, to put an end to a very great evil, the constant fluctuation of our former plans for collecting the revenue. But, in examining the merits of this system, we must be careful to distinguish between the object and the means adopted for its accomplishment. The establishment of a regulated and moderate assessment is one beyond all others in wisdom and justice; but that might as easily have been applied to those who had real property and right in the soil as to the zemindars or landholders whom we found or created. It is pleasing to see a rich landlord expending his wealth in improvements; but the sacrifices made by government to promote the general prosperity will not be rewarded, unless the frugal and industrious of the cultivating class have the path open to obtain property, as well as to preserve what they already possess. A government which precludes itself from any increase of territorial assessment must look to the general diffusion of wealth for the future improvement of its resources; and though a long period may elapse before it can venture to subject to direct taxation any of the possessors of that affluence which its liberal policy has created, it may expect to receive an early and constantly-increasing return, through the enlarged demand for the necessary commodities and luxuries of life required for a population advancing in numbers and comfort, and the consequent progressive improvement of duties and customs.

The experience derived from the errors committed in the permanent settlement of Bengal, were useful as lessons in the introduction of a settlement over part of our territories of Madras and Bombay; but serious doubts<sup>40</sup> soon arose as to the policy of a further extension of this revenue system, and its progress was arrested.<sup>41</sup> The objections urged were more to the mode than the principle of it: no one could deny the benefits that must result both to the state and to its subjects, from the demands of the former and the payments of the latter being regulated as early as complete knowledge would admit of this being done with justice to all parties. The importance of moderate assessments was also universally acknowledged as the foundation of all improvement. The wisdom of recognising long-established zemindary rights was not denied; but it was urged, that, by the creation of landholders, and the sale of lands to the highest bidder, we must either diminish our receipts by the admission of the purchaser to a part of the government share of the produce, or vest him with a right of exacting more than is accordant with usage from minor proprietors and hereditary cultivators, classes of men who, it was argued, had the best title to benefit from any remission we could afford to make in our demands from the soil. Many of these arguments were grounded upon local differences, both as to the tenure of the lands and the character of the people; and, with reference to this difference, it was represented to be as incompatible with our interests and policy as it was inconsistent with humanity and good sense to insist, for the sake of uniformity, in our own institutions and establishments, upon tribes and nations so various as those under our dominion in India being all subject to the same mode of realizing the revenue: and upon this point it may be observed, that though we cannot retract the past, nor withdraw the pledges we have given, we should not deny ourselves the benefit of experience to regulate our conduct for the future. If we have found, on minute investigation, that the inhabitants of one province have been for generations adverse to the usages of another; that their rights vary; that they have been accustomed to a different mode of collecting the revenue, and of adjusting their disputes; it comes to the plain question, whether we are to accommodate our rule to the

various prejudices, habits, and opinions of the natives under our sway, or to study our own convenience by forcing them all into one system.<sup>42</sup>

If it is deemed politic (as no doubt it is) to make a sacrifice of any part of the revenue to which we are entitled, for the object of raising a superior class of natives, from whose rank and respectability we may look for aid in the internal rule of the country, we should elevate in his native district the military officer who has served with distinction in our army; the meritorious and honest native law officer, or judge; the respected Mukh, or president of a court of Panchayat; the most industrious and deserving of the heads of districts or villages: we may imitate with advantage the native governments, which grant certain portions of waste lands to him who constructs a well, or any other work beneficial to the community; like them, we may shape our system to admit the rise of the frugal and industrious cultivator: all these are legitimate modes by which we may reward service, stimulate to exertion, and strengthen our internal government. They form indeed our only means of effecting this object; and we should not improvidently waste them by admitting, on the mere ground of their ability to advance a small sum, a set of men without personal respectability or local ties to occupy this vacant but important niche in the community.

In districts that are in the immediate vicinity of capitals, or large commercial towns in different parts of our eastern empire, the influx of wealth will always produce changes in society and in property. The waste will become a field, the field a garden; the cultivator will either part with his hereditary or prescriptive rights, or, partaking of the desire of gain that pervades the community in which he lives, will carry his labour to market, and be satisfied with changes arising out of circumstances which, through the allurements of profit and luxury, gradually wean him from the ways of his forefathers. But the measures necessary to facilitate this progressive alteration of the condition and relations of such a society must be limited and local. They are quite unadapted to a great proportion of our extended territories, and the attempt to introduce them in some of these must have consequences directly opposite to what we desire. They

will outrage those whom we wish to conciliate; they will disturb where our object is to settle; and, from not being understood, and from being at variance with cherished feelings and usages, they will have the effect of rendering unpopular a government whose great objects are peace, humanity, and justice.

Opposite systems of collecting the revenue have been pursued by the native governments in different parts of India. They have at times employed Zemindars, and at others, resorted to the Mozuairee, or village.<sup>43</sup> and the Ryotwary<sup>44</sup> settlement. To the latter, which has been lately introduced into some countries under the Madras government, many objections have been made.<sup>45</sup> It has been urged that it enters too much into detail; that it requires more application and talent in a collector than can generally be found; and that from its raising rent in proportion to industry, it is calculated to depress the cultivators, and, in short, to make a population of paupers. It has also been urged as a strong general ground of objection to this system, that it necessarily requires that the revenue officers should be vested with an authority which they must be prone to abuse, because their interests and their duties will be in opposition. To the first of these objections it is answered, that it is better for the cultivator that the details of his settlement should be arranged with the European collector than through a middle man, like the zemindar. To the second it is stated, that an efficient revenue officer, when once acquainted with the details of his district, will find his labours easy, and the minuteness of his investigations, and the effects of his constant intercourse with the inhabitants, will in a great degree save the labour of the judge. In reply to the third objection, it is denied that rent is raised on industry, though it rises with produce: and with regard to the objections grounded on mistrust of the integrity, and jealousy of the power, of the revenue officers, it is answered, that such principles, however just, are more adapted to the government of England than of India, and that, in our administration of the latter, we are too often misled by our theories on such points to aim at an abstract excellence of rule, which is at equal variance with the habits of our subjects and the character of our government.<sup>46</sup>

Such is a brief view of the arguments for and against a system

of revenue which has been introduced, or rather continued, in several of our provinces with eminent success. It would, perhaps, be as remote from wisdom to extend it over all India as the permanent settlement. There are many territories in our possession so situated that nothing but the liberal efforts of government can restore them to prosperity and maintain them in it. To fix their revenues would be a security against nothing but the possibility of our deriving benefit from their improvement. Riches must flow into countries through other sources than agriculture, before government can be secured against losses from bad seasons, famine, and war; and until it has such security, it seems reasonable that it should have a share of the advantage resulting from increased produce. This principle is quite congenial to the habits and sentiments of the cultivators. They require no more than a just and moderate assessment upon their receipts; generally speaking, they do not understand our more enlarged views of fiscal administration, and, consequently, cannot appreciate them. The governments in India which preceded ours never made a permanent settlement of revenue; yet experience proves that where the rulers were just, their system of collecting the revenues was quite compatible with the improvement of the country, the diffusion of wealth, and the creation of landed property.<sup>47</sup> The agricultural classes of our subjects are more than any other attached to their usages; all changes, even when intended for their benefit, alarm them. This arises from their having no power of resistance. They know the extent of the burden they have been accustomed to bear, but from ignorance dread that for which it may be exchanged. From these causes, it is as unwise to adopt any general system over our various possessions as it is fallacious to argue that our subjects may not be as happy and as prosperous, under systems to which they are accustomed, as under those we would introduce to meet our own convenience, and our ideas of amelioration.

The improvement in the appearance of the country from extended cultivation is hardly to be deemed a test of any system. That may, in all cases, be referred chiefly to the increase of the portion of the population whose pursuits are exclusively agricultural, consequent to exemption from war. This last conclusion



appears to be proved by the condition of every part of India that has for many years enjoyed that exemption; and it is certain that many provinces, under the most arbitrary rule of native governments, are, from the operation of this cause, as flourishing as any lands in the possession of the Company.

Many have taken alarm at that spirit of minute investigation<sup>48</sup> which has lately prevailed, considering that it would prove injurious to our subjects in its operations and results; but the more perfect the knowledge which is possessed by those who govern the country, the less exposed its inhabitants must be to misrule and imposition, unless we suppose a case where such information be sought as the means of extortion and oppression. It may be, and has been, urged that, in some parts of India where this system has been introduced, we have used the information we acquired, for no purpose but to bear harder upon the cultivators, and that our desire of increase of revenue has deprived them of every hope of benefit that could stimulate men to industry and exertion. Allowing, in order to try the question, that such an assertion is correct, it would prove no more than that we have made a bad use of our knowledge, not that the knowledge was unnecessary. We may, indeed, assume that without it we must continue in many material points to rule and legislate in the dark, and that our desire to promote the general prosperity of our subjects by a moderate assessment, regulated by just principles, will never be essentially done till the fullest and most detailed information enables us to effect the object with a clear understanding of what is consonant to the usages, appropriate to the condition, and accordant with the true interests of every class of the various inhabitants of our territories. Much has recently been done by an active spirit of minute inquiry into revenue, and other matters connected with the good government of India; but our knowledge has yet gone little beyond a discovery<sup>49</sup> of our ignorance, and a long period must still elapse before we have accumulated facts and experience on which we can venture to establish permanent and unalterable arrangements. But this period, though comparatively long in the life of man, is but a short space in that of an empire.

These general observations upon the judicial, police, and revenue administration of our Indian territories are the result of

much study of the details of those branches of our government. The most important of the lessons we can derive from past experience is to be slow and cautious in every procedure which has a tendency to collision with the habits and prejudices of our native subjects. We may be compelled by the character of our government to frame some institutions different from those we found established, but we should adopt all we can of the latter into our system. The progress of our power has been favourable to the commercial community, and to some of the poorest and most defenceless of our subjects; but it has been the reverse to the higher orders of the natives, and to the military classes. On the remedying of these defects, the duration of our dominion will in a great degree depend. From the success of our arms in extending it, we have lost the great advantage that we before had in the contrast of the misrule and oppression of former governments. This loss can be repaired only by that security which we may obtain through the wisdom of our internal government; but that should be administered on a principle of humility, not of pride. We must divest our minds of all arrogant pretensions arising from the presumed superiority of our own knowledge, and seek the accomplishment of the great ends we have in view by the means which are best suited to the peculiar nature of the objects. By following another course, we may gratify self love; we may receive the praise of each other; we may be applauded in England for the introduction of plans and institutions which Englishmen understand and appreciate; but neither the abstract excellence of our systems, nor the industry, purity, and talent of those employed in carrying them into execution, will avert the evils which must result from every measure that is in opposition to prejudices so fixed, and habits so rooted, as those of the natives of India. That time may gradually effect a change, there is no doubt; but the period is as yet far distant when that can be expected: and come when it will, to be safe or beneficial, it must be, as these pages inculcate, the work of the society itself. All that the government can do is, by maintaining the internal peace of the country, and by adapting its principles to the various feelings, habits, and character of its inhabitants, to give time for the slow and silent operation of the desired improvement, with a constant impression that every attempt to accelerate this end will be attended with the danger of its defeat.

*CIVIL SERVICE*

These observations upon the various branches of the internal government of our Indian territories lead to a consideration of the character of that body of public officers by whom it is administered.

The civil service of the Company has undergone many changes, but it has, at all periods, and under every system, produced men of eminence and distinction.

The prudence of those who governed India in the earlier stages of our power did not precipitately depart from institutions which they found established for the administration of the territories of which they had gained possession. The natives were continued for a period, associated with the Europeans, both in fiscal and judicial duties. As long as this was the case, the European civil servant, who presided over a district or department, was often ignorant of the language of India,<sup>50</sup> and little versed in the details of his office. These were intrusted to some of the higher classes of the natives, who, according to their station, shared in the emoluments, which continued the same as had been customary in the same offices under the Indian governments.<sup>51</sup> This system had its advantages and defects; a more abrupt change would, probably, have raised serious obstacles to the advance of our power, which was most essentially promoted by the rank and influence of the natives employed in association with the European servants; but who, as the latter acquired practice in the duties of detail, lost the consideration and emolument which they had previously enjoyed. This change making many of them retire from employment, their place was supplied by persons of lower rank and more subservient character, who were less scrupulous as to the means of enriching themselves, and possessed little or none of that weight with the inhabitants of the country which gave value to the services of their predecessors. This new class, by still grasping at profits which had been declared illicit, and by efforts to maintain undue influence and power, brought obloquy, not only on themselves, but on all those by whom they were trusted and employed.

It is a subject of congratulation, that a change has taken place by which the civil servants of the Company have become

personally better qualified for the performance of their duties; but we must not hasten to a conclusion that the former system had no advantages, and the present no defects. The severe reflections so frequently made against the former state of the civil service are far from being just. This body of functionaries, it has been admitted, had neither such general acquaintance with the languages of India, nor with the details of their several stations, as they now possess. It is true also, that recompense for their services was derived from sources more undefined, and more liable to abuse than those at present established; but a knowledge of the native languages, though a most important aid to the personal transaction of business, was, from the nature of our first rule, and the manner in which that was exercised, of comparatively small consequence. Under the reformed and more exact system of the administration of our territories, it very properly enters into the education of youth, and is made an indispensable qualification for office; but in the estimate of character, it should have no more than its just weight, and should rank subordinate to industry, strict principle, general knowledge, and sound judgment, which must combine to form the able public servant. As an auxiliary to the development and useful action of these qualities, an acquaintance with the languages of India is most desirable; but unassociated with them, it is nothing, and injury has sometimes resulted to the public from a too exclusive consideration being given to this attainment.

Though the former civil servants of the Company did not discharge the minuter duties of their stations as they do at present, the records of the state fully show that this proceeded from no inferiority of general knowledge, or of individual character, but was the mere result of the difference of the mode of government. The same cause produced a difference in the sources from which they derived the remuneration of their services. In receiving, instead of a regulated salary, the fees and profits which had been enjoyed by the natives to whose offices they succeeded in newly-acquired territories, they only followed the usage of the country; and they were sanctioned in it by their own government. It suited the character of the Indian administration in England, and was altogether adapted to that of our first rule in India. That it was loose, undefined, and liable to great abuse, is admitted.

The evils of such a system became manifest, and were remedied; but assuredly, while it continued, the civil servant who drew his emoluments from open and recognised sources was no more blamable than some of the first men in England who hold offices that continue to be paid by fees, or fines, in the manner established by our ancestors.

There are some considerations connected with the actual state of the civil service of the Company which demand very serious attention. From the days of Lord Clive to the present, there have been the same complaints regarding this class. They have been represented as being prone to extravagance on their first arrival in India; as very generally involving themselves deeply in debt, and thereby contracting habits and obligations adverse to their own happiness and respectability, as well as to the interests and good of the public service. The general fact is admitted, but the remedy has not yet been found. An increased liberality of allowances has tended only to augment that propensity to thoughtless extravagance, natural to their age and prospects in life. Youth is ever sanguine, and its calculations of the means it will obtain of overcoming difficulties are too commonly fallacious. Yet we observe that, in other walks of life, motives have been discovered of sufficient power over young minds to check such dispositions, and to inculcate habits of economy grounded on a generous desire of independence, and altogether free from any mean or sordid spirit of saving. Such effects, which we observe around us in young men of the best prospects, while trained to their assigned duties in houses of commerce, in the law, and in public offices, should satisfy us that the end we seek is attainable even amid scenes of temptation; for it will not be denied that the capital of England holds forth more allurements to extravagance than that of India.

It is important to consider whether there is anything in the education and the duties of the young civil servant of the Company which can account for this striking difference. It has been objected to the former, that it proceeds more upon the principle of forming the future man for the important stations to which, from the nature of the India service, he is liable to be hereafter called, than to make an unpretending assistant to a collector or judge, who is gradually, through the means of industry and

information, to advance to higher employment. It is admitted to be indispensable that young men should attain the acquirements suited to their destinations in life; but it is contended, and with truth, that all that education can effect, is forming the youth by discipline and by habits, in a manner that will give him the power of increasing his knowledge from facts and experience; and that knowledge, to be useful, must grow with the man, go hand in hand with the habits and occupations of his life, and wait upon the gradual development of his character.

The young civil servant of the Company knows that he cannot fail to be employed in some branch of the service; his want of acquirements may obstruct his advance, but irregular habits and being in debt (which in some cases must lead to deterioration of feeling and of principle) is no impediment. How different is the situation of the young men in England, with whom any comparison may be drawn! However liberal their education, their attention is constantly fixed upon the first step of the ladder: they know that dissipation and debt will at any stage arrest their career; and the examples they see around them operate as a most salutary check, to keep them regular and steady in their efforts to ascend to the head of the line in which they are placed.

No part of this question has undergone more discussion than that which relates to the colleges established for the education of the youth of the Indian civil service.<sup>53</sup> Those of Calcutta<sup>53</sup> and Haileybury have, like other institutions, their advantages and defects. The former certainly redeemed youths from some bad habits consequent to their being sent too early to sequestered stations in the country. It diffused<sup>54</sup> more general competence to their duties among the civil servants; and, from the opportunity of becoming acquainted with their character, enabled government to allot them to the various departments of the service for which they were best qualified. A spirit of emulation was also excited, and young men, studying under the immediate observation of those by whom they were to be employed, made efforts to distinguish themselves beyond what they would probably have otherwise done. These were great advantages: the chief evil was the congregating of so large a body of youth in a luxurious capital, where it was difficult, if not impossible, to check extra-

vagance, to which they had every imaginable temptation both as to objects of expense and facility of attaining them. In such a scene, a more rigid discipline than has hitherto been deemed compatible with the age and condition of these young men was necessary to a complete or efficient check over their conduct.

The college in England is upon the most liberal scale, and the students have every advantage that the tuition of able and enlightened men can afford them.

It is not meant to enter upon an examination of the various arguments which have been recently brought forward for and against this institution. One part of the subject, however, upon which opinions are divided, demands particular attention; it is the age at which young men should be sent to India. Those who have minutely watched the progress of youth in all branches of the public service, will probably be of opinion that, taking the balance of good and evil to be found in different systems, there is more hope of good from a regulation which would send the well-instructed youth of seventeen, or at farthest eighteen, to that country, than at a later age. He might, it is true, gain much learning by staying a year or two more, and some students might eventually rise to greater fame in consequence of having the advantage of more mature instruction; but the object is to form, not eminent individuals, (these will always form themselves,) but a class of men competent to certain duties; and it is of great consequence that they should be of an age when the mind will easily adapt itself to the condition in which they are first placed. A very humble sense of their own deficiencies will be of more benefit, on their entering upon their subordinate duties in India, than all the knowledge they can attain, if accompanied by that pride and self-sufficiency which in youth are too often its concomitants. The general argument in favour of their remaining to a more mature age is, that besides their education being more complete, their good principles will be more fixed, and they will be imbued with a love and knowledge of their own country. Nothing can be more desirable than such results, if they were certain; but though there may be many exceptions, speaking generally, we must assume that, from the age of seventeen to twenty, the habits and principles are oftener injured and unsettled than improved and fixed;

particularly when youth are exposed to the increased hazards that will arise from their numbers in the best-regulated establishment, and that at a period when they are likely to receive more than common indulgence from parents and relatives on the point of losing them for a long term of years, if not for ever: moreover, a taste for the pleasures of their own country, which is generally acquired in the first years of manhood, is not a happy preparation for the life to which they are destined. They are too often disposed, when so advanced in age, either to turn with disgust from scenes amid which they must pass the greater part of their lives, or to seek, in a course of thoughtless extravagance, some solace for what they conceive they have abandoned.

That there are dangers, and some of magnitude, to the youth who commences his Indian career at an early age, is not to be denied; but there is a better prospect for him of being contented and useful throughout the different stages of the service, than for one who enters upon the same career at a later period.

There are certain qualifications, and, above all, testimonies of good conduct, without which no youth ought to be allowed to proceed to India in the civil service; but if in that country regulations were rigorously enforced, making their increase of salary, as well as their promotion, to depend on their attainments, and rendering the incurring<sup>55</sup> of debts and habits of extravagance a serious obstruction, if not an absolute bar to advancement, we might expect to create a reform in the greatest defects of the present system; but to do this effectually many changes are required. The civil servant is, at present, compelled to attain certain acquirements before he can be employed, and when in office he must give a great portion of his time to his public duties; but, unless in extreme cases, improper habits of life, or large debts, are deemed no disqualification for office, though these (according to the opinion of every statesman who has treated the subject) are not only likely to deaden his best feelings and to endanger his principles, but to place him under an influence which may be exercised in a manner alike injurious to his reputation and the interests of the state.

The example we have in the conduct of youth in other departments of life, shows that the object in view is quite



attainable, and points out the only mode by which an efficient remedy can be applied to this evil; but care should be taken that this is effected in a manner that will elevate, instead of depress the service. While consideration for the young men who enter it, for their relatives, and the public, compels us to establish stricter discipline than has hitherto existed in India, the education of youth should be more exclusively directed than it has hitherto been to qualification for the first duties they will have to perform; and from these they should not be kept one instant, after they have attained the necessary qualifications, and evinced sufficient steadiness of conduct to enable them to aid the superiors under whom they will have to act.

The reports made by the latter of the progress and conduct of those under them should regulate promotion; and if any young men neglected to qualify themselves for employment, or continued idle and irregular, after a limited number of years, they should be sent to England. This might appear harsh; but if known to be the inevitable consequence which attended incompetence or misconduct, the penalty would be rarely incurred. Parents would not desire such a trial<sup>66</sup> for sons of whose conduct and abilities they had doubts; and every man of feeling and principle would be checked in his career of folly, extravagance, or guilt, by the dread of the shame and misery he would bring upon himself and others. But, supposing that it should sometimes happen otherwise, the merited punishment of a few would be most salutary examples; and, looking to the virtue and talent of the civil service for the present as well as the future good government of India, who will recommend that indulgence to youth, or consideration to their connexions, should interfere with the adoption or rigid execution of any plan expedient for that great object?

Many minor arrangements might aid the success of the measures suggested; but we may be assured, from the moment those strong steps were decidedly taken, examples of idleness and extravagance would become rare. Not only the feelings of the individuals and their friends would be roused against them, but the sources of supply would fail; credit<sup>67</sup> would no longer be given to men whose prodigal career was certain to deprive them of the means of repayment.

To carry any plan of this nature into effect, it would be necessary to increase the number of young men in India, that the local government, even at the commencement of their service, might have the power of selection; and this principle should, within the prescribed limits as to periods of service, continue to regulate every future promotion. Any other system must be unfavourable to the development of those various and superior powers of mind which it is essential should be possessed by all who fill, or aspire to fill, the high offices in the Indian empire.

A seat in council is now the chief object to which a civilian aspires; and the change that occurs every five years has a happy effect in keeping alive that portion of the ambition of the service which is directed to this object. There appears no good reason why others who fill the high offices of presidents of the board of trade, and revenue, and of the court of Sadar Diwani, should not also be periodically changed.<sup>58</sup> The local governments, with whom the nomination<sup>59</sup> to these stations should rest, might re-appoint where very extraordinary ability demanded an exception from a practice which would animate the system, by exciting an active spirit of emulation.

The objection that will be offered to such a measure is, that the salary of a counsellor, if enjoyed for five years, affords the means of independence, which not being the case with the other situations in question, it would, therefore, be hard upon individuals who had attained such offices to be compelled to vacate them in five years: but it may be answered, that one of the most essential principles in a government like that of India is, to combine reward to individuals with the promotion of the public interests, and that, upon this principle, it is better to increase the pay attached to those situations than to lose the advantages which the arrangement promises to the state. This, and every other practicable measure, should be adopted, that can have the effect of directing the views of the ablest civil servants to objects of distinction and high employment, both in India and in England. The prospect of accumulating great wealth, which once stimulated the civil service of India, no longer exists: the means of living comfortably, and the attainment of a moderate competence at rather an advanced stage of life, is all that they

can now expect. The state cannot afford to give them higher allowances<sup>60</sup> than they now enjoy; and it is not desirable that this class, particularly those who fill the first stations, should have a money-making disposition, which, even when remote from corruption, is adverse to the high tone so essential for them to preserve and to impart, by showing an example of perfect freedom from such propensity; nor would this by any means preclude attention to just economy, which is alike essential to independence of mind, and of action.

Notwithstanding any arrangements that can be made, or any order that can be given, the success of every plan for the maintenance or improvement of this branch of the public service will chiefly depend on the character and talent of those at the head of the local governments. On their knowledge, impartiality, and unbending firmness of action, will rest this as well as all other points connected with the good administration of India. We can regulate and reduce to a system every other part of our government in a manner that renders us, to a certain degree, independent of extraordinary ability; but we cannot escape from the necessity of having a succession of enlightened and able men to preside over the councils of a state, which, from its singular construction, is almost as much affected by the personal characters of its rulers as if it were a despotic monarchy.

### *INDIAN ARMY*

However much the success of our internal government may depend upon the civil administration of our eastern empire, our efforts to improve that might be given in vain, unless we maintain a commanding military power; and this consideration gives the utmost importance to every question connected with our military establishment in that country, as being the only means by which we can preserve India, and as too likely, if mismanaged, to prove our ruin.<sup>61</sup> This latter position has been so fully proved by the evidence of past events, that any argument in support of it must be superfluous. As His Majesty's troops employed in India are composed solely of Europeans, and differ in no respect from the British army, of which they are a detachment, remarks upon the constitution of that part of the force

there will not be necessary. We shall, therefore, proceed to examine the organization and principles of the Company's army, which now consists of nearly two hundred and fifty thousand men.<sup>62</sup> We shall commence by taking a glance at the plans which have been formerly suggested to remedy the defects of the general system, and then consider the changes which circumstances would now appear to render expedient.

Lord Cornwallis was requested by Mr. Dundas, His Majesty's minister for India, to give a plan by which the transfer of the Indian army to the King should be effected; the chief grounds for which measure are stated to have been,<sup>63</sup> "To give safety and security to our Indian empire, and to prevent the continuance or revival of those discontents or jealousies which have so often manifested themselves between the King's and Company's troops, as well as the Company's troops belonging to the different presidencies in that part of the world." From His Lordship's reply, it appears to have been his deliberate conviction, that no system could be devised of permanent utility and satisfaction to the individuals of both services, and for the public good, unless there was a preliminary measure, by which the whole force, native as well as European, in India, should be "transferred to His Majesty's service; and, with a few modifications, be regulated and conducted, in future, according to the rules which have long operated in the King's army." Lord Cornwallis stated his opinion, that although the army were transferred to the King, it should remain perfectly subordinate to the Company; and that those intrusted with the local government should have the full power of suspending and sending to England any officer, from the highest to the lowest rank, it remaining with the King to examine into the conduct of the officer so sent home; but the local government being alone responsible to the court of directors for such peremptory exercise of power. Lord Cornwallis, in the letter alluded to, strongly inculcates as a principle, that measures should be taken to induce Europeans of all classes, particularly military officers, to return to England. He recommends leave and retirement on full pay for officers of each rank, after a certain period of service.<sup>64</sup> While he proposes a continuance of rise by seniority, he is the advocate of the sale of commissions under certain restrictions;<sup>65</sup> he suggests an entire

separation between the European and native branches of the army, and is unfriendly to future interchanges betwixt them, lest it should open a door for abuse of patronage, and the introduction of inefficient officers into the native corps. He expresses himself very strongly as to the necessity of protecting the latter. "Officers," he observes, "whose services are so unalterably fixed in so distant a quarter of the globe, ought to be protected by established regulations against the hazard of suffering by the abuse of patronage in any commander-in-chief."

In 1811, when the Company petitioned for a renewal of their exclusive privileges, the subject of the transfer of the army was again brought forward. Those by whom it was advocated rested their chief argument on the same basis, the indispensable necessity of putting an end to the jealousies and divisions which existed between the officers of the King's and Company's armies in India. But the principles of the transfer now proposed differed in some essential points from those proposed by Lord Cornwallis. A greater latitude of power as to promotion, particularly in the higher ranks, was proposed to be given to the commander-in-chief. As an incitement and reward to the native local service, it was suggested that, on reaching the rank of colonel, they should be eligible to employment in any quarter of the globe; and such a measure, it was anticipated, would not only be an encouragement to this branch, but render the experience of men of talent and acquirements available to the general service of the country. It was proposed that exchanges should take place between the two branches of the army, restricted only by such regulations as were indispensable to preserve the efficiency of the local service, which required in those that entered it a knowledge of the language, and a certain period of residence in India. It was not intended to admit the officers of the native branches of the army to sell their commissions, but they were to have the right they now enjoy of retirement on full pay, after a certain period of service. It was proposed that, upon this change being made, the armies of the different presidencies should be consolidated into one. This was strongly recommended, on the ground of that leading principle which has been the foundation of every large and liberal plan suggested for the reform of the Indian army, that of putting an end to

feelings of jealousy and irritation, which arise out of distinctions as to allowances and promotion between the armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.

Strong arguments were brought forward against any transfer. The peculiar constitution of the native army, and the education necessary for the European officers attached to it, were strenuously urged; and it was assumed, that recent measures had given a strength and efficiency to this branch of the service which did not belong to it when Lord Cornwallis suggested that transfer; and it was added, that the principal objects that nobleman had in view were attained by the regulations of 1796, which, by giving equal rank and consideration to the officers of the Company's army, had approximated them as much to those of His Majesty's service as it was expedient or politic to do with an army so situated and so constituted.

The danger to the character and efficiency of the local army of India, from being under the same authority with that of England, was forcibly dwelt upon; and it was assumed that, if a transfer took place, no merit or pretensions of the former, and no sense of the wisdom of general rules for their protection, could be expected to resist the tide of influence and interest which would always be in favour of the latter. The certain consequences must be, that the local army, when transferred to the King, would gradually become inferior and secondary, a result which, there was every reason to fear, would be fatal to the existence of our Indian empire.

The constitutional objection, so often urged, of transferring to the Crown such a great portion of patronage, as the command of an army of such magnitude, was repeated; but the strength of all the arguments brought forward on this occasion by the chairmen of the directors rested on political grounds. Their reasons cannot be better given than in their own words. "The Company's government", they observe, "has hitherto been respected, both by its own subjects and foreign powers, because it possessed a great military force; organizing this force, enlarging or reducing it at pleasure, appointing its officers, rewarding merit, punishing the unworthy, providing for the comfortable retirement of the veteran officer and soldier, and, in short, exercising all the functions of a governing power over a very

numerous body of men of high military spirit, it has possessed all the respectability and the benefit of their attachment and fidelity. Looking upon the members of civil government, and the body of civil servants, as belonging to the same masters with themselves, and as the first order in the state, they have paid a willing obedience to their authority, and have thereby upheld their internal administration, and their consequence abroad. The introduction of certain King's regiments has been understood, as it was intended, to be merely in support of the public interest under the existing system; but if the Company were to be divested of the whole of their military force and power, if they were to be no longer masters of a single regiment, no longer capable of entertaining any soldiers, nor of giving one subaltern's commission; if the immense body of men who have so long looked up to them were to be transferred from them, the people must consider their power as fallen, and drawing rapidly to a close. Continuing still to their government a general control over the employment of the army, and to their civil servants the internal administration of their officers, would give the people no assurance to the contrary. Those servants, in the discharge of their different functions, of judges, magistrates, collectors, could not expect the same respect and support, either from public opinion or the attachment of the native troops, as when all looked to the same head for protection, patronage, and reward. Indeed to make so wide a separation of the military from the civil power, to take away the organization, the interior regulation, and with these the patronage of the army, from the local government, to place all these powers in the hands of the commander-in-chief, subject only, in the exercise of them, to an authority at the distance of half the globe, would throw the means and temptations of a dangerous ascendancy into the scale of the military department, which, constituted by His Majesty, might easily be led to slight the civil servants of a meaner master, and their chance of distant redress. Among the natives of India, it has been usual to consider the military power and those possessing it as pre-eminent; and they see, in some examples of the present day, that power, under the idea of assisting the civil and political administration, actually controlling it. The Company's government, in short, lowered and overshadowed

owed in this way, would not, in the opinion of the court, continue to possess the authority necessary for the proper administration of the affairs of that great empire; and it might then be conceived that a further change only could supply what is defective.”<sup>66</sup>

These arguments were deemed of sufficient weight to prevent the transfer; and as they may probably meet with attentions when the subject is again brought under discussion, it becomes of importance to examine how far the defects of the actual system can be remedied, and the interests of the different branches of the military service of our common country be placed upon a permanent footing, that, by adding to their efficiency, will give strength to the state.

The opinion of all wise statesmen and able military commanders has been invariably the same with regard to the indispensable necessity of putting an end to the jealousies<sup>67</sup> and divisions which have so often arisen between the officers of the King's army and those of the Company's, and between the different military establishments of the latter. Some narrow-minded men have whispered their belief that there was safety to the state in the existence of such differences: but such persons have forgot that the very alarming events which form the grounds of their dread have been, in almost every case, the result of those jealousies and divisions which are deprecated. They are ignorant also that it is much more easy to create and maintain a bad spirit amongst a limited body of men, who are affected by the same local circumstances, than it is to spread such a spirit throughout more extended numbers, and a wider sphere. But these considerations hardly merit mention, for we may safely assume that, if ever it is a principle of our policy to rule by keeping divided the European officers, to whom we must chiefly trust for the safety of our empire in India, that empire will soon verge to its decline. The competency, the spirit, and the loyalty of this class, constitute our strength, and it will be increased by their union, but will be decreased by all causes which tend to perpetuate or create jealousies, distractions, or divisions amongst men, who, though placed in different branches to meet peculiar circumstances, serve one common country, their attachment to which can have none of those motives to shake it which exist where men colonize,



*and are almost naturalized, in a distant land. The truth and force of this fact has never been so strongly illustrated as in the course of those temporary aberrations from duty which have occurred in different parts of the Indian army since the first establishment of our power in that country.*

The supporting and elevating of the Company's army is a point not more necessary than difficult. It cannot be done without the cordial co-operation (arising out of a sense of its necessity) of the Crown. It must enjoy an equal share of the favour and consideration of the sovereign as that which bears his name: in commands, in honours, in every distinction, it must be upon a par; and every measure must be adopted that can counteract the depressing influence of the circumstances in which it is placed. If kept, from political reasons, distinct in name, it should be associated in feeling and interests, and every arrangement formed that could bring the two services nearer to each other.

To effect these objects, some concessions, both on the part of His Majesty's government and of the Company, will be necessary. The boon of employment on general service to officers of high rank in the Company's army might be granted. It would elevate the local service of India; it might eventually be of benefit to the country, and could never inflict the slightest injury on His Majesty's service. Exchanges,<sup>68</sup> under strict regulations, might be permitted between officers in the King's and Company's army. These, however seldom they occurred, would be very beneficial, and tend more than any measure to raise the feeling of the latter, and to unite the two branches of the service.<sup>69</sup>

It has been a constant theme of complaint with the officers of His Majesty's service in India, that they are debarred by usage from many situations of honour and emolument which are exclusively filled by Company's officers. This complaint appears just, or otherwise, exactly as it is considered with reference to individuals or the whole service. That there always have been some few of His Majesty's officers in India qualified for such employments is certain; and that many have served in that country a period which fully entitled them to such situations, is equally so; but general questions that affect the interests of large bodies of men must be decided on general principles. Placed in the condition in which the Company's officers have

hitherto been, they have viewed, with a reasonable jealousy and apprehension, any approach to interference with those advantages to which usage had given them, what they deemed, a prescriptive right. They had little dread of the few officers of the King's army who were competent, and the justice of whose claims to participation in staff employments was not deniable; but they feared, and with justice, that if the path were opened, another class, with less pretensions as to local qualifications, but with better interest, would step between them and these hopes, on the fulfilment of which every prospect of revisiting their native country was grounded.

Should exchanges between the two services be established, the door would be opened through which qualified officers of His Majesty's service might enter and participate in those stations from which they are now excluded. No other expedient can be adopted to accomplish this object, that will not be liable to abuse, and calculated to affect most seriously the temper and interests of the Indian army.

The proposition for consolidating the forces of the three presidencies into one army was recommended, fifteen years ago, as a measure of expediency. The events which have since taken place have rendered it one of necessity. The territories of our different governments are no longer divided by seas and continents. Though we do not actually possess the whole of India, we have military occupation of every province of that extensive country; and constantly maintain from twenty to thirty thousand men in stations, which, as far as the position of forces is concerned, experience has proved to be alike convenient to Bengal, Madras, or Bombay. Besides this fact, no internal rebellion, much less foreign war, can occur, without the troops of the different presidencies being called upon to co-operate. Yet such continues to be their distinct organization, with regard to the pay and establishments both of fighting men and followers, that they can never be brought together without danger of serious discontents, if not mutiny. It would be superfluous to expatiate on causes and effects, the nature and consequences of which must be obvious to the most superficial observer. Those whose experience has enabled them to form a better judgment upon the question must see, not merely serious inconvenience, but danger in continuing to leave it

unsettled. The remedies are easy, and the application can be opposed only by men whose minds are fettered by local prejudices, or who desire to foster distinctions and divisions amongst those whose harmony constitutes the true safeguard of the state.

From the character of the native army, and the similarity of habits and language of a great proportion of these military classes, of whom it is composed, no inconvenience or embarrassment could result from making the three armies of India three divisions of one army. Each division would remain as at present; cadets would be nominated to it, and be appointed as vacancies occurred to its regiments. On such an organization taking place, it would be better that officers should rise regimentally to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, instead of that of major, as they now do; as such an alteration in the actual system would prevent their removal from distant parts of India, except when an increase was made to the army. On such an occasion, the senior officer of each rank would be promoted, not those of any division. The above plan would disturb nothing that is established; the staff would continue as at present, unless it were deemed expedient to select the generals<sup>70</sup> employed upon it from the whole army, instead of the division where the vacancy occurred. The off- reckonings to commandants of regiments are at present consolidated in one general list; and officers would succeed, if this plan were adopted, to be colonels of corps by seniority in the Indian army, not in the division to which they had as regimental officers belonged. The pay and allowances of all ranks, from the general who commanded to the lowest public follower, would, on this change taking place, be regulated by clear and understood principles of equality and justice, so as to leave no ground of complaint of any one part of the army, from the comparison of its condition with that of another part employed on the same service and the same duty.

That there might be petty difficulties in carrying into execution some of these changes in the constitution of our Indian army, cannot be denied. The chief objections will occur to the minds of men who have not served in that army during the last ten or twelve years; and such will be least sensible of the necessity of making them. Those who know the military stations we now occupy, and who have had opportunities of observing the

recent intermixed employment of the troops of the different presidencies, will well understand the absolute necessity of putting an end to distinctions which have embarrassed, and will, if not altered, continue to embarrass the public service. The feelings and prejudices of individuals may lead them to suggest doubts as to the wisdom of a plan which proposes, in some cases, to transfer officers from one division to another. They may bring forward the difference of character of the sepoys, and the different treatment they require; and it may be also alleged, that the removal of an officer from one extreme of India to another will be a hardship. To the first of these arguments it may be said, that whatever was formerly the case, there is at present no essential difference either in language, habits, or character of the native troops of our establishments, and that, whatever may be their usages, they all require to be treated in the same manner. With respect to the European officer, it is desirable, on every ground, that he should never be local. The more he is exposed to the vicissitudes of the service, and to be employed in different parts of the empire, the more his experience and knowledge will be enlarged; and those qualities, with whatever of inconvenience or hardship their attainment is attended, must ultimately prove as beneficial to the individual as to the government.

Many and essential benefits would result from consolidating the local armies of India into one: there would then be an end to those discontents which have so often arisen concerning a difference in pay and allowances, and from an increase of one establishment to the real or supposed injury of another. This was not felt formerly in the manner it must be at this period, when the third of our military stations can be occupied with equal facility by the troops of any one of the presidencies. Wherever an increase of corps is required, it becomes a question of judgment with the Governor-general to which army it shall be given; and a slight previous change in the disposition of the forces will make it easy to transfer the apparent expediency of an increase from one presidency to another. Whatever may be the talent, the justice, or the impartiality of the Governor-general, he can never hold the balance in a manner that will prevent discontent. Bodies of men will always have their feelings agitated

by measures which so seriously concern their future prospects in life, when these are so liable to be affected by the decision of an individual in power; and if that decision is unfavourable to them, they will impute to him, however insufficient the grounds, motives of partiality, or weak submission to the influence of those by whom he is surrounded. The nature and effect of the feelings to which the present system must give rise will be perfectly understood by all acquainted with the temper and constitution of armies. The remedy of this evil should not be deferred. If there is a dislike to direct the immediate adoption of an arrangement, making the benefit of increase of corps general; at any rate, all regiments raised in future might be equally distributed between Bengal, Madras and Bombay, commencing with that of which the officers are most backward in promotion. What has been before stated will show that not the slightest difficulty could occur on the ground of the increase being more wanted at one presidency than at another, as that would be obviated by the transfer of the duties of a station, which, from its position, was equally convenient to the presidency receiving the benefit of the augmentation.

A second advantage from amalgamating the local armies of India would result from the first. When the nomination of European officers from a general list to newly-raised corps was adopted, it would be a matter of indifference to those where the men were recruited, or where employed. The consequence would be, that the whole native army would be more disposable than it is at present to serve in any quarter of our dominions. Occasions have occurred, and are more likely than ever to occur, when our safety may depend on our power to employ the natives of Bengal in the territories of Madras or Bombay, or those of the latter in Bengal or Hindustan. Looking to those internal commotions from which we cannot expect exemption, there is no principle of policy likely to be more conducive to the security of the empire: but we must in a great degree be deprived of the advantage it offers, till a plan is adopted which shall put an end to the separation of interests now existing among the European officers.

The third advantage of the plan proposed is of consequence for the same object, that of rendering our native army more

available in every part of India, and of enabling us to employ them together, without creating a spirit of discontent which has often approached to mutiny. This can be done only by assimilating, on the principles suggested, the pay and allowances of the native soldiery and public followers. These should be fixed with reference to certain general principles, and not be dependant on the establishment to which this or that soldier of the same government belonged. The military equipment and departments<sup>71</sup> of the forces of the different presidencies should be constituted on the same general principles, and be as little different in practice as local circumstances would permit; otherwise we shall never have our Indian armies possessed of that efficiency and strength which they should have for united operations.

The rise of European officers in the native army of India must continue to be by seniority; but every measure consistent with their interests, and with those of the public, should be taken, to accelerate the attainment of rank and command for those who have gained experience in this branch of the service. The frequent stagnations of promotion which have occurred have been hitherto relieved by expedients that gave an impulse for the moment, but were followed by a re-action that often left men in a worse situation than they were before. We must not judge of the effects of such stagnation of promotion in the local army in India by what we observe from the same cause in England. There is hardly any analogy: the power of exchanging into other corps; of purchasing and selling their commissions; that of living with their relations and friends; the connexions they form, and the different walks of life open to men in their native country, place them in a situation totally different from those who are in a manner banished to a foreign land, where they may almost be considered aliens from all family ties and connexions, with their prospects limited to their profession, to which they are in fact bound, from the day they enter it, as the only means they have of subsistence. The officers of His Majesty's service, if disappointed or discontented, have generally the means of escape, and if, in effecting that, their condition becomes worse, their complaints are not heard; they produce no effect on others; young and more sanguine candidates fill the niche they occupied: nor does the state suffer by the change; for the constitution of the army to

which they belong, requires in its inferior officers no qualifications that may not be easily acquired. But how different is the situation of those who enter the Company's service!<sup>72</sup> Their youth must be devoted to the attainment of acquirements, without which they are unfit even for the subaltern duties of a native corps; they have no escape from their lot in life; discontent and disappointment in it not only corrode their own minds, but spread a baneful influence over the minds of others: their place, after they are in any degree advanced, cannot be easily supplied, for certain qualifications, which time and study alone can give, are requisite to those who succeed them. All these circumstances (and many more might be adduced) show that the question of the improvement of the Indian army should be considered on its own grounds, and not with the reference which is too often made to the comparative condition and pretensions of an army from which its constitution is altogether different.

To give opportunity of acquiring distinction to the officers of the local army of India, (without which no military body can ever attain and support a character, and least of all a body that is in constant comparison with troops of the same nation, regulated on other principles) high rank ought to be conferred by local commissions, while the individuals to whom it is granted are yet efficient for the duties to which it may call them. The privilege of nominating general officers to the staff must soon become as useless to any objects of ambition in the Indian army as of service to the state, under the slow progress of brevet rank in England, consequent to peace in Europe. Every general belonging to the Indian service must be superannuated before he can be employed. There would appear no objection to grant local brevets to colonels of the Indian service to serve on the staff of that country, as the same can be extended to His Majesty's service. The adoption of such a measure would, of course, prevent officers being permitted to proceed with regiments to India, whose rank was above that of officers within the limits of selection for the general staff; but this would be attended with no injury to the service, and would be a slight sacrifice to obtain a great benefit.

The sale of commissions and exchanges between the English and local branches of the army employed in India, under regu-

lations which guarded the efficiency of the local branch, would be most beneficial, both from introducing good and effective officers, and accelerating promotion in the local army; but there is no measure so requisite for the latter as the formation of a staff corps, which would furnish the means of supplying vacancies in regiments occasioned by the removal of their officers to other duties.

The native corps in India were, perhaps, in as efficient a state as they have ever since been, when they had only two or three European officers; but, at that period of the service, their commandant was their chief, and they were his followers. The ties and the feelings from which both acted were altogether different from those which now subsist; and, under the present system, the deficiency of European officers is felt, particularly on service, as a great evil. This evil must continue till the regular staff of the army, and those necessary for distinct departments, are separated from that list which it is essential to keep complete for regimental duties. If this measure is determined upon, the formation of a plan<sup>73</sup> for carrying it into effect will not be difficult; but great care must be taken that it combines a due regard for the interests of individuals with those of the public.

Should the same reasons which prevented the transfer of the Indian army to the Crown, when the exclusive privileges of the Company were last renewed, continue to operate, this will be no reason why the measures which have been suggested for the improvement of the condition of the European officers of the Indian army should not take place. There is nothing required to give them full effect, but a cordial and liberal spirit of co-operation in the different authorities in England. But this large question must be viewed as one of national policy, and not as the settlement of the comparative pretensions of individuals. We must continue dependent on the fidelity and efficiency of our native army for the preservation of India. The European officers are the links by which we must preserve its attachment, and maintain its reputation. Their peculiar condition requires favour and support; and it is not too much to affirm, that any means which have a tendency to depress this body of men, or to introduce any claims but those of Indian service, and complete competence, into a competition for those objects of reward which this



branch has hitherto exclusively enjoyed, will be fatal to our best hopes of preserving our eastern empire. The constitutional jealousy that will be called into action, whenever this important subject is agitated, must not be lulled by a consideration of the character and influence of the present commander-in-chief of the British forces, which, as long as that illustrious personage may hold the office, would, no doubt, afford to the local branch of the army of India every security for liberal and just treatment.

### *NATIVE TROOPS*

Among the many political considerations likely to affect the future prosperity and security of the British empire in India, there appears hardly one of more magnitude than the attachment of the natives of our army.

The great proportion of the inhabitants of India are devoted to peaceful occupations, and are consequently, to a certain degree, unable, if they were willing, to defend that government, to which a sense of benefit may have rendered them well affected. The object of our laws and institutions is to repress if not destroy those habits which distinguish the military tribes subject to our rule: but such changes, to be safe, must be gradual; we cannot otherwise expect to escape the dangers and convulsions with which they are likely to be attended. As long however, as we can repose on the fidelity of our native army, we are safe from internal danger; but every disquietude must assume an alarming appearance, when associated with disaffection in that army; nor can we obtain relief by an accession of European force, for the very means which would give us security for the moment, would aggravate the evil, (from causes which will be noticed hereafter,) as they would tend to lessen the efficiency, and weaken the attachment of those native troops, by whose courage and fidelity alone we can preserve India. As the truth of these observations will hardly admit of dispute, we can contemplate no measures of more importance than those which are calculated to incite and confirm the obedience and allegiance of the native corps employed in our service. The rigid principles of economy, and the precise forms of our civil rule, should both yield to the establishment of this corner-stone of our strength; as,

without it, the vast fabric which has been raised with such pains must totter to its base at every tempest with which it is assailed.

The native army has undergone many changes from its origin to the present day.<sup>74</sup>

When the British government first established itself in India, military tactics in Europe were in a less advanced state than at present, and the caution with which a few Europeans, endeavouring to conciliate the natives of India to fight their battles on a foreign shore, were obliged to act, prevented the introduction of any part of those tactics which could in the least interfere with their prejudices, habits, or religion. A jacket of English broad cloth, made up in the shape of his own dress, the knowledge of his manual exercise, and a few military evolutions, constituted the original sepoy; and with this qualification, and his English firearms, he was found to possess an incalculable superiority over the other natives of India, who, ignorant of the first principles of discipline (which enable men to act in a body), were easily defeated, however great their numbers, by a small corps of their brothers, armed, disciplined, and directed, by the art, intelligence and energy of European leaders.<sup>75</sup>

It was natural that the early sepoy should share in that feeling of pride which his superiority in discipline obtained him over his countrymen;<sup>76</sup> and the native officers in the employment of the Company were gratified not only by the opportunities which they had of acquiring military distinction, but of improving their fortunes. There were but few European officers in the first sepoy battalions. A captain, an adjutant, with a serjeant to each company, was the original establishment. Commands frequently fell to subedars and jemadars; and the comparative laxity of discipline, as well as the general corruption of the times, enabled the whole of the native army, from the subedar to the sepoy, to derive pecuniary benefit from the nature of the services<sup>77</sup> on which they were occasionally employed. To this advantage, which rendered the service of the Company desirable, and often lucrative, was added a still more powerful attraction in the kind treatment which they generally received from their European officers, the number of whom, to every battalion, was so small, that from necessity, if not from inclination, they acted as much upon principles of conciliation as

coercion, and their authority in their corps rested more on affection than fear. They were most particular in their conduct to the native officers, towards whom they behaved with regard and respect proportionate to the responsibility of their situations. One of those native officers, who held the rank of native commandant, often possessed an influence in the corps nearly equal to the European commander. As a strong and convincing proof of this, it may be mentioned, that many of the oldest battalions of the native army of Madras are respectively known to this day by the name of some former native commandant.

This system, which had, undoubtedly, many defects, had also much to recommend it: for though the European commanding officer, who acted without check in the exercise of a great trust, generally made his corps a source of pecuniary advantage, in which he was aided by the native commandant, who shared in this indirect emolument; yet both had a strong interest in the character and conduct of the corps, to the men of which they were almost always kind and generous.

An increase of their European officers, a great alteration in their dress, and an improvement in their discipline, made material changes in the constitution of the native corps, and these took place through several causes. The native princes had trained sepoys in European tactics; and to maintain a superiority over them it became necessary that the native army of the Company's government should make further advances in the military art, which they were enabled to do, not only from the great improvements which had taken place in that science in Europe, and from the example furnished by some of the King's regiments sent to India, but from the number of officers of liberal education and respectable character, whom a prospect of advantage had at this period drawn to the service of the Company. According to the opinion of many able officers, it was under this system that the men became most attached to their officers, and the native army attained as great a degree of efficiency as it has ever known. Captains were selected to the command of corps,<sup>78</sup> which was an object of sufficient emolument and trust to limit the views of officers of that rank (then one of the highest in the service) to its attainment. These officers were almost invariably chosen from their reputation as sepoy officers; that is, officers

who united to all the military qualifications of a soldier a particular knowledge of the prejudices, habits, and characters of the men whom they were appointed to command. It was observed under this system, that though many of the corps were brought to a great perfection of dress and discipline, there was hardly an instance in which this was done at the expense of the temper of the men; on the contrary, those corps which were the most remarkable for their discipline were almost attached to their commanding officers, whom they found as liberal to their wants, and attentive to their prejudices, as they were anxious for that superiority and excellence in their appearance, discipline, and attachment, upon which they grounded all their hopes of reputation and preferment in the service to which they belonged.

The native officers continued under this system to enjoy great respect and regard. This circumstance was chiefly owing to the European commanding officer, who, from his station, and the emoluments attached<sup>79</sup> to it, enjoyed a consideration and consequence which enabled him not only to confer distinction by his personal favour and regard, but to keep in complete check and control the younger officers of the service, and to direct their minds to a moderate and indulgent conduct towards all the natives; but particularly to those who, from their gallantry or long services, were entitled to respect and attention, and which it was proper to show them on every ground of policy as well as of generosity.

The native service underwent another great change in the year 1796, when new regulations were introduced, which a train of events, connected with the comparative rank of the Company's officers with those of His Majesty serving in India, had rendered indispensably necessary. By these regulations, two battalions of native infantry were formed into one regiment; to which the same number of officers were allowed as to a regiment in the King's service. Regimental rise to the rank of major was, at the same time, introduced; and this, it was hoped, by attaching the officers to corps, would confirm and strengthen reciprocal confidence and connexion between the European officers and the sepoys, which had ever been deemed the most essential principle in the constitution of the native army. It was also expected that the increased number of European officers

would greatly add to the efficiency of the native corps, as the smallest parties that could be detached would be commanded by an European officer, and have the advantage of his knowledge and experience.

The most unhappy effect of these regulations was the alteration they produced in the condition of the commanding officers, whose situation, under the operation of them, was attended with little of either advantage or distinction. It was, in fact, no longer an object of ambition, as it had been formerly. It had become a station of trouble, without influence and consideration: and every officer of interest or reputation in the service exerted himself to avoid it, and to obtain a government command, or a situation on the general staff. The bad consequences of this part of the constitution of a native corps have been felt and acknowledged; a partial remedy has been applied; but none will be complete, or give efficiency to this important branch of our military establishment, that does not make it an object of more value, both in point of profit and reputation, for an officer of rank and character to command a native regiment, than to fill any station on the staff except the heads of a department.

The condition of the native officers of our sepoy corps has often been the subject of the most serious attention of government; but though their allowances have been a little increased, no measures<sup>80</sup> have yet been taken which we can consider as adequate to the object of creating and maintaining motives for their continued fidelity and attachment. In an army of nearly<sup>81</sup> two hundred and forty thousand natives, the highest pay which a subedar of infantry can attain is 174 rupees per month,<sup>82</sup> and after attaining that rank, he enjoys no consideration which can save him from the harshness of an European officer, a boy, perhaps, who has just joined that corps to which he, the native officer, has perhaps belonged for thirty or forty years. He has in barracks, and in camp, no other accommodation than that provided for the sepoys; and although on his retiring to the invalid list, his pay is continued, that is become, from habit, necessary for his support, so that he can make no provision for his children; and as pride in his own condition, or alarm at their being subject to corporeal punishment, prevents in most cases his bringing them up in the army, they are generally a burden

on him while he lives; and when he dies they are left poor and discontented.

There are, no doubt, a few instances in the army, where a small pension has been given to a native officer, and part of it, in some very rare cases, has been continued to his family; but such instances have seldom occurred, except when the person to whom the reward was granted had an opportunity of distinguishing himself beyond all the common chances of the service; and even then, to obtain this notice has required the exertion of all the interest and influence of those under whom that fortunate native officer acted. It cannot be expected that the few rewards, so obtained, should have any general effect as an encouragement to the efforts of this class of our native army. Under such a complete limitation of their views, can it be a subject of surprise that in cases of severe trial, particularly of mutiny, the native officers have seldom displayed a spirit of activity and zeal? They have in such cases been almost always objects of suspicion, and have often evinced a sullen indifference of conduct,<sup>83</sup> which appeared to be produced by the absence of those motives of action which were necessary to support men in their situation. Placed between officers they were bound to obey, and offenders with whom they had kindred and national ties, they had a difficult and dangerous task to perform; if they have failed, we must blame the system, not them: but when we can infuse life into that system, and elevate their minds to further objects of ambition, we shall succeed in animating them to continued efforts in our service; until then, they will stop where we do, and be more anxious to enjoy in repose the small objects they may have already attained, than to incur hazards disproportioned to any hopes they have reason to indulge with regard to the future.

If the nature of our power in India requires, as it certainly does, the exclusion of the native officers from the exercise of high military command, and that gate to distinction is barred by policy, others should be opened. In the strictest conformity to those principles upon which the native army is formed, we might lead the minds of these troops to expect comfort and distinction in civil life, as the reward of approved military service; and by directing their ambition to the natural and seductive object of

acquiring importance in their own tribe, and enjoying some privileges, however trivial, which, under certain regulations, might descend to their children, we should not only discover a motive sufficiently powerful to supply the place of that which a jealous but wise policy obliges us to withhold, but place their fidelity beyond the power of corruption. If such measures were adopted, the native service would become popular and respected; it would be embraced with eagerness by men of the first families in the country; and in the course of years we might expect the attachment of our subjects to be greatly improved by a spirit of active allegiance, which would be generally diffused by veterans and their descendants, whose claim to their rank or land was founded in the gratitude of a state whom they had served with fidelity and distinction.

The men who form the native army of the Company are almost all sober, and of good conduct in private life. Drunkenness, as a general vice, is, indeed, unknown; and notorious immorality is rare. But their virtues are more of a passive than an active nature. They consist more in forbearance, from fear of offending against their civil institutions and the rigid tenets of their religion, than from any sense of the beauty of virtue, or the deformity of vice. These men appear, in many cases, hardly to consider themselves as free moral agents; they often blindly resign their judgment to the law of usage, the dictates of their priest, or the influence of their superiors in cast or station; and, under such influence, they change, in an instant, their mild, inoffensive, and pliant character, for that of the most determined obstinacy and savage ferocity.

All the natives of India, but particularly those of military classes, are fond of show and of high titles; and they often seem to prize the semblance, almost as much as the reality of power. It is indeed surprising to see the consequence which they attach to every mark of outward respect, especially when bestowed by their superiors: and, partaking of the character of his countryman, the native soldier of the Company, intelligent and quick in his conception, full of vanity and a love of pre-eminence, if not of glory, is of all men the most sensible to attention or neglect. Though the climate disposes him to inertness, and his frame is seldom very robust,<sup>84</sup> he may be flattered and encouraged

to make the most extraordinary exertions; while harshness or cruelty serves only to subdue his spirit, and sink him into apathy, if it does not rouse him to resentment.

It may be stated as the result of the fullest experience, that the native troops of India depend more than any in the world upon the officers who command them: when treated by these with notice and kindness, and when marked consideration is shown to their usages, they become attached, and evince, on all occasions, a zeal and valour that can hardly be surpassed; but when they have not confidence in those who command them, when they are made secondary, or treated in any manner indicating a want of reliance on them; much more when any act of their commanders betrays ignorance or contempt of their prejudices or religion, they become spiritless or discontented. This is the natural consequence of their condition, as mercenaries of a nation with whom they have no ties beyond those that compel them to a cold performance of their duty, and such as they form with their immediate officers; but able leaders, who understand how to infuse their own spirit into those they command, find no difficulty in making what impressions they desire on the minds of men, whose education and sentiments predispose them to participate in every feeling associated with military fame and distinction.

An army so constituted, and formed of men of such tempers, may appear very susceptible of being corrupted, and made instrumental to the destruction of that power which it is employed to protect; but of this there is no danger, unless in the improbable case of our becoming too presumptuous in what we may deem our intrinsic strength, confiding too exclusively in our European troops, and undervaluing our native army. From the day of that fatal error, (should we ever commit it,) we may date the downfall of our eastern empire. Its finances would not only sink under the expense of a greatly-increased European force, but the natives of India in our ranks would lose the opinion which they entertain of their own consequence to the government they serve, and their whole tone as an army would be lowered in a degree that would impair our strength far beyond any addition it could receive from the superior efficiency and energy of a few more English regiments.



The employment of native troops associated with Europeans, is a point that merits the most serious attention. The ablest of those commanders who have led them to victory, however impressed with a just sense of the superior courage and energy of a British soldier have carefully abstained from every act that could show the least want of confidence in the native part of their force, or convey to the latter an impression that they were viewed in a secondary light. By mixing them in every operation with English troops, they have succeeded<sup>85</sup> not only in exciting an emulation and pride in the minds of the native soldiers, which greatly added to their efficiency, but diffused a spirit of cordiality and good feeling, not more calculated to promote the success of their immediate operations than the general interests of the empire.

These observations will help to show the peculiar character of the native army, and the consequence of all arrangements that relate to the European officers of every rank who are to command and lead them, and upon whose disposition, knowledge, and ability, the fidelity and efficiency of this branch of our strength must depend.

Viewing the subject in this light, it appears most important to provide at an early period a remedy for the defects of the existing system. This should be done by measures grounded on sound principles of liberal policy, suited to the character, composition, and actual condition of the men of our native army. There is every reason to apprehend that, if these measures are long neglected, our local governments may be forced upon expedients which may remove partial or local evils, but which will lay the seeds of more general discontent and danger. The difference between a wise foresight, which prevents demand, and that weakness, which meets it with concession, is immense: the former is the characteristic of a rising, the latter of a falling government.

It would occupy too much space to enter into a fuller detail of the plan best calculated to animate the zeal and confirm the fidelity of our native troops; but if the importance of these objects is acknowledged, there will be no difficulty in devising the means for their accomplishment.

Whatever measures we adopt must provide rewards suited to

their condition for a certain number of the most deserving native officers; and these rewards should be of a character not only to give life to this class, but to raise the hopes of all who shall be striving to obtain similar rank and consideration. We have been compelled to cast down much in India, and almost all whom we found raised above others in the community have perished under our levelling rule. The necessity of creating and maintaining a superior class amongst the natives is recommended by every consideration of wise and generous policy; and assuredly there is no measure more calculated to aid in obtaining this end than that of conferring on the veteran, who has gained reputation in the army, rank and consideration in his native district, so as to render him an object of respect to his countrymen, who will see in his services to the state a legitimate claim to favour and distinction, whatever may have been his former condition. This mode of reward is quite accordant with the usage of all Asiatic states, and its adoption by us would be congenial to the habits and feelings of the whole population.

The consideration given to distinguished native officers should, in a greater or less degree, according to their claims, be extended to their descendants; and their sons might be permitted to pass through the grades of our army with a trivial addition of pay, and exemption from corporal punishment. The constitution of the army will never admit of our introducing volunteers, or native cadets. Every man who enters it must work his way, by his own efforts, from the station of a private to that of a subedar; but nothing could be more popular with the sepoys than to see the sons of their officers mingled in their ranks, yet enjoying a notice and respect that added to the value of that station in life to which they all aspired.

Native commissioned officers, when employed on the staff, as they frequently are, should receive a fixed allowance, and not be left, as they have hitherto been, to look to a future reward, depending as much on the influence of the officer under whom they acted as the services they performed. The value of their efforts, if judiciously directed in this line of duty, is very great, and cannot, in some cases, be supplied by those of any European officer. They are also frequently required for specific charge or command, and this employment should come under the head of

staff duty. The selection for such stations, when pay was attached to them, would constitute both reward and encouragement to the class to which they belonged.

The above measures would be very beneficial, and not attended with any large expenditure; but their operation would be limited to the higher ranks; and however much the favour and notice extended to them might influence others, more is required to cement the union of the interests of the state with that of the general body of the troops by whom it is defended. To do this effectually, the sepoy should be taught to look to meritorious services in the army as the road to employment under the civil administration of his native province. A certain period of service in the regular army should be an indispensable qualification in all candidates for situations suited to persons of military habits; and there is no doubt that all the duties of police, which are distinct from hereditary village establishment, would be as well performed by men who had passed through the army, as by any other class, if not better. The sepoys employed in police duties might have a privilege of getting part of their pay commuted, if they wished it, for grants of waste land, provided they possessed the means of bringing it into cultivation.

The general introduction of such a plan would be attended with great and manifold advantages. If well organized, it would encourage recruits and reward service, and would promote internal order and prosperity; nor is it a slight recommendation that, while it gave the best hold upon the continued attachment of our native army, by multiplying our means of rewarding meritorious individuals, it would be attended with a saving instead of an increase of expense. The only difficulty that could impede its successful accomplishment has been before noticed, and the necessity of the measure may be adduced as another argument in favour of selecting the magistrates and superintendents of police from a class of men who are accustomed to command soldiers.

Sudden changes in any system of administration are unwise, and it would be sufficient, if this plan were approved, to make its gradual introduction imperative. The details would be adapted to local circumstances, but no deviation should be allowed at to the fundamental principles on which it is grounded. These

are political, and connected with our very existence in India. Our government of that country is essentially military, and our means of preserving and improving our possessions through the operation of our civil institutions depend on our wise and politic exercise of that military power on which the whole fabric rests. This is a recognised fact; but, unless a conviction of its truth is continually impressed on the minds of those placed at the head of the Indian administration, it will be in vain to attempt plans which will meet with every obstacle that partial and local views, a desire of personal influence<sup>86</sup> and power, or attachment to established system, can devise or create to impede and defeat their execution.

## CHAPTER 11

# *British Community in India*

THIS WORK would be incomplete without some notice of that part of the British community in India living under the protection of the Company's government, but not in their service. This body has of late years greatly increased,<sup>1</sup> and is likely to become much more numerous; and the questions which relate to its privileges and pretensions will require very particular attention.

His Majesty's courts of justice, established at the capitals of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay,<sup>2</sup> are a legal defence, to all English subjects within the limits of their jurisdiction, against any arbitrary acts of the local government, unless in certain cases where the legislature has given to the latter the power<sup>3</sup> of sending to England any individual who may be residing in India without licence, or other lawful authority.

When the judges of the Crown were first nominated to Bengal, their power was extended over all the provinces subject to the Company; but a very short trial of this system showed that it could not be maintained; and experience has since proved that, even within the confined limits to which their jurisdiction is circumscribed, it is liable to come into such violent collision with the local authorities,<sup>4</sup> that we can only hope to avert the evils flowing from this internal source of division and weakness by a most careful selection of individuals to offices which require in those who fill them not only perfect acquaintance with the law, of which they are the organs, but calm temper, enlarged judgment, and a competent knowledge of the peculiar scene in which they have to act. Unless men with such qualities are nominated to the high stations of judges in India, we must anticipate, under the growing numbers of the population of our Indian capitals, very serious embarrassment in the future operation of this the most delicate of all parts of the frame of our eastern administration.<sup>5</sup>

The jurisdiction of the supreme courts of law is limited to a few miles beyond the capitals where they are established, and a long period must elapse, and great changes take place, before it

can be in any degree extended.<sup>6</sup> Those whom it protects are essentially distinct from the great body of our Indian subjects. The mixed population of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, made up of European Half Castes, or Anglo-Indians,<sup>7</sup> and that part of the natives who are associated by their ties, their interests, and their occupations with English laws and usages, and a great proportion of whom have been born and educated under the influence and operation of these laws, form a community as separate in habits and sentiments from that which exists in a town or village at the distance of twenty miles from these capitals, as if they belonged to different nations. There are no people so abhorrent of change as the inhabitants of India; and if its progress has been so slow that it has not as yet travelled beyond the walls of our chief settlements, we may judge of the period which must elapse before we can expect to see complete success crown our efforts for the improvement of our subjects in what we deem the blessings of civilization, but which are viewed by those whom we desire to adopt them as innovations on their cherished habits, and the religion of their forefathers.

The difference between our capitals and their surrounding districts, is not greater than that which exists between the countries that have been long in our possession and those we have recently acquired. The various provinces which form our wide empire may not unaptly be compared, as far as relates to their knowledge of the principles of our rule, our character, and our institutions, to a family of children, from the mature man to the infant. What long acquaintance has made familiar to the one, scares the other; the diet that nourishes the adult may poison the child. These considerations should make us proceed with great caution, otherwise we shall plunge into difficulties from which there is no retreat.

An arbitrary government can make experiments with comparative safety. It can retract a boon which does not promise advantage. It can abrogate today the rights which it granted yesterday; but this is not the case with the British government of India. Its favours and concessions to its subjects, on any points connected with their rights and privileges, cannot be recalled without a real or apparent outrage to the free spirit of the constitution of England, and without impairing the confidence

of the natives in its good faith, which is the basis on which it rests all prospect of permanent improvement. This consideration renders it essential that no measures should be adopted creative of such rights and privileges, unless we have the clearest conviction that they can be permanently maintained, without injury or danger to our native subjects, and to the general interests of our empire in India.

The first question regarding the English community in India is, how far it is wise and safe to allow the settlement of Englishmen in India, and to open to their energy of character the paths of agricultural as well as commercial improvement? This branch of the subject has the more importance, as it is evident that no extensive colonization can take place unless men are admitted to have property in the soil as well as in its produce.

The grounds upon which the impolicy and danger of admitting Englishmen to follow agricultural pursuits in India rest, are, in a great degree, referrible to the peculiar nature of our eastern possessions, which (it cannot be too often repeated) must never be viewed as a colony, but as a subject empire, to the inhabitants of which we have guaranteed, by every pledge that rulers can give to their subjects, the enjoyment of their property, of their laws, of their usages, and of their religion. We may and ought to impart such improvement as will promote their happiness, and the general prosperity of the country; but we are bound, by every obligation of faith (and it would be a principle of imperative policy, even if we had given no pledge,) not to associate with our improvement any measures of which the operation is likely to interfere with their interests, to offend their prejudices, or to outrage their cherished habits and sentiments.

That colonization on any extended scale would have this effect no man can doubt, who is acquainted with the nature of the property in the soil, and the character of the population. The different rights which are involved in every field of cultivated land in India have been particularly noticed, and those who have studied that subject will be satisfied that in many of our provinces there is no room for the English proprietor. Such might, no doubt, purchase land where our regulations have made that saleable, and they might settle in the vicinity of great cities, where, from causes already stated, landed property has, in a certain degree, changed its character.

There are throughout our territories many waste tracts, but almost all the lands capable of being occupied have claimants, who can produce strong title to the eventual occupation of them. This extends even to jungles and wilds, in which the right of pasture, and of cutting wood and grass, usually belongs to the villages in their vicinity. Besides, as has been before stated, when peace and prosperity augment the agricultural population, those that want employment, compelled as they are by their usages to follow the occupation of their fathers, must spread over waste lands, to a share in the produce of which they assert an hereditary claim. The government, which makes advances to enable them to settle in such reclaimed lands, is early repaid by increase of revenue; and when, from any considerations, it is disposed to resign the whole or part of its proprietary rights in order to benefit individuals, there are, as has been elsewhere shown<sup>a</sup>, classes amongst its native subjects who have the first claim to benefit by such grants of the contingent rights that may have devolved upon it.

If the facts here stated are correct, English colonists could only be partially admitted into India, without an interference with the property in actual possession or just expectation of our native subjects of the cultivating class, or those of the higher orders; and whatever might be our intention, we could not adopt the measures for raising these colonists to that consideration which would be requisite to render them an useful and contented part of the community, without a corresponding depression of the native part of the population.

The danger of offence to the prejudices, usages, or religion of the native, from the settlement of British agricultural colonists, would be great; and this danger, it is to be remarked, would not spring so much from the acts of the latter, as from the apprehensions and the impressions of the former, who would believe any such settlement to be the commencement of a system for the subversion of the existing order of society. They would view the settlers as invaders of their rights, and no benefit they could derive from the introduction of capital, or the example of industry and enterprise, would reconcile any to such a change, except the very lowest of the labouring classes; all others would either shrink from a competition with what they would deem a



higher and more favoured class, or be irritated to a spirit of personal hostility, which, in whatever way it might show itself, would be most injurious to the public interests.

English agricultural colonists in India would, in a very few generations, degenerate both in body and mind. This, in spite of every effort to prevent it, must be the effect of the climate, of the connexion with the ignorant and low females with whom their circumstances would inevitably lead them to associate, and of those habits and sentiments which they would acquire from being surrounded with a distinct population whom they would look upon as their inferiors. This change, whenever it came to pass, would bring into disrepute that nation to whom they continued to belong in name, and, instead of adding to its power, they would become a source of weakness to it. In the present scale of our Eastern empire, we can never expect to count numbers with the natives, and it is upon their continued impression of the superiority of our character<sup>9</sup> that our existence must depend. We ought, therefore, to be most cautious as to the adoption of any measure having a tendency to lower the opinion they entertain of their rulers; and that the colonization of some scattered English families over our provinces would have this effect, no one can doubt who knows the country and its inhabitants.

The profits attendant on commerce, and on mechanical science, have carried many of our countrymen to India; and their numbers are likely to increase, from the changes that have occurred and are in operation. Our empire there has already derived, and must continue to derive, the greatest benefit from the enterprise of British merchants, which has diffused wealth, encouraged industry, and promoted the general prosperity of the country, adding by the increase of its resources to the strength of the government. English artisans have also, within a narrower sphere, been most useful; neither of these classes have, in any way, come into collision with our native subjects, by trenching upon their rights and claims: on the contrary, they have been their benefactors; they have given them an example of the benefits that accrue to individuals and nations from large and liberal principles of trade; they have taught them the useful and ornamental arts of life, and it is to them that we must chiefly

look, as affording examples for the natives to follow in every improvement of civilized society. The civil and military officers of government are, from their stations and duties, too distant from the population to be copied; but in the merchant with whom he deals, or competes, and the mechanic for whom he labours, or whom he tries to rival, our Indian subjects view classes to which they are near; and notwithstanding the inveteracy of habits, many may unconsciously become imitators of customs which time may satisfy them are preferable to their own.

These considerations give great importance to the mercantile and mechanical classes of the community; and their growth is desirable, provided it is accompanied with the strict observance of those covenants and legal restrictions under which they are placed. From these, a government so constituted as the English in India cannot relax. Some of its powers, particularly that of deporting any British subject from India to England, is at variance with every principle of our free constitution, and repugnant to the feelings of Englishmen; but it is not at variance with the constitution of our Indian empire, and it is strictly accordant with the covenants into which Englishmen enter before they obtain leave to reside and pursue their several occupations in that empire. We must, nevertheless, expect, from the nature of English society, that on every exercise of absolute power, however necessary, there will be a recurrence of struggle between the government and this part of the population of our Indian capitals; and the sympathy which the latter will meet with in England is such, that it will require all the wisdom and firmness of the authorities at home and abroad to withstand the efforts that will be made to weaken and degrade the local administration.

The number of English merchants and artisans who have been allowed to settle at any distance from the presidencies<sup>10</sup> is not considerable: some of them are fixed at the principal stations, civil and military, in the interior; and others, who have established manufactories,<sup>11</sup> reside in provinces which have been long under our rule. The number of the latter is very small, and many reasons concur to make the increase of it impolitic. At all events, before we venture to do so, we must make some changes

in the law to which they are subject. They should be amenable to the local courts of justice in all but offences of the highest description, and both the judges and magistrates must have such an extension of power as is necessary to enable them to check the excesses of Europeans in their district.<sup>12</sup> That power can be made subject to appeal; but it must be efficient to the object of saving the natives from those inequalities of justice (for so they may be termed) which now exist between them and the English merchant, or artisan, with whom they have litigation or disputes.

The settlement of Europeans, not in the service of government, should be limited to those countries which have been long in our possession, and are familiar with our rule. If unattended with bad consequences, it can be gradually extended. The differences between such provinces and those more recently acquired has been mentioned. In the latter, the ignorance of the inhabitants identifies every European with the government. Many years must elapse before they can comprehend the distinctions which exist in our society; and, until they have attained this knowledge, their peace and good government are liable to be affected, in a degree hardly to be believed, by the words and actions of every individual Englishman who visits or resides amongst them. Better knowledge will, in process of time, correct these delusions and alarms, but until this excited feeling subsides, and our administration and habits are perfectly understood, it is most hazardous to admit any Europeans except those who are under the strict restraints of the civil and military service.

Though a desire to defend their exclusive privileges of trade might, at one period, have led the Company's government to oppose itself to Europeans proceeding to India, nothing can be more groundless than the accusations recently made against the court of directors, of having, from an illiberal and short-sighted policy, endeavoured to prevent, by prohibitions and restraints, the settlement of Englishmen in that country. They have, on the contrary, permitted their settlement as far as was compatible with the welfare of the settlers, the interests of their native subjects, and the peace and prosperity of the empire. The principles upon which they have acted are alike essential for

the safety of the state, and of that community of whom many, from a confined view of their own condition, adopt erroneous opinions on this important subject; and it is to be hoped that the specious representations and popular clamours to which those opinions give birth may never prevail so far as to make us lose sight of that caution which has hitherto been our guide and safeguard. The advantages expected from the concessions called for by speculative men would, in all probability, be found visionary. Their tendency would be to create divisions in the English community in India, and, by injudiciously yielding to them, we might inflict irreparable injury on our native subjects, without conferring a benefit on our own country, that could in any way compensate for the evil consequences of such a measure.

### *ANGLO-INDIANS*

The descendants of Europeans by native mothers, usually termed half-castes, or Anglo-Indians, if they do not form a part of the English community in India, are closely allied to it. Independent of those relations of blood by which many of them are united to this community, their common language, education, habits, and religion, form ties which must always connect them; but, on the other hand, difference of complexion, and situation in life, separates a great proportion of this race from the English society; and, as they are still more distinct from the native part of the population, they must be considered as forming a class of themselves. This body of our subjects in India has of late years occupied much of the attention of government, both at home and abroad, and there appears an anxiety to adopt every measure which can raise it from its equivocal condition, and render it useful and respectable.

The numbers of this class are not considerable;<sup>13</sup> and many causes combine to prevent their rapid increase. A great proportion being illegitimate, they seldom possess much property; and this circumstance, with the difficulty they have in providing for their children, prevents their early marriages.

The male part rarely marry with European women, and their connexions with their own class, or with the native females of India, produce a race still darker than themselves, many of

whom, when the parents are poor, mix with the lower orders of the native Christian<sup>14</sup> population, and lose in the next generation all trace of the distinctive body from which they sprang; while, on the other hand, the children of females of this class who have inter-married with Europeans, from being fairer, and belonging to another society, become, in one or two generations, altogether separated from that race of natives from whom they are maternally descended.

With the exception of a few, who have acquired fame and fortune as military adventurers,<sup>15</sup> the superior as well as the most industrious branches of this community are found at the capitals of our different presidencies, and at the principal civil and military stations; and they may be said almost to monopolize the situations of clerks and accountants, in the offices of government as well as in those of public servants and private European merchants. The whole of this class speak English, as well as the provincial dialect of the country in which they were born. With a few distinguished exceptions, however, they have no political influence with the natives. It has not hitherto been their interest to attain such influence, and many obstacles would oppose their success if they made it their object. The respect which the natives of India pay to an Englishman is associated with their allegiance to the government under which they live. This feeling does not exist towards a person whom they view as more approximated to themselves, and yet without any common interest, or any of those claims from superiority of Indian tribe or caste to which they habitually pay deference. The character, conduct, or achievements of an individual of this class may gain and fix their attachment, but we can look to no period when the Anglo-Indians, as a body, are likely to form any dangerous ties with the Mahomedan or Hindu part of the community. The date at which this part of our population can arrive at any numerical strength as a separate body is very remote; but they are almost all well-educated, and have from this a consequence beyond what they derive from their numbers. They are naturally connected with a part of the English society, and politically with the native Christians; and as associated with those branches they may early attain importance. A just and generous government will not however have recourse to that narrow

principle which apportions benefits by the power any class of its subjects have of enforcing them, nor will it withhold any reasonable boons, because it is offended by the temper in which they are solicited. Acting on different grounds, it will give to this, as to every other class of its subjects, that consideration which is due to their condition, and which fulfils their reasonable hopes without a sacrifice of any essential interest of the empire.

Though placed under circumstances of depression and discouragement, this body of men has lost few opportunities of becoming useful and respected in the different walks of life to which their pursuits have been directed. We should continue, therefore, to cultivate their moral and religious principles, and while we institute and encourage seminaries for their instruction, upon an extended scale, we should provide the means of their future employment in the conditions of life best suited to their respective situations and qualifications. If the justice of this proposition is admitted, the means of carrying it into execution will not be difficult, as they require no change in those salutary restraints in which the principles of both the civil and military services in India are now grounded. The execution of it will not impair our present, but lay the foundations of future strength, by the care which we bestow on an increasing class of our population, to render them useful and attached subjects.

The real consequence of the Anglo-Indians, in the eyes of the natives and in their own, arises chiefly from their connexion with Europeans. They cling to an origin which seems to exalt them, and are only driven by the rebuffs of slight or contempt to take measures by themselves as a detached body, with separate and opposite interests. The very pride they have in placing themselves in the rank of Europeans, while it makes them feel with peculiar sensibility every instance of scornful repulse which, from their anomalous situation, they must often be doomed to experience, affords the means of making them useful allies. In being so, they are in their natural situation: they are adopting the policy most beneficial to themselves; and, on the other hand, in treating them with kindness and consideration, we are only acting the part of wise and benevolent rulers; and the policy of our extending every consideration we can to this

class, is greatly increased by their recognised rights of holding lands,<sup>16</sup> and of sitting upon juries, which latter has been given them recently. These privileges must gradually augment the influence of this class, and, by giving them importance with the English community and themselves, will tend to improve their condition, and confirm their attachment to the state to which they owe allegiance.

### *PROPAGATION OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN INDIA*

There is no subject more intimately connected with the preceding remarks on colonization, and the attention due to the descendants of Europeans, than the question that has been so much agitated, as to the propriety or policy of maintaining and propagating the Christian religion within the limits of our Indian territories. The first is the duty of government; with the latter its name or authority should never be associated. It is our duty, as a Christian nation, and it is politic in us, as rulers of India, to support our church in that country on the most respectable footing. We are bound to give the Christian inhabitants of our territories the means of spiritual instruction; and it is of importance, even in a worldly sense, that they should improve in the knowledge and practice of religion. By decorous attention to the exercise of divine worship, and the observance of the pure tenets of our faith, the character of this class of our subjects will be elevated. They will rise in general estimation, and their example will be more likely to effect the conversion of the native population, than any other means that can be adopted. But in every effort we permit beyond this, for the propagation of our faith among a people who are attached to the religions transmitted to them from their forefathers, and which, however false, are rendered venerable in their eyes by their connexion with the great principles of morality and social duty, we should be guided by our experience of the past, and knowledge of the present, and use that caution which is alike recommended by regard for the safety of the state, and for the ultimate accomplishment of our hopes for the enlightening of our Indian subjects.

The Portuguese, who were the first European settlers in India, hastened<sup>17</sup> their downfall by that bigoted spirit with which they endeavoured to introduce their religion. They surrounded themselves, in their settlements and towns, with native Christians. By so doing, they drew a line of separation between those natives who adhered to them and all others, and rendered themselves an object of dread to all out of the pale of their church. Their advancement in power, therefore, was opposed, not merely on a principle of independence, but of religion.

The French, though not so bigoted and superstitious as the Portuguese, adhered, in some degree, to their imprudent policy in this respect; and the native inhabitants of their settlements, and the servants in whom the principal officers of government reposed trusts, were almost all Christians. It was remarked when their power was at the highest, in the days of Dupleix and Lally, that, instead of scrupulously respecting the prejudices and religious feelings of the Mahomedans and Hindus, they allowed the most sacred usages of both to be frequently violated. On the other hand, from the whole career of the British in India, one would conclude, that in every stage of their progress they had looked for success in avoiding the great errors of their rivals. The government and all its servants have hitherto refused public support and countenance to efforts for converting the natives of India. The consequences of the impressions made by such conduct will never be appreciated, perhaps, till the charm which upholds this great empire is broken.

By the introduction of a judicial system, founded upon their own laws, which are completely incorporated with their religious<sup>18</sup> usages and superstitions, we have given a tacit, but most solemn pledge to withhold all interposition of authority or influence in their conversion. Should the dictates of a conscientious, but overheated zeal, ever lead to a breach of this pledge, the alarm will be great; the consequences may be fatal to our power; and a good Christian would regret to see an effort made to propagate his religion, by means so unsuited to its character and divine origin. In the pursuit of that object, he would deprecate the exercise of an influence which has been obtained by a confidence studiously inspired of its never being so employed.

We have recently placed our church-establishment in India



on a high and respectable footing. Let us continue to give it every proper attention; let the clergymen sent thither be men of exemplary conduct and character, and their number be sufficient to secure to the European part of the community the best means of learning and practising the duties of their religion; but let the clergymen in the employ of government, whether as ministers of religion, or professors of colleges, be prohibited from using their endeavours to make converts. This task might be left, as it has hitherto been, to the labours of the humble missionary, whose habits and zeal give him more prospect of success and whose unnoticed efforts will excite less alarm, when wholly unassociated<sup>19</sup> with the aid and support of government.

The jealousy which numbers of the inhabitants of India entertain, touching our designs upon their religion, has naturally increased with our growing power. The local government, aware of the progress of this feeling, has taken every opportunity to counteract it, and to give their native subjects a continued confidence in the principle which they have acted upon, by abstaining from all proceedings that could, in the remotest degree, be construed into an intention of interfering themselves, or countenancing those under their authority in interfering, with their faith and usages.

In 1804, the subject proposed for a public disputation at the annual examination in the college at Fort William, was, "The advantages which the natives of this country might derive from translations, in the vernacular tongue, of the books containing the principles of their respective religions, and those of the Christian faith." The belief that this discussion would involve topics offensive to the religious prejudices of the Mahomedans led a number of the most respectable and learned of that faith to address a memorial to the Governor-general, Lord Wellesley, remonstrating against this supposed infringement of the unequivocal toleration which they gratefully acknowledged the government had till then afforded to the unmolested exercise of the religions of its subjects. In reply, a declaration was addressed to the memorialists, in the name and by the authority of the Governor-general, in which, after adverting, as a fundamental principle of the British government, to the solicitude with which it abstained from all interference with the religions of its Maho-

medan and Hindu subjects, the memorialists were assured, that the discussion of any subject connected with religion, or which was degrading to the religions of India, was quite foreign to the principles of the institution of the college; and the Governor-general stated that, although he saw no objection of the nature alleged in the proposed thesis, yet, in order to remove every doubt as to that unlimited toleration which the British government had always observed, he had positively prohibited the disputation, the moment he learned its subject. Copies of this declaration were circulated to all the principal stations, and to every foreign court in India.

Nothing can better illustrate than the above incident the slight cause which will produce alarm upon any point touching the religion of our native subjects; and the pains taken by a wise and vigilant government to diffuse its principles and sentiments upon an occasion apparently so trifling, shows the opinion it entertained of the danger of allowing the least erroneous impression to go forth on such a subject.

The mutiny and massacre at Vellore, though owing to a combination of causes, were distinctly proved to have been occasioned in a great measure by the success of discontented and designing men in persuading the mass of their ignorant fellow-soldiers that a serious design was entertained by government of changing their religion.<sup>20</sup> The grounds on which they founded their assertion were slight and fallacious; but they well knew that such an impression alone could work upon the minds of men like the sepoys, in such a manner as to make them unite to murder their officers, to whom they were attached, and rebel against the government by which they were maintained. The spirit<sup>21</sup> which led to these horrid acts spread to other stations; but its further progress was arrested by the judicious measures of government, which issued a proclamation containing the most solemn disavowal of the intention maliciously ascribed to it by evil men, and disclaiming every thought of interference with their customs or religion. The court of directors, on hearing of these proceedings, declared their sentiments on the subject in the following paragraphs of a letter<sup>22</sup> to Fort St. George. "In the whole course of our administration of the Indian territories, it has been our known and declared principle to maintain a perfect toleration of

the various religious systems which prevailed in it, to protect the followers of each in the undisturbed enjoyment of their respective opinions and usages, and neither to interfere with them ourselves, nor to suffer them to be molested by others.

“When we afforded our countenance and sanction to missionaries who have from time to time proceeded to India for the purpose of propagating the Christian religion, it was far from being in our contemplation to add the influence of our authority to any attempts they might make; for, on the contrary, we were perfectly aware that the progress of real conversion will be slow and gradual, arising more from a conviction of the principles of our religion itself, and from the pious example of its teachers, than from any undue influence, or from the exertions of authority, which are never to be resorted to in such cases.”

About this period the attention of the Governor-general-in-council was called to the public preaching of the missionaries, and the issue from the press (which had been recently established at Serampore) of works in the vernacular language of the country, the contents<sup>23</sup> of which were highly offensive to the religious feelings of the natives.

The supreme government, in consequence of the latter proceeding, ordered the press at Serampore to be removed to Calcutta. This press, though established at a Danish settlement, was recognised both by the missionaries and the Danish governor to be virtually under English authority.<sup>24</sup> The order for its removal was afterwards revoked on the respectful application of the Rev. Mr. Carey, who expressed his willingness, and that of the other missionaries, to submit, for the future, to the inspection of the officers of government all works intended for circulation in the British territories.

The Governor-general-in-council reported this proceeding to the secret committee of the court of directors, and, when alluding to the memorial<sup>25</sup> received from the missionaries at Serampore, observed, “We have great satisfaction in acknowledging the temperate and respectful spirit of that memorial, and in expressing our entire conviction of the correctness of the statement which it contains relative to the motives and objects of the zeal of the missionaries for the propagation of the sacred doctrines of Christianity; and our duty as the guardians of the public

welfare, and even a consentaneous solicitude for the diffusion of the blessings of Christianity, merely require us to restrain the effects of that commendable zeal within those limits, the transgression of which would, in our decided judgment, expose to hazard the public safety and tranquillity, without promoting its intended object, and would be incompatible with a just adherence to the obligations of political interest, and of public faith, in the degree in which both are involved in the unequivocal toleration of every religious sect among the inhabitants of these dominions.

"The missionaries have related the progress and result of labours similar to their own during a long course of years, and from the negative fact that the zeal of the propagandises has not, on any occasion, produced the dangers which we apprehend, have inferred that neither the publication of the works which have attracted our attention, nor the practice of public preaching, is calculated to produce them; but two material circumstances, which have escaped the observation of the missionaries, appear to invalidate the force of this conclusion.

"While the British government in India continued to be a subordinate power, the efforts of the missionaries in the work of conversion were not likely to excite among the natives of India any apprehension either of the disposition or the power of the British government to impair the stability of the prevailing systems of religion. Possessing, from the general system, and even under the specific laws of the British administration, every degree of security for the free and undisturbed exercise of their religious ceremonies and devotions, they had no cause to connect the proceedings of the missionaries with the acts of the government; and, deprived of that connexion, the mere personal labours of the former on the work of conversion were inadequate to produce a general sentiment of religious jealousy and alarm, more especially because the efforts of the missionaries were almost exclusively directed towards the class of Hindus, who are free from that spirit of bigotry and fanaticism which distinguishes the class of Mahomedans.

"In the present ascendancy of the British power in India, however, the natives may naturally be led to apprehend that the augmented efforts of the missionaries, exercised under the

immediate protection of the government, are supported and encouraged by its authority; they may be induced to imagine that the possession of unrivalled power, in a dominion extending over a great proportion of the continent of Hindustan, and of an ascendant influence or control over all the primary states of India, may suggest the accomplishment of an object which the comparative inferiority of our power and influence had hitherto excluded from the contemplation of government, the gradual substitution of its religion for the actual religion of its subjects. Under these circumstances, therefore, the labours of the missionaries are calculated in a far greater degree to excite alarm among our native subjects than they were at any former period of time.

"We shall conclude this discussion," the supreme government says, in another part of this able letter, "by observing, that it has never been in the contemplation either of the present or preceding administrations of this government to control or impede the pious labours of the missionaries, while conducted in the manner which prudence dictates, and which the orders of the honourable Court have distinctly described; but when the mistaken zeal of the missionaries exceeded those limits which consideration to the public safety, and even a solicitude for the propagation of Christian knowledge among the misguided natives of these countries, have wisely imposed; when publications and public preachings calculated, not to conciliate, but to irritate the minds of the people, were brought to the notice of government, the interposition of the ruling power became necessary, to preclude the apprehended effects of these dangerous and unprofitable proceedings."

This transaction has been dwelt upon not only as giving facts that elucidate the subject, but as it exhibits the calm yet firm proceedings which an administration characterized by temper and moderation felt itself compelled to adopt under circumstances of much delicacy and embarrassment. The lesson it conveys is important; nor can we reject it without renouncing those generous and liberal principles of toleration which have hitherto guided the conduct of the British government in India, and introducing the doctrine that, in our conduct to our native subjects, we may allow ourselves to indulge in arbitrary exer-

tion of our power over them, for the purpose of forcing upon their minds opinions which (however recommended by truth) are most hostile to all their prejudices, manners, and feelings.

The great increase of our territory within the last eight years has added force to the just reasoning of Lord Minto upon the change which the feelings of our subjects have undergone from this cause. They see us without a rival in power; and, if once persuaded that we have formed the design of altering their religion and usages, their minds are too contracted to believe that any pledges we have given, or any restraining principles we may proclaim, will divert us from such an object. The sense of degradation which they must feel as a conquered people is soothed by the uninterrupted enjoyment of religious tenets and ceremonies handed down from their forefathers. Around these they will rally, on the slightest apprehension of attack; and experience has taught us that this feeling creates an union between Mahomedans and Hindus which no other cause can produce. It places the ignorant of both these classes of our subjects at the mercy of the designing and seditious, in a degree which none can believe whose duties have not led them to a long and minute consideration of the various elements of which the population of our Indian empire is composed.

We have seen the sedition of Bareilly<sup>26</sup> in 1816, though it originated in causes wholly unconnected with religious feeling, assuming that shape the moment the latent spirit of jealousy and alarm was awakened; and perhaps no occurrence in our history more completely shows the power which our secret enemies possess of arraying our subjects against us. This power can be lessened only by our studiously avoiding all measures that can give them any means of imposing upon the ignorance, the credulity, or bigotry of the great mass of the population.

The provisions in the Act of legislature passed in 1812 gave a new impulse to the labours of missionaries in India, where many different societies are now established, connected with those in England with which their peculiar tenets correspond.<sup>27</sup> The efforts of these societies are variously directed to the object of conversion and education. It appears, however, to be now generally admitted by the most able as well as pious of their members, that no rational hopes can be entertained of success in

propagating Christianity until a foundation has been first laid by a more general diffusion of knowledge.<sup>28</sup> This conviction has been acted upon, during the last twelve years, to a very considerable extent; and government, while it has been vigilant in repressing inconsiderate zeal,<sup>29</sup> has given its liberal aid to measures which it deemed likely to improve and benefit its subjects without exciting jealousy and alarm dangerous to the public tranquillity. On the continuance of such a course will depend, not only the safety of the empire, but any hope that can be entertained of ultimate success in the diffusion of knowledge and true religion.

Those who have to govern our eastern empire will often have an unpopular task to perform in opposing their authority to what may appear, to numbers of their countrymen, a clear and direct road to a great and good object; but if the day ever arrives when change of sentiment in the authorities in England, or weakness and mistaken zeal in the local rulers of India, shall lead to the adoption of other principles than those which government has hitherto pursued, the danger will be imminent; and all those fair hopes of gradual improvement which we may now entertain will be lost in the vain and rash attempt to accelerate their accomplishment.

There are only two modes from which any safe progress can be anticipated in our endeavours to convert the natives of India. The first is, by means of unaided and unconnected missionaries:—the second is by education. The first, to give the slightest hope of success, must be attempted by missionaries, who are not only, by their condition, removed from the suspicion of any connexion with government, but who stand alone, and trust solely to their own efforts, and the support of the Almighty. These pious persons should have no worldly ties that could embarrass or impede their efforts. They should cheerfully abandon all the comforts and pleasures of the community to which they have been accustomed, and submit, with a resigned and humble spirit, to all the privations and dangers to which they may be exposed. They should neither have, nor desire to have, their names pronounced beyond the field in which they labour, and their chance of success would be in exact proportion to the degree in which they were unnoticed and unknown beyond the limits of their ministry. This mode of inculcating religious doctrines is con-

genial with the sentiments entertained on such subjects by the greater part of the Indian population, who, when they view such instructors as men entirely dependent on them, and from whom they might derive benefit, and could fear no evil, would not connect, as they often now do, their mission with the support of government, nor consider them as persons paid for professional labours by societies and institutions, and as noting down the errors and crimes of those amongst whom they sojourn for publication in a distant land. That these are the sentiments of the people of India towards many who are now endeavouring to convert them, there can be no doubt; and it is equally true that such impressions, whether just or otherwise, are attended with danger to the state, and will seriously obstruct all progress to conversion; but, on the other hand, it must be confessed that the mode proposed as most likely to propagate the Christian faith, through the means of missionaries, appears more suited to the primitive ages of the church than the present; and that a prospect of success, through such means, may almost be deemed visionary. We must, therefore, advert to the second course,—the maintaining and founding of institutions for the improvement of our Indian subjects, on principles unassociated with any efforts for their conversion, trusting that better knowledge may hereafter dispose their minds to renounce their own errors and superstitions, and to embrace the doctrines of the gospel, when capable of appreciating their real character.<sup>30</sup> That this is the true path to our object there can be no doubt; but we must not deceive ourselves; generations must pass away before it can be accomplished: it will be liable to rude and violent shocks; and, perhaps, the greatest of all dangers will occur when our subjects, taught by us, shall cast off those excellent moral restraints and maxims with which their religion, with all its errors and superstitions, abounds, and yet not adopt that sincerity of faith in the divine precepts which would fill and elevate their minds. This is a danger which we may be compelled to incur; we can only hope to escape the ruin with which it threatens both us and those we desire to improve by the extreme of caution, and being satisfied with a slow and almost imperceptible progress. We must lay it down as a fundamental principle, that it is better for our great purpose to give full knowledge to a few, than super-



ficial knowledge to numbers. We must strictly confine our first efforts at such improvements to those countries<sup>21</sup> where our views are least likely to be mistaken, and carefully repress every exuberance of zeal that can hazard our final success. When we have furnished the means of instruction, we must leave to our subjects to seek the benefit. If they desire to drink at the fountain of knowledge, they will repair to it. To scatter abroad its waters, and to force them upon those who do not thirst, is to diminish their value and to injure their reputation.

The chief obstructions we shall meet in the pursuit of the improvement and reform of the natives of India will be caused by our own passions and prejudices. Those who are sanguine in their hopes of rapid progress will endeavour to obtain aid by exaggerating (perhaps unconsciously) the evils it is desired to remedy, and diminishing the obstacles that present themselves. Others, again, will see dangers beyond those which really exist, and deem every difficulty insuperable. These two extremes must produce an angry collision, unfortunate for the cause. Those who are employed in the work of conversion should shun all exaggeration of facts, which must ever verge upon falsehood. Placed in such situations as they are, it is a crime to speak positively without full knowledge, and it is a greater crime to deceive others by drawing general conclusions of the state of tribes and nations in India, derived from observation of superstitious usages in any one particular district, province, or kingdom. They should seek, not to inflame, but to calm the minds of those with whom they correspond in England, and who have to form their judgment upon trust, at such a distance from the scene. The deep errors of races of men, which arise from their blindly following the ways of their fathers, should be painted in colours calculated to excite pity and commiseration, not horror and detestation. This theme should be approached with humility, not pride, by all who venture to it. We may and ought to be grateful that superior knowledge has removed us far from the ignorance and errors of our Hindu subjects, but we should be humbled to think in how many points, in how many duties of life, great classes of this sober, honest, kind, and inoffensive people excel us. That they have some usages revolting to reason and to nature is certain. At the sacrifice of life in the shocking practice

of sati and infanticide, all must shudder, except those whom habit has reconciled to such acts of inhumanity; but while we feel and express abhorrence at them, we must not forget that they are comparatively local<sup>32</sup> and limited, and that one of them, infanticide,<sup>33</sup> is held in as great horror by all but a few families of Hindus as by us. While all agree in sentiment regarding the sinfulness of the voluntary sacrifice of widows, a great difference of opinion exists as to the mode of terminating the practice.<sup>34</sup> The diffusion of knowledge, the force of example, the mild and conciliating but strong remonstrances of superiors, with the undisguised feelings of shocked humanity, will, we may hope, gradually eradicate a barbarous rite which has already fallen into disusage in many parts of India, from ceasing to excite that sympathy in the people, and, consequently, to meet with that encouragement from their priests and superiors, which it formerly did. But such sympathy and encouragement will be maintained where they still exist, and revived where they have ceased, if we are so unwise as to attempt to suppress, by the strong arm of power, this or any other of the superstitious customs of our native subjects. The merit of resisting what they will consider intolerance and persecution will be added to the other motives for such sacrifices; besides, the impression made by such use of our authority would be attended with great hazard: they who argue otherwise, because they perceive no immediate danger result from particular cases where there has been partial interference, cannot have much knowledge of the character of the Hindu population, or of the nature of the means which the secret enemies of our power endeavour to array against us.<sup>35</sup> Every such act of interference is an item in their account, and adds to their hopes of uniting their countrymen in what they would deem a patriotic and pious cause, that of subverting the rule of strangers and usurpers, who, under the plea of humanity and improvement, made an open and violent attack upon usages respected by the most bigoted and tyrannical of their Mahomedan conquerors, and sanctioned by their own practice during thirty centuries.<sup>36</sup>

These sentiments relative to the propagating of the Christian religion and the diffusing of knowledge, which were publicly<sup>37</sup> expressed by the Author some time ago, have been confirmed by his more recent experience,<sup>38</sup> and are given in this place as the result of the most conscientious conviction.

*FREE PRESS*

The subject of the free press in India, which has of late occupied much attention in England, is of such importance as to require the fullest consideration.

It is little more than half a century since the first newspaper was printed at Calcutta.<sup>39</sup> The times were favourable for the profit and popularity of an editor prepared to promulgate the acts, the misrepresentations, the calumnies, the public and private scandal, which distracted and disgraced the period at which his labours commenced. A contest for power between His Majesty's supreme court of law and the Bengal government was at its height. The latter was compelled to seek, and it found, some safety in conciliating the support of the chief judge of His Majesty's court, without which it must either have perished or have been forced upon the most extreme and arbitrary acts to maintain its existence. Amid such scenes, every individual high in station had his advocates and his calumniators, and the violence of public and private feelings was gratified and aggravated by a journal which gave publicity to every word and deed that suited the views and sentiments of a party. The open scurrility of its abuse exceeded perhaps that of any periodical paper now published in England. The civil government, which was then from its constitution weak, took what steps it could to remedy the serious evil of a paper directed against its reputation and authority, by confining the circulation as much as possible, by frequent prosecutions for libellous matter, and by establishing another paper, in opposition.<sup>40</sup> But though these measures had ultimately the effect of ruining a bold and indiscreet individual,<sup>41</sup> there can be no doubt that the place in the community which he was forced to abandon would have been soon occupied, had not the Acts of the legislature which immediately followed altered the frame of the civil government, and given it a power completely adequate to defend itself against insults and attacks.

From the discontinuance of the periodical paper<sup>42</sup> to which we have alluded, no publication in India demanded the serious interposition of the authority of government, till 1791, when Lord Cornwallis directed the arrest and transmission to England of an editor,<sup>43</sup> in consequence of an offensive paragraph reflect-

ing upon a French public officer and some of his countrymen then residing at Calcutta.

The editor applied to the supreme court for a writ of Habeas Corpus, which was granted. The serving of the writ upon the town-major of Fort William, who had charge of the prisoner, gave rise to a long discussion between the government and the supreme court of judicature; which terminated in a solemn and unanimous decision of the judges, recognising the right exercised by the government; and the editor, on being brought into court, was remanded to the custody of the town-major. The intercession of the French agent at Calcutta, however, saved him from being sent to England on this occasion; but the publication of a number of improper and intemperate articles subsequently, caused this penalty to be inflicted on him in 1794; a proceeding of which the court of directors highly approved.

In 1796, several paragraphs appeared in the public papers which excited the displeasure of government; but on the editors expressing regret, and promising more care for the future, no extreme measures were resorted to. In 1798, there appeared in the *Telegraph*, a periodical publication of Calcutta, a paper signed Mentor, which was thought to be calculated to excite discontent and disaffection in the Indian army. On Captain Williamson of the Bengal establishment being discovered to be the author, he was suspended from the service. The court of directors afterwards gave this officer the half pay of his rank, but refused to comply with his petition to be allowed to return to India. In the same year a letter appeared in the *Telegraph*, signed Charles M'Lean, reflecting upon the judge and magistrate of Gazipur. The editor and Mr. M'Lean were called upon by government to make an apology to that public officer. The former complied with the requisition, but the latter refused; and in consequence of this contumacy, and of previous misconduct in quitting the ship to which he was attached, and remaining in India without permission, he was sent to England. The court of directors fully approved of this proceeding.

The editor of the *Telegraph* incurred in the ensuing year the further displeasure of government, by the insertion of several offensive paragraphs; and this incident, together with some of a similar nature in other newspapers, led the Governor-general-in-

council to establish the following rules for the regulation of the press at Calcutta:—

1. Every printer of a newspaper to print his name at the bottom of the paper.

2. Every editor and proprietor of a paper to deliver in his name and place of abode to the secretary of government.

3. No paper to be published on a Sunday.

4. No paper to be published at all, until it shall have been previously inspected by the secretary to the government, or by a person authorized by him for that purpose.

5. The penalty for offending against any of the above regulations to be, immediate embarkation for Europe.

The court of directors, on receiving the report of this regulation, gave it the sanction of their approbation; as they did to further restrictions issued under the administration of Lord Wellesley, which interdicted newspapers from giving any general orders, or naval intelligence, (such as the arrivals and departures of ships) unless such articles had appeared in the Gazette, thereby to ensure the authority of government to their publication.

The first of these restrictions proceeded from a desire that the orders of government should not come before the public before they had an official and authentic form; and the latter was designed to protect the commercial interests and those of the state from our enemies. The Indian seas were at this period filled with French privateers; and it was discovered that the shipping intelligence, inserted to gratify the curiosity of the readers of newspapers, was sent to every point where it could reach the commanders of these vessels, whom it often enabled to intercept merchantmen, and to avoid the British cruisers. This last restriction, which the carelessness or contumacy of editors compelled government often to repeat, will show, in the strongest point of view, the great difference between the character of the press in India and England. At first view, it will certainly appear very harsh, and almost tyrannical, to prohibit the public papers from inserting arrivals and departures of vessels, these being occurrences in which it may be said many are deeply interested; but we shall be sensible, on reflection, that the government could hardly have shown more negligence of

its duty, or more injustice to those living under its protection, than to permit this to be done at the expense of its commercial subjects, of its own reputation, and that of His Majesty's naval commander. The chief end to be answered by the articles published would be, to gratify the curiosity of the English inhabitants of Calcutta, not amounting in numbers to those of some large village in England, and to convey to public servants and residents in the interior of India information which, if at all interested in it, they were certain of receiving through private channels.

This case may be deemed an exception; but the nearer we look at the question of a free press in India, the more exceptions we shall find, and be compelled to confess that, as long as the necessity exists for the maintenance of absolute power, it is far better, both for the state and individuals, that it should be exercised to prevent than to punish such offences, particularly where the punishment is so severe. In the latter case, government has no option, it has only one course to pursue; and when its authority is slighted, and its disposition to moderate measures treated with contumacy, it is compelled to proceed to the extreme exercise of its prerogative, or present to its subjects the spectacle of its authority condemned and defeated.

After the establishment of the office of censor, there were no cases of offence, except what were comparatively trivial, and which seem to have originated more in negligence than design.

The steps taken in Lord Minto's administration, to prevent the publication<sup>44</sup> of religious works offensive to the nation, has been already detailed. During the whole of the government of this nobleman there appears to have been a very vigilant superintendence of the press.<sup>45</sup> In 1811 the names of the printers were directed to be affixed to all works, advertisements, papers, etc.; and two years afterwards, further regulations directed not only that the newspapers, notices, handbills, and all ephemeral publications, should be sent to the chief secretary for revision, but that the titles of all works intended for publication should be transmitted to the same officer, who had the option of requiring the work itself to be sent for his examination, if he deemed it necessary.

These additional restrictions upon the press were made under

the government of a nobleman who, from his character, was the most unlikely of men to impose any restraint that he could avoid upon the liberty of his countrymen.<sup>46</sup> They were a strong confirmation of the wisdom and foresight of his predecessor, and evinced the necessity of increased vigilance to check a growing evil. They had the effect of preventing his being forced upon any harsh measures to individuals; and it is worthy of observation, that from the time the office of censor was established,<sup>47</sup> though there were never less than five newspapers published at Calcutta, in which every kind of European intelligence, and all matters of general and local interest, were inserted, there did not occur, from 1801 till 1820, a period of twenty years, one occasion on which government was compelled even to threaten to send any individual to England.

During the first three years of the administration of Lord Hastings, frequent censures had been passed on the editor of a paper, called the *Asiatic Mirror*, for what was deemed improper conduct. The editor, for one of his pleas of justification, remonstrated<sup>48</sup> upon the varied mode in which different individuals who filled the office of censor performed its duties, and the consequent difficulty there was in understanding exactly the course which an editor was to pursue. No notice was taken of this remonstrance; but in the subsequent year, the office of censor was abolished, and as a substitute, regulations<sup>49</sup> for the conduct of editors of newspapers were issued.

By this measure the name of an invidious office was abolished, and the responsibility of printing offensive matter was removed from a public functionary to the author or editor; but this change, so far from rescinding any of the restrictions upon the press, in reality imposed them in as strong, if not in a stronger degree, than any measure that had been before adopted. This conviction would, no doubt, have been general, but for the misinterpretation of a passage in the answer given by Lord Hastings to an address from the inhabitants of Madras. In this address, His Lordship was complimented on the adoption of a measure "calculated to give strength to a liberal and just government, to which freedom of inquiry and the liberty of discussion was the best support;" and His Lordship's answer was couched in terms,<sup>50</sup> which were in some quarters altogether misinterpreted.

It was erroneously inferred that His Lordship was disposed to give a very great latitude to freedom of publication; and that the restrictions which had been before imposed, if not virtually repealed by this public declaration of his opinions, would, at least, not be enforced by the arbitrary punishment inflicted by former Governor-generals of sending offenders to England. The editor<sup>51</sup> of the *Calcutta Journal* was forward to declare this impression and to act upon it. This paper early evinced a talent and industry that would have given it success under any circumstances; and when its pages added, to the excellent matter with which they were often filled, attacks upon public measures, with strictures on the highest official personages in India, its circulation greatly increased. The very disputes of the editor with individuals and with government gave a piquancy to his pages, while his display of attachment to English principles, in the bold assertion of the liberty of the press, and his resistance to what was reprobated as arbitrary power, gained him many and zealous advocates, who, awakened as it were at his call to feelings congenial to their native country, forgot for the moment the vast difference between that and the land in which they had chosen to reside. Encouraged by their approbation, and by the profit and popularity which for a short period attended his labours, the editor persisted in his course, which terminated in his being sent to England. The legality and justice of this extreme measure were confirmed by the decision of the court of directors, and by the King-in-council, to both of which authorities he made his appeal against the severity of his treatment in India.

It would occupy too much space to detail the measures which Lord Hastings took before he left Bengal to restrain the licentiousness of the press, or to give the sentiments he recorded expressive of the disappointment at the effects produced by the latitude which he had desired to give to this cherished English privilege. The moderation with which he performed his duty on this occasion did not save him from the attacks of those who had a short time before hailed him as the bestower of that freedom which he was now represented as anxious to destroy. His successors, Mr. Adam and Lord Amherst, were virulently assailed for the acts which the continued offences of the successive editors of the *Calcutta Journal* compelled them to adopt; and the



former incurred more obloquy from a popular party on account of the regulations established by him, with the sanction of the supreme court of Calcutta, by which every printer is obliged to have a licence before he is authorized to print newspaper, pamphlet, or work of any description whatsoever; which licences are to be withdrawn on the transgression of any of the restrictions under which the press is placed. This measure applies to all classes, and is deemed, for that reason, better than the restoration of the office of censor, which, as far as the arbitrary act of banishing from India operated, could apply to Europeans only; while the Anglo-Indians and natives could consequently print and publish what they pleased, without being amenable to any punishment but what the ordinary course of law inflicted.

The history of the press at Madras and Bombay is, on a small scale, not unlike that of Calcutta. At the former presidency one case occurred, thirty years ago, of an editor<sup>52</sup> being ordered to England for publishing a libellous paper; but no similar act of severity has been required there since, owing, no doubt, to the office of censor having been continued in that presidency. It is important, however, to state that, when that able and respectable nobleman, Lord William Bentinck, was at the head of this government, one of His Majesty's judges<sup>53</sup> sent to the government a copy of his charge to the grand jury at the preceding sessions, with a request that it should be printed; which request was not complied with, as the charge in question was considered to contain an attack on the civil government of the country. The governor took this occasion of expressing his sentiments in the most decided manner regarding all such publications.

"It is necessary in my opinion," His Lordship observed, "for the public safety, that the press in India should be kept under the most rigid control. It matters not from what pen the dangerous matter may issue; the higher the authority the greater the mischief."

This was the just and deliberate opinion of a nobleman deeply imbued with the true principles of English freedom, but, at the same time, too well acquainted with the frame of our Indian government to admit any part of that to suffer injury when in his hands, from a desire either to evade responsibility or to court popularity.

The press at Bombay was placed under the supervision of a government officer in the year 1791; and the censorship continued until it was done away at Calcutta, when it was also abolished at Bombay. Though various discussions had arisen, no extreme act of authority was resorted to until lately that the governor-in-council directed the editor<sup>54</sup> of the *Bombay Gazette* to be sent to England, on a complaint from one of His Majesty's judges at that presidency, founded on an alleged mis-statement of the legal proceedings of the court in which he presided. The quarter from which this appeal was made to the civil government, unless we impugn the conduct of the judge who made it, must carry with it irresistible evidence of the necessity of that authority whose aid was solicited; and with respect to the extreme resorted to, in affording this aid, there is one unanswerable plea to be preferred, which is, that a government so situated cannot suffer the commands it has issued to be successfully opposed by an individual, without a loss of that impression of its power which is quite essential to the fulfilment of its various and important duties.

The foregoing is a short history of the press in India, from its first establishment till the present date. It is not necessary to notice the many discussions and publications to which the more recent occurrences at Calcutta have given rise in England. The author's sentiments upon that question, as given at a debate at the India House, will be found in the Appendix;<sup>55</sup> but he must, in this place, offer some general observations, which, he trusts, will be perused with that calmness and consideration which a subject of such vital importance to our Indian empire demands. It is no easy task to reconcile Englishmen to any principles which have an appearance of militating against that freedom, to which, from their very birth, they are so fondly attached; but they will not refuse assent to the reasonableness of some departure from these principles, if proved to be alike essential to maintain the prosperity and glory of their country, and to promote the good and tranquillity of distant nations, who, though subject to its power, are, and must long continue, in a totally different state of society.

The mode in which we can best arrive at a safe conclusion upon this important point is, to examine carefully the general

character of a free press, and the effects which its introduction would be likely to have upon the different classes of our subjects in India. Throughout the civilized world, a free press is a powerful engine for good or for evil. When the knowledge of the people, their institutions and form of government are such as to admit of its freedom, the good preponderates; when the reverse is the case, the evil. It is safe to admit the press to comment freely upon the acts of government and the conduct of its functionaries, when there is an independent public to whom its observations and strictures are addressed, and by whom it is salutary, for the general welfare, that they should be canvassed and understood, in order that their opinion should check misrule; and that the fear of offending or outraging it, should temper with moderation and justice every act of those intrusted with the administration of state affairs; but no part of this description of an independent public applies to our empire in India. The English part of the population is, perhaps, as respectable a community as any in the world; but they are not what an Englishman would designate as a public. The great majority are civil and military servants, of whom a very considerable proportion hold their offices at the pleasure of the local government under which they serve; and the other part, composed of merchants, free-traders, missionaries, shop keepers, and artisans, not in the service of government, enjoy, under the protection of British courts of law, every privilege of an Englishman, except such as the interests of the Indian empire would make it dangerous for them to possess. But the want of these excepted privileges is rarely felt, for such is the happy effect of our free constitution, that a portion of it attends and guards Englishmen in whatever soil and situation they are placed. Its beneficial influence tempers the actions of the most absolute power with which an English government over foreign countries can be vested, having for its support the sympathy of all who are born Britons; and, in the respectable community now formed by the English in India, this feeling has gained, and will continue to gain, a strength that must rank it among the most powerful of the checks we can expect to have upon a government which circumstances require to be strong, and in some cases almost despotic.

There can be no doubt that, in substance, there exists in our

empire in India as much of personal liberty as is compatible with our sovereignty of that country; but if, from a desire to assimilate with the national government of England the un-national government which extraordinary events have given us in India, any individuals are to be suffered to exercise the same rights there as are exercised in England, in commenting upon the acts of local administration, animadverting on its functionaries, publishing complaints and grievances, discussing questions of internal and external policy, and exposing as objects of ridicule and detestation the usages and religion of our native subjects; they will create insubordination, contention, and disaffection. Unless strong and political restrictions are enforced, neither the grave admonitions of those in authority, nor an occasional appeal to the law, will stop men in a career where their profit and popularity will be so commensurate to the boldness of their attacks as always to indemnify them for the slight hazard they incur from judges bound by the letter of the law, or juries, consisting of men who, from their condition, will look with no hostile feeling at those who rail at persons in office, or attack the measures of their superiors in society. But the evils likely to result in the European part of the community from the admission of a free press appear slight to those which would be produced, and at no distant date, amongst the natives<sup>56</sup> of India; and it is the consideration of their good, even more than of our own, which demands attention to this subject. It is impossible England should desire to withhold from her subjects in India the benefit of knowledge; but on the manner in which this benefit is imparted, her glory and their happiness depend. On this point, therefore, it is our duty to exert our best judgment; and what person that has studied the past history of the natives of India, and fully understands their present character and condition, will venture to recommend us to commence this improvement by the agency of a free press? That may, perhaps, be the last boon given to a people whom, with a policy unknown to former ages, we shall have gradually matured into a state of society fit to receive it; the gift will be ennobled by the conviction that the existence of a spirit of national feeling and independence, which it is calculated to spread and maintain, is irreconcilable with the continuance of submission to a foreign rule,

however enlarged the views and just the principles upon which that rule is founded.

The establishment of a free press in India is congenial with the interests and feelings of a number of that class of Europeans who dwell at the presidencies under English law. It is from their support that it has lately derived, and will hereafter derive, confidence in its attacks upon the local administration, and upon the usages and religion of the natives of India. There is no preventing this effect if the law is exclusively appealed to, and the victories which editors obtain over government and its officers will daily strengthen a cause which has gained, in a short period, much ground both in India and in England; for even in the former country the great majority of English residents are but little acquainted with the true character of those ties by which we hold our eastern empire. The general sentiments of persons connected with the courts of English law are, from education and from habit, favourable to what appears the cause of liberty. Many members of the European part of the community are discontented with their condition and prospects; others continue at the presidencies with unchanged English ideas and feelings, and ignorant of the condition of the country and its native population beyond the limits of the capitals in which they reside. Such persons often cherish a hatred (which they flatter themselves is constitutional) to all that, in their opinion, approaches to oriental despotism. A great number (and this class increases rapidly) are so ardent for the propagation of education and religion, that they welcome, with an inconsiderate zeal, every aid which they think will accelerate the early attainment of their objects, and we cannot be surprised that among those they deem a free press one of the most essential. Thus professional feeling, ignorance, disaffection, prejudice, and enthusiasm, swell the numbers of the advocates of a free press in India; and these meet with coinciding sentiments in England in all who are ignorant or but superficially acquainted with the history and condition of India. Better informed men, however, will be convinced that the good of the latter country needs a mixture of some principles happily uncongenial to England; and that not only the interests of Great Britain, but those of humanity and of knowledge, require our firm resistance to this and

other points similar in their spirit of innovation, and unseasonable excitement.

The establishment of a free press in India has been represented as a means of advancing the knowledge and promoting the utility of that class of our subjects denominated "half-castes," or Anglo-Indians. The attention which this class has lately received has been already noticed; and it may be added, that the success of the measures which have been adopted with a view to their improvement would be much more likely to be defeated than advanced by a free press, which might prove a fatal boon to a society yet in its infancy of knowledge. That freedom would be more likely to instil principles of insubordination, division, and misplaced ambition, than to convey lessons of virtue and moderation to a community whose rise into respectability and consideration in the state depends on habits of active industry and solid acquirements. The press, as at present licensed in India, affords to this body of our subjects all that can be well desired of instruction. If its freedom were extended beyond this point, it might work them evil; it could render them no good: but a view of the benefit or injury it might bring to this class, or to a few Europeans,<sup>57</sup> sinks into insignificance when we contemplate its probable effects upon eighty millions of our native subjects. In treating this part of the subject, we may commence by assuming, that there never was a government actuated with more just and liberal views, nor one more anxious to exercise its sovereign functions in a spirit of mildness and toleration, than that of the British in India. Arrived as it now is at a state of unrivalled power, it may look to an undisturbed progress in the execution of its plans for a substantial and gradual improvement of the natives of its vast empire; but this fair prospect must be destroyed, if we unwisely anticipate the period when the blessings we intend can be safely imparted. By doing so, we shall not only hasten our own destruction, but replunge India into a greater state of anarchy and misery than that in which we found it. Of all the means that could be devised to accelerate this deplorable crisis, none is so efficient as the admission of a press restrained only by laws adapted for a free and independent country, into one where, before freedom and independence can be understood, the mind of the people must be wholly

changed, and where, before they can be worthy of these blessings, they must have thrown off the yoke of foreigners. But to understand the ground of those opinions, we must examine the character of the people in question.

The two great divisions of our Asiatic subjects are Mahomedans and Hindus: the former, who are the least numerous, have been the greatest sufferers by our establishment in India; but their means of subverting our power are slight compared with those possessed by the Hindus. Though the Mahomedans are no longer actuated by that enthusiastic spirit of religion which, at one period, gave them strength and union, their idleness and bad habits, combined with their courage, render them dangerous; for they are prone to change, and have strong passions, with an unrestrained appetite for sensual pleasures, for the gratification of which they will incur any hazard.<sup>58</sup>

Such a race have hitherto been, and will continue to be, apt instruments for the purpose of the designing and disaffected.

The Hindu population of India comprises all descriptions of human beings, from the most intelligent to the most ignorant, from the most courageous to the most timid: but, though divided by their tribes and castes, as well as by their various dispositions, pursuits, and qualities, there are some general feelings that will unite them; and of these the more instructed part of the community understand how to take full advantage whenever it suits their purpose. The Brahmins and the civil classes have for ages been the nominal servants and real masters of the turbulent and bold, but ignorant and superstitious, military tribes of their countrymen. Their skill in wielding this dangerous power has become complete by frequent exercise; and when we consider what they have lost by the introduction and extension of our dominion, it would be folly to expect that they should not have a wish to subvert it.

Contemplating, as we always should, the possibility of such an attempt, we ought to be very careful that we do not ourselves contribute means for its success; and it may be asserted that, until the minds of the natives of India are changed, their prejudices subdued, and knowledge gradually diffused, we could give to the Brahmins, and others of the instructed classes of India, no weapon which they would know better how to use

against us than a free press. Their efforts would be chiefly directed to corrupt our native soldiery, who are neither insensible to their own consequence, nor inobservant of the depressed scale on which they serve. It is our duty, as it is our interest, to guard these brave and attached men from insidious attacks upon their fidelity. A contest with any part of our native army must commence with a destruction of links essential to our existence. If we oppose English to revolted Indian troops, the best result would give success only for a short period; for, from the moment that we began to rely upon our physical strength, the chain by which we hold our eastern empire would be broken, and we should have to struggle through recurring difficulties and dangers to an inglorious termination of our power.

The measures hitherto employed by artful enemies to produce dissatisfaction in our subjects and native troops, and their partial success, give earnest of the dangers to be apprehended from the dissemination in the native languages of printed tracts and papers, such as might be expected from a free press. It is not necessary to enumerate the instances to which allusions are here made;<sup>59</sup> suffice it to say, they are numerous, and all directed to the same object, the excitement of a feeling hostile to the existence of our power.

Upon a view of these facts, we can imagine no precaution of such consequence as a watchful restraint of the press. If that is not restricted from publications tending to lower the respect in which government and its officers are held, from offending and weakening princes and chiefs, by lessening their estimation with their subjects, from alarming and irritating the natives of India, by attacks on their usages and religion, and from disseminating principles of sedition and rebellion, it will gradually undermine and destroy our power; and it may compass this without any serious transgression against the law of England, or, indeed, without the slightest evil intention of some of those who aid in working the mischief. Their limited knowledge and imperfect information, combined with their zeal, may blind them to the dangers they engender; and others, who have deeper designs, will court their names in a cause that must be popular with many, from its supposed association with the propagating of freedom, useful knowledge, and true religion.



We must necessarily deduce from what has been stated, that the existence of a press, free in the same degree as that of England, is incompatible with a government such as that we have established in India.<sup>60</sup> It would accelerate the destruction of our power long before its dissolution could be a benefit to the natives of that country: it would impede instead of promote the progress to improvement now making by the Anglo-Indians and Europeans whose curiosity, national prejudices, and personal feelings, which it might amuse and gratify, would be thrown by its unlicensed action into parties and dissensions every way injurious to the happiness and interests of this small but important part of the population.

That a spirit of emulation might be excited, and some latent talent be elicited, by the freedom of the press, cannot be denied; nor is it meant to deny that good might arise from its observations on public men and measures, and that it might occasionally constitute a check against abuses; but, in a government like British India, such good would be partial and uncertain, whereas the mischief to which a free, unlicensed press would open the door, would be general and incalculable. The present press in India is under no restrictions that can prevent its doing good on as large a scale as can be rationally wished. It is restricted from attacking a government so placed and constituted that it would lose by such attacks the impression which is indispensable to fulfil its duties; it is interdicted from publishing any articles that have a tendency to disturb the society, and to excite passions and feelings that would lead through discontent and disaffection to sedition and revolt. These salutary interdictions excepted, it has every freedom and every encouragement that a friend to publicity (which every friend to just government must be) could desire. There is no restrictions that can prevent the spread of intelligence, and the dissemination of science and instruction, in every art and improvement of civilized life. But it is important to observe that our continued ability to give the press that latitude which will make it a great and useful instrument to further our plans of improvement, depends on the strict<sup>61</sup> and vigilant manner in which we check any trespass upon the limits which have been prescribed to those by whom it is conducted.

It has been argued that a free press in India would prove a channel through which complaints would be heard; that it would be a protection to the weak and oppressed; that it would convey wrongs and abuses to the ear of government and its high functionaries, and would prove in this and in other ways an efficient check to the abuse of power: but it is sufficiently obvious that such benefits could alone result when those that conducted the press had complete information and perfect knowledge of the languages, the manners, the character, and concerns of the people; where, in short, all their feelings were congenial with those of the society of which they were the advocates; otherwise their representations would be full of error, and their observations superficial and inconclusive. No English editor of a paper can have the means of becoming qualified for an impartial and useful advocate of our Indian subjects; and with regard to native editors, we cannot expect them to exercise such a privilege within limits that could be tolerated by a government whose power is at variance with those principles of national independence and freedom which it would be their duty, if worthy of the task they undertook, to disseminate amongst their countrymen. We are too separated from the great bulk of the population of India to be enabled to judge with precision the progress of change in their feelings and sentiments; but it must be obvious to all who are acquainted with their character and the construction of their society, that freedom of discussion and of action, to be beneficial amongst such a people, must be a plant of slow growth. A very long period must elapse before it is naturalized in a land to which its very name is hitherto unknown; nor can this great gift ever be a blessing till men's minds are prepared to receive it. Through the institution and maintenance of well-regulated colleges and schools, and the circulation of good and useful compositions, we can alone look with confidence to the accomplishment of our just and liberal views. By such rational means we shall disseminate instruction in process of time amongst those peaceable classes of our subjects where it will be most beneficial, and our efforts for their improvement may increase as their minds expand. In such a course there is safety and benefit; but very different would be the effects of the immediate toleration of papers, pamphlets,

and tracts which, without any violation of law, might be filled with matter that would be too intelligible to the turbulent and military part of our population, whose passions they would provoke by published contempt of their religion and usages; while they excited their ambition, and invited their attack, by exposing and decrying the authorities to which they are subject. The very men whom we have armed for our defence would, in all likelihood, be among the first whose principles of obedience and duty such a press would undermine. Through it, seductive but false lessons would be taught them by the discontented and designing. They are already at a stage of knowledge and condition which renders it (as experience has shown) too easy to delude their credulous and ardent minds. By the aid of an unrestricted press our enemies would soon make this brave, and hitherto faithful, body of men believe that their independence and advancement would be achieved by our downfall and destruction.

To conclude, it is not from ephemeral publications, nor from the desultory efforts of talent without experience, and enthusiasm without judgment, that we are to expect the improvement of the natives of India. Such may dazzle and attract individuals, and form a few bands and societies who, proud of their imagined superiority, separate themselves from the population to which they belong, and thus create a collective body, powerless to effect good or great ends, but efficient to work much evil. The change we seek, to be beneficial, must be general; it must be wrought by the society itself, and come as the result, not as the object of our persevering and unwearied labours.<sup>62</sup> By the extreme of care in the selection of those who are to rule over this people, who are to command our armies, and to distribute justice; by stimulating the zeal and ambition of those employed in the public service; by liberal encouragement to commerce, and to the introduction of the useful arts of civilized life; by addressing ourselves not only in the substance but mode<sup>63</sup> of administration to the understanding and feelings of those we have to govern; by useful public works; by a moderate assessment of revenue from our subjects, and toleration of their religious and superstitious usages; by institutions founded on sound and solid principles; by raising into consideration and distinction those of the native population whose

services, superior talent and integrity, or weight and influence with their countrymen, make it wise and politic to elevate; and above all, by governing our vast territories in India with more attention to their interests, and to the character and condition of their inhabitants, than to the wishes and prejudices of those of England, we shall succeed in ultimately accomplishing every plan now in progress for the benefit of this singular and great empire. But the conduct and direction of all these plans must be left to the local administration, the members of which, anxious as they must ever be for their reputation and good name in their native land, will be found more desirous to accelerate, than to retard the march of improvement. We may change the character of the natives of India in the course of time, but we never can change the character of our government over that country. It is one of strangers, and cannot endure but in the shape in which it now exists, well regulated, but absolute; acting under the strictest responsibility in England, but vested with a power in India efficient to prevent and repress every danger to which it may be exposed from the intemperate zeal, the contumacy, or the opposition of its subjects, as well as from the machinations or the aggressions of its enemies.

## APPENDIX I

# *Treaty of Seringapatam*

*Abstract of Conferences between the Commissioners of the Honourable East India Company, the Nizam (or Subedar of the Deccan), and the Peshwa, on one part, and those of the Tipu Sultan, on the other, to negotiate the Treaty of Seringapatam, 1792.*

Sir John Kennaway, *English*

Mir Alam, *Nizam's*

Gulam Ali, Ali Reza (recently returned from the Embassy to Constantinople), *Tipu's*.

Govind Rao Kishen, Bhikaji Pandit,

*Peshwa's*.

The Commissioners met at a tent, pitched near the Edgah.<sup>1</sup>

Feb. 13th:—The first day's conference has been lost—but little appears to have passed, except ceremony and the arrangement of future meetings.

Feb. 14th:—The allied deputies stated as a *sine qua non* the cession of the half of Tipu's territories, and also the payment of six crores (six millions sterling), towards defraying the expenses of the war.

Feb. 18th:—Persons and place of meeting the same as before.

Ali Reza, one of Tipu's envoys, was willing to cede one-fourth of his master's country, and to pay three crores of rupees. Sir John Kennaway observed that if this was Tipu's final answer, the conference must cease, and hostilities be renewed, as the allies could not depart from their demands. He added to this observation his desire, grounded on reasons he was not at liberty to divulge, that Tipu's vakils should quit the ground they occupied, and return to Seringapatam that night. "However irksome," he said, "it is to my private feelings to insist on this point, with persons whose manner and conversation has so much attached me to them, my public duty and attention to the injunctions of the orders which I act requires it of me."

This observation made a serious impression on Tipu's envoys, who pleaded, earnestly, their master's inability to pay such a sum, and remonstrated against the hardness of the terms. They were answered by Sir John Kennaway, that Tipu's aggression had given the allies the right, now they had the power, to strip him of all his possessions which would not pay their expenses in the war.

The vakils reiterated their master's inability to pay more than two crores and a half (two millions sterling) of rupees: offered their own oaths on the Koran to this effect; and requested a reference to the public accounts of the treasury to prove his inability. They stated Tipu's expenses in fortifications, public works, and his disbursements during the war, to have been enormous: from these and other considerations, they entreated that their first offer might be accepted.

Sir John Kennaway replied that he could only repeat the substance of his former demand, which was founded in principles of moderation, and finally, that he and his colleagues were only deputies acting from powers strictly defined and limited by their respective principals. After a long interval had elapsed, and after Tipu's vakils had consulted apart, Gulam Ali said he would undertake to guarantee the cession of half the country, with fifty lacs more, in all, three crores (three millions sterling) of rupees; he added, that even this could only be given by eight or ten of Tipu's sirdars aiding their master's means. Sir John Kennaway repeated his former answer, and insisted on the vakils returning to Seringapatam. The vakils entreated to be permitted to remain, and to have their last offer reported to Lord Cornwallis. To this Sir John Kennaway at length assented, cautioning them against the hope of their proposal being accepted, or their being permitted to remain where they were longer than tomorrow morning; and as it would be unpleasant to him to issue harsh orders to them, he requested that if they saw his tent struck next morning, they would consider it as necessary to remove their own.

In some of the pauses and intervals of the above conference, Ali Reza, conceiving that Tipu had been represented to Lord Cornwallis as a cruel and tyrannical prince, entered into a laboured defence of his sovereign. As an example of his liberality, he

instanced his conduct to the garrison of Mangalore: to which Sir John Kennaway replied, that that garrison had capitulated on terms which had not been infringed. He also instanced his good behaviour to the garrison of Bidenore, under General Mathews. Sir John Kennaway answered, that the terms of this latter capitulation had been violated by Tipu in a shameful manner. Ali Reza replied, it was true, but the violation of the terms had commenced with General Mathews, who was discovered carrying away treasure from the fort.<sup>2</sup> Cruelty to his prisoners, he said, was often imputed to his master unjustly. Their hard usage had been caused by the treachery of his public servants, who had applied to their own use the money allowed for their support. Sir John Kennaway allowed that this might, in part, extenuate particular cases, but the treatment of the prisoners in general had been that of brutes rather than men. He expressed to the *vakil* the satisfaction Lord Cornwallis felt at the offer which had been made to release those now in Seringapatam, which, however, could not at present be accepted; but His Lordship trusted they would receive the same treatment which Tipu's prisoners received from us. The conference then broke up about nine o'clock.

Feb. 19th:—At five o'clock, p.m., Sir John Kennaway waited, by Lord Cornwallis's orders, on the Nizam's minister, and requested his opinion of the answer that should be given to Tipu's offer. The minister stated his readiness to agree to whatever was Lord Cornwallis's determination, and demanded what the determination was likely to be.

Sir John Kennaway told him that His Lordship considered three crores a large sum to be paid down at once, and as Tipu's envoys had expressed their readiness to make oath as to his want of means to pay more, and had offered to show the treasury accounts, he doubted whether more could by possibility be had. The point, therefore, to decide was, whether they should accept the offer, or protract the war, by sticking out for another crore. The minister thought it also a large sum, yet before agreeing to the offer, he was of opinion we ought to call on Tipu for the revenue accounts of his territories, that it might be ascertained what was the value of the proposed cessions. Sir John Kennaway answered, that by calling for papers, the negotiation

would be protracted, which was unadvisable, and moreover, that until Tipu's hostages were in our possession, his good faith, and adherence to one article of the agreement, could not be depended on. When that took place, papers might be called for at our leisure. The minister reiterated his wish to be entirely guided by His Lordship's decision. Sir John Kennaway then took leave, and accompanied by Mir Alam, proceeded to Hurry Punt's tent.

The conversation with the Mahratta chief commenced in the same manner as it had done with the Nizam's minister. On understanding that Sir John had just come from the latter, he asked what answer or opinion he had given. Mir Alam replied, that the minister's answer would be Hurry Punt's.

Hurry Punt then said, he would be happy at Tipu's entire extirpation, and he should revel in the spoil and conquest of his territory; yet that great men, in Lord Cornwallis's predicament, guided their conduct in two ways. The first was, when fortune favoured them, and the enemy was at their feet, to be deaf to prayers and entreaties, and to destroy him utterly. The other alternative, and, without doubt, the preferable, was to have compassion on him, when he was humble and sued for mercy; and to restore him to power without neglecting their own advancement and security. Sir John Kennaway said, that Lord Cornwallis preferred the alternative of mercy, and being also of opinion that it would be difficult for Tipu to pay more than he had offered, was not inclined to protract the war by any more demands. To this the Mahratta chief assented, using a proverb equivalent to taking time by the forelock, or striking while the iron was hot.

Mir Alam recurred to the minister's plan of declining a definite answer till we had obtained the accounts necessary to ascertain the value of the proposed cessions. Hurry Punt objected to this delay, and said he would be responsible for Tipu's territories yielding a net revenue of three crores.

He then desired Sir John Kennaway would suggest to Lord Cornwallis the propriety of demanding from Tipu a sum for Durbar charges, as a gratuity to the officers of the three states employed in the war: unless a sum of this nature were obtained, the Nizam's ministers and other civil officers would not benefit



a rupee by the war. Such demand, he said, was usual on similar occasions, and could not impede the negotiations, and that sixty lacs might be demanded, and thirty accepted. Sir John Kennaway then taking leave of Hurry Punt, waited on Lord Cornwallis, and from thence repaired to meet Tipu's envoys at the conference tent.

Persons, the same as before; time of meeting half-past eight, p.m.

Sir John Kennaway opened the conference by saying, that Lord Cornwallis having deeply considered the offer they had made, and consulted the representatives of the allies; having also duly considered their solemn averment of the impossibility of Tipu's paying more than he had offered, and their proposal of showing to competent persons their treasure and accounts; and being averse to press too severe terms, he was willing to accept the offer they had made; but in addition to the three crores now accepted, an additional article must be inserted in the treaty, granting sixty lacs for Durbar expenses.

Gulam Ali Khan, after the expression of his deep sense of Lord Cornwallis's consideration for the state of his master's affairs, requested Sir John Kennaway to state, candidly, the lowest sum that would be insisted on for Durbar expenses, that the treaty might not be delayed by discussing that article. Sir John answered, that thirty lacs was the minimum. They then proceeded to form the draft which was to form the basis of a treaty, and to discuss it article by article. This ended, the paper stood as follows:-

Article I.—Preamble as usual, noticing the names and powers of the envoys, and by whom deputed.

Half of Tipu's territories to be ceded to allies, adjacent to their own boundaries, and according to their selection.

*Remarks.*—Mir Ali Reza objected to the words "at their selection," as it would leave the allies at liberty to deprive Tipu of his hereditary possessions, for instance, Calicut. He had objected to this in the conference of the 17th.

Article II.—Three crores of ready money shall be delivered to the allies.

*Remarks.*—Ali Reza asked whether bullion, jewels, or goods, would be taken in payment of this sum. Sir John Kennaway

replied, that ready money being the terms, rupees, pagodas, or gold mohms, could only be accepted.

Article III.—Thirty lacs shall be paid to the allies for Durbar expenses, or civil contingencies.

Article IV.—All prisoners, whether made during Haidar Ali's time, or since, to be immediately given up.

Article V.—Until the above four articles are carried into effect, Tipu's two eldest sons to be given as hostages, when hostilities shall cease.

*Remarks.*—Sir John Kennaway assured the vakils, from Lord Cornwallis, that the princes would receive the most honourable and respectful attentions. Gulam Ali said Tipu would, from a feeling of shame, object to this article, and probably propose other persons, but they must dispute the point with him on the morrow.

Article VI.—When the above articles have been signed and sealed by Tipu, a counterpart will be signed, sealed, and delivered by the Governor-general, the Nizam's minister, and Hurry Punt.

Before the conference (which lasted till near one o'clock in the morning) broke up, Sir John Kennaway addressed Ali Reza, desiring him to reflect seriously on the critical situation of his master's affairs, as he thought it would be eminently advisable to accelerate the conclusion of the treaty. Gulam Ali said he would hasten with his colleague to the fort, and would return as soon as possible.

Feb. 21st:—Mir Alam sent a message to Sir John Kennaway, saying that Govind Rao Kishen and Govind Rao Baswant, the Mahratta vakils, were with him, and wished to wait upon Sir John. Sir John Kennaway being at table, said he would go to Mir Alam's tent, and went at five, p.m. The vakils stated, that it appearing that there was to be but one treaty, comprising the interests of all parties, they wished that it should recognise all former treaties, and stipulate that Tipu should not circumcise any more Hindus. Sir John Kennaway asked if they knew the contents of these former treaties?—they answered in the negative, but would inquire. Sir John Kennaway observed, with regard to circumcision, that if it could be made to appear that any advantage would result, it should be inserted in the treaty, as Europeans had also been sufferers.

Tipu's vakils having returned from the fort at five, p.m., the conferences commenced: persons, etc., the same as before.

After a short conversation, the envoys proceeded, with the paper of contents in their hands, to a particular discussion of the proposed articles. They said their master wished that the preamble should in its terms be binding on his successors in the government as well as on Lord Cornwallis. Sir John Kennaway replied, that hostilities having ceased, the definitive treaty which must be concluded would in all respects be conformable to their wishes.

With regard to Article I., they said their master objected to the alienation of any part of the hereditary dependencies of the rajaship of Seringapatam, which they then could not specify; among them were Calicut, Bangalore, Sevendroog, Osoor, Roydroog, Bidenore, and Gooty.

In regard to Article II., Tipu, they said, was ready to pay one crore fifty lacs immediately, of which fifty lacs should be ready money, and the remainder in jewels, goods, horses, elephants, etc. That the remaining crore and fifty lacs should be paid in instalments within a year or less.

Respecting Article III., they said Tipu objected to its being recognised as a formal article of the treaty: that the avowal of such a charge was not customary, but, without any public stipulation, it ought to be left to his own option to increase or decrease.

With regard to Article IV., Tipu wished its benefits to be reciprocal.

Article V. The vakils said their master was willing to deliver up one of his sons as a hostage, but that family reasons prevented his parting with more, and they hoped Lord Cornwallis would be prevailed on to relax in his demand. The vakils having finished, Sir John Kennaway replied, that he was happy to perceive the appearance of sincerity in Tipu's conduct, indicated by his agreeing to deliver up even one of his sons: that he would report their request to Lord Cornwallis, but gave them no hopes that their request would be granted: that had it been possible to relax in the security demanded, Lord Cornwallis's feelings, as a father, would have operated in Tipu's favour.

In respect to part payment in jewels, etc., Sir John Kennaway

reminded them that we had no means of getting rid of such articles, but he deferred giving a definite answer to this, as well as to their objections to the other articles, until he had consulted Lord Cornwallis, Mir Alam, Bhikaji Pandit, Azim-ul-umara and Hurry Punt, save that in regard to prisoners, he would take upon himself to guarantee that the arrangement should be reciprocal. Conference broke up at eight o'clock, to meet next morning.

Feb. 22nd:—11, am.—Persons the same as before.

Sir John Kennaway addressing the envoy, said that Lord Cornwallis having, on their solemn asseverations of the utter inadequacy of Tipu's means, relaxed from the original demand of six crores, might have shown Tipu the moderation and the kind consideration of the allies; he was sorry to perceive that they had not been appreciated by Tipu, as was evident from the disposition to cavil and object, evinced the preceding evening. That Lord Cornwallis having entered into the war by compulsion, and having formed engagements with the Raja or Zamarin of Calicut, it was impossible, with honour, to allow it again to be surrendered to Tipu. That although the acquisition of Bangalore, Sevendroog, Oosoor, etc., had been arduous, and they were valuable possessions, yet that Lord Cornwallis having hopes that a time should arrive when a thorough friendship might subsist between the two states, and being unwilling to occasion any jealousy or irritation to Tipu, by retaining them, had long ago determined to restore them, thereby to prove to Tipu that instead of wishing to overturn his family and empire, he was desirous of upholding both. Gulam Ali, in his reply, dwelt, at some length, on the sentiments of justice and generosity above expressed, concluding by saying, that "it was better to have a wise and considerate enemy, than a short-sighted and time-serving friend."

Regarding Article II, Sir John Kennaway informed the vakils, that the Company had never been in the habit of receiving goods in lieu of cash; that such could not be disposed of; and that if any great quantity of jewels were thrown on the market, the price would immediately fall. To this it was answered, that the loss would be Tipu's: upon which Sir John Kennaway replied, that such being the case, there were bankers in camp,

through whose agency a sale might be effected, but that Lord Cornwallis declined any concern with them; but that to show his accommodating disposition, he was willing to take gold or silver bullion.

In regard to Article III., Sir John Kennaway informed them that the thirty lacs of Durbar expenses should as assuredly be exacted, as that not one rupee further of a private nature should be taken; that His Lordship and the allies were united on this point, and that it should be added to the three crores: that out of the total of three crores and thirty lacs, one crore and sixty-five would only be required in cash or bullion immediately, and the remainder in instalments within twelve months.

With regard to the sons of Tipu, to be given as hostages for the due fulfilment of the treaty, Sir John Kennaway said, that it was in his private capacity very repugnant to Lord Cornwallis's feelings, to be obliged to exact such terms, but that his public duty demanded it; that His Lordship had himself but one son, but that Tipu's children would be treated with equal kindness and affection as this only son, and that, to meet the Sultan's wishes as much as he could on this point, he consented to receive any two out of his three eldest sons.

The vakils asserted their master's entire confidence in Lord Cornwallis's kindness to his children, but that out of the three children specified, the eldest, Haidar Sahib, fourteen years old, was obnoxious to his father, and he therefore disliked parting with him. The second, Abdul Khalik, eight years old, was diseased from his infancy, and unfit to be removed from the Zenana (Seraglio), and that the third son, Moyuz-ud-Deen, the favourite son, five years old, destined by his father, and considered by the courts as his successor, would be given up. That Tipu in doing this was actuated by the wish of showing his sincerity and good disposition, and at the same time of making his successor known to the principal persons of the three allied states.

The three younger sons, the vakils added, were still at the breast, and they therefore demanded whether two or three of Tipu's sirdars would not be taken in lieu of the second hostage? Sir John Kennaway replied in the negative. They urged the point with some pertinacity, and it appeared that they conceived

carrying this article with Tipu involved more difficulty than any other.

Before finishing the conference, Sir John Kennaway delivered to Gulam Ali Khan a copy of the general preliminary treaty of five articles, drawn up according to the above five answers, and observed that, as Lord Cornwallis could not relax in the least from their tenor, he hoped Tipu would approve of them, and sign them, when hostilities would immediately cease on delivering of the hostages. The definitive treaty could then be entered on. But that if Tipu started any objections, their return would be fruitless, and they ought then to order their tents away. The envoys replied, that they hoped affairs would not take such a turn, and that they would in all probability return next day.

Feb. 23rd:—Persons and place of conference the same as before.

The vakils began by congratulating all parties that the business was terminated by Tipu having signed the preliminary agreement which they produced, and stated that the Sultan's sons would be delivered up when required. Sir John Kennaway directed the paper signed by Tipu to be read and compared with the original draft; when it appeared that Article I had been altered, leaving out the *choice of country to be ceded*.

Sir John Kennaway remarked on the impropriety of this alteration, after the long discussion which had taken place; and having waited on Lord Cornwallis, returned to the conference, and told the vakils that His Lordship would not conclude a treaty, unless the omission in Article I was immediately filled up, that there existed no wish on the part of His Lordship or the allies to take possession of detached or inconvenient portions of the Sultan's territories, but that the choice remaining with the allies would obviate all future litigation. The vakils said, the Sultan's difficulty in allowing the condition, arose from a remark of Mir Alam that Sera would be required of Tipu. Mir Alam replied to this, that his observation merely went to express his doubt whether Sera formed one of the ancient possessions of Haidar. The vakils now stated that this explanation had fully satisfied them, and they were ready to insert the condition, without a reference to their principal. To this

Sir John Kennaway objected, observing, that it was extremely necessary that the Sultan should fully understand the necessity of the condition; and he demanded from the envoys what were the ancient possessions? He was answered, Seringapatam, Sera, Gooty, and among others, Coimbatore. Sir John Kennaway observed how impossible it was that he could have given them the satisfaction they demanded, as Coimbatore would, probably, be the first country required from Tipu. Mir Alam also reminded them of the circumspection with which Sir John Kennaway had expressed himself, which they admitted. The vakils returned with the treaty signed about twelve o'clock. They requested, as peace was now as good as concluded, the immediate cessation of hostilities, and they promised that the young princes should be delivered up the succeeding day.

Feb. 24th:—In the afternoon Sir John Kennaway forwarded to Gulam Ali counterparts of the treaty signed by Lord Cornwallis and the Nizam's minister, and also intimated his surprise that the tents of the hostages had not arrived, although the day was far spent.

Feb. 25th:—Sir John Kennaway, Mir Alam, and the other deputies, removed their tents from the Nizam's camp to the Edgah, where the hostages were to pitch. About one p.m., the vakils arrived. Sir John Kennaway commenced by saying, that Lord Cornwallis, confiding on the speedy arrival of the hostages, had suspended operations sooner than stipulated in the preliminary treaty, and that unless they came out this afternoon, operations would re-commence. The envoys replied that the distress of the family in parting with the younger princes had rendered their previous arrival impossible, and that although this was an unlucky day, they should, if it were insisted on, come out this evening. But if excused today, they would, without fail, be ready tomorrow forenoon, when the Sultan trusted that suitable persons, on the part of the allies, would be sent to meet the princes, and conduct them to Lord Cornwallis in a manner worthy their birth and rank. Sir John Kennaway said, it was not Lord Cornwallis's wish to put the princes to the inconvenience of coming out to camp at night, but any deviation from the appointment now made would be followed by very serious consequences, and that he would, in the course of the

night, inform them of Lord Cornwallis's pleasure with regard to the persons to be deputed to meet the princes. Sir John also delivered to them a copy of the preliminary treaty, signed by Hurry Punt, etc.

Feb. 26th:—It having been determined that the princes should only visit Lord Cornwallis today, and postpone their visit to Sikandar Jah and Hurry Punt until tomorrow, Sir John Kennaway, attended by Mr. Cherry,<sup>3</sup> on the part of the Governor-general, repaired to a tent pitched by Tipu's people, about two miles from headquarters, near one of the gates of Seringapatam. They arrived about two p.m., entering by one door, while the princes entered by the other. After the usual compliments, the party proceeded to Lord Cornwallis's tents, under a salute of nineteen guns, and presented arms from part of the line. From thence they went to their own tents, where Sir John Kennaway visited them in the evening, and impressed on the vakils the necessity of fulfilling the remaining articles of the treaty. First: Releasing the prisoners. Secondly: Producing the accounts of the gross amount of the revenues, and the net receipts, and sending the stipulated money as soon as possible. The envoys promised the immediate fulfilment of these conditions: and requested that Lord Cornwallis and the allies would take steps for equally fulfilling theirs. They inveighed with great bitterness against Parashuram Bhow, for violating the terms of the capitulation of Darwar. They desired that Asad Ali Khan should be ordered to cease hostilities near Gurumconda, and promised Tipu's passports for the messengers sent to Coimbatore and the Malabar coast, to put a stop to hostilities.

Feb. 27th:—Lord Cornwallis visited the young princes. Ali Reza went to the fort, and while there, Sir John Kennaway reminded him, by letter, of fulfilling the articles relative to the prisoners, the cash, and the revenue accounts.

Feb. 28th:—Mir Alam being at the hostages' tents, Sir John Kennaway wrote to him, to arrange with the vakils about sending Tipu's revenue officers with their accounts. Mir Alam<sup>4</sup> returned only a verbal answer, and instead of visiting Sir John, accompanied the princes to Sikandar Jah's. Sir John, surprised at this, wrote to him again, requesting him to press on the vakils the necessity of proceeding to business. The answer given to



this note was, that the vakils had assured him they would attend next day, and that the money would be sent out immediately. Sir John Kennaway received, on their return, a message from the vakils, and repaired to their tents about four p.m. After a preliminary conversation, expressive of their master's friendship for the Governor-general, and the sense they entertained of Sir John Kennaway's conduct throughout the negotiation, they spoke of the embarrassment which they would have to sustain from the cavils of the allies in all matters of revenue, and said their master trusted to Lord Cornwallis for protection against such. Sir John replied, that they might rest confidently on the protection of the Governor-general, provided they acted with good faith in giving in the revenue accounts. Ali Reza solemnly assured Sir John Kennaway, that no imposition should be attempted, and having earnestly expressed his master's solicitation for the evacuation of the trenches, returned to the fort.

Feb. 29th:—Sir John Kennaway visited the princes by desire of the vakils, and met Ali Reza, who stated that the treasure was now loading, and the revenue-officers ready to come out with it and the prisoners, when Tipu expected the troops would evacuate the trenches. Sir John Kennaway replied, that he would ascertain Lord Cornwallis's pleasure regarding their request, but that it would have an ungracious appearance to rest the sending of the treasure upon such a contingency.

They listened to this hint, and delivered to Sir John a letter from Tipu, and also two documents; one containing an account of Tipu's old possessions, the other an account of those which bordered on our frontiers.

The vakils shortly afterwards accompanied the princes in their visit to Hurry Punt, whence they returned at four p.m.; when Sir John Kennaway wrote to them, stating, that relative to the evacuation of the trenches, Lord Cornwallis thought, that considering the friendly relations now existing between the two states, our occupation of the trenches a little longer was a thing of little moment; that he doubted not of the speedy arrival of the prisoners, the treasure, and the revenue accountants. The papers they had delivered, he observed, were useless, as they did not contain the amount of revenue; and what had excited His Lordship's astonishment, they assumed deductions to be

allowed Tipu which could not be agreed to; and he concluded by requesting other accounts to be sent, without restrictions or assumptions. A copy of this letter, and the papers referred to in it, was transmitted to the Nizam's and Mahratta deputies.

March 1st:—Sir John Kennaway received a message from Tipu's vakils, that a crore, nine lacs and a half of rupees, had arrived from the fort last night and this morning. Sir John expressed, in answer, the pleasure this would give the Governor-general; he inquired after the prisoners, and requested the vakils and accountants would repair as soon as possible to his tent.

The vakils, including Govind Rao Kishen, the Peshwa's minister, with the Nizam, who was on this occasion associated with Bhikaji Pundit, assembled at Sir John Kennaway's tent. After a conversation on general topics, Sir John demanded of Gulam Ali the accounts of the gross and net revenues of Tipu's territories. Gulam Ali evaded an answer, by asking for the papers delivered the preceding day, and also a copy of the revenues of his master's country, as extracted from the royal exchequer at Delhi. Sir John Kennaway denied the use of the production of any paper on his side, until theirs were ready. Ali Reza observed, in reply, that in consequence of designing people having intrigued and disarranged the train into which he had put matters, all the necessary papers were not ready, but he would now go to the fort, and after procuring all proper documents, would return early tomorrow. Before his departure, he earnestly requested that no further depredations might be committed in the Lal Bagh, and the Ganjam suburbs, and that General Abercrombie's army might be forbid to ravage the neighbourhood of the village of Papli.

March 2nd:—Ali Reza, failing to attend his appointment in the forenoon, Sir John Kennaway wrote to him, to remind him of it. He came out at four, and sent a message of apology, adding, that he had brought out Subarao, chief financial minister to Tipu, along with all necessary papers. Sir John Kennaway wrote, requesting their instant attendance: the vakils excused themselves on the plea of their papers requiring previous arrangement, but promised faithfully to be ready on the morrow. A party of the prisoners of the allies were sent in the afternoon.

March 3rd:—Sir John Kennaway attended Lord Cornwallis,

on a visit to the princes, and communicated to Ali Reza, that His Lordship, on considering his complaint of the preceding day, had directed General Abercrombie to change ground to Canimbaddy, and ordered Colonel Stewart, who commanded in the island, to abstain from cutting any more trees in the Lal Bagh, or destroying the houses in Ganjam. Ali Reza, in reply, stated that Tipu had issued orders to his troops, not to cut off General Abercrombie's supplies.

At ten, the vakils of all parties met at Sir John Kennaway's tent. Tipu's deputies then produced a list of their master's subjects, prisoners with the allies. A warm altercation took place between the Mahratta and the Sultan's vakils, about the infringement of the solemn terms granted to the garrison of Darwar. Sir John Kennaway asked for the papers and accounts: when produced, they were found little better than the insufficient papers formerly given. After they were recorded, Subarao, to show the fairness of the accounts, proposed that if a particular examination of the revenue of one of the adjacent villages, or districts, should be instituted, he would stake his character on their justness. Sir John Kennaway asked to what year did the accounts refer? Subarao replied they were made out for different years, all preceding the war; that the revenues of some districts, such as Coorg, were for a period seven years back, no revenue having been received from them since. Sir John Kennaway observed, that this irregular and improper mode of giving the account of revenue would render it impossible to compare one year's revenue with another: that the greater or less quantity of rain, etc., would operate to render the revenue of each year different, and that their mode of giving the accounts would render the striking of an average impossible. The vakils said this should be corrected, but their mode of stating the accounts would make little difference in the grand total, which would be found to be about two crores, and ten lacs of rupees, (£ 2,040,000).

It was agreed, that comparing the accounts just recorded with the originals would occupy the remainder of the day; and after mature consideration, all parties would meet tomorrow, and discuss them *seriatim*, and that in the meantime the deputies should also communicate them to their respective principals.

Before separating, Sir John Kennaway reminded Govind Rao Pandit of the guarantee given by Hurry Punt, that Tipu's territories would produce three crores.

March 4th:—Sir John Kennaway wrote to Tipu's vakils relative to yesterday's discussions. Mir Alam having returned from the ministers and Hurry Punt, stated the opinion of the former to be, that Tipu's revenue accounts, as produced, were fallacious, which he could prove by a paper from the Sultan's duftar, (exchequer,) relative to the revenue of the taluk of Velanoor, in the division of Gooty, the cession of which Sir John Kennaway had assured them would not be required by the allies. This paper stated the revenue at £26, 864, while Tipu's valuation made it only £ 8,800.

The minister therefore advised that a bond, with heavy penalties, should be required of Subarao, or from Tipu's vakils, in case the falsity of the accounts produced could be proved. Hurry Punt declined giving his opinion until he had consulted Parashuram Bhow, but he had observed that Tipu had stated the revenue of the Bidenoor country at seven lacs of pagodas; now he would, he said, be content to receive it in part of the Peshwa's share, for twelve lacs. Sir John Kennaway showed to Mir Alam his letter of that morning to the vakils, which entirely met his approval. Mir Alam, and Govind Rao Baswant, waited on Sir John Kennaway with revenue accounts procured from one of Tipu's revenue officers of rank, a prisoner in the Mahratta camp. This paper showed the amount of revenue, as now given by Tipu, the amount conformable to the knowledge of the officer, and the difference between both. Govind Rao Baswant further declared Hurry Punt's readiness to take Bidenoor in any of three ways. First: At double the amount of Tipu's valuation. Secondly: At the same amount, with the pagoda valued at four, instead of three rupees. And thirdly: At the same amount, with the deduction of there or four taluks, inserted as belonging to it in Tipu's schedule. In the evening, Sir John Kennaway wrote to the vakils in answer to their note of yesterday, and reminded them verbally, that the time for delivering the accounts would expire today. They wrote in reply, that Ali Reza was setting off for the fort, would be back this night, or tomorrow, when Tipu's answer would be

sent. Sir John this evening visited the hostages and deputies in company with Mir Alam. Gulam Ali told him that the Sultan, on seeing his note of yesterday, had sent for Subarao, and the other accountants, and expressed his displeasure: he allowed the accounts delivered were unsatisfactory, and that those demanded by Lord Cornwallis were fair and just. Sir John Kennaway remarked, that he had at an early period warned them against attempts at imposition; that the allies had intrusted, in the pending negotiation, their interests to His Lordship's charge, and that nothing in this world would induce him to neglect them. Gulam Ali said the difference was a mere matter of account, and therefore capable of speedy adjustment.

March 6th:—Ali Reza Khan having returned from the fort, Sir John Kennaway sent him a message, requesting written answers to his questions of the 4th instant. Ali Reza replied, that he would attend in person next day. Sir John Kennaway again requested that he and his colleague would come to his tent that evening. After some difficulty, they consented, and met the deputies of the allies at his tent at seven p.m.

The conversation commenced about prisoners. Ali Reza insisted with great warmth that Hardas, the dewan of Darwar, included in the capitulation, granted, though afterwards violated, to Budder-ul-Zeman Khan, the killadar, should be given up to Tipu, as that public officer was many lacs in arrear to their master. The Mahratta deputies replied with equal warmth, that as he had claimed and received their protection, he could not be delivered up. Sir John Kennaway at length stopped this altercation by requiring that the revenue accounts of three years, specified in his note of 4th March, should be produced. He was referred to the minister of finance, Subarao, who said that the public papers and accounts of the provinces of Bideenoor, Coimbatore, and Calicut, were lost at the taking of the two latter by the English; and the accounts of Darwar, Gajendergarh and Bangalore, when they also fell; but that the accounts of the other divisions would be prepared as soon as possible, and would be ready in three or four days.

Ali Reza remarked that innumerable papers had been lost on the night of the 6th ultimo, on the storming of Tipu's works, when his camp was plundered by his own troops; and that the

revenue accounts had been very loosely kept since Tipu had come to the throne. To this it was answered, that after consulting Lord Cornwallis and the representatives of the allied powers, a specific reply would be sent. Hussain Ali, a menial servant of Lord Cornwallis, detained in the fort after the liberation of the other prisoners, was today, on compliance with a formal requisition, delivered up.

March 7th:—Mir Alam and Govind Rao Baswant met at Sir John Kennaway's tent, when he represented to them, that as Tipu had evaded giving accounts, it would be immediately necessary for each separate power to make out a schedule of what it conceived itself entitled to, the aggregate amount of which could then be included in the definitive treaty, and that the Company would require a proportion amounting to 37,88,295 rupees. They promised to submit this to Hurry Punt and Azim-ul-umara.

The succeeding morning Sir John Kennaway wrote twice to the Sultan's vakils: the first about workmen being again at work on the fort; and the second, regarding prisoners conceived to be still detained.

Tipu applied for leave for the religious to officiate as usual at the tomb of his father Haidar. Instantly granted.

March 8th:—Sir John Kennaway waited, by Lord Cornwallis's desire, on the Sultan's deputies, and expressed in strong language Lord Cornwallis's astonishment at the treatment he had received from their master, who had delivered in false accounts, etc. He stated, that Seringapatam, Tipu's family, treasure, in short, his kingdom, being within His Lordship's grasp, he, consulting nothing but his moderation, had, against the wishes of his allies, consented to a peace. In return, every effort was made to deceive him. The necessity of the English retaining Calicut had been candidly communicated, and Tipu had estimated it at five or six lacs of rupees beyond its real value. The vakils replied in general terms, professing their master's friendship for the Governor-general, and wishing that he, himself, would deliver in his plan of partition, when no opposition would be offered to the interests of the Company, but that the Sultan indulged a rooted hatred, which was mutual, to the allies, and could ill bear to part with his possessions to them; and were it not for

the support of the English, their master, in his present reduced state, he would soon expel them from his country. Sir John Kennaway replied, that his government was bound to the allies by treaties which would never be infringed to obtain any sinister object; and that he yet hoped to see their master derive benefit by his good faith and strict adherence to treaties. After leaving the Sultan's deputies, Sir John Kennaway requested the attendance of the deputies of the allies, who produced lists of their share of the partition; out of these Sir John struck out Soonda, Biswapatam, Chitteldroog, Raidroog, and Harponelly. The amount of the country remaining was £ 88,13,787, and added to the Company's share, made a total of £ 129,59,082.

March 9th:—Sir John Kennaway, having drawn out a draft of the definitive treaty, conformable to the preliminary treaty, and containing a specification of the countries to be ceded, sent it in the evening to Tipu's vakils, with an official note. The papers referred to in that note were authenticated by an aumil and sirreshtidar (two revenue officers), and also an account containing the statement of Hardas, the late dewan of Darwar.

Sir John Kennaway requested of Lieutenant Macleod, charged with the intelligence department, to compare the accounts sent in by Tipu with the best information he could collect. About 9 a.m., Sir John Kennaway received a message from the Sultan's vakils, requesting leave to wait upon him. In accordance with his request the Sultan's and the Nizam's deputies attended, but the Mahratta vakils neglected to attend. The Sultan's deputies commenced by expressing their surprise at the tone of yesterday's note, and the hard terms of the treaty: they would, they said, proceed to lay it before their master, and in the mean time proposed to examine some accounts brought by Subarao. Sir John Kennaway replied, that the time for examining accounts was passed; that Lord Cornwallis had waited patiently nearly twenty days for the production of Tipu's revenue accounts, etc., to enable him to make a fair partition; that their production had been evaded, and, as time was precious, the Governor-general felt himself obliged to make the division from the best data and materials in his power. Lord Cornwallis would not, therefore, he thought, examine any more accounts, or relax in the least from the terms of the division specified in

the draft of the treaty before them. His Lordship's character, they knew, had nothing ambitious or selfish in it, and the very circumstance of possessing their master's children, as hostages, had made him more delicate and moderate in the terms he had required. The vakils demanded of Sir John Kennaway, if he conceived that the Governor-general had consulted their master's reputation or interest, by the terms of the treaty? Sir John replied, that he left the answer of this question to their own sense of justice, expediency, and moderation.

Subarao then proceeded to read over the list of the proposed cessions. He began with Coorg, which he termed one of the doors to Seringapatam, from which it was distant only ten or twelve coss. Sir John Kennaway replied, that the distance was greater, and that Lord Cornwallis had entered into engagements with the Raja, which would prevent the possibility of giving it up. He then instanced Decanicottah as close to Bangalore, and distant from our frontier.

He was answered, that when the treaty was carried into execution, it would be exactly on the confines. The answers to the objections urged against Sunkagherry and Salem, were similar to the above. He then remarked, that the river, termed Noil, proposed as our southern boundary, had no existence; that a small rivulet of another name was in that position.

Sir John Kennaway pointed out the river in the map, and said the mistake, as to name, would be corrected in the fair copy. Subarao next mentioned Bellary and Gooty, observing, that the allies had, in the partition, taken all the strong forts. Sir John Kennaway replied, that the forts of Bangalore and Oosoor, in strength comparable to Calcutta and Madras, were by the treaty left to their master; and that retaining the forts was purely defensive, to prevent, by obtaining a secure frontier, a recurrence of the calamities suffered by the irruptions of Haidar and Tipu into the Carnatic. Sir John concluded by remarking the utter uselessness of any further discussion, and recommending to them to go into the fort, and after laying the treaty before Tipu, return speedily with his answer; and that he would now leave them with Mr. Cherry, to settle the exchange of the money delivered, and come back when that affair was finished. As soon as Sir John Kennaway returned, Ali



Reza endeavoured to lead him to the former discussion, and the dewan (Subarao) asked on what document he relied for the assertion that the "ancient possessions" of Tipu were undervalued? Sir John replied, that one proof, among many, was the statement of the taluk of Velanoor, under the hand and seal of their own aumil, being *three times* the amount of the revenue assigned to it in their paper. This staggered them at first, but after a little time they called in question the genuineness of the document referred to, and said the balances of former years must have been added to make up this amount. Sir John Kennaway observed, that the document was genuine, and would be produced when necessary: he would in the mean time seriously recommend to them to return all to the fort. Subarao asked, what they were to do *there*? Which Sir John answered, by demanding what they were to do *here*? Subarao explained, that he apprehended his master's resentment would principally fall upon himself, as nothing had been settled. They then took leave, promising to return next morning, or at farthest on the evening. In an interval of the conference just detailed, Sir John Kennaway, addressing Ali Reza, said, that the Governor-general, in consequence of an authentic report of their master continuing to repair the works opposite the trenches, had ordered the engineers to resume their work on the fascines and gabions. Ali Reza expressed his regret, and said the works should be immediately discontinued. Sir John Kennaway also desired that in case a British foraging party should have to be sent across the river, means should be taken to prevent disturbance.

In the afternoon Sir John Kennaway wrote to the Sultan's vakils a note, in answer to one of theirs, complaining of Major Cuppage having ascended the Guzzlehutti pass.

March 11th:—In consequence of the shares of the allies being unequal, and the Nizam's minister having neglected to insert the district of Moakah in their share, a new division became necessary, by which the East India Company received, in addition, the district of Doopain Kanickgeery, and part of Doormal, at the back of the Palnad and Ongole districts. Notwithstanding the remonstrances of Sir John, and the promises yesterday of the vakil, the working parties continued today employed on the fort.

March 12th:—The vakils failed to come out last night, and as the working parties were still busy in the fort, Lord Cornwallis directed Sir John Kennaway to write to the vakils at eleven, a.m., to say, that as, contrary to the agreement, at the cessation of arms, the working parties continued employed in the fort, His Lordship would immediately direct the resumption of operations in the trenches, unless their labours instantly ceased.

The messengers returned at three, p.m., reporting that he had met the vakils coming out, and that they, on perusal, forwarded the letter to Tipu. Sir John desired the attendance of the vakils as soon as possible. They promised to wait upon him at four, but did not arrive until six, p.m., accompanied by the deputies of the allies. On commencing the conference, they intimated generally, that Tipu had agreed to the terms demanded of him, and that nothing was now wanting but that the Governor-general and the allies should relax on some points. Tipu, they said, was willing to cede half the territories, according to the valuation in his own paper, and the other half as valued by the allies, and also to deliver up some of the districts required for our boundaries; but that he objected to others, particularly Coorg, which being close to Seringapatam, might be viewed as one of its entrances: that he considered, by the treaty, we were not entitled to require Coorg, which did not lie “adjacent” to our boundary. Sir John replied, that he would not enter into a critical examination of the meaning of the term “adjacent,” that, in matters of business, it signified *not far removed*: that the allies were only debarred by this term from taking districts in the centre of Tipu’s dominions; and that Coorg, which they called the door to Seringapatam, was distant forty coss,<sup>5</sup> and within fifteen<sup>6</sup> of our settlement of Tellicherry, and certainly “adjacent” to Calicut, which they had agreed to cede. That, finally, engagements had been concluded with the Raja, which could not be infringed, otherwise what reliance could Tipu place in those engagements about to be entered upon? Both the vakils warmly defended their construction of the term “adjacent,” which Sir John Kennaway denied. After a good deal of argument, the matter was, at the earnest request of the vakils, referred to the Governor-general. Sir John having returned from Lord Cornwallis, informed them that His Lord-

ship having been forced to make the partition treaty on the best data in his power, was determined, after mature deliberation, not to relax in the least, or yield up any of the countries specified; and that the vakils ought now to return to the fort, and bring Tipu's final answer. They replied, that it was not necessary to make any further reference to their master, for if Lord Cornwallis did not choose to accept their offer, they requested their dismissal, and left the future to fate. Sir John Kennaway observed, that there could be no objection to their departure when they chose; but they insisted that, before going, Lord Cornwallis should know what had now passed.

March 13th:—Sir John Kennaway having received the Governor-general's orders, wrote to the vakils, that no reliance could be placed on Tipu's accounts, which were formerly declared to be plundered, and now ready to be produced: that our calculation made the amount of country to be ceded 43,19,694 of pagodas, but that His Lordship would, from an anxiety to avoid extremities, consent to a deduction of 4,50,000 pagodas; but that the countries objected to, and particularly Coorg, must be ceded.

The vakils answered by a note, requesting a more particular specification of the countries to be ceded. The vakils themselves shortly followed their letter, and Sir John having desired the presence of the deputies of the allies, delivered to the Sultan's envoy the list desired in their last note. Ali Reza began warmly to argue that the preliminary treaty did not give the right of demanding Coorg. Sir John Kennaway referred him to his former arguments, and said that as nothing new was urged, he declined to argue the matter further. Ali Reza, with a softened tone, hoped the Governor-general, actuated by the same motives which had induced him not to insist on the cession of Bangalore and Sevendroog, would also refrain from insisting on the cession of Coorg, which was so much nearer the capital. Sir John replied, that His Lordship's good faith was not involved in the cession of the two forts mentioned, and that he knew that nothing would alter the determination of the Governor-general with regard to Coorg. Ali Reza then demanded with warmth what, in the event of breaking off the negotiations, would be our conduct to the princes? Sir John replied, they would be detained

as hostages for the violation of the treaty. They asked how and by whom had it been violated? Sir John replied, that Tipu had violated the treaty in three instances: first, in declining to abide by the selection of countries; secondly, by the cavils and evasions used in settling the exchange of money; and, thirdly, in despite of our continued remonstrances, and his repeated promises, by continuing to this moment, the repairs and works in the fort opposite our trenches. They replied, they conceived Sir John to have formerly told them that the hostages would not be detained, and that, from the English having released a person of consequence, deputed to them by Haidar, they had expected a different line of conduct. Sir John returned, that Lord Cornwallis would not have detained the princes from any other cause than the violation of the preliminary treaty by Tipu: that on the faith of the treaty, the works in the trenches, etc., which, in all probability, would have ensured the possession of Seringapatam in ten days, had been relinquished; and if the princes were delivered up, what equivalent had the British for the loss of time? That the case quoted of the vakil was not in point; and that they themselves, similarly situated, might depart when they chose. Sir John informed them, the princes should change ground tomorrow, and that the Sultan's guards, now with them, must take their departure. The vakils requested permission to accompany the hostages, which was objected to.

March 14th:—Sir John Kennaway was awakened by a message from Ali Reza, instantly followed by himself. Sir John sent word he was undressed, which the vakil said was of no consequence, and that he would come to the sleeping tent. On his arrival, he earnestly entreated Sir John to use his influence with Captain Welsh, commanding the guard of honour with the hostages, to delay their departure for one day, when he would engage to bring back Tipu's answer to the list of districts by the evening, otherwise the removal of the princes would, in all probability, cost him and his colleagues their lives. Sir John Kennaway replied that Captain Welsh was acting under superior orders, and was not bound to obey him; but that he would write to Lord Cornwallis, and request the respite so urgently sought. The princes had, however, moved, before this note could be despatched, but, at the desire of the vakil, Sir

John requested they might not take their final departure until he returned, at the appointed time, from the fort. Lord Cornwallis, in consequence, directed the princes to be encamped one mile in the rear of headquarters. In the evening Ali Reza returned, and, with his colleague, waited on Sir John Kennaway. After adverting in general terms to the success of their interview with their master, they particularised his acquiescence in all demanded of him, except the cession of Coorg, so near to his capital, which he hoped would be *re-considered* by the Governor-general, as also the cession of some few other places, otherwise an inconvenient *intermixture* of districts would ensue, and the boundary wished by His Lordship would be destroyed. Sir John having requested of him to particularise, Shewaness Rao instanced Attoor and Permallee, left to Tipu, as intervening between the Company's old boundary of Lallee and Namcul. Sir John observed that this omission had been provided for in the remarks made opposite Namcul, Lallee, etc; that all districts to the east and north of the Caveri should belong to the Company. Sir John Kennaway then asked if there were any more districts than those he had now instanced? The vakil could not answer without referring to his papers and maps in the fort, which Sir John requested of him to produce next morning. Gulam Ali observed that it now appeared that instead of yielding anything, we were going to keep more. Sir John denied this, and said equivalents would be given for all those districts taken to make a secure boundary. The vakils then recurred once more to Coorg. Sir John Kennaway represented to them the uselessness of such discussion, as nothing inserted in the list of the 13th would be yielded up; and then categorically demanded whether or not Tipu would agree to the cession of Coorg. They answered, that rather than risk the interruption of peace he was prepared to yield it up, but he hoped, from Lord Cornwallis's friendship, that the cession of Coorg would not be insisted on. Sir John agreed once more to consult the Governor-general on this point. Ali Reza then presented a paper, containing articles which he wished should be corrected in the definitive treaty. The greater part of these alterations had been provided for in the additions made to the treaty after it had been sent to the vakils, on the 9th.

March 15th:—Sir John Kennaway sent, early, a message suggesting the despatch of Shewaness Rao to the fort, for the maps and papers necessary for the final adjustment of the cession of districts and limitation of boundaries, as in the event of the definitive treaty not being settled this evening, Lord Cornwallis would not delay the march of the princes tomorrow. At eight a.m., Sir John desired the attendance of the allied deputies, who having retired, adjusted a partition of their respective shares. In the mean time, Sir John was employed in drawing out the definitive treaty, which having completed by mid-day, he desired the attendance of the Sultan's vakils, although Shewaness Rao had not yet arrived from Seringapatam. They arrived about two p.m., and commenced by demanding Lord Cornwallis's determination, more especially with regard to Coorg. Sir John Kennaway replied, that Lord Cornwallis, with every disposition to gratify Tipu, could not consent to abandon the Raja of Coorg. His Lordship, he said, considered the preservation of faith to his engagements to be of equal importance and sanctity, and as superior to all other considerations, as a sincere adherence to the tenets of his religion; he could, therefore, hear nothing further on this subject. Sir John then delivered to them the treaty, without the list of countries to be ceded, which depended on the arrival of Shewaness Rao. The only articles objected to, were those preventing any claims for outstanding revenue balances, and the omission of the word *ryut* in the article providing that no protection should be given to officers and zemindars flying from each other's districts. Sir John Kennaway, in reply to the first, observed that the article was just to the inhabitants, and would obviate all disagreeable disputes between the different governments—it could not, therefore, be altered. The same reasoning could with equal justice be applied to the demand for the insertion of the word *ryut*—that enough had been done in inserting "officers and zemindars." It being now five p.m., and Shewaness Rao not having arrived, Sir John Kennaway retired to make out the list of countries with his own data; but whilst thus employed, Shewaness Rao arrived, and showed that the districts of Shadimunglum and Valenoor, to the east of the Caveri, if left to Tipu, would occasion an intermixture of

boundaries; Sir John included them in the Company's share, and having given equivalents, the Company's division stood as follows:—

Calicut, 63 Taluks	8,487,650	5½	¼
Paulghatcherry	88,000		
Dindigul and Palnaveerpackshy	9,000		
Salem	24,000		
Coorg	8,000		
Numkul	16,000		
Sunkagerry	40,000		

#### BARAMAHAL

Baramahal	64,000		
Caveriputtun	10,000		
Veerbudidroog	8,000		
Raicottah	8,000		
Kangoondy	6,000		
Darampoory	8,000		
Dinageer	10,000		
Tingricottah	12,000		
Caveripoor	8,000		
Attoor, Ancutgeery	18,000		
Peermutty	14,000		
Shadiminglum	20,000		
Vamloor	16,000		

Kantery Pagodas	13,16,765	5¾	¼
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An altercation now arose between the Sultan's and the Nizam's vakils, regarding the share of the latter; as after including the whole of Kudapah, Cummum, part of the Doab, and the taluks about Tangrapilly, twenty thousand pagodas only remained to be given to the Nizam, out of which was to be settled the cession of Gooty and Bellary, which had been insisted on by the allies as absolutely necessary to form a northern boundary. For these forts, and a few dependant taluks, it was proposed to the Sultan's vakils to take the districts of Budwail and Chitoweil in the Kudapah country; these they positively refused to have, as they were cut off from Tipu's remaining territories, and were bordering on those of the Calistry and Venkatagherry Rajas, whose troublesome and litigious dis-

position might involve him in disputes similar to those that had brought on the present war: rather than be burdened with districts so situated, Tipu would give them, they said, in addition to the other cessions.

After much angry discussion between the vakils, the Nizam's always refusing to yield up those districts which Tipu's were willing to take, Tipu's vakils earnestly besought that the cession of Gooty and Bellary should not be insisted on. Mir Alam observed, that neither himself nor the minister would object to this, provided it met with the wishes of Lord Cornwallis. Sir John Kennaway opposed this. It growing late, the conference broke up, with an understanding that the Governor-general, and Azim-ul-umara should in the meantime be consulted, and that all the parties should assemble next morning.

March 16th:—Sir John Kennaway, this morning, informed Mir Alam that Lord Cornwallis had no objection to relinquishing Gooty to Tipu. Mir Alam having waited on the minister, stated it as his intention to be guided by the wishes of Lord Cornwallis; but that though he considered keeping Gooty necessary, he would relinquish it, and keep Budwail and Chittowail, provided also Tipu would give the fort of Gurrumcondah, and such of its dependant taluks as would complete the share of the Nizam. The Mahratta vakils being present, this proposal was fully discussed; when both they and the Nizam's vakils agreed it would be necessary to yield Gooty to Tipu. Sir John Kennaway, from a conviction that good policy demanded that these forts should remain in possession of the allies, suggested to the Mahratta vakils the propriety of giving up Huwanoor, and part of Bankapur, as an equivalent: this they directly and positively refused to do.

It was then agreed to propose the remaining alternative; taking Gurrumcondah, etc., in lieu of Gooty, and if this was insuperably objected to, Gooty would then be relinquished, provided Lord Cornwallis consented.

The Mahratta vakils then requested the definitive treaty might be produced. When read, they stated that Hurry Punt wished three alterations of additions should be made to it. First, The omission of the words "heirs and successors", in the preamble. Secondly, A clause securing protection to pilgrims



visiting the pagodas in Seringapatam. Thirdly, That the treaty should recognise and confirm all former treaties, except those modified by the tenor of this. In reply to the first, Sir John Kennaway observed, that it could not be agreed to; that such phraseology was usual, and if they wished to observe good faith, they ought not to object to it. They answered it was not their habit to use these terms. In reply to their second request, Sir John Kennaway said he had no objections, provided they contained nothing recognising their claim to Chauth. This would form an insuperable objection, as that demand ought to be abandoned, after the acquisitions obtained by them under the present treaty. In regard to the third request, about security to pilgrims, Sir John remarked, that it would lead to future disputes with Tipu, if he disliked their visiting his capital, and if he did not, it was superfluous. In short, if they disliked the present treaty, they might make a separate one with Tipu themselves. This they declined, and to compound with Sir John, they said they would, in their copy of the treaty, substitute for "heirs and successors," that the treaty should last as long as *the sun, moon, and stars!* and with regard to pilgrims, Hurry Punt should address a separate letter to Tipu on this subject, but they besought Sir John to bespeak Tipu's favourable attention towards it. Tipu's vakils having now arrived, it was proposed to them to exchange Gooty, etc., for Gurrumcondah. To this they immediately and decidedly objected, for these reasons; that Gurrumcondah was one of the first acquisitions to the Mysore state, and because the bones of Mir Sahib, Haidar Ali's brother-in-law, were deposited in a tomb near the fort. Lord Cornwallis having now signified his hope that the minister would relinquish Gooty, it was intimated to the vakils that the point would be conceded. All the vakils now proceeded to arrange the division of the countries that were to be exchanged. After much altercation about the exchange of Parganas, the different shares stood, at length, as inserted in the definitive treaty. The Sultan's vakils then took their leave to go to the fort, promising to return with the treaty, next morning, duly executed. Sir John warned them against the alteration of a single word, as from the critical situation of affairs, such might be attended with the most serious consequences.

March 17th:—Nothing was heard from the vakils until about four p. m., when Mahomed Ali reported they would soon be out with some more treasure. At six, Sir John received a note from them, stating that they had laid the definitive treaty before Tipu; and complaining of excesses and plunderings by Parashuram Bhow's cavalry. Sir John Kennaway returned an answer, that Parashuram Bhow's excesses had been reported to Lord Cornwallis, and would in future be prevented. He cautioned the vakils against any delay, or the smallest alteration in the treaty, as either would inevitably lead to a rupture.

March 18th:—The Sultan's vakils arrived at three, and came to Sir John Kennaway's tents, where they found the Nizam's deputies. The Mahratta vakils were not in the way when summoned. The vakils commenced by making complaints against Parashuram Bhow, and whilst they were yet talking, a letter was brought to them from Tipu, giving details of the plunderings of Parashuram Bhow on the road to Sera; that he made collections, beat and imprisoned ryuts, and had taken 63 camels, 3000 bullocks, etc., etc. Sir John Kennaway replied, that the Governor-general would do all in his power to stop these enormities, but they were mainly owing to the bad faith of their master, who had, in spite of all representations and remonstrances, continued to repair and strengthen the works in the fort, which had induced Lord Cornwallis to make Parashuram Bhow cross the river. The vakils attempted to deny this, but Sir John offered to produce a plan of the works, showing the repairs, etc., made up from daily authentic reports.

They then produced the fair and signed copies of the treaty, which were collated, corrected, and revised; in the annexed list of countries, two important omissions had been made, which could not be rectified without the especial permission of Tipu. They also delivered nine orders of surrender for the forts of Salem, Namkul, etc. The next day was appointed for the formal delivery of the three treaties by the princes to Lord Cornwallis, when the Nizam's and the Mahratta vakils were requested to attend.

March 19th:—The Mahratta vakils sent, this morning, a copy of the article they wished added to the treaty, confirming all former treaties with the Mysore government. Sir John Kennaway

answered, that the treaty was now signed and executed by Tipu, that therefore the time for alterations was past, and that Lord Cornwallis would not return the treaty for such an addition, and he concluded by requesting their official attendance at the Governor-general's tents, to receive their copy of the treaty delivered by the princes in Durbar. They answered they would ascertain, immediately, the pleasure of Hurry Punt on this head; without his permission they would not attend. All Sir John Kennaway's arguments could not induce them to alter this resolution, and the treaty had been delivered by the princes, and the company breaking up, before Govind Rao Kishen arrived. When Lord Cornwallis presented the treaty to him, he desired it might be understood that Hurry Punt had objections to it which he would state to the Governor-general in a personal conference, if granted one, which Lord Cornwallis said he would be happy to give him. After the Durbar had broken up, Govind Rao Kishen had a conversation with Lord Cornwallis, which ended in an understanding, that the articles they wished should be discussed in the conference requested by Hurry Punt.

March 20th:—Sir John Kennaway received a letter from Ali Reza, complaining again of the continued depredations of Parashuram Bhow. Sir John wrote in reply, that he had done his utmost to restrain the Bhow, who had by command marched to return to his former position today, or would certainly do so tomorrow. It was stated that Tipu's Bedes and Pindaris were quite as active and destructive as the troops of the Bhow.

Hurry Punt visited Lord Cornwallis in the evening, and agreed to the treaty in its present form; but as the counterpart from him could not be prepared by the next morning, Lord Cornwallis put off the formal delivery of the counterparts from the different allied powers until the 22nd instant.

March 21st:—Sir John Kennaway wrote to Mir Alam and Bhikaji Pandit, relative to the public delivery of the counterpart treaties.

March 22nd:—In the morning the vakils of the Nizam and Mahrattas assembled at Sir John Kennaway's tents, and on the arrival of the Governor-general, accompanied him to the tents of the princes, to whom the ratified counterparts of the definitive

treaty were delivered, under salutes from the different powers. After the interchange of compliments, Sir John Kennaway informed Ali Reza, that the orders of delivery of the forts to be restored to Tipu were preparing, and demanded the remaining orders for those forts to be given to the Company, such as Kishnagarh, Sunkagerry, etc., which the vakil stated to be ready, but that in his hurry he had left them behind. Ali Reza then requested of Sir John Kennaway to bespeak Lord Cornwallis's influence with the Mahrattas relative to the release of prisoners, especially Hardas, Dewan of Darwar; also relative to a deduction of ten per cent on the money payable to the Nizam and Mahrattas, usual in all money transactions between such states. The concourse of people being great, Lord Cornwallis proposed that they should retire and discuss these matters more privately in Sir John Kennaway's tent.

Tipu's vakils commenced by requiring the delivery of Hardas. Lord Cornwallis replied, that great as were the calamities of the war, they would be much heightened by delivering up to enraged masters, people in the position of Hardas; who had voluntarily claimed the protection of the Mahrattas, had not been detained by force, and could not be looked upon as a prisoner, and did not therefore come within the scope of the operation of the treaty relative to prisoners.

The vakils allowed he had entered the Mahratta service of his own free will, and would not now return to Tipu's, as he was between thirty and forty lacs in arrears, to defraud their master of which was the principal cause of his desertion; but that, forming part of the garrison of Darwar, under Budder-ul-Zeman Khan, he had, with the rest, surrendered on terms which Parashuram Bhow had violated by attacking the garrison, after the evacuation, plundering and making them prisoners; that this, coupled with the severe treatment they subsequently received, had given to Hardas both the cause and opportunity for deserting. This, they argued, entitled them to class him among the prisoners. Lord Cornwallis declined entering into the discussion of the surrender of Darwar, or its violation; all he considered necessary was, that he was a deserter by his own free will, and therefore his surrender was not stipulated for by the treaty. Govind Rao Kishen observed that Hurry Punt was willing that Hardas be

brought to Lord Cornwallis's tent, and allowed to go to Tipu if he chose. In reply to their further discussion on this point, Lord Cornwallis adhered to his former answer. They then proceeded to demand the deduction of ten per cent. Lord Cornwallis said he knew of no such custom, when the Sultan's vakils referred the matter to the Nizam's and Mahratta deputies, saying that if they denied its existence, they would give it up. Lord Cornwallis replied that he was accountable to his superiors for the due fulfilment of the treaty, wherein no such deduction was provided for. They answered, that money transactions being new between their government and the English, they could not insist on it with regard to them; but they claimed it as usual and well understood between them and the other powers. Lord Cornwallis said he would not interfere in such a business; if Hurry Punt and the minister allowed it, he had no objections to offer. Mir Alam appeared to think such custom usual between the Mysore government and the Mahrattas, but he denied its existence as it regarded his own government; and when it was proposed by the Mahratta vakils to refer the decision on their part to Hurry Punt, he said there would be little use in making a reference to Azim-ul-umara, who would give them a plain denial. The conversation here terminated, and Tipu's vakils went away in the belief that no deduction would be agreed to by any party. In the evening Sir John Kennaway wrote to Tipu's vakils, relative to the release of prisoners still unreleased; among others, there were two officers, named Fonblanque and Hoare, confined at Mudgeery.

Here the conferences ended: shortly afterwards the allied armies commenced their march towards their respective frontiers, and, save general expressions of civility, no further intercourse passed between the Governor-general and the Sultan.

Tipu gave an ample supply of doolies<sup>7</sup> and bearers to assist in removing the sick in hospital, which had increased in an extraordinary degree during the continuance of the siege of Seringapatam.

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## APPENDIX II

# *Sir John Shore's Minute*

*Dated Calcutta, Feb. 18, 1795*

WHILST HOSTILITIES between the Mahrattas and the Nizam are yet in suspense, the attention of this government is naturally called forth to the consideration of probable events, which may fundamentally change the political situation of affairs in India. It has been already decided, that we are not bound by any treaty to take part with any of the contending powers against the other, and, in this case, the acts of the legislature of Great Britain prohibit an interference that would necessarily involve us in hostilities.

From this decision I have no reason to apprehend that we shall be forced to depart, whilst dissensions prevail between the Mahrattas and Nizam only; but if they should ultimately end in hostilities, a question may arise on which our determination ought previously to be formed, *viz.*, What part this government is bound to take, if Tipu should attack the territories of the Nizam, during hostilities between that prince and the Peshwa, either as a confederate of the Mahrattas, or independently.

The only treaties which have a reference to this question, are those concluded at Paungul and Poona with the Nizam and Mahrattas, under the title of Offensive and Defensive Alliance, in June and July, 1790.

The preamble to the treaty with the Nizam specifies three parties to it, and that the alliance is against Tipu Sultan. The first article confirms the friendship subsisting between the three states by former treaties, and the second declares that Tipu having violated his engagements with the contracting powers, they have united in a league to punish him to the utmost of their ability, and to deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity in future. The third and subsequent articles, to the ninth inclusive, relate to the prosecution of the war, and to

objects connected with it, to the distribution of the conquered territories, and to the mode of making peace; and the tenth article of the treaty of Paungul, which is the thirteenth in that of Poona, is in the following terms:—

“If, after the conclusion of peace with Tippoo, he should attack or molest either of the contracting parties, the other shall join to punish him, the mode and conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled by the contracting parties.”

The treaty, therefore, from this summary recital of it, is clearly an alliance between three states for a declared specific object, with a prospective clause for the future security of all the contracting parties against a common enemy.

To ascertain, with all possible accuracy, the nature of the obligations of the treaty, I now advert to the negotiations preceding the formation of it, and to the discussion of the quoted article, which have taken place subsequent to the war.

Upon receipt of the intelligence that Tipu had invaded the territories of the Raja of Travancore, instructions were sent from this government to the residents at Hyderabad and Poona, to notify its determination to support our ally, and to propose a co-operation with the Nizam and the Mahrattas against Tipu.

The resident at Poona, previous to the receipt of these instructions, had obtained from that court an unrequested declaration of its disposition to take part with the Company in the war against Tipu. The first advance to the confederacy was therefore made by the Mahrattas, without solicitation or sacrifice on our part.

To the information communicated to the Nizam, by the resident at Hyderabad, of unprovoked aggression of Tipu against the Raja of Travancore, and of the determination of this government to support him, and to the expressed expectation of the Nizam's co-operation, His Highness replied without qualification, that it was his intention, after an interview with the Peshwa, and after concerting with him a plan of attack, to commence hostilities against Tipu, and that the Governor-general's resolution very happily coincided with his own plans,—that it had long been his intention to attack Tipu, and that he had communicated it to the Peshwa.

The Nizam, however, claimed the merit of a ready co-opera-

tion with the English, of a decision in their favour, without waiting to ascertain the disposition of the Peshwa, and of an earlier commencement of hostilities than he had intended.

The Nizam's declaration was soon followed by a question from him to the resident, as to the part which the Company would take if during the absence of his army while assisting the Company, the Peshwa invited by Tipu should invade the dominions of His Highness; and the reply of the resident, which he acknowledges to be unguarded, was, that *the Company ought to sacrifice their all in His Highness's defence*. The minister subsequently requested that Lord Cornwallis would introduce in one of his letters an expression implying, in general terms, that he should consider any attempt to disturb the peace of His Highness's dominions, whilst engaged with us in the war against Tipu, in the same light as an attempt to disturb those of the Company. He had previously signified his wish that the defensive alliance should be made general, and both the Nizam and his minister had evinced a disposition to connect themselves by the closest ties with this government.

The following extract from the Governor-general's letter of the 12th April, 1790, to the resident at Hyderabad, will furnish the most material information on this subject:—

“You may likewise take that opportunity to express both to himself (the Nizam) and to Azeem-ul-Omrah, how highly sensible I am of the liberal manner in which they received my propositions to join with the Company in the present war, and of the openness and fairness with which they have discussed the different articles which are to constitute the terms of our alliance; and you may give them the strongest assurances that they shall have no reason to repent of their having treated me with so much candour; but that, in return, I shall have pleasure in embracing every opportunity that offers to give them convincing proofs of my sincerity and friendship.

“I trust that the more that his Highness reflects upon the nature of his proposition, that I would engage to interfere in case the Mahrattas should at any time make unreasonable demands upon him, he will more clearly see that, as the Mahrattas have acceded heartily and cordially to the confederacy, it would be highly improper in me to suppose that they would be inclined



to treat one of their own allies with injustice; and, consequently, such an assurance must appear to them in a light highly injurious and offensive. But, in order to prove to His Highness how anxious I am to go every justifiable length to show my regard to his interests, and to gratify him in his wishes, you may inform him that, provided the Mahrattas do not positively object to it, I will agree to its becoming an additional article in the present treaty, that, should differences arise between any two of the confederates, the third party shall be bound to interpose his good offices, and to take every means in his power to bring those differences to a just and amicable settlement; and you may add to His Highness, to Azeem-ul-Omrah, and to Meer Abal Kassim, that should an article to that *effect be assented to by the Poona government*, and any case should arise, in which my interference should be called upon in consequence of it, they will always find me in the best disposition to endeavour to save His Highness from the necessity of submitting to injury."

This is the substance of what preceded the treaty. It now remains to state what passed subsequent to it at the period of general pacification as Seringapatam. Hurry Punt, on the part of the Mahrattas and Azim-ul-umara, on that of the Nizam, proposed to Lord Cornwallis to enter into a guarantee treaty, in fuller explanation of the 13th and 16th articles of the treaties of Poona and Paungal, with a view to render the terms of them more precise, and to define the operations to be pursued by the three contracting parties, in the event of future molestation, or attack, by Tipu, against either of them.

It is unnecessary to detail the negotiations which followed these propositions; it is sufficient to observe the written declaration which the residents were instructed to deliver to their respective courts, if they manifested evasion or backwardness in entering into the proposed explanation, *viz.*, "That we consider the three parties to be bound to each other, to act with their whole force against Tippoo, in the event of his attacking either of them, without clear and just provocation, but in no other case whatever." That the draft of an explanatory treaty was prepared by Lord Cornwallis, and transmitted to the residents at Hyderabad and Poona, by whom it was explained to the ministers of their respective courts, that the Mahrattas

required time for considering it, but Azim-ul-umara *positively declared his resolution not to agree to the guarantee treaty* until his master's request concerning Kurnool had been complied with; that he afterwards retracted this declaration, and expressed his consent to accede to the propositions of Lord Cornwallis, without waiting for the determination of the Mahrattas; that another draft of an explanatory treaty was afterwards prepared by the Mahrattas, and that the discussion has long since been brought to a close, without any specific agreement, under a satisfactory declaration from the Mahratta minister, that his state was ready to act agreeably to existing treaties, and an expressed acquiescence of the Nizam to the proposed draft of Lord Cornwallis.

I shall now consider the arguments by which the Nizam may be presumed to urge his claim to our assistance, in the event of the premised suppositions.

That he is by treaty entitled to the assistance of the Company, as well as that of the Mahrattas, if Tipu should attack his dominions, without just cause or provocation, and the defection of one party to the treaty cannot exonerate the other from the obligations which it has contracted to discharge; that, so far from being justified in refusing him aid against Tipu, it is incumbent on us to stand forth and compel the third party to perform its stipulations.

That the article imposing the obligation of assistance is clear and positive in its terms, and contains no expression or condition to justify a secession on our parts; that his reliance in making the treaty was upon our good faith, as he not only well knew the treachery of the Mahrattas, but plainly intimated his suspicions of it during the preliminary negotiations; that, at the period of making the treaty, our interest dictated the necessity of entering into an alliance with him, whether the Mahrattas became parties to it or not,—and it cannot be doubted, that if he had insisted upon an offensive and defensive engagement, in general terms, it must have been acceded to; that if we are at liberty to renounce the performance of our stipulations, because the Mahrattas have violated their engagements, or for other reasons of convenience or policy, that good faith, which is the basis and cement of treaties, is subverted, as a pretence equally

valid can never be wanting to authorize a departure from the most solemn obligations.

That Tipu's aggression must be with or without the concert of the Mahrattas, and, in either case, we are bound to oppose it, but more particularly should he take the field against the Nizam as the confederate of the Peshwa, as such a confederacy on his part would be a direct and insulting violation of the treaty, which it would be our indispensable duty to resent.

To these arguments the following may be opposed:—

Nothing can be clear than that the treaty, by the terms of it, is a tripartite engagement, binding and uniting three states for their reciprocal security against a declared common enemy; and supposing the guarantee established by it to be maintained by the joint efforts and co-operation of the three allies. Upon this principle, all explanations and acts originating out of the treaty were to take place by mutual communication and the concurrence of the three allied powers. That as the union of the three allies was the basis of the treaty, the continuance of that union, or friendship, is essential to the performance of the obligations imposed by it, and a war between two of the parties totally changes the relative situation of all.

A junction between Tipu and one of two parties to the treaty, whilst at war with each other, is to be considered with reference to the causes of hostilities between the two parties engaged in them. The treaty can never be construed with that rigour, as in all cases to preclude any of the parties to it from forming such alliances as may be necessary to his safety; and upon a supposition that the justice of the war between the Nizam and Peshwa is decidedly on one side, and that the other has been compelled into it by unprovoked aggression, self-preservation would justify an alliance between the aggrieved party and Tipu. On the other hand, a confederacy between him and one of the parties to the triple alliance, against any other party, from ambitious motives, may be pronounced a gross infraction of that alliance with respect to the state confederating with Tipu. The inference from this reasoning, in point of fact, bears rather against the Nizam, as his advance towards Bidder, if not an act of aggression against the Mahratta state, was indisputably with a view to take part in the dissensions bet-

ween Sindhia and the minister, and so far an indication of hostility. In an early stage of those measures which have contributed to involve the Nizam in his present embarrassment, the consequences of them were distinctly pointed out to Azim-ul-umara; and whilst the importance of a good understanding with Balaji Pandit to the prosperity of the Nizam's government was urged to him, he was at the same time apprized of the destructive tendency to His Highness's affairs of a rupture with the Mahratta minister.

To support the Nizam against Tipu, if he should seize the opportunity of actual hostility between His Highness and the Mahrattas, to attack the territories of the former without provocation, must necessarily involve us in a war with the Mahrattas, a predicament which the obligations of the treaty never supposed. I state this as a necessary consequence, for the operations of the field would lead to it: even though the invasion were not originally concerted or intended between Tipu and the Peshwa, we cannot conceive it possible for us to fight against Tipu alone, in defence of the Nizam, and with the co-operation of his forces, whilst he is engaged with the Mahrattas; and to prosecute the war with effect against Tipu, we must commence hostilities at the same time with the Mahrattas. But if a contrary supposition were admissible, the whole burden of repelling and punishing the aggression of Tipu would exclusively fall upon us, contrary to the spirit, meaning, and terms of the triple alliance.

We are respectively bound by different treaties with the Nizam and Mahrattas, not to assist their enemies; and we are bound in a guarantee with both, for the object of reciprocal security against Tipu: the first imposes a neutrality on our parts with respect to the Nizam and to the Mahrattas; and the second, the obligation of mutual support against Tipu. The stipulations of the last imply and express the continuance of amity between the three contracting parties, as the foundation of that concert which is the very essence of the treaty, and by which the security derived from it can alone be maintained. Hostilities between any two of the parties is in fact, as long as they last, a subversion of the principles of the treaty.

The primary question, as far as regards the obligations of the treaty, is reducible to a very narrow compass, and is resolvable

into this statement,—whether the treaty of Paungul is to be deemed a separate independent agreement between us and the Nizam, or connecting in all its obligations him and the Mahrattas. The terms of it most clearly prove it to be a triple alliance, by which three parties are bound together against a presumed enemy, for their reciprocal security, which is to be maintained by their joint efforts, and, if necessary, with their whole power. To the argument, that the secession of one party from performing the obligations of the treaty does not release the other, because it is not so expressed in it, and because such a clause would have been inserted, if this had been the intention of the contracting parties, it may be replied, that this construction is inadmissible, for it requires more than was intended by the treaty itself, as it involves the necessity, or, at all events, the risk, of a war with one of the parties to it. This is a case which the treaty never supposed, and all the stipulations in it are formed upon a contrary presumption.

In reply to other arguments it may be observed, that both the Nizam and the Mahrattas were previously disposed to war with Tipu, and that in all probability they would have carried this intention into effect, if the Company had not been compelled into hostilities with that prince; that they embraced with alacrity the favourable opportunity afforded them by the determination of this government, and can claim no other merit, than that they were induced by it to commence their operations at an earlier period than they had at first proposed. The clause to which Lord Cornwallis signified his conditional acquiescence was not inserted in the treaty, and it is evident that it would have been objected to by the Mahrattas. The Nizam himself has afforded a proof of the latitude in which he views the article of the guarantee treaty under discussion, by his declaration to withhold his acquiescence to the proposed explanatory engagement, until our concurrence was obtained to the object which he had in view.

In discussing the nature and force of the obligations of the treaty, we are not to be biassed by any considerations of the weakness of the Nizam, and the probability of an attack upon him only. Such considerations apply to the question of *expediency*, and the point of *obligation* is to be argued in the same manner

as if the supposition extended to an attack upon the Mahrattas by Tipu. If the terms of the treaty, under the stated circumstances, prescribe the obligation of assisting the Nizam against Tipu, they must be construed to require our assistance in favour of the Mahrattas under similar circumstances, if attacked by that prince, and the probable ruin of the one, with the aggrandizement of the other, would be the necessary consequence of such aid.

Although hostilities between the Mahrattas and Nizam is a dissolution of all existing treaties between them, yet they are both still bound to us. I am at the same time aware that if Tipu were to attack the possessions of the Company, whilst the Mahrattas and Nizam are at war with each other, however they might profess an adherence to the stipulations of the treaty, they would not be in a situation to execute them. But with the restoration of peace the power of fulfilling their stipulations may again ensue, and the contracting parties may again stand in the situation which the treaty supposed. Upon this principle, if Tipu were to attack either the Nizam or Mahrattas, whilst at war with each other, I should deem it necessary, in the first instance, to call upon the third party to perform his stipulations. It might induce the two parties at war to make peace with each other; and, at all events, would either show that Tipu's attack was by concert with one of the allies, or prove a direct breach of the treaty against the ally refusing his aid in defence of the party attacked, and thus leave us at liberty to act as we might think proper. But I do not hold this government bound to assist either party against Tipu, unless peace were previously established between the Mahrattas and the Nizam.

Having discussed the obligations of the treaty, I shall now consider the question of assisting the Nizam, on the grounds of political expediency.

In deciding against the Nizam's claim to our assistance against Tipu, without the co-operation of the Mahrattas, I am not to suppose that he will yield his conviction to those arguments which have satisfied my judgment. On the contrary, we are to conclude that he will be inclined to view our neutrality as a desertion of his cause, which ill repays his co-operation with us, and his anxiety to unite with us by the closest ties. We are

therefore, in the concurrence of the supposed event, which I am far from deeming probable, to look to the indisposition of the Nizam to the British interests in India, and to the consequences of it. In truth, the whole tenor of the Nizam's conduct, from the earliest period, proves that he has been friendly or inimical to the British government, as it suited his immediate views; and that his later union with us has proceeded from a motive of deriving support from our countenance and power.

The apprehensions and dangers suggested by this consideration are remote, and, at present, the question, the decision of which presumes them, has not been forced upon our determination. But whilst they are possible, it is our duty seriously to weigh the probable consequences of neglecting the Nizam, or of supporting him against the joint invasion of the Mahrattas and Tipu Sultan.

The destruction of the Nizam's power, and the aggrandizement of that of his enemies, must be the consequence of leaving him without support, and Tipu and the Mahrattas will of course become proportionably dangerous.

On the other hand, when we reflect upon the vices and imbecility of the Nizam's administration, the impossibility of directing his politics, without usurping his government, and the dangers of perpetual war, the consequence of such interference,—when we consider the difficulty of making any effectual impression in the Mahratta state by our forces, the comparative facility with which they might injure us,—the magnitude of the resources and exertions, as well as the number of troops both native and European, which would be required to oppose the united efforts of the Mahrattas and Tipu—and the inevitable ruin of a long protracted war—the inducement to support the Nizam, at the hazard of such impending consequences, ought to be much stronger than the apprehension of future evils from the subversion of his power.

This event, before it could be effectually opposed by the assistance of this government, would be the probable consequence of an invasion of his dominions by Tipu and the Mahrattas, and it is at least dubious if any efforts on our part could procure his re-establishment.

But, above all, it is indispensably necessary to advert to the

situation of affairs in Europe, which precludes the expectation of receiving any considerable reinforcement of troops during the continuance of the war, and impresses the necessity of preserving, by every effort, peace with all the powers in India.

Under the supposition of the annihilation of the power of the Nizam, by the combination of Tipu and the Mahrattas, the probability is as great that they would attack each other, as that they would unite to invade the territories of the Company; and, if it were otherwise, the progressive accumulation of our resources would enable us better to resist their confederacy against us. Our political consequence might lose something of its importance in the estimate of the native powers, by leaving the Nizam to his fate; but although I am fully sensible of the value of opinion in this country, it cannot be placed in competition with the greater evils attending a war with Tipu and the Mahrattas, which I consider the unavoidable consequence of supporting singly the Nizam against Tipu, if that prince should attack him, whilst engaged in hostilities with the Peshwa.

Independently of the reasons for affording protection to the Nizam, which are suggested by a consideration of the consequences following the denial of our assistance, other motives occur. The conduct of the British government in resenting the attack upon their ally, the Raja of Travancore, during the war, and in the negotiations for the termination of it, not only gained us the confidence of our allies, but established the British reputation throughout India for good faith, firmness, and moderation; but in weighing these motives, we must attend to self-preservation, including the permanency of the British possessions in India.

I have now considered a question which I most sincerely hope we shall not be compelled to decide, and I shall take this opportunity of recording some reflections which I have frequently revolved.

Whether the dissensions between the Peshwa and the Nizam are terminated in war or by negotiation, there is too much reason to fear that the Nizam will fall under the subjection of the Mahrattas, and on this event his power, under their control and direction, will become an accumulation of their strength, already exorbitant.



This apprehension cannot have escaped the Nizam, and it seems natural to conclude that, having no expectation of our support, he would endeavour to avoid subjection to the Mahrattas, by forming an union with Tipu. Whether he has really ever had this in contemplation I am not informed, but I have already assigned reasons which I still think satisfactory for deeming it impracticable.

Surmises have been propagated, on the other hand, of a meditated confederacy between Tipu and the Mahrattas; this also I deem improbable, unless the latter should be forced into it by our avowed support of the Nizam against them. They are, I presume, satisfied on this head; Tipu would, I doubt not, be ready to accept overtures from the Peshwa for such a confederacy, but I think they will not be made, and I entertain little apprehension that he will at present venture to attack the dominions of the Nizam, without the concert of the Mahrattas. If he should, the most probable consequences of such an attempt would, in my opinion, be these, that the Mahrattas, in the first instance, would make their own terms with the Nizam, and then unite with us to defend his territories against Tipu.

The sovereignty of India may be now considered to be exercised by the Mahrattas, Tipu, the Nizam, and the English.

The power of the house of Sindhia has become subject to the control of the Peshwa by means which were foreseen, without any immediate prospect that his successor will recover that independence which Sindhia himself possessed; and the paramount government of Poona enjoys and exercises a most extensive influence and authority over all the constituent and dependant members of the Mahratta empire. If, then, there be assignable limitation, it is with respect to the Berar Raja, who, from situation and circumstances, has less interest and concern in the general politics of the Mahratta state, and carries on his administration independently of it. But his dependence is constitutional, and the present Raja, as I am informed, received the confirmation of his succession, with the insignia of his investiture, from the Peshwa, and although it should be granted that he is not disposed to enter into any measures inimical to the British interests in India, we may with certainty conclude that he would take no active part with this government against the Peshwa.

The power of the Mahratta empire, without the co-operation of the Berar Raja, is sufficiently formidable, and the forces under General De Boigne may perhaps be deemed equal to that of two English brigades.

The nature of the Mahratta government is well known to be avaricious, grasping, and ambitious,—that it never neglects any opportunity of extending its power, or aggrandizing its wealth, with little solicitude as to the rectitude of the means employed in obtaining these objects.

But although the accumulated power of the Mahrattas is great, it is not collected for enterprise without delay and difficulty, as we may learn even from recent events. This difficulty and delay may be imputed to the nature of the Mahratta constitution, to the separate interests and pursuits of the dependant members of it, which seldom admit of a distant or speedy diversion of their forces, and to the great extent of the empire from which the troops are to be drawn. In this diversity of interests a principle of discord exists, which, although it may disappear whenever the safety of the Mahratta state is endangered by attack, opens an impediment to the union of the efforts of the empire for the purpose of hostile invasion.

Friendship or alliance now subsists between the British government and the Mahratta state, and its feudatories, the Raja of Berar, Sindhia, and Holkar; but though some advantage may arise from a friendly connexion with the feudatories, and greater perhaps from the apprehension which they may entertain of danger to their respective interests in the event of hostilities between the British and the Mahratta state, it would be unsafe to rely too much upon this consideration; on the contrary, if that event should occur, whilst we employed the best means which policy could suggest to effect a disunion of interests among the different chieftains, our exertions must be made on an expectation of the united opposition of all.

With respect to all the powers in India, our actual security is our strength, but with regard to the Mahrattas the alarm of danger is lessened, by a consideration that a wider and safer career is open to their ambition, in the absolute subjection of numerous petty states in Hindustan, some of which are independent, whilst others are partially under their control, than by

attacking our possessions, or those of our allies. Our security may be deemed to be further confirmed by our avowed principles, in comparison with those of Tipu Sultan, whose ambition is as notorious as our disavowal of extending the British territories by arms. But after all, we are never to forget that a dominion exercised by foreigners must never be viewed in a hostile light,—that an union merely political is, in the highest degree, precarious—and that if the whole power of the Mahratta state were directed against us, we should find ourselves very vulnerable in many parts, and in some perhaps at present unsuspected.

If Tipu were at the same time to join the confederacy, or an European enemy superadd the weight of his power, the successful termination of the contest would require the utmost exertions both here and in Europe.

The British territories on the Ganges are open to invasion by Cuttack, by the west, and including the Vizier's dominions on the north. With respect to the Vizier, I shall only here say, that, whilst his administration continues on its present footing, we should derive no effective assistance from his troops, and that we must rather expect to find enemies than friends in his dominions, which are inhabited and surrounded by numerous hardy and needy adventurers, without attachment or allegiance, and ready to take arms in any cause that would provide them spoil.

It is unnecessary to expatiate on the character of Tipu, the leading principle of which is ambition, and that has no friendships. We know by experience his abilities—he has confidants and advisers, but no minister, and inspects, superintends, and regulates himself all the details of his government—he maintains dignity without ostentation—the peasantry of his dominions are protected, and their labours encouraged and rewarded. Before the late war, reports were continually propagated of his cruelty and tyranny, with respect to his subjects in Malabar,—they were not ill founded, but that they were greatly exaggerated may be established by one consideration, that, during the contest with him, no person of character, rank or influence, in his hereditary dominions, deserted his cause. With less bigotry than is usually imputed to him, we know his zeal for his religion to be strong,

and his ambition acquires new motives of action from this principle.

Since the termination of hostilities, he has faithfully discharged all the obligations of the treaty of peace, and his attention appears to have been more immediately directed to the improvement of his finances by economy, to the internal administration of his country, and to repair and strengthen Seringapatam. No part of his conduct has indicated hostility towards us or our allies, but we have information that he entertains a particular resentment against the Nizam, and a contempt for him.

His obvious policy is to wait until events produce a disunion amongst the confederates, and to foment it if he can.

The weakness of the Nizam's administration would probably have an irresistible temptation to his resentment and ambition, if he were not protected by the triple alliance, but the subversion of the British power, as opposing the firmest barrier to his ambition, must naturally be the object which he has most in view.

Of the three powers, therefore, which I have mentioned, I shall observe, that the aid of the Nizam can never enable us to hold the balance of India,—that the ambition of Tipu has more and stronger motives for action than that of the Mahrattas—and that the consolidation of our alliance with the latter is an object of the first importance to us. With their aid, which we might expect, we could always oppose Tipu and any European power—from Tipu we could never hope for assistance, or scarcely neutrality.

In the event of hostilities with the Mahrattas, I think it probable that an useful alliance might be formed with the northern Rajas, and perhaps even with some of the Sikh chiefs. But I should not advise entering into offensive and defensive alliances with them, as a precautionary security, on this principle, that the danger attending them would probably exceed the advantage to be derived from them in times of necessity. It is safer, in my opinion, to trust to the formation of alliances when that necessity exists; and this may certainly be promoted by the moderation and sincerity of our language and conduct at all times. The correspondence between this government and the principal northern Rajas is regular—with any of the Sikh chiefs occasional only.

These general reflections may assist the judgment in forming a determination on the primary question, which has insensibly led to the introduction of them; and if the Board concur in the result of my opinion upon it, they will further, I imagine, agree with me, that there is no immediate probability that we shall be involved in war in India. But with this conclusion, under the uncertain consequences of hostilities between the Mahrattas and the Nizam—the precarious situation of affairs in Europe, and the desperate exertions of the French, we must admit the necessity of being prepared to meet any extremity. This, in fact, is an obligation of primary necessity at all times, although our preparations must be extended or abridged according to the impulse of circumstances. With respect to the coast of Coromandel, I should have submitted some propositions founded on this consideration to the Board, if I had not been informed by the Right Honourable President of Fort St. George, in a letter of the 18th December, that, for similar reasons, he had called for a list of stores and provisions on the frontier coast—that he would take care that they were amply supplied, and that the camp equipage should be in a state of preparation to admit of our taking the field upon a short notice. To these measures I expressed my concurrence, and the Board may recollect my verbal communication of them.

In Bengal, as far as immediate precaution may be expedient, little remains to be done. The Commander-in-chief long ago noticed an evil of a very serious tendency, the dispersion of the regular troops in detachments upon civil services. Exclusively of the impossibility of enforcing a proper discipline over troops so divided, it would be difficult to collect any considerable body at a short warning, in any part of the provinces, Calcutta, perhaps, excepted; and whatever reliance we may place on the submission, timidity, or attachment of the subjects of this government, nothing can be more obvious than the necessity of being prepared at all times to quell insurrection.

At the verbal or recorded suggestion of the Commander-in-chief, some information was called for, as preparatory to an arrangement for correcting the evil noticed by him, and lately further information has been required. It will probably be ready by the period of his return to the Presidency, which may be

very shortly expected, and we may then avail ourselves of his advice and assistance in forming the necessary arrangements.

But after the maturest reflection on our situation in this country, on the policy, the character, the forces, and ambition of the different powers in India, and the dislike which they must entertain to the manners, religion, and dominion of Europeans, it is impossible to suppose that, with all our caution to avoid war, we shall be always at peace. Any inability on our parts to oppose the enmity of our neighbours, would immediately make us sensible of its effects; and for these reasons our consideration should extend beyond a provision for immediate exigency. We know from experience that the natives of India improve in military tactics, and that every new war with them requires augmented exertions and forces on our parts; and we are further to reflect that, exclusively of the protection of these provinces, we must have it in our power to send assistance to the other possessions of the Company when attacked.

Our military establishment was formed nine years ago, and in the interval we have been engaged in a war which required the united efforts of the three Presidencies, not to mention the co-operation of the Nizam and the Mahrattas, under the direction of superior military and political abilities, to bring it to a fortunate conclusion.

In addition to these observations, we may assume it as an undeniable principle, that to impose peace on our neighbours, by the strength of a military establishment, ready at all times for active or extensive exertion, is not only the wisest but the most economical system.

Under the influence of these reflections, I propose therefore that the Commander-in-chief should be requested to take into his consideration the military establishment of this government, and to communicate his sentiments whether he deems it sufficient for the security and protection of the country which it is to defend; adverting at the same time to the reflections which I have stated; and to suggest any augmentation, either of the whole or the parts of it, which he may deem expedient, or any alterations either in the disposition of the troops or otherwise, which he may think proper.

I have ever been disposed to adhere as literally as possible to

the strictest interpretation of the restrictive clause in the act of parliament against entering into hostilities; but in the course of my present reflections one question has originated from it, which I think proper here to state. To pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are declared (in the preamble to the clause) to be measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of the nation; and with this preamble the prohibition against declaring war or commencing hostilities is connected, except where hostilities have actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities against the British nation in India, or against some of the states or princes dependent thereon, or whose territories the United Company shall be at such time engaged by any subsisting treaty to defend or guarantee.

This clause, in literal construction, if any interpretation of the guarantee treaty with the Nizam and the Mahrattas against Tipu be admitted, is decisive against any interference on our parts in his favour against Tipu, without the co-operation of the Mahrattas; and the circumstances of the case are such, under all the considerations stated, as to confirm the construction in point of expediency.

But it is possible that, without any view to the extension of our dominions by conquest, a case might arise in which the security of the British possessions in India might be best consulted at the risk and even certainty of hostilities, by taking part with one state against another; and the question, upon this supposition, is, whether we should be justified in such a determination, where we are not bound by treaty to defend or guarantee the state which it might be expedient to assist?—and it should, I think, be referred to the Honourable the Court of Directors.

To their particular notice, also, the question which is the subject of this minute should be pointed out; repeating my opinion of the improbability of its being forced upon our decision; that we may obtain their instructions for our guidance at any future period, in case it should hereafter occur.

### APPENDIX III

## *Lord Wellesley's Minute*

*Fort William, 12th August, 1798*

IN COMMUNICATING to the Board an authentic copy of the proclamation issued by the Governor-general of the Isle of France during the residence of the ambassadors of Tipu Sultan in that island, I informed the Board that I would prepare the detail of such measures as appeared to me most advisable, for the purpose of frustrating the united efforts of Tipu Sultan and of France. Accordingly, I have laid before the Board, for that necessary purpose, a number of propositions connected in their principle as well as in their object; and I have endeavoured to carry the proposed system of measures into execution with every practicable degree of diligence and despatch. When it is remembered that I did not take charge of this government until the 18th of May; that the proclamation did not make its first appearance at this presidency until the 8th of June, and was not authenticated here until the 18th of June, I trust it will appear that I have proceeded with as much expedition as was compatible with the due consideration of the various and important questions which demanded my decision. Although the leading objects of the several propositions which have been adopted by this government may be collected from my late correspondence with the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and with the residents at Poona and Hyderabad, it may be useful to review with more particularity the circumstances which have suggested this system of measures to my judgment. My present intention, therefore, is to explain and illustrate the principles upon which that system is founded, the means by which I hope to carry it into effect, and the ends which I expect to accomplish by its ultimate success and permanent establishment. In this retrospect of my conduct I shall disclose without hesitation or reserve the whole train of reflections which has passed in my mind during the agitation of this



intricate and extensive subject; and I shall avow without disguise every successive variation of my opinion, and every instance in which I have reluctantly submitted my unaltered judgment to the pressure of practical difficulties: nor shall I deny that I have ultimately pursued a course far within the limits of that to which the course of my own duty and character, the clearest principles of justice and of policy, the unquestionable rights and interests of the Company, and the honour of the British name in India, would have directed me, if the obstacles to my progress had not appeared absolutely insurmountable.

The various considerations which have successively engaged my attention may be stated in the following order:—

First, the nature and character of the recent proceedings of Tipu Sultan.

Secondly, the rights and interests of the Company, and the principles of my duty arising out of these proceedings.

Thirdly, the circumstances which might suspend or limit the actual exercise of these rights, the immediate and complete establishment of those interests, and the satisfactory discharge of that duty.

Fourthly, the intermediate precautions which might be adopted during the suspension of more effectual measures; and the securities which might now be provided against the return of our actual danger.

The first consideration required an attentive examination of the proclamation issued at the Isle of France, together with all the collateral circumstances accompanying that extraordinary publication. The proclamation made its first appearance at Calcutta in a newspaper of the 8th of June.

Upon the first view of the subject, I was much inclined to doubt the authenticity of the proclamation. It seemed incredible, that if the French really entertained a design of furnishing aid to Tipu, they would publicly declare that design, when no other apparent end could be answered by such a declaration excepting that of exposing the project, in its infancy, to the observation of our governments both at home and in India, and of preparing both for a timely and effectual resistance. It did not appear more probable that Tipu, whatever might be his secret design, should have risked so public and unguarded an

avowal of his hostility. However, even under these circumstances, I thought it advisable to transmit a copy of the proclamation to the governor of Fort St. George, in a private letter of the 9th of June, apprizing him that if the proclamation should prove authentic, it must lead to a serious remonstrance from this government to Tipu, the result of which remonstrance must be uncertain. My letter, therefore, directed him to turn his attention to the means of collecting a force upon the coast, if necessity should unfortunately require such a measure.

The first regular authentication of the proclamation which I received was contained in the letter from Lord Macartney of the 28th of March, and in that from Sir Hugh Christian of the same date, received on the 18th of June. It could now no longer be doubted that the proclamation actually had been issued by the Governor-general of the Isle of France. Still, however, it might have remained a question, whether this step might not have been taken without the concurrence of Tipu Sultan, and for the promotion of some separate object of the French government, unconnected with his interests and unauthorized by his consent. From the accounts which I had received of the state of the Isle of France, I was led to believe that the object of M. Malartique might have been to clear the island of the adherents to the present government of France, rather than to afford any effectual assistance to Tipu.

It appears, however, from a more accurate investigation of evidence that the ship which first conveyed to the Isle of France those accounts of the last revolution in France, and of the violent measures projected against the Isles of France and Bourbon, which occasioned the late disturbances at Port Nord Ouest and the expulsion of the French national troops from thence, did not reach the Isle of France until Tipu's ambassadors had departed from thence on their return to Mangalore. The assistance afforded to Tipu cannot therefore have been connected with the recent commotions in the Isle of France.

However, I do not apprehend, unless some new revolution shall happen in the Isle of France, that Tipu Sultan will be able to derive any considerable aid from that quarter. But whatever may have been the motives of Monsieur Malartique in this transaction, the object of Tipu Sultan was always plain

and clear, although, fortunately for our interests, his success has not yet been answerable to the extent of his design. Of the object of that design I soon possessed ample proof, arising from the best evidence which the nature of the case could admit. In the first place, it appeared, from the general tenor of the letters from the Cape, as well as by every public account which had been given of the transaction, to be an undisputed fact, that Tipu despatched two ambassadors to the Isle of France, and that the proclamation in question was published subsequent to their arrival and during their residence in that island. These facts would perhaps have been sufficient, without further inquiry, to warrant a strong presumption that this proclamation, purporting to declare the objects of the embassy, must have been framed with the consent and knowledge of the ambassadors of Tipu, then on the spot, and must have corresponded with their instructions from their sovereign, whose orders they would scarcely have ventured to exceed, in a matter of such serious consequence as the conclusion of an alliance offensive and defensive with the French. In order, however, to obtain the most accurate information with respect to the circumstances attending the reception of the embassy, the publication of the proclamation, and the conduct of the ambassadors, I examined upon oath some respectable persons who were present in the Isle of France during the residence of the ambassadors at Port Nord Ouest. From the concurrent testimony of these persons, since corroborated by intelligence from various quarters, I obtained a corrected account of the whole transaction.

Tipu despatched two ambassadors, who embarked at Mangalore for the Isle of France, and arrived there at the close of the month of January, 1798. They hoisted Tipu's colours upon entering the harbour of Port Nord Ouest; were received publicly and formally by the French government, with every circumstance of distinction and respect; and were entertained, during their continuance in the island, at the public expense. Previously to their arrival, no idea or rumour existed in the island of any aid to be furnished to Tipu by the French, or of any prospect of a war between him and the Company.

The second day after the arrival of the ambassadors, an advertisement was published, of the same purport as the procla-

mation, and immediately afterwards the proclamation was fixed up in the most public places and circulated through the town. One of the ambassadors was said to be conversant with the French language. A person accompanied the embassy from Mangalore who was habited in the Turkish dress, who spoke French and English with uncommon correctness and fluency, and who appeared to possess considerable knowledge and talents, and to be well acquainted with most of the country languages of India. This person had been known as Bussorah by the name of Abdulah; at Surat, by that of Derwick; and in the Isle of France passed under that of Talamas: under which last name he had also passed in Bengal, where he resided for some years. The ambassadors (far from protesting against the matter or style of the proclamation) held, without reserve, in the most open and public manner, the same language which it contains with respect to the offensive war to be commenced against the British possessions in India. They even suffered the proclamation to be publicly distributed. At their own house, 'Talamas' conversation, though with more caution and mystery, corresponded in substance with theirs. In consequence of these circumstances an universal belief prevailed in the island that Tipu would make an immediate attack on the British possessions in India; which opinion had gained so much force, that the persons who gave this evidence, and all those who arrived at that period in India from the Isle of France, expected to find us at war with Tipu; but they all concurred in declaring that the temerity of Tipu's design had excited general ridicule in that island. The ambassadors were present in the island when the French government proceeded to act under the proclamation in question, and they aided and assisted the execution of it by making promises in the name of Tipu, for the purpose of enticing recruits to enlist. They proposed to levy men to any practicable extent, stating their powers to be unlimited with respect to the numbers of the force to be raised.

The ambassadors were aided and assisted in a levy of one hundred officers and fifty privates, for the service of Tipu, under the terms and for the purposes stated in the proclamation. Few of the officers are of any experience or skill, and the privates are the refuse of the lowest class of the democratic rabble of the

island: some of them are volunteers; others were taken from the prisons and compelled to embark: several of them are Kaffirs and people of half-caste. With such of these troops as were volunteers the ambassadors entered into several stipulations and engagements in the name of Tipu.

On the 7th of March, 1798, the ambassadors embarked on board the French frigate, *La Preneuse*, together with the force thus raised; and they publicly declared an intention of proceeding to the Isle of Bourbon, with the hope of obtaining more recruits for the same service.

The proclamation, therefore, originated in the arrival of the ambassadors at the Isle of France, was distributed by their agents, was avowed in every part by their own public declaration, and, finally, was executed according to its tenor by their personal assistance and co-operation.

The proclamation itself furnishes the most powerful internal evidence of the concurrence of the ambassadors in all its essential parts. The principal facts stated therein are:

“That Tippo Sultaun, through two ambassadors, despatched for the purpose to the Isle of France, had addressed letters to the colonial assembly of the Isle of France, to all the generals, employed there, and to the executive directory of France; and had made the following propositions:

“1st. That he desired to form an alliance offensive and defensive with France; and offered to maintain, at his expense, during the continuance of the war in India, whatever troops should be furnished by the French, and to supply (with the exception of certain stores) every necessary for carrying on the war.

“2nd. That he had given assurances that all his preparations were already completed, and that the generals and officers would find everything necessary for carrying on a species of war to which Europeans have not been accustomed in their contests with the native powers in India.

“3rd. That he only waited for the succour of France to declare war against the English; and that it was his ardent desire to expel the English from India.”

Upon the ground of these facts the proclamation recommends a general levy of men for the service of Tipu; and it concludes by assuring “all the citizens who shall enlist, that

Tippoo will give them an advantageous rate of pay and allowances, which will be fixed by his ambassadors, who will also engage, in the name of their sovereign, that the Frenchmen who shall have enlisted in his army, shall never be detained there after they shall have expressed a desire of returning to their native country."

The avowed purport of this proclamation is to acquaint the inhabitants of the island with the propositions made by Tipu Sultan through his ambassadors then on the spot.

It enumerates those propositions with a particularity of detail which could never have been hazarded in the presence of the ambassadors, if the facts stated had not been correctly true, or if the propositions enumerated had varied in substance from those communicated by the ambassadors under the orders of their sovereign. But the last paragraph of the proclamation connected with the conduct of the ambassadors, as already described, establishes in the clearest manner their participation in the whole transaction. That paragraph contains a direct reference to the powers of the ambassadors, and engages on their behalf that they shall enter into certain stipulations, in the name of their sovereign, with respect to the pay and final discharge of such French subjects as shall enlist in his army under the conditions of the proclamation. The accounts which I have received from the Isle of France concur in stating that the ambassadors openly acted under this part of the proclamation, and in the name of Tipu entered into engagements and stipulations with the recruits, according to the assurances specified in the proclamation.

Monsieur de Bruce, now master attendant at Mangalore, stated to one of the witnesses whom I examined the whole substance of the engagements which had passed personally between him and the ambassadors, all of which engagements referred immediately to Tipu's intention of commencing war upon the Company, with the aid of the French force then about to be levied. And it is certain that without some such engagement, not a volunteer could have been raised in the Isle of France for the service of Tipu.

It appears, from the evidence which I have collected, that the ambassadors had not brought to the Isle of France a supply

of treasure sufficient for advancing bounty money to the recruits. It was stated that an apprehension of the English cruisers had prevented the embarkation of treasure for this purpose; and no doubt was entertained, that if the ambassadors had been better provided with money, they might have raised a much greater number of men, who refused to engage on the mere security of promises in the name of Tipu.

The ambassadors, together with the force thus collected, during the time of their mission in the Isle of France, landed from the frigate *La Preneuse* at Mangalore, on the 26th of April. Accounts vary with respect to the exact number of the force landed, the most probable are, that it did not exceed two hundred persons. Tipu (far from manifesting the least symptom of disapprobation of the conduct of his ambassadors in any part of the transaction) formally received them, and the officers, and leading persons so landed, with public marks of honour and distinction. One of his ambassadors resided for some time with the French recruits in a fortress at Mangalore, and the Sultan has admitted the whole levy of officers and men into his service. Referring, therefore, to the conduct of the ambassadors in the Isle of France, to their arrival at Mangalore, with the force levied in consequence of their mission, and, finally, to the reception of the ambassadors and of the French recruits by Tipu Sultan, the following conclusions appeared to me to be incontrovertibly established:

First.—That the ambassadors despatched by Tipu Sultan to the government of the Isle of France, proposed to that government an alliance offensive and defensive against the British possessions in India, which alliance was accepted by that government, and its acceptance formally notified by a public proclamation.

Secondly.—That the ambassadors were charged with letters from Tipu Sultan to the Executive Directory of France, which letters were stated to contain the same proposition, and that the ambassadors delivered those letters to the Governor of the Isle of France for the purpose of transmission to France.

Thirdly.—That the ambassadors, in the name of Tipu Sultan, gave public assurances, that he had actually completed the necessary preparations for commencing immediate hostilities, and that he only waited the arrival of succour from the French

to declare war against the Company, for the express purpose of expelling the British nation from India.

Fourthly.—That the ambassadors demand unlimited military succour from the French, and levied a military force in the Isle of France, with the declared object of commencing immediate war against the British nation in India.

Fifthly.—That this force has been actually landed in Tipu's country, and publicly admitted into his service with signal marks of approbation; and that the ambassadors have been received with similar distinction.

Sixthly.—That Tipu Sultan (by receiving with public marks of approbation his ambassadors, who had concluded in his name an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and by admitting into his service the military force raised for effecting the objects of that alliance) has personally ratified the engagements contained in the proclamations of the Governor-general of the Isle of France, and has proceeded to act under these engagements, conformably to the tenor of that proclamation.

Seventhly.—That although the succour actually received by Tipu Sultan under his offensive alliance with the French is inconsiderable, yet the tenor of the proclamation, the proposition made to the French government for unlimited military aid, and the declaration of the ambassadors, have proved, that it was the intention of Tipu Sultan to receive into his service the largest force which he could obtain, for the purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company in India.

Having thus entered into offensive and defensive engagements with the enemy, having proceeded to collect, in conjunction with the enemy, a force openly destined to act against the possessions of the Company, having avowed through his public ambassadors, that he has completed his preparations of war for the express purpose of attempting the entire subversion of the British empire in India, and having declared, that he only waits to prosecute offensive operations, Tipu Sultan has violated the treaties of peace and friendship subsisting between him and the Company, and has committed an act of direct hostility against the British government in India.

Before I proceeded to apply the principle of the law of nations to the conduct of Tipu Sultan, it appeared proper to inquire



what had been the conduct of the Company towards him for some years past, and whether he had received any provocation to justify or to palliate his late proceedings.

Since the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam the British governments in India have uniformly conducted themselves towards Tipu Sultan, not only with the most exact attention to the principle of moderation, justice, and good faith, but have endeavoured, by every practicable means, to conciliate his confidence, and to mitigate his vindictive spirit. Some differences have occasionally arisen with respect to the boundaries of his territory bordering upon the confines of our possessions on the Coast of Malabar; but the records of all the British governments in India will show that they have always manifested the utmost anxiety to promote the amicable adjustment of every doubtful or disputed point; and that Tipu Sultan has received the most unequivocal proofs of the constant disposition of the Company to acknowledge and confirm all his just rights, and to remove every cause of jealousy which might tend to interrupt the continuance of peace.

The servants of the Company in India have not, however, been ignorant of the implacable sentiments of revenge which he has presented without abatement since the hour of his last defeat. It has always been well understood, that Tipu Sultan's resentment was not to be appeased by any conciliatory advances on our part, nor by any other means than the recovery of his last power, the disgrace of the British arms, and the ruin of the British interests in India. With such views it was expected that he would eagerly embrace the first favourable occasion of striking a blow against our possessions; and his intrigues at the Court of Hyderabad and Poona, together with his embassy to Zeman Shah, although managed with such a degree of caution as to avoid the appearance of direct acts of aggression, were sufficient indications of an hostile mind. But none of these circumstances have, in any degree, affected the conduct of the Company's servants towards him; the correspondence between him and the late Governor-general, and the letters from Bombay on the subject of the district of Wynaad, furnish ample proofs of a sincere desire to bring that question to a fair issue, "*with the consent and knowledge of both parties,*" according to the

tenor of the 7th Article of the Treaty of Seringapatam; and I can appeal to the letter which I despatched to him soon after my arrival in Bengal, proposing an amicable adjustment of the same question, as well as of his recent claims upon certain parts of the district of Coorg, for a testimony of the pacific spirit which has marked my first communication with him; although, perhaps, a less mild representation might have been justified by his unwarrantable precipitation in stationing a military force on the frontier of Coorg, before he had made any trial of the prescribed and regular channels of negotiation. Tipu Sultan cannot, therefore, allege even the pretext of grievance to palliate the character of his recent acts; he has, indeed, alleged none, but has constantly professed the most sincere desire to maintain the relations of amity and peace with the Company. In his letters to Sir John Shore, written a short time before the return of his ambassadors from the Isle of France, and received at Fort William on the 26th of April, 1798, (the day on which the French force landed at Mangalore) Tipu declares, "That his friendly heart is disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord established between the two states." And he signifies his desire, that "Sir John Shore would impress Lord Mornington with a sense of the friendship and unanimity so firmly subsisting between the two states."

This is not the language of hostility, nor even of discontent. From what disposition in the friendly heart of Tipu these amicable professions have proceeded, how they are connected with a regard to truth and justice, or calculated to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord, and to impress me with a sense of the Sultan's friendship can now admit of no question, since it is now supposed that these letters were written at the very moment when Tipu was in anxious expectations of the hourly arrival of that military succour which he had solicited from the enemy, for the express purpose of commencing a war of aggression against the Company's possessions.

The motive, therefore, of Tipu Sultan was no other than that avowed in his correspondence with the enemy, and published under the eyes of his own ambassadors,—"*an ardent desire to expel the British nation from India.*"

It appears highly probable that he was instigated by the promises and exhortations of the government of France (whose emissaries have reached his councils) to hasten the execution of a project in which every consideration of interest, and every sentiment of passion would induce the French to embark with a degree of zeal, ardour, and rancour not inferior to his own. The importance of these possessions to all the most valuable interests of Great Britain has pointed the particular attention of the government of France to the destruction of our empire in India. The prosperity of our settlements in India has long been the primary and undisguised object of the jealousy of France, avowed by all her ministers in every negotiation, and by all her rulers in every stage of her innumerable revolutions. Tipu, therefore, might reasonably hope that, if the cessation of hostilities on the continent of Europe should at any time enable the French Directory to turn their views to the disturbance of the peace of India, such an adventure would be among the earliest of their operations.

The conclusion of a peace upon the continent of Europe, the weak state of the internal governments of Poona and Hyderabad, the existing disputes apparently precluding all co-operation and concert between these two powers, added to the growing strength of a French faction, every part of India may have appeared, both to Tipu and to the French, to offer a favourable opportunity for the prosecution of their joint design.

The premature disclosure of this design may, perhaps, be imputed rather to the policy of M. Malartique, than to the imprudence of Tipu. Whether the scope of that policy was to involve us in a war with Tipu, or to expose his treachery to our view, is yet a matter of doubt; but whatever circumstances occasioned the premature disclosure of the design; whether the design was wisely or rashly conceived, whether it has partially succeeded, or entirely failed, are questions, the solution of which in no degree affects the offensive nature of an aggression so unprovoked, and of a violation of faith so flagrant and unqualified. The history of the world scarcely furnishes an instance in which any two powers have united in a confederacy, or alliance, previously with the same motives. The party proposing an offensive alliance against the Company cannot be absolved

from the consequences of such an act, by any apparent or real indifference in the party accepting such a proposal. The conduct of Tipu Sultan, therefore, cannot be correctly estimated by reference to the supposed motives of Monsieur Malartique.

From the application of the acknowledged principles of the law of nations to the facts of this case, I formed my judgment of the rights of the Company, and of my own duties, with reference to the aggression of Tipu. The course of reasoning which I pursued may be stated in the following manner:

The rights of states, applicable to every case of contest with foreign powers, are created and limited by the necessity of preserving the public safety. This necessity is the foundation of the reciprocal claim of all nations to explanation of suspicious or ambiguous conduct, to reparation for injuries done, and to security against injuries intended.

In any of these cases, when just satisfaction has been denied, or, from the evident nature of circumstances, cannot otherwise be obtained, it is the undoubted right of the injured party to resort to arms for the vindication of the public safety; and in such a conjuncture, the right of the state becomes the duty of the government, unless some material consideration of the public interests should forbid the attempt.

If the conduct of Tipu Sultan had been of a nature which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious; if he had merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establishment, or had stationed it in some position on our confines, or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or alarm; if he had renewed his secret intrigues at the courts of Hyderabad, Poona, and Kabul; or even if he had entered into any negotiation with France, of which the object was at all obscure, it might be our duty to resort, in the first instance, to its construction of proceedings, which, being of a doubtful character, might admit of a satisfactory explanation. But where there is no doubt there can be no matter for explanation. The act of Tipu's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war, aggravated by an avowal that the object of the war is neither explanation, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British government in India. To affect to

misunderstand an insult and injury of such a complexion, would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear. No state in India can misconstrue the conduct of Tipu; the correspondence of our residents at Hyderabad and Poona sufficiently manifested the construction which it bears at both those courts, and in so clear and plain a cause our demand of explanation would be justly attributed either to a defect of spirit or of power. The result of such a demand would therefore be the disgrace of our character, and the diminution of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies, and of every power in India. If the moment should appear favourable to the execution of Tipu's declared design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate attack; if, on the other hand, his preparations should not be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his engagements with France—would persist in the denial until he had reaped the full benefit of them; and, finally, after having completed the improvement of his own army, and received the necessary assistance of an additional French force, he would turn the combined strength of both against our possessions, with an alacrity and vigour inspired by our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay. In the present case, the idea, therefore, of demanding *explanation* must be rejected as being disgraceful in its principle, and frivolous in its object. The demand of reparation, in the strict sense of the term, cannot properly be applied to causes of intended injury, excepting in those instances where the nature of the reparation demanded may be essentially connected with security against the injurious intention.

Where a state has unjustly seized the property, or invaded the territory, or violated the rights of another, reparation may be made by restoring what has been unjustly taken, or by a subsequent acknowledgment of the right which has been infringed. But the cause of our complaint against Tipu Sultan is not that he has seized a portion of our property which he might restore, or invaded a part of our territory which he might again cede, or violated a right which he might hereafter acknowledge: we complain that, professing the most amicable disposition,—bound by subsisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by any offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect our total destruction,—he has prepared the means and

instruments of a war of extermination against us,—he has solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy, for the declared purpose of annihilating our empire, and he only waits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike a blow against our existence.

That he has not yet received the effectual succour which he has solicited, may be ascribed either to the weakness of the government of Mauritius, or their want of zeal in his cause, or to the rashness and imbecility of his own councils; but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by the amount of the force which he has actually obtained, for we know that his demands of military assistance were unlimited; we know that they were addressed, not merely to the government of Mauritius, but to that of France; and we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the full extent of his acknowledged expectations. This, therefore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but of the public safety to be secured against the present and future designs of an irreconcilable, desperate, and treacherous enemy. Against an enemy of this description no effectual security can be obtained, otherwise than by such a reduction of his power as shall not only defeat his actual preparation, but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence.

To this species of security our right is unquestionable, upon the grounds already stated. But it cannot be supposed that Tipu Sultan will voluntarily concede to us a security of this nature against the effects of his own resentment, treachery, and ambition, and against the success of the most favourite projects of his mind.

Since, therefore, the principles of justice, and of the law of nations, entitle us to such a security, and since we cannot possibly obtain it by the voluntary concession of Tipu Sultan, it is the right of the Company to compel him to yield it, and it is equally my duty to use that compulsion without delay, provided the interest of the Company committed to my charge be not more endangered by the attempt, than by the unrestrained progress of his preparations for war. In proportion to the continual progress of Tipu's preparations, he will acquire more

decisively the advantage of holding in his hands the issues of peace and war, together with the power of selecting the time and mode of his long-meditated attack upon our possessions. He has not yet obtained any formidable accession of strength from his alliance with France, nor is it probable that any such accession will reach his country within a short period, certainly not before the close of the monsoon of the coast of Malabar. While he shall retain the ready means of intercourse by sea with the French government, it cannot be doubted that they will use every endeavour to assist him with military aid, and to instigate him to war. The arrival of one of two French regiments would probably induce Tipu to commence offensive operations, and the assistance of so small a body of Frenchmen might become alarming in the actual state of the native armies of India. The systematic introduction of French officers into the service of all the native powers, is described by Mr. Wickham as the fixed policy of France, adopted with a view of establishing the most certain means of sapping the foundations of our power. This system has been pursued in the armies of the Nizam, of Sindhia, and of many other inferior powers, with unremitting assiduity, and extensive success. If Tipu should be allowed to derive from France such succour as would induce him to act offensively against us, his earliest movements would probably be seconded by the general insurrection of the various bodies of French adventurers who are incorporated in the service of the several native powers, and who maintain a concert and correspondence in every quarter of India. Under such circumstances it would be prudent to take advantage of the actual crisis, in which the hostile designs of Tipu has been clearly manifested, but the means of accomplishing it have happily disappointed the ardour of his hopes. In this moment of his comparative weakness—of his disappointment, and of his probable dejection, no policy would be more wise than to strike such an instantaneous blow against his possessions, as should effectually frustrate his preparations for war, and should render him unable to avail himself of the aid of France whenever it may arrive.

The inconsiderable amount of the force which he has already received from France, while it cannot limit our right to reduce

his power, affords a strong argument of policy in favour of an immediate attack.

It is, therefore, evident that the rights and interests of the Company concur to demand from this government every practicable effort to anticipate the execution of his projects of vengeance, by attacking him on all sides without delay. In this train of reasoning I was confirmed, by adverting to the general tenor of the Court of Directors, and of the proceedings of this government with reference to the contingency of a French force landing at any time in the territories of Tipu Sultan.

The orders of the Court of Directors uniformly enjoin, that the landing of a French force in Tipu's country should be "the signal for our attack upon him." The construction of those orders by the late Governor-general-in-Council, in his instructions to the President-in-Council of Fort St. George, of 12th September, 1796, appears to have been, that the number of the French force should be considerable in order to justify our attack. But I am persuaded that the real intention of the late Governor-general in these instructions could not have been to declare that the justice or policy of attacking Tipu was hereafter to be measured solely by the magnitude of any French force landed in his country. It is certainly true, that, on the one hand, the landing of a considerable French force in Tipu's country would be an unquestionable indication of his hostile intentions against the British power, while, on the other hand, the landing of a few French officers and privates, and even their admission into the service of Tipu, might, under certain circumstances, be supposed to manifest nothing more than a disposition to improve the general discipline of his armies, without implying any formed design of war against the Company or their allies. This, I am persuaded, is the only view in which the later Governor-general-in-Council could consider the magnitude of the French force landed in Tipu's country, as the foundation of a rule for limiting the discretion of the Company's governments in such a contingency. On the present occasion, the hostile intentions of the Sultan are unequivocally manifested by the proclamations, by the declarations, and conduct of his ambassadors—by their demand of French troops to an unlimited extent; and, connected with these circumstances, the landing and



admission into the Sultan's armies, even of a less considerable force than that which he has received, would be deemed, under the just construction of the opinions both of the Court of Directors and of this government, "a signal for our attack upon him."

My determination, therefore, was fixed, to attack Tipu with every degree of practicable despatch. The objects which appeared to me the most desirable, as well as the most easily attainable, were—First, to seize the whole maritime territory remaining in his possession below the Ghats, on the coast of Malabar, in order to preclude him from all future communications by sea with his French allies.

Secondly. By marching the army from the coast directly upon his capital, to compel him to purchase peace by a formal cession of the territory seized on the coast of Malabar.

Thirdly. To compel him to defray our whole expense in the war, and thus to secure the double advantage of indemnifying us for the expense occasioned by his aggression, and of reducing his resources with a view to our future security.

Fourthly. To compel him to admit permanent residents at his court from us and from our allies: a measure which would enable us at all times to check his operations and his treachery.

Fifthly. That the expulsion of all the natives of France now in his service, and the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen both from his army and dominions, should be made conditions of any treaty of peace with him.

With this plan in view, I directed that the army upon the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and at Bombay, should be immediately assembled; and I entertained a very sanguine hope that active operations might have been commenced so early as, with the co-operation of His Majesty's squadron on the coast of Malabar (which Rear-admiral Rainier had promised), might have secured the effectual reduction of Tipu's power before any assistance could have reached him from France. But I never proposed to undertake any attack upon him, of which the success could be doubtful in the judgment of those whose opinions must always govern my discretion in every question of military detail.

The avowed design of Tipu; the state of his preparations for

war, (which, notwithstanding his late disappointment, was certainly forward as far as regarded his own troops); the uncertainty of the motives which might impel the violence of his temper to action; and my knowledge of the indiscreet zeal with which he has frequently pursued his favourite object of revenge against the British power,—all concurred to urge the necessity of placing ourselves in a state of preparation for war, at least equal to that of his army. These measures appeared to me not matters of choice, but of indispensable duty. I could not suffer the security of the Carnatic to rest on so precarious a foundation as the forbearance of Tipu Sultan and of his French allies. To resume the power of meeting him in the field, and to replace in our hands the option which he then possessed of accommodating the time of attack to circumstances and events, appeared to me to be the most prudent step which could be immediately adopted, whatever might hereafter be the service to which our force might be applied. The orders therefore which I gave for assembling the army, (although pointed more particularly at the execution of the plan of operations which I have just now detailed,) were founded upon principles independent of the practicability of that plan, and were connected not only with the immediate defence of the Carnatic, but with other comprehensive measures of permanent precaution and security, to which my views have been extended at every period of this crisis. When I submitted my ideas of the time and objects of the proposed attack upon Tipu to those military authorities which I shall always consider with respect, it seemed to be their opinion that the state of our army admitted no doubt of the ultimate success of the plan which I had proposed. If its speedy accomplishment had appeared to them as certain as its ultimate success, I should not have hesitated a moment in directing the commencement of offensive operations: but I found that, instead of deriving to the interests of the Company the inestimable advantages of a sudden and rapid reduction of Tipu's means of offence, the result of such an attempt was likely to lead to a tedious, protracted; and expensive, although ultimately successful war. The obstacles which arose were of a nature not to be surmounted by any degree of present activity or resolution, although they originate in causes which I trust may be removed by future diligence and perseverance.

The result of my earliest inquiries convinced me that radical defects existed in the military establishments on the coast of Coromandel, which were afterwards confirmed by the concurrent testimony of the Governor of Fort St. George, and of the Adjutant-general of that establishment. I have entered into a particular consideration of this testimony in a minute recorded in the secret department, of the 20th of July, to which I desire to refer on this part of the subject. The letter of the government of Fort St. George of the 10th of July proceeds far beyond the limits of any opinion which I had ever formed or heard with respect to the difficulty of restraining the hostility of Tipu. In that letter the President-in-Council even deprecates the ordinary precautions of defence, lest they should draw down the resentment of the Sultan upon our unprotected possessions.

The expense of a protracted war, and the evil effects which such a calamity must produce upon the trade of the Company, upon their pecuniary affairs at home, upon the welfare of their subjects in India, and upon the general state of the public revenue and credit of Great Britain, now pressed with great weight upon my mind; and the embarrassment of our finances aggravated all the difficulties of my situation. The question was now entirely changed; the plan which I originally had in contemplation was nothing more than a military expedition, of short duration, of no heavy expense, and of certain success; with the additional advantage that success would certainly exonerate our finances, and throw the whole expense of the undertaking upon the enemy who had provoked it. But it now appeared that I could not hope to effect any of my proposed objects without encountering the expense and inconvenience of a long war.

In this state of the question the condition of our allies occurred as an insuperable obstacle to our progress. Although the assistance of the Peshwa and of the Nizam might not have been deemed indispensable, in an expedition of the nature which I have described, I have always been apprized that an offensive war of any long duration in Mysore would be difficult if not impracticable, without the effectual aid of the Peshwa and of the Nizam in facilitating the supplies of provision to our army in the field.

The state of the courts of Hyderabad and of Poona afforded

no hope of their early co-operation with us; and although I had determined to take the most expeditious measures for restoring both our allies to the power of fulfilling their defensive engagements with us, I could not expect to derive any benefit from those measures for a considerable period of time, and it would have been imprudent to have undertaken offensive operations, with the prospect of a continued war, until the efficiency of our alliances had been previously secured. Under the accumulated pressure of all these difficulties, I felt, with the utmost degree of disappointment and regret, that the moment was unfavourable to the adoption of the only measure which appeared to me sufficient to satisfy the rights and interests of the Company and the exigencies of my own duty; and I was, therefore, compelled to relinquish the idea of striking an immediate blow against the possessions of Tipu Sultan; but the circumstances which thus suspended the actual exercise of the rights and the immediate establishment of the interests of the Company, could not absolve me from the duty of providing, without delay, every degree of intermediate security which might now be attainable, by adopting such a system of preparation and defence, as might enable us to repel any attack which Tipu may make upon us, or to support any demand of satisfaction which we may eventually deem it advisable, in concert with our allies, to make to him.

The sense of this duty induced me to propose to the Board the several orders and instructions, which have been forwarded to the Government of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at Poona and Hyderabad, from the 8th of July, to the present time.

The principles upon which these instructions and orders are founded, will be best illustrated by referring to the nature of our actual danger, as well as to the causes which have contributed to produce it.

No comprehensive or satisfactory view can be taken of this subject, without adverting to the whole system of our defensive alliances with the native states, and to the various circumstances which have effected, or which now influence, the general balance of power in India.

The primary objects of the treaties of Poona and Paungal,

combined with the treaty of Seringapatam, were to diminish Tipu Sultan's means of future aggression, by reducing his resources and territory, and to provide an efficient defence against him, by strengthening the Peshwa and the Nizam, by uniting their interests with ours, and by securing their co-operation in any future war with Mysore. On the other hand, a part of the policy of the treaty of Seringapatam seems to have been to preserve Tipu Sultan that degree of power which might enable him to maintain a balance with the Mahrattas and the Nizam, in such a manner that the interposition of our force might always turn the scale,

It is evident that the policy of this system has been entirely frustrated by the course of recent events, and that neither the Peshwa, the Nizam, nor Tipu Sultan, now retain the same relative position which they held at the conclusion of the treaty of Seringapatam, either with respect to one another, or to our interests.

Since the conclusion of the peace of Seringapatam, the power and resources of the Court of Hyderabad have been constantly declining, the disgrace which fell upon the Nizam's arms, in the unfortunate contest with the Mahrattas at Kurdelah, reduced the military character of the Court of Hyderabad to the lowest point of degradation. The treaty in which that defeat terminated completed the humiliation of the Nizam; he was compelled to sacrifice a portion of territory, to engage to pay a fine of three crores of rupees, and to submit to the captivity of his minister, Azim-ul-umara, who was carried a prisoner to Poona. Azim-ul-umara resided at Poona during the late convulsions in the Mahratta government, and, although a prisoner, bore a very distinguished part in supporting his name through the various revolutions which followed the sudden death of the Peshwa, Madhava Rao. For these services Nana agreed to relinquish all the benefits acquired by the Peshwa against the Nizam, under the treaty of Kurdelah.

But the Peshwa, Baji Rao, having called in the assistance of Sindhia, to check the overgrown power of Nana, Sindhia persuaded the Peshwa to violate the engagements concluded with Azim-ul-umara; and the event has been, that the Peshwa has insisted upon, and obtained from the Nizam, a cession of

one-fourth part of the territories, and the payment of one-fourth part of the fine stipulated by the treaty of Kurdelah.

In addition to so heavy a loss, both of power and honour, the internal resources of the Nizam's government have not yet recovered the derangement occasioned by the rebellions of Ali Jah and the son of Dair Jah, by the unfortunate contest with the Mahrattas, and by the detention of Azim-ul-umara at Poona.

The effect of these causes has necessarily been to reduce the considerations of the Nizam in the scale of the neighbouring states; and in this mean and degraded condition he has been for some time past menaced by the army of Sindhia, stationed in the neighbourhood of Poona. But the most striking feature of change in the state of the Nizam's affairs, since 1793, is the alteration which has taken place in his military establishment. The Nizam, since the peace of Seringapatam, has greatly reduced his cavalry and other troops, and considerably augmented the body of infantry, commanded by French officers, and known by the name of Raymond's corps.

The corps of Raymond had been in the service of the Nizam before the last war with Tipu Sultan, and in 1792, when it served with Lord Cornwallis's army, its strength was not greater than one thousand five hundred men at the highest estimation, and its discipline very defective. At the battle of Kurdelah, in 1795, its strength amounted to about eleven thousand men; during the rebellion of Ali Jah, and in a variety of service in which the corps has since been employed, it has acquired experience and skill, and it is now composed of thirteen regiments of two battalions each, amounting in the whole to upwards of fourteen thousand men. Its discipline, according to every recent account, is very considerably improved, insomuch, that although inferior to our native force, it is said to be superior in nearly an equal proportion to the ordinary scale of the infantry in the service of any of the native powers. Besides field-pieces to each regiment, a park of forty pieces of ordnance, chiefly brass, from twelve to thirty-six pounders, with a well-trained body of artillery-men, (including a number of Europeans,) is attached to the corps; a foundation has also been laid for raising a body of cavalry, to act with the corps of infantry. The chief officers of this corps are all Frenchmen, of the most violent principles of jacobinism; many

of the privates served originally with the French native force at Pondicherry; and the whole corps constitutes an armed French party of great power, zeal, and activity. The efforts of this party are continually employed to magnify the power, resources, and success of France; and to depreciate the character, force, and credit of Great Britain, in the eyes of the court of Hyderabad; and it appears by authentic intelligence, that wherever any detachment of this corps has been stationed for any considerable time, a most unfavourable impression has been produced against the character of the British nation.

The death of Monsieur Raymond, which happened a few months past, appeared likely to impair the influence of this corps at the court of Hyderabad; and, accordingly, Azim-ul-umara took that opportunity to resume the large jagir, which had been allotted for the pay and maintenance of the corps; but another Frenchman, of the name of Peron, has succeeded to the command. His disposition is described to be violent and brutal, and his principles do not appear to differ essentially from those of Raymond. The corps as now constituted, forms the considerable and only efficient part of the Nizam's military establishment, and retains such a degree of ascendancy over the councils of the Nizam, as to be an object of serious alarm to Azim-ul-umara. In addition to the command of this corps, M. Raymond had the entire conduct of the Nizam's ordnance, with an allowance of 50,000 rupees monthly. The ordnance has since been placed under the command of Monsieur Peron, and he derives great influence from so important a charge. This corps has been recruited in the proportion of one-third of its total numbers, from our territories, and from those of the Nabob of Arcot, and partly from deserters abandoning our service.

Distinct proof has been given of the assiduity and success of the emissaries employed by Monsieur Baptiste, (the second-in-command to Monsieur Peron, and stated to be of a very designing and artful character,) for the purpose of exciting mutiny and sedition, and of inviting desertion amongst our sepoys stationed on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions. A considerable desertion of our troops took place in that quarter some time ago, and nearly five hundred men, with several native officers, who deserted on that occasion, are now serving in Monsieur Peron's

corps. The repeated applications of our Resident, for the surrender of these deserters, have hitherto been frustrated by the prevailing influence of Monsieur Peron and of his army, and by the weakness of the Nizam's government, which Azim-ul-umara has declared to be unable to control the overbearing spirit and formidable power of the French faction. After a protracted negotiation, Azim-ul-umara has at length, with much difficulty, and by an extraordinary effort, obtained the surrender of two subedars, who were the principal contrivers of the desertion.

Monsieur Peron and his officers maintain a correspondence with a faction at the Nizam's court, denominated the Pagah party, being composed principally of the officers of His Highness's body guard of cavalry.

The Pagah party has long been connected with Tipu Sultan, and is entirely adverse to Azim-ul-umara, and to all the friends of the British interests at the court of Hyderabad.

It must not be forgotten that in the year 1796, during the detention of Azim-ul-umara at Poona, the French faction, with the assistance of the Pagah party, prevailed upon the Nizam to dismiss the British detachment, and took such measures in concert with Tipu (a large body of whose army marched in this crisis to the frontier of the Nizam's dominions) as would have enabled them to dispose of the succession to the Musnad according to their pleasure, if the Nizam's death had happened in that critical conjuncture. At this period of time the French contrived to obtain the grant of the large jagir since resumed. This grant was considered as the first step towards the establishment of a territorial revenue; and there can be no doubt that it would have led to that necessary foundation of European power in India, if the death of Monsieur Raymond had not enabled Azim-ul-umara to frustrate the project. The French officers at Hyderabad maintain a direct correspondence with their countrymen in the service of Tipu Sultan and of Sindhia.

The latest accounts from the resident at Hyderabad state that French officers and adventurers arrive continually at Hyderabad: the routes by which they gain access to the Deccan are as yet unknown.

This French party, connected as it is with the prevailing



factions in the court of the Nizam, corresponding with Tipu Sultan, zealous in the case of France, and actuated by a spirit of intrigue, which would lead it to mix in every distraction of the state, if not to originate internal confusion; must be considered as a circumstance of positive weakness in the frame of the government of Hyderabad. Azim-ul-umara is fully aware of the magnitude of this evil, and dreads the growth of a party which he can no longer restrain within any bounds of moderation, and which already threatens to subvert his power, and to disturb the regular order of succession, if not to destroy the throne itself. With respect to our interests and to the value of our defensive alliance, and the treaty of Paungal, the change in the Nizam's military establishments places him in a condition worse than that of absolute inefficiency, and renders the court of Hyderabad a source of additional strength to our enemies, rather than of useful assistance to any branch of the triple alliance. The dangers to be apprehended from the existence of Peron's corps are not to be estimated merely by the actual state of its discipline, of its numbers, or of its influence over the councils of the Nizam: our views of this danger must be extended beyond the present moment. The French army at Hyderabad must be considered not only as a powerful aid to the cause of France in the present crisis, but as the basis of a permanent French faction in India; on which, according to the opportunities of fortune, and the variation of circumstances and of events, the activity of the enemy may establish a strength of the most formidable kind either in peace or war.

It requires no labour of argument to prove the benefits which must be derived to the cause of France even in time of peace from an establishment of an army of 14,000 men, commanded by natives of France, in the heart of the dominions of one of our principal allies, in the vicinity of our most active enemy among the native powers, and on the borders of a vulnerable part of our own dominions. In the event of peace, no more convenient channel could be provided for the intrigues of France, no more useful point of union for the numerous adherents to her principles and emissaries of her designs; and it cannot be doubted that the natural effect of the unchecked and rapid growth of such an army at the court of the Nizam, must be to

detach that court from our interests, and to fix it absolutely in those of our enemy.

But, in the event of a war with Tipu Sultan, or in the still more aggravated case of a war with him, aided by a French force, what assistance can we expect from the Nizam, the main body of whose army is commanded by the correspondents of Tipu, natives of France, distinguished by their zeal in the cause of that country, and united with the whole body of French adventurers now established in India.

Under such circumstances, the force of the Nizam would become useless, and even dangerous to us, precisely in proportion to the exigency of the case in which we would require its services.

If the French troops of the Nizam did not afford Tipu open assistance, at least they could not be brought into the field against him, without the utmost danger to our cause; nor could they be suffered to remain in the Deccan during the continuance of the contest, unless checked by the presence of an equally powerful force, which must, in that case, be diverted from the objects of the war, and must operate as a positive diminution of our effective strength in the field. It appears however nearly certain, that in the present weak state of the Nizam's government, the French corps in his service would openly join Tipu Sultan, and by a sudden blow, endeavour to seize the Nizam's territories, and to secure them to the dominion of France, under an alliance offensive and defensive with Tipu Sultan. This danger is aggravated by the present position of Sindhia's army, and by the disposition and present views of that chief: he now entertains a large body of infantry in his service, under the command of a French officer, and it might be expected that he would readily engage with Tipu Sultan (with whom he is supposed to have lately opened a negotiation) and with the French, upon the conditions of a partition of the territories and authority of the Peshwa and of the Nizam. The junction which might thus be effected by the French officers in the several armies of the Nizam of Sindia and of Tipu, might establish the power of France in India upon the ruins of the states of Poona and of the Deccan. Under all these circumstances, therefore, it is evident that the court of Hyderabad, in its present condi-

tion, (whatever may be its disposition to use every effort for our assistance,) is not only disqualified from co-operating with us as an ally against Tipu, but furnishes him with powerful means of prosecuting his designs against us, and offers every temptation to the ambition of France.

Such being the condition of the Nizam, it will be found that the Peshwa, who forms another branch of the triple alliance against Tipu Sultan, is not more able to fulfil his defensive engagements with us.

The precise situation in which the Mahratta empire stood after the peace of Seringapatam, was the most favourable to our interests. The several co-states were then so equally balanced, as to prevent any danger of that degree of union which might concentrate the formidable force of the whole in one consolidated mass, either against the British possessions, or against any other established power in India; nor had any one member of the empire attained such a degree of strength as to be able singly to encounter our force. On the other hand, the Peshwa, the acknowledged and constitutional head of this extensive confederation, aided by the abilities of his minister, Nana Furnavese, possessed a sufficient influence over several of the leading chiefs, to render him a respectable ally, and to furnish him with the means of bringing a considerable force into the field.

From the period of the peace of Seringapatam, to that of the death of Madhava Rao, the danger appears to have been that the address of Nana might have drawn too great a weight into the scale of the Peshwa's power, and have enabled the government of Poona to wield the united force of the whole Mahratta empire. At the battle of Kurdelah, the Peshwa was assisted against the Nizam by the contingents of most of the confederate chieftains of the Mahratta empire, and the power of the Nizam was greatly endangered in that state of the Peshwa's authority and force. But Nana's ambition or jealousy having induced him, upon the sudden death of Madhava Rao, to attempt the disturbance of the regular order of succession, by intruding an adopted child upon the throne, opened the way to those successive intrigues and revolutions which, for some time past, have distracted the Mahratta empire. Without pursuing the various changes and convulsions of the government of Poona during

the period described, it is sufficient to observe that their progress naturally tended to weaken the sovereign power, and has terminated in the imprisonment of Nana, in the ruin of his influence, and in the suspension of the power and authority of the reigning Peshwa, under circumstances which menace the abolition of his office.

Sindhia, who, in this changeable scene, has alternately taken part with the present Peshwa and with Nana, has at length overpowered both, and has been for some time past so far master of the government of Poona, that the Peshwa could not, in his present condition, command the co-operation of any considerable body of the Mahratta chieftains, nor afford us any assistance against Tipu Sultan.

During the course of the events which have contributed to weaken and degrade the governments of Poona and Hyderabad, their mutual animosities and opposition of interests have arisen to such a height, as to render all co-operation between them utterly impracticable. The efficiency of our system of defensive alliance against Tipu Sultan has, therefore, been impaired, not only by the respective weakness of each of our allies, but by the difficulty of uniting them in any common view, or join to operation.

In the mean while Tipu Sultan has enjoyed a state of internal tranquillity nearly uninterrupted. While our allies have been distracted and exhausted by faction, rebellion, revolution, and war, he has been employed in improving the discipline of his armies, and in repairing the vigour of his resources. He has alternately endeavoured, but without success, to gain the Peshwa and the Nizam to his cause; he, however, possesses a considerable influence at the court of Hyderabad, in consequence of his connexions with the corps of Raymond, and with other factions adverse to the British interests at that court. It is also known that he despatched an embassy to Zeman Shah, whose design of invading Hindustan has been recently announced in a formal manner to this government and to the Nabob Vizier.

That Zeman Shah really entertains the romantic project of invading Hindustan cannot admit of a doubt; this was the opinion of the late Governor-general, in which I entirely concur.

It has been supposed that Zeman Shah, in his late march towards Hindustan, was recalled from Lahore into his own

dominions, either by some domestic dissension, or by the apprehension of an attack from some of the states in the neighbourhood of his kingdom, and it was hoped that the same causes might for some time obstruct the execution of his declared project; but the last despatches from the acting resident at the court of Sindhia state a report, that Zeman Shah is now relieved from all apprehensions either of internal rebellion or of foreign invasion; and his inclination, as well as his ability, to move his army towards the frontier of Hindustan, on the close of the rainy season, are now universally credited. It must be recollected that, upon a recent occasion, Zeman Shah advanced to Lahore without meeting any formidable opposition from the Sikhs, although it had formerly been asserted that the country of the Sikhs would always prove an insuperable obstacle to his progress. Between the country of the Sikhs and the frontier of Oudh no barrier exists to check the motions of the Shah, excepting the power of Sindhia. The dominions of Sindhia at present are so weakened by internal dissensions, as to be in a state nearly defenceless; while Sindhia continues at Poona with the main body of his army, and while his tributary chiefs, remaining in Hindustan, are most seriously disaffected to his cause, and are prepared to seize any favourable opportunity of annihilating his power.

Zeman Shah cannot be ignorant of these advantages, and if they should tempt him to invade Hindustan, the diversion of our force, which would be occasioned by such an event, would afford the most favourable opportunity to an attack from Tipu upon the Carnatic; it is not improbable that the object of the intercourse between Tipu and Zeman Shah was (on the part of the former at least) some such plan of joint operation.

The present position of Daulat Rao Sindhia's army operates as a double advantage to the cause of Tipu. The absence of Sindhia from his dominions in Hindustan invites the invasion of Zeman Shah, and favours its success; while the presence of Sindhia's army at Poona holds both our allies in check. The weight of Tipu's power in the general balance must, therefore, be considered to have received an augmentation, not only by the declared projects of Zeman Shah, and by the possibility of their, at least, limited success, by the operations of Sindhia, in

addition to all the other events which have concurred to impair the efficiency of our defensive alliance.

In the meanwhile, the government of Fort St. George, whose peculiar duty it is to watch the operations of Tipu Sultan, and to communicate to me every circumstance relating to the growth of his power, have distinctly stated in their letter of the 10th of July, that "his resources are more prompt than our own, and that a great part of his army is supposed to have long been in a state of field equipment." So sensible, indeed, is the government of Fort St. George to the terror of Tipu Sultan's arms, as to be apprehensive of making any effort for resisting their progress, least Tipu should anticipate the tardiness of our preparations by the rapidity of his own, and should overrun the Carnatic before our army could even move for its defence.

It is difficult to describe the pain and regret which that letter from the government of Fort St. George occasioned in my mind, nor can I conceive that it is calculated to raise any other emotions in the mind of any friend to the prosperity of the British interests, or to the honour of the British name in India. If the facts and arguments stated in that letter be correct, it must now be admitted that the glorious success of the last war in Mysore, the wisdom which balanced the relative interests and forces of the belligerent powers on the conclusion of peace, and, finally, the great expense incurred by the Company in the progressive increase of their military establishments on the coast, have terminated in no better result than to render Tipu's power absolutely invincible, and to place the disposal of our fate in his hands. For if the sentiments of the government of Fort St. George be founded upon a just estimate of the relative conditions of Tipu Sultan and of the Company in India, he possesses the ready means of attack, while we cannot venture to resort even to those of defence. But, with a full knowledge of his hostility, of his offensive alliance publicly concluded with the enemy, and of his continual and advanced preparations for war, we must submit to remain unarmed, because any attempt to counteract his design might possibly accelerate its execution. This argument against the prudence of preparing for our defence would become stronger every day, in proportion to the progress of Tipu's hostile preparations, until at length we should be reduced to the alter-

native, either of implicit submission, or of incurring a much greater risk than any which can now be apprehended from assembling our defensive force.

Although I am not disposed to adopt the sentiments of the government of Fort St. George on this subject, I acknowledge, with great concern, those defects in the military establishments on the coast, which will not admit any large proportion of that army to move for several months. Those defects certainly constitute so many additional advantages in the scale of Tipu's power, and in this view they become objects of the most serious consideration, and form a principal feature of the danger which it is the duty of this government to avert, by councils of another stamp than that of despondency, and by measures of another character than that of inaction, or of implicit submission to the will of the enemy.

I have now examined the principal causes of that danger, as they are to be traced in the variable course of events since the peace of Seringapatam. The nature of our actual situation, arising from the combined effects of these causes, will best appear by a summary review of the facts which I have already enumerated in detail. Tipu Sultan having manifested the most hostile intentions towards us, possesses an army, of which a considerable portion is now in readiness to take the field for purposes of offence: he has increased the number of his French officers, and has solicited, and may possibly receive, further assistance from the French; he may also receive assistance from the several corps commanded by French officers in the service of the Nizam, of Sindhia, and of many other native powers. He may be assisted by the invasion of Zeman Shah, and by the co-operation of Sindhia. On the other hand, our protecting force upon the coast of Coromandel cannot be put in motion within a shorter period than three, or, according to the Adjutant-general, Lieutenant-colonel Close, than six months, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic. Our allies, in the meanwhile, are utterly unable to fulfil their defensive engagements with us, the Peshwa being depressed and kept in check by the intrusion of Sindhia and the Nizam, by the vicinity of that chieftain's army, and by the overbearing influence of an army commanded by French officers, and established in the centre of the Deccan. While we remain in this situation, without a soldier prepared to take the field in

the Carnatic, and without an ally to assist our operations in the event of an attack from Tipu, we leave the fate of the Carnatic to his discretion; we suffer the cause of France to acquire hourly accessions of strength in every quarter of India; we abandon our allies, the Nizam and the Peshwa, to the mercy of Tipu and of Sindhia, in conjunction with the French; and we leave to France the ready means of obtaining a large territorial revenue, and a permanent establishment in the Deccan, founded upon the destruction of our alliance. Under all these circumstances, the situation of the British empire in India is, without doubt, extremely critical, but, in my opinion, by no means alarming. For, in the very difficulties of our actual situation are to be found the means, not only of averting the danger of the present moment, but of procuring permanent security against the future return of a similar crisis. A common apprehension of the designs of Sindhia has fortunately produced an union of interests between the governments of Poona and Hyderabad; and, notwithstanding some occasional symptoms of that spirit of duplicity and intrigue which marks the character of every Asiatic court, Azim-ul-umara and the minister of the Peshwa seem to be sincerely convinced that a renewal of amicable engagements between the Peshwa and the Nizam is equally necessary to the safety of both. On the one hand, it appears that the Peshwa cannot expect to be speedily emancipated, or effectually defended, from the undue influence of Sindhia, without the assistance of the Nizam; and, on the other hand, it is evident that the restoration of the just power and authority of the Peshwa would operate as a constant restraint on the designs of Sindhia, of Tipu, and of the French, against the independence of the court of Hyderabad. Under these circumstances, it appeared to me that neither the Peshwa nor the Nizam would be likely to view with jealousy any assistance which we might think it advisable to afford to either, for the purpose of reviving the triple alliance against Tipu on its original basis, and of enabling the contracting parties to fulfil their respective engagements. This expectation constituted a fundamental principle of my instructions to the residents at Poona and Hyderabad, of the 8th of July. Their subsequent correspondence has furnished abundant proofs that my view of the disposition of the two courts was not erroneous,



since it appears that, while I was occupied in framing a system of measures for uniting the Nizam and the Peshwa, upon the firm ground of their reciprocal interests, a treaty was actually concluded between the two powers at Poona, with a view to the same object. The ratification of this treaty on the part of the Nizam has been delayed by Azim-ul-umara, but there appears every reason to hope that the interposition of our arbitration will accommodate every point of difference. Our arbitration has already been earnestly solicited by both parties, and I am persuaded that it will be both acceptable and efficacious, whenever it shall be interposed. The increasing alarm excited at the court of Hyderabad, by the intemperate conduct of M. Peron, and of the French army, would dispose Azim-ul-umara to receive with great gratitude any offer of assistance towards the destruction of so powerful and dangerous a faction, and the existing jealousies between the French officers would facilitate the dismissal of the corps. Azim-ul-umara has recently expressed, in the strongest terms, his wish of being enabled, by our assistance, to accomplish this most desirable measure. The only obstacles which appear likely to occur to a general accommodation, are the impetuosity and violence of Daulat Rao Sindhia, whose continuance in his present position would operate as an effectual assistance to Tipu, and would preclude the possibility of restoring either the Peshwa or the Nizam to any degree of efficiency or consideration. But the absence of Sindhia from his own dominions, and the ungovernable excesses of his temper, however to be lamented, as having contributed to those events which have impaired the power of our allies, have, at the same time, weakened the sources of his own power, have occasioned a spirit of faction and revolt in his own dominions, and have disgusted all the ancient friends and connexions of his family, together with every respectable adherent to his cause. His violence towards the female relations of his family has raised a considerable party against him among his own followers; and his signal treachery in the imprisonment of Nana, from which he hoped to derive free use of Nana's treasure, has terminated in rendering that resource inaccessible to him, at the very moment when it is most indispensable to his necessities. He is therefore now surrounded by an army clamorous for pay, is

destitute of pecuniary resources, and is unsupported by any one respectable friend. His principal minister, a person of considerable experience, and bearing the highest character of any of his followers, has expressed to the resident at Poona, in the most distinct terms, an entire disapprobation of Sindhia's late conduct, and an earnest wish for an accommodation between Sindhia and the Peshwa, through our mediation, and for the peaceable return of Sindhia to his dominions in Hindustan. Sindhia himself has manifested no disinclination to receive the advice of the resident at Poona, whose discretion has hitherto limited the extent of his interference; but from what has already passed, it is reasonable to hope that Sindhia, in the present distressed state of his affairs, will give a favourable attention to any just and moderate proposition, urged with full authority of this government. In the mean while the threatened invasion of Zeman Shah offers a new motive to recall Sindhia to the protection of his own dominions; and he must be sensible, not only that his security, in the event of such an invasion, must depend in a great measure on the co-operation of the British troops, but that in the present disturbed condition of his possessions and of his army, we hold his fate in our hands.

In this posture of affairs, any opposition to our interference for the re-establishment of our alliances, would be equally ineffectual and unjustifiable on the part of Sindhia; and various considerations of policy and interest will concur to render him cautious of taking any step which might afford us just cause of offence. The last despatches from Poona afford a hope that Nana Furnavese and the Peshwa may find it their interest to forget their mutual animosity. Any accommodation between them would tend greatly to facilitate an arrangement, embracing the respective interests of the Peshwa, of Sindhia, and of the Nizam.

Such are the circumstances of the present moment which appear to me to favour the execution of that comprehensive system of precaution and defence demanded by the exigency of our actual situation. The mode in which I have endeavoured to carry this system into effect has been suggested by the following considerations. The court of Hyderabad has repeatedly and earnestly solicited an increase of the British detachment in the service of the Nizam, under an assurance that the French corps of Peron

would be dismissed from His Highness's service immediately upon the arrival of the additional British force. This proposition has hitherto been embarrassed by conditions of a nature incompatible with our engagements at Poona; and the late dissensions between the Nizam and the Peshwa have precluded all hope of any amicable adjustment of this difficulty. It was therefore thought advisable, by the late Governor-general-in-Council, to resort to the expedient of encouraging the introduction of British adventurers into the service of the Nizam, for the purpose of counterbalancing in some measure the influence of the French army at Hyderabad. With this view, the corps commanded by Mr. Finglass has received the protection and encouragement of the acting resident, and has been augmented to the number of 8000 men. The policy of this expedient always appeared to me very doubtful, and I have entertained serious apprehensions that the measure might ultimately furnish additional recruits to the cause of France, instead of counteracting her influence. In the most favourable view, however, this expedient could only be considered as a palliative of the evil: it could not be expected that such a force as that of Mr. Finglass would enable the Nizam to disband the corps of Peron; it must therefore have been evident at all times that nothing less than a considerable and permanent increase of our regular subsidiary force at Hyderabad could empower the Nizam to extricate himself from the hands of the French faction so solidly established in his dominions.

I have already stated my reasons for thinking that the increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad would no longer afford any cause of jealousy to the Peshwa; and under all these circumstances I have availed myself of the late conduct of Tipu and of Sindhia, to propose that measure, subject, in the first instance, to the previous consent of the court of Poona. I have accompanied this proposition with a condition, that the arbitration of this government shall be accepted for the final adjustment of the points of difference still remaining between the two courts. These points are now so few, and the requisitions of the court of Hyderabad of a nature so just and moderate, that I entertain a confident expectation of effecting an accommodation upon principles equally advantageous to both parties.

I have already observed that one of the most dangerous circumstances attending the establishment of the French party at Hyderabad, is the influence which they are likely to possess in directing the succession to the throne, whenever it shall become vacant by the death of the Nizam Sikandar Jah, the eldest son of the Nizam, would be the natural successor, unless the regular order of succession should be disturbed by domestic faction, foreign intrigue, or force; for, although priority of birth may not be considered to give the same absolute and exclusive right to succession in India as it does in Europe, it is invariably deemed the strongest title, and is rarely superseded, excepting in cases of disaffection or of positive disqualification. So far from these or any other objections being applicable to the title of Sikandar Jah, it is well known that the Nizam has given the strongest indications of his favourable intentions towards Sikandar Jah, by intrusting that prince with the custody of the seal, and by empowering him to perform certain acts which are reserved exclusively for the sovereign. This admission to the personal exercise of a portion of the sovereign authority during the life of the Nizam is deemed equivalent to a virtual nomination to the throne; and there is no reason to suppose that the Nizam will nominate any of his younger sons to the exclusion of the heir-apparent, unless His Highness should be prevailed upon, in the weakness of his last moments, to commit an act of such flagrant impolicy and injustice.

Sikandar Jah is connected by marriage with the family of Azim-ul-umara, and his establishment upon the throne would give great additional security to the British interests at the court of Hyderabad. On the other hand none of the younger sons can hope to reach the throne by any other assistance than that of the French party and of Tipu Sultan. Sufficient proof has been stated of the interest which Tipu and the French take in the exclusion of Sikandar Jah, and of the attempts which they have already made to interfere in governing the succession. These attempts may be renewed, and their success would necessarily involve the destruction of Azim-ul-umara and of Sikandar Jah, together with the consequent annihilation of the British influence at Hyderabad. All hope of re-establishing the balance of power in India, as it existed at the peace of Seringapatam, would then be

precluded; the countries of the Nizam would, in such an event, become in effect a dependency of France, and the partisans of that nation in conjunction with Tipu, and, with the body of their countrymen lately received into his pay, would have the means of endangering the British power in India.

Under all these circumstances the same principles which suggested the necessity of increasing the British detachment at Hyderabad, demanded that it should be employed to support the succession of Sikandar Jah, as being essentially connected with the permanency of our influence at Hyderabad, and with the effectual exclusion of the interference of Tipu and of France.

I have therefore authorized the resident at Hyderabad to employ the British troops in this service, if their assistance should hereafter become necessary; but I am persuaded that the mere presence of our force, accompanied by the knowledge of my firm determination to support the regular order of succession, will preclude every movement either of foreign or domestic oppositions.

The arrangements proposed for the service of the Nizam will be very incomplete, unless connected with the restoration of the Peshwa to a due degree of authority and power, and preceded by the cordial approbation of the court of Poona. But the great danger to be averted is the growth of the influence of Tipu and of France in India; it is therefore evident, that the failure of the proposed plan at Poona would increase the necessity of providing for the safety of the Nizam, and of destroying the French party at his court. If, therefore, the Peshwa should either refuse his assent to the propositions to be made to him, or if, from the success of Sindhia's operations, or from any other cause, those measures which relate to the court of Poona should be frustrated. I have still deemed it advisable to direct the acting resident at Hyderabad to carry into effect the increase of the British detachment, and such other parts of my instructions as may appear practicable, reserving always to the Peshwa the power of acceding hereafter to any treaty which we may conclude with the Nizam; and continuing with that view the restrictive terms of our present subsidiary engagements with the latter, as far as they relate to the interests of the Peshwa. The dismissal of the French corps at Hyderabad would not fully answer the views with which I

have proposed that measure, if the officers or European privates were permitted to enter into the service of any other native power. Although I should think them less dangerous in any service than in that of the Nizam, I have endeavoured, not only to secure the expulsion of the French from Hyderabad, but also their immediate return to their native country. I have, therefore, required that the French officers and privates should be delivered up to the government of Fort St. George, in order that they may be immediately conveyed to Europe. The Nizam is under no engagements, either with the government of France or with the French officers, to continue them in his service, and he possesses the full right to dismiss them whenever he shall think fit. The exorbitant power which M. Peron and his army have acquired at Hyderabad, as well as their immoderate abuse of it, will justify the Nizam in taking whatever measures may appear most effectual, for the purpose of securing himself against a faction so formidable, not only to the independence of his government, but to the safety of his own person, and the existence of his throne. With the same view, I have made it a preliminary condition of the whole plan, that the Nizam, his heirs, and successors, shall for ever exclude the French from their armies and dominions.

The corps of Mr. Finglass, after the establishment of a considerable British force at Hyderabad, will no longer be liable to the full force of the objections which I have stated against the policy of encouraging such a body of adventurers in the service of the Nizam; this question, however, does not require our immediate decision: we shall possess ample means of deciding it according to our discretion, if our propositions to the court of Hyderabad should be attended with success: the consent of the Nizam to such parts of the proposed arrangements as relate to the establishment of the government of Poona is required as a necessary preliminary to the increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad.

My intention being to take no step at either court without the full knowledge and concurrence of the other, a principle, the strict observance of which, to every degree of practicable extent, appears to me to be the only effectual mode of removing all causes of jealousy, of uniting the confidence of both parties, and of bringing them to a dispassionate consideration of their mutual interests.

The parts of the proposed arrangement which relate to the re-establishment of the government of Poona, were suggested by Colonel Palmer's letter of the 1st of June, in which he states, "That the authority of the Paishwah would be restored by the appearance of a strong British force at Poonah, and that Sindhia, under the circumstance of Tippoo's recent aggression, could on no just pretence object to such a movement of our troops, nor, in his present condition, be able to oppose it."

The whole tenor of the subsequent advices from Poona tended to confirm this opinion; for while it appeared evidently impossible that the authority of the Peshwa could be restored otherwise than by foreign assistance, there seemed to be every rational ground of expectation, that the mere appearance of our troops would induce all the leading chieftains of the Mahratta empire to unite in support of the Peshwa, and that such an event would not be unacceptable, even to the followers of Sindhia.

The Peshwa himself has earnestly solicited the aid of a body of our troops, and has expressed the fullest sense of the necessity, as well as his reliance on the efficacy of such a measure, for the restoration of his authority, and for the protection of his person.

On the other hand, the danger of the Peshwa increased from day to day: the assistance which he had solicited from the Nizam was not likely to reach him before his fate had been decided; and the expectation even of any assistance from the court of Hyderabad, notwithstanding the conclusion of the late treaty, appeared to rest on a very precarious foundation. In this situation, the direct interposition of this government, by moving a detachment of troops to Poona, was the only measure on which we could rely with any degree of certainty, for averting the immediate destruction of our interest at that court.

The resident at Poona was, therefore, authorized to require a detachment of troops from Bombay; but previously to so decided a step, it was deemed proper that the resident should require of the Peshwa his consent to the increase of the British detachment at Hyderabad, his acceptance of our arbitration between the courts of Poona and Hyderabad, and his exclusion of the French from his armies and dominions.

With a view of securing the lasting benefit of this arrangement at the court of Poona, it is intended that a proposal shall be made

to the Peshwa, to enter into permanent subsidiary engagements with us of a similar nature and extent with those which shall be concluded at the court of Hyderabad.

With the same view, the resident at Poona has been directed to take such measures as may appear to him most likely to interest Nana Furnavese in the success of this general arrangement of the affairs of the two courts.

The last despatches from Poona afford every reason to hope that the abilities and experience of the minister Nana may be successfully employed by Colonel Palmer in effecting the return of Sindhia to his own dominions, and the consequent restoration of the Peshwa.

The impediments which Sindhia opposes to the success of this arrangement, will probably disappear, whenever the union of the two courts, cemented by our interposition, shall become a matter of public notoriety.

The treasure of Nana is the only resource in which Sindhia can find the means of appeasing the clamours of his discontented army; and Colonel Palmer will avail himself of any favourable opportunity of connecting the interests of Nana with those of Sindhia and of the Peshwa, in such a manner as shall enable Sindhia to retire with safety into his own dominions, without affording him the power of effecting any other military movements. Being desirous of conciliating the real interests of all parties, I have instructed Colonel Palmer to make the most amicable propositions to Sindhia, and to urge the policy of his return to his own dominions, by pointing out their actual danger during his absence, by offering our co-operation against the menaced invasion of Zeman Shah, and our mediation with the courts of Poona and Hyderabad; and I have made the consent of those courts to our mediation of their respective differences with Sindhia an indispensable preliminary to the arrangements which regard the restoration of their own independence. Sindhia cannot reject our propositions on any ground that would not immediately place him in the rank of a declared enemy to us, and of an avowed auxiliary to Tipu Sultan.

In this case, therefore, we must have recourse to compulsion; and I have authorized the resident at Poona to use it in the last, and I trust improbable, extremity.



Such are the measures which I have proposed, with a view to restore the efficiency of our alliances, and to check the growth of the French party in the Deccan.

I have already stated the reasons which convinced me (against the opinion of the government of Fort St. George) that the assembling of the army on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and at Bombay, was absolutely indispensable to the defence of the Carnatic, under the circumstance of Tipu's declared designs and acknowledged preparations for war.

The fatal policy of neglecting to keep pace with the forwardness of the enemy's equipment has been felt more than once on the coast of Coromandel; and I repeat it, I cannot, consistently with any sentiment of duty, consent to rest the security of the Carnatic, in the present crisis, on any other foundation than a state of active and early preparation for war. But if I had looked only to the success of those measures which are now depending at the courts of Poona and Hyderabad (measures essentially involving our present and future means of checking the implacable enmity of Tipu), I should, on that ground alone, have proposed to assemble the army upon the coast of Coromandel, at Bombay, and upon the coast of Malabar.

It is impossible to suppose that Tipu would not employ every effort to prevent the revival of our defensive alliances; and it would therefore be nearly certain that the advanced state of preparations for war, and his renewed connexion with the French, would tempt him to interfere in the affairs of the Nizam and of the Peshwa, and to assist the views of Sindhia at Poona, and of Peron's army at Hyderabad. It therefore became necessary to check the motions of Tipu Sultan by assembling our army upon his frontier during the continuance of our negotiation with our allies.

I have adverted, in the course of this minute, to those defects in the constitution of the army upon the coast which have impeded its early movement in the present critical conjuncture. The measures which I have proposed for the correction of those defects are absolutely necessary, in my judgment, to our future security in the Carnatic. The detail of those measures will appear in my minute, in the secret department, of the 20th of July, and in the letter to the government of Fort St. George, of the same date.

I am fully aware of the expense to be incurred in establishing any improved system which shall enable the army on the coast to keep pace with the promptitude of Tipu's resources, and to move with an alacrity and expedition equal to his.

If, however, the proposed increase of our subsidiary engagements at Hyderabad should take place, it is my intention that the whole detachment, consisting of three regiments, should be provided from the establishment of Fort St. George. The force stationed at Hyderabad will afford an effectual security to the northern Sircars against Tipu Sultan, or against any other foreign enemy. The duty of the Sircars with them require no larger a proportion of troops than may be sufficient to maintain the internal police and good order of the country. It will not therefore be requisite, in the event of peace, to raise more than one new regiment at Fort St. George, to replace those serving with the Nizam. This arrangement will operate as a saving of the expense of two regiments upon the establishment of Fort St. George, and will furnish a fund at least adequate to the permanent charges of the new establishment of artillery, draught cattle, and grain, which our recent experience has proved to be indispensable for the purpose of enabling the army on the coast to take the field expeditiously on any sudden emergency.

In this view, the restoration of our defensive alliances against Tipu, essentially connected with the improvement of our system of defence in the Carnatic, and the assistance afforded to the Nizam, will become (without any increase of expense) the source of additional vigour and activity to our army upon the coast.

Deeply as I lament the obstacles which have prevented us from striking an instantaneous blow against the possessions of Tipu, I expect to derive considerable advantage from the success of that system of precaution and defence which I have been compelled to substitute in place of an immediate war.

The enlargement of our subsidiary engagements at the court of Hyderabad, combined with the establishment of similar engagements at the court of Poona, will become a great augmentation of our strength, attended by no increase of charge, and possibly by a diminution of our military expenses.

The two detachments will form a considerable army, stationed

on the most vulnerable part of Tipu Sultan's frontier, in a position which will at all times facilitate our approach to his capital, by securing the protection of our convoys of provisions. A force so stationed will operate as a perpetual restraint upon any movement which Tipu might be disposed to make towards the frontier, either of the Carnatic, of the Northern Sircars, or of Malabar.

It will also impede any co-operations between the armies of Sindhia and Tipu, and will induce the former to remain within his own dominions; where his motions will again be checked by the vicinity of our army on the frontier of Oudh.

In such circumstances, it must always be the interest of Sindhia to cultivate our friendship, in preference to that of the French, or of any native power. Thus he may become a useful ally to us, in the event of Zeman Shah's approach to the frontier of Hindustan, and the prospect of that event must render him anxious to secure our protection. On the other hand, the success of his present ambitious and unjustifiable views against the Peshwa would fix him in the interest of Tipu Sultan and of France, with the accession of whatever strength he might be able to collect from the remnants of the empire which he would have overthrown.

The influence which we shall naturally derive, both at Hyderabad and Poona, from the presence of so large a body of our troops, will enable us to prevent any aggression on either side, by the constant interposition of our good offices with both parties, to restrain every symptom of a revival of their former spirit of jealousy and contention.

Our endeavours may then be successfully directed to the desirable object of preserving unimpaired the strength and resources of the two powers on whose co-operation we must rely for assistance, in the event of any war with the state of Mysore; and while we prevent our allies from weakening themselves by repeated contests, we may expect that such an interference in the disputes of the native powers, so far from tending to foment divisions, and to occasion war, will prove the best security for the general tranquillity of India, as well as the most solid pledge of our disposition to preserve that blessing from interruption.

However comprehensive and intricate the proposed system

may appear at the first view, it will soon be evident to all the powers of India, that the fundamental principle of our policy is invariably repugnant to every scheme of conquest, extension of dominion, aggrandizement, or ambition, either for ourselves, or for our allies. Consistently with this principle, it is our right and duty to restore the vigour and deficiency of our defensive alliances, but beyond the limits of this principle we entertain no project of altering the condition, of reducing or of raising the power of any established state in India. On the other hand, the same principle justifies and demands our firm resistance to the intrusion of any foreign power, which shall attempt to acquire a preponderant influence in the scale of Indian politics, to the prejudice of our defensive alliances and of our just interests.

The establishments of our subsidized force at Poona and Hyderabad will afford effectual means of guarding, not only against any such intrusion, but against the undue growth of any native powers. While we possess so formidable a force in the centre of India, no such event can happen without our knowledge and consent.

The last question which remains for consideration is what shall be the nature and extent of that demand of satisfaction which we shall make from Tipu Sultan, whenever we shall have completed the system now depending at the courts of our allies, and shall have brought our army in the Carnatic to a state of preparation for the field.

It is evident, from the facts which have come under my observation in the course of this discussion, that our safety requires a further reduction of the relative power of Tipu Sultan.

The policy of the treaty of Seringapatam certainly was not to maintain Tipu's power upon such a scale as should leave him a constant object of alarm and apprehension to the Company. That he has been so for some years past cannot be denied by any person acquainted with the records either of this government, or of that of Fort St. George. The present is the second crisis within the last two years in which this government has thought it necessary to assemble the army on the coast, for the sole purpose of checking the motions of Tipu Sultan.

The vague and inaccurate nature of our intelligence, with respect to the extent of his force, and to the state of his prepara-

tions, added to the facility which he possesses of receiving emissaries and succours from France by sea, have contributed to increase the anxiety of the Company's governments; and our intercourse with him has been of an unsettled and ill-defined character, destitute of the advantages either of peace or of war.

Under such circumstances, the continuance of Tipu's power, in its actual state, must prove to the Company a perpetual source of alarm, vexation, and expense.

The reduction of his means of offence might be effected either by a positive diminution of his territory and resources, or by a proportionable increase of power and efficiency on our side of the balance, accompanied by such additional securities as might enable us to ascertain at all times the nature of his intentions, as well as his power of carrying them into effect, and to restrain, if not wholly to preclude, his intercourse with France.

The diminution of his territory on the coast of Malabar would certainly be the most effectual mode of precluding his intercourse with France, as well as of preventing his movements towards the Carnatic. But it does not appear probable that this most desirable security can ever be obtained by the mere terror of our arms. It must be purchased at the expense and hazard of war. Any considerable reduction of his resources must probably be purchased at the same price.

I have already stated the nature and tendency of those steps which have been taken for confining the power of Tipu within narrower limits, by the operation of the proposed system of alliance, of subsidiary engagements, and of improvement of our defences in the Carnatic.

The success of this system will unquestionably operate as an effectual restraint upon the power of Tipu, and will so strengthen our barriers against him, as to afford a rational expectation that we may be enabled to obtain from him, without incurring the hazard of war, a very considerable augmentation of security, with respect to all those points which now form the most alarming features of his power.

I have already stated those points to be, the secrecy of his operations, his continual intercourse with the French, and his constant state of equipment for war.

Our demand of satisfaction for his late infraction of treaty

should be so framed as to apply corrections to each of these evils; and such a demand might be founded on principles of moderation and justice, so clear and indisputable, as would place the refusal of Tipu in the most odious light, and in that event prove to all India the necessity of our resorting to arms.

We might distinctly state to Tipu, that we entertain no view of encroaching upon his territory, or of diminishing his resources; and we might appeal to the late restoration of the district of Wynaad for an unequivocal proof of this disposition.

We might declare that after a most unprovoked violation of treaty on his part, we did not intend to demand any cession of dominion, or payment of money, but will content ourselves with obtaining those ordinary pledges of an intention to abstain from hostilities which all civilized nations in a state of peace are in the established habit of requiring reciprocally from one another. We might insist upon an unequivocal and final explanation of the real nature of our relation with him, declaring that we will no longer submit to that ambiguous and anxious state, in which the allies have been placed by his conduct for some years past.

We might signify our determined resolution either to establish with him a real and effectual peace, accompanied by the customary intercourse, by the mutual exchange of good offices, and by all other securities which maintain the continuance of that blessing, or to wage war upon him until we have removed the causes of our apprehension and danger, by the entire destruction of his power.

This declaration might be made jointly by all the allies, and it might be followed by requiring Tipu to receive at his court an established ambassador from each of the allies, according to the practice of all civilized nations in a state of peace, offering, at the same time, to admit ambassadors from him on equal terms.

The force levied by him under his offensive alliance with France, having been raised for the express purpose of aggression upon the Company, can be considered in no other light than that of a signal of hostility, while it shall remain in his service. He must therefore be required to disband it without delay, and to remove it from his dominions.

The anxious desire of the French to destroy the British power

in India, the nature of Tipu's acknowledged connexion with them, and the interest which they must always feel in instigating him to war, demand the further requisition, that he should enter into an engagement for himself, his heirs, and successors, to exclude the French from his territories and dominions for ever.

The advantages resulting from these concessions on the part of Tipu would be very considerable.

The residence of an ambassador at his court would not only restrain the execution of any hostile designs which he might hereafter form, but would provide an authentic source of intelligence, from which we might always derive timely information of his motions.

This measure might also ultimately lead to the establishment of an amicable intercourse with Mysore, for Tipu may perhaps at length be convinced that his wisest policy would be to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of his present dominions, rather than to risk the loss of what he still retains, by attempting to regain what he has lost.

The dismissal of the French corps raised at Mauritius would discourage other adventurers of that nation from attempting to engage in the service of the Sultan, and, with a British ambassador on the spot, it would be difficult for him to evade the engagements by which he would have bound himself to exclude the French from his army and dominions.

The combined effect of these two measures would therefore be, if not wholly to preclude, at least to embarrass to a very great degree his intercourse with our enemy.

He may also at length perceive that he never can hope to make any lasting impression upon the British power, without the aid of a large French force; and that he never can admit such a force into his dominions without the utmost danger to his own independence.

The revival of our alliances, the appearance of our armies in the field, and the presence of a part of the British squadron on the coast of Malabar, will probably incline Tipu to listen to requisitions of this nature; he will soon perceive that we possess ample means of annihilating his military force, and of destroying the state of Mysore, from among the native powers; and I trust

he will also be convinced that we have no object in view beyond our own security, and that we are really desirous of maintaining the relations of amity and peace with him as long as he shall rest contented with his present dominions, and shall relinquish his vindictive projects against ours.

If Tipu should accede to the substance of the requisitions which I have suggested, I entertain a sanguine hope that with the efficiency of the triple alliance, not only restored, but considerably strengthened with a large army at Hyderabad, and another at Poona, with a resident established at Seringapatam, and with the exclusion of the French from the dominions of Tipu Sultan, of the Nizam, and of the Peshwa, we may be enabled to look confidently to a long continuance of tranquillity in India. The growth of the French power in India would no longer be a matter of apprehension. Sindhia, (or whoever shall succeed to his dominions in Hindustan) would become an useful auxiliary against the threatened irruption of Zeman Shah. The military charges on the coast of Coromandel might then safely admit of reduction; this government would not then be perpetually alarmed with an apprehension of Tipu's equipments, and of impending invasions of the Carnatic. We should no longer complain of suffering, in time of peace, all the solicitude, hazard, and much of the expense of war; and the continuance of tranquillity would be ensured, not more by the predominance of our power, than by the moderation manifested in using it for the sole purpose of obtaining permanent security and genuine peace.



#### APPENDIX IV

### *Sir John Malcolm's Letter*

*Madras, July 17th, 1817*

My Lord,

I TOLD YOUR LORDSHIP, before I left Calcutta, that I should, at the earliest period I was able, communicate my sentiments upon the expected operations against the Pindaris, and the likelihood there appeared of these involving us with the principal rulers and chiefs in Malwa. In treating this subject, I am aware I shall be able to convey no new information, and to bring forward no facts with which you are not already acquainted; but my anxiety to show the grounds upon which my opinions are founded will nevertheless make me incur the hazard of wearying Your Lordship's patience. A deliberate examination of this difficult question has satisfied my mind of the positive necessity of measures which may involve a departure from the principles of policy we have hitherto observed towards the states in Malwa. By a full statement of the course of reasoning which has led me to form this conclusion, I shall afford Your Lordship the best means of appreciating the correctness, or of detecting the errors of my judgment.

Before I left England I gave a memoir to Mr. Canning on the subject of the Pindaris, in which I endeavoured to trace their origin, to exhibit their character and habits, and to suggest those means which appeared best calculated for their extinction, or rather suppression. Since that paper was given in, two invasions of the territories of the Company, the disturbed state of the Poona government, the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with the Raja of Nagpur, the evasive conduct of Daulat Rao Sindhia, and many minor events, (among which the rebellions in Ganjam and Cuttack, subsequent to the invasion of the former province by the Pindaris, are the most important,) have given a very different shape to many parts of this question, which

I shall now proceed to examine under its altered state, and with reference to the full and luminous correspondence of the residents at the native courts; which, with other authentic documents furnished by intelligent officers of the political department, throw light on our condition, both with relation to these increasing hordes of lawless freebooters, and to the predatory powers with whom they are naturally and constitutionally associated and connected.

The causes of the increase of the Pindaris have been before fully described.<sup>1</sup> Though they had long existed as a separate class of military freebooters, it was no doubt the destruction of the power of Tipu Sultan, the extinction of the political independence of the Nizam and Peshwa, and the reduction within narrower limits of the power of Sindhia and Holkar, that added to their number, and, by freeing them in a great degree from that control to which they were before subject, gave them not only a wider sphere of action, but a character of greater boldness and enterprise.

Those that condemned the policy adopted by the Marquess Wellesley, trace this great evil to the principles which he introduced of extending either the power or influence of the British government over all the states of India; while the defenders of that system contend that all the dangers that have arisen have their root in that selfish and neutral policy, which came, according to them, like a mildew to blight the fruits of our great successes, and to disappoint that near prospect of general tranquillity which our actual and acknowledged supremacy enabled us to command, through the means of our intrinsic power, our allies, and the active exercise of our influence solely and unremittingly directed to that great and desirable object.

Before we can propose a remedy for an evil we must determine its source; and with this view it is of importance to examine, as far as the experience of twelve years enables us, those facts which will assist us to judge the comparative merit of these two systems. That of Lord Wellesley was first introduced in the southern parts of India. It had a full, unchecked, and successful operation in the settlement of Mysore, where the liberal arrangements for the support of the principal chiefs, of a considerable corps of horse and infantry, and a large body of

Candachar peons,<sup>2</sup> gave us possession of the military part of the population, to mould into what shape we chose, and thereby enabled us to prevent the occurrence of either discontent or rebellion.

Our alliance with the Nizam furnished us with the means of destroying Tipu and overcoming a Mahratta confederacy; and that with the Peshwa was alike essential for the latter object. These engagements have no doubt been attended with many evils; but we must recollect that a government so constituted as that of our eastern empire, presents, on all questions, but a choice of difficulties. If the introduction of our power and influence into the territories of the Nizam and Peshwa has increased the numbers of the Pindaries, as it undoubtedly has done, by destroying in a very considerable degree the energy of the internal government of our allies, and consequently thrown the latter more upon us for protection, the embarrassments which these causes produce must be balanced against the dangers to which we should have been exposed, had we refrained from cultivating their friendship upon the only terms that could render it useful. We should, under any other course of policy, have probably had still to contend with the Sultan of Mysore; and supposing his power to be annihilated, the Nizam and Peshwa would either be proceeding in a prosperous career of ambition that might render them dangerous neighbours, or become, through weakness, a prey to the ambition of some restless military chief, who desired their resources to further his plans of conquest. Any one the least acquainted with the history of the native powers of India, must be sensible that one or other of these events must have occurred; and assuredly the embarrassments which now threaten us, taken at their worst, bear no proportion to the dangers attendant on such a state of affairs.

If it is admitted that the system of establishing our power and influence over our allies, as the best means of securing our own and the general tranquillity, has been found to be attended with benefit in the south of India, can we deny its effects, as far as it has been allowed to operate, in other quarters? May not Bundelkhand be adduced as a remarkable instance of this fact? It was, perhaps, more disturbed, more distracted by the disputes of petty rulers, and more overrun by bands of freebooters and

banditti of every description, than any country of equal magnitude in India. Yet how completely have our arms and policy subdued and reformed this province; many of the petty rulers of which continue to enjoy their possessions, and, acknowledging us as their lords paramount, form with their armed adherents one means of maintaining internal peace and security, and of repelling foreign invasion.

The exercise of our control over the states of Bharatpur and Macherry has been attended with one slight embarrassment, caused by the latter forgetting his relations; but the display of our power instantly brought him to reason: and the petty chiefs, such as the Nabob of Bahraich, Ahmed Baksh, Murteza Khan, and others, who were settled in Jagirs to the west of the Jumna, not only live peaceably and prosperously, but have presented an example much wanted in that and every other quarter of British India—of natives of rank and respectability in the enjoyment of estates (which support themselves and military adherents) that were granted as the reward of their attachment and faithful services during a period of no common emergency. The Sikh chiefs also, between the Jumna and the Sutlej, have been restored to that protection to which their services and good faith entitled them, and live after their own forms, in their principalities, acknowledging and rendering service to the British government.

An attentive consideration of the facts which have been stated, dispose us to a conclusion, that if the policy pursued by the Marquess Wellesley had not been checked in its progress to completion, it would have attained its great and professed object, the establishment of the general tranquillity of India, through the supremacy of the British government. The measures left unaccomplished had similar features, and were of a similar character with those that have proved successful. It was proposed to attach and employ a portion of the military inhabitants of Hindustan in the same manner, and upon the same principle, which had been adopted with the irregular horse and Candachar peons of Mysore. Treaties had been formed with the Rajput states, and it was meant to cherish to the utmost the energies of that warlike, but tranquil race. Every practicable effort was to be made to call forth the native resources of the

Peshwa and the Nizam. An intimate alliance was to be preserved with Sindhia, the only object of which was to effect a change in the principles of his government, and to render this ruler an instrument for the reform or the destruction of that predatory system of which he had been the principal support. A subsidiary alliance with the Raja of Nagpur was, as it always had been, an object of anxious interest, as his habits were settled and peaceable, and he promised, from these causes, to become, if we could conquer his jealousy and fears, an useful ally to the cause of order and tranquillity. The personal character of Jaswant Rao Holkar forbade much hope of his accession to any confederacy, that had for its object the suppression of that predatory warfare of which he was the avowed champion, but it was neither intended to bar the door upon him, nor any other leader, whom change of sentiments or despair of success in predatory warfare, might dispose to settle and to enjoy in peace the revenue of their possessions.

When we consider the means which the British government at this moment possessed, the impression that had been made by the unexampled success of its arms and its policy; in other words, the complete and recognised supremacy of its power, it is not too much to affirm that there is every reason to conclude it would have been successful in its object, or introducing comparative order and tranquillity into countries which it was easy to foresee would, if left to themselves, not only fall into anarchy and confusion, but become a nursery for predatory bands, who might, at no distant day, threaten the peace of all India. It was stated with truth by those who condemned this system, that the measures necessary to fulfil the object it had in view were likely to involve us in all the embarrassments attendant on extended and complicated political relations. But it was answered with equal justice that this embarrassment was the natural concomitant of our actual condition; and it was most evident that all attempts to escape from it would not only be futile, but be attended with superadded embarrassment, and with positive danger to the general peace of India, and ultimately to the prosperity and security of the British possessions.

To show how far these apprehensions have been realized, a very short detail of events since 1806 (the period of the intro-

duction of this system of neutral policy) will suffice. To the treaties concluded with Sindhiā and Holkar in 1805 and 1806, the Governor-general added declaratory articles, containing gratuitous cessions, which were meant to emancipate us from the care and hazard of defending allies, and occupying or guaranteeing territory that was supposed to be inconveniently situated. The moment peace was concluded, an indiscriminate reduction was made of all those bodies of irregular horse (natives of our newly-conquered provinces) who had been entertained during the war, or had come over at our invitation from the enemy. These, finding themselves without any provision whatever, immediately left Hindustan, and swelled the ranks of the freebooters who began at this period to collect in Malwa. Some of the chiefs who had aided us during the war were settled, as has been stated, by giving them grants of land; but it was anxiously desired to prevail upon these, as well as the Rajas of Bharatpur and Macherry, to renounce their right to our protection, and increased territory was directed to be proffered as the reward of their assent to this proposition. The representations of Lord Lake, and the determination of the chiefs above mentioned not to forego their claim to the protection of the British government, prevented the execution of this part of the plan, and the result has fully proved that no occurrence could have been more fortunate for our interests.

In pursuance of this neutral policy, the Rajas of Jaipur and Bundi had been cast off, so, in fact, were the Sikh chiefs between the Jumna and the Sutlej, who had acted with our army during the war. In our relations subsequent to the peace, we studiously avoided every interference with Daulat Rao Sindhiā, lest we should involve or embarrass ourselves with that ruler. With Holkar we had hardly any intercourse, and every effort to negotiate a more intimate alliance with the Raja of Nagpur was abandoned. In short, it seemed to be determined that the rise and fall of all other states and chiefs, except those we were bound by treaty to defend, was in future to be an object of no interest to the British government, and it was expected that the interminable contests in which it was foreseen the native powers, with whom it had no connexion, would become involved, would tend to promote its peace and security, and that of its allies.

A period of two years had not elapsed, when the ambition of Ranjit Singh, Raja of Lahore, stimulated by our receding policy, claimed and coerced the allegiance of the Sikh chiefs south of the Sutlej. The whole conduct of this prince, at the time to which I allude, was calculated to convey an impression that he cherished hostile designs; but Lord Minto saw at one view the danger and the remedy. The march of a corps to Ludhiana, on the left bank of the Sutlej,—the extension of our protection to the chiefs to the south of that river,—and a warning to Ranjit Singh not to cross it, brought that ruler to a just sense of the relation in which he stood. A little more forbearance would have encouraged him to a war in which he would have been destroyed, and his territories conquered. A contrary conduct rendered him a peaceful neighbour. This occurrence has importance, as it shows from experience the tendency of a neutral system of policy to produce that very consequence (extension of territory) which it desires to avoid.

In 1808, the distracted state of Holkar's government led Mahommed Khan Bangash, with a number of followers, to rebel against his authority; and having established himself in the territories belonging to that family in Khandesh, he not only plundered their revenues, but extended his depredations into the adjoining provinces of our allies, the Peshwa and Nizam. The consequence was, the employment of our troops became essential to destroy a rebel of the government of Holkar.

The extraordinary activity and energy of the officer<sup>3</sup> charged with this service, prevented, by the capture of Bangash and the defeat of his party, a protracted warfare, but the event showed to what we were likely to become subject, and how impossible it was to follow the course that had been prescribed. This was more fully evinced in the ensuing year, when Amir Khan, a chief who had risen to considerable military power in the service of Holkar, associating with his natural allies, the Pindaris, threatened, at the head of a predatory host, amounting to about thirty thousand men, to overwhelm the country of Nagpur. His advance towards the accomplishment of this object was deemed by the Governor-general (Lord Minto) to be connected with views of ambition, that went to the establishment of a Mahomedan dynasty in his own person, and ultimately to changes un-

favourable to our interests in the Deccan. These considerations, combined with a desire to protect the Raja of Nagpur, with whom negotiations for a subsidiary alliance had been revived, led the Governor-general to assemble an army on the Narmada, which afterwards advanced as far as Seronje, obliging Amir Khan to return to the northward. Lord Minto would appear, at one period, to have contemplated further operations for the destruction of Amir Khan, and seems to have been fully sensible of the expediency of an improved frontier,<sup>4</sup> and the actual necessity of some more efficient means than we possessed, of keeping in check the hordes of freebooters which were annually augmenting in Malwa; but he was deterred, according to his own statement, from a prosecution of these important objects, and disposed to confine himself to the protection of Nagpur, by the contemplation of the complicated military and political arrangements, to which such extensive operations might lead; the impracticability of limiting the scene of action, or the scope of measures with references to the numerous interests affected by them, the heavy burden of expense, and the turn which affairs had at that period taken in Europe. These combined considerations led to his directing the army that had entered Malwa to return to the Nizam's territories. The officer commanding was directed to give up Seronje, the Jagir of Amir Khan, to one of the officers of Holkar, with a condition that it should not be restored to that chief. This condition, however, the Governor-general expected might prove abortive, for though he had considered Amir Khan as completely distinct from the Holkar government, and the latter had confirmed this ground by disavowing the actions of that chief, he anticipated that he would soon re-establish his influence over a weak and distracted court. The fact was, the ministers of Holkar, though they had promised to do so, did not send an officer to take possession of Seronje, which was delivered up to the head inhabitant, or, in other words, to the officer of Amir Khan. Thus terminated a campaign, in which an army,<sup>5</sup> commanded by one of the ablest officers<sup>6</sup> India has produced, was employed for nearly twelve months. It is probable that the territories of the Raja of Nagpur were saved from being plundered by its operations, and possible that Amir Khan might have been frustrated for the moment in his scheme of



personal aggrandizement; but though the ambitious views of an individual might have been checked, the events of succeeding years proved that this display of our force (for it amounted to no more) struck no blow at that predatory system, in which had originated the necessity of its employment, and which, it was now evident, constituted our real danger.

In 1811, 1812, and 1813, the Pindaris greatly increased in numbers, not only invaded and plundered the territories of our allies, the Nizam and Peshwa, but had the boldness to pass through Bundelkhand, and to extend their ravages to the vicinity of Mirzapur, threatening with fire and sword the rich province of Bihar. The boldness of these freebooters caused, at this period, a very considerable addition to our military expenses, both at Bengal and Madras; and, in 1814, when the former government had a great proportion of its troops employed in Nepal, the state of the predatory powers in Malwa, from Sindhia down to the lowest chieftain, who subsists by plunder, was deemed so threatening, that it was not only considered prudent to strengthen the subsidiary corps in the Deccan, but to advance the whole disposable force of the army of Fort St. George to the banks of the Tungabhadra.

This precautionary measure, which the state of affairs rendered necessary for our temporary security, was attended with as great an expenditure as the most active campaign; but neither our advanced corps, which were now augmented to the size of armies, nor the great force we had drawn out on our frontier, prevented the Pindaris from plundering the countries of our allies; and during the next year (1815), as if in derision of our boasted power and great defensive preparations, a body of these freebooters passed our advanced corps, and moving rapidly through the territories of the Nizam, fell upon the unprotected province of Guntoo. I would not willingly exaggerate the effects which this invasion of our territories has produced. Our subjects had long relied with implicit faith on our power of protecting them from attack; it was a point on which their minds were at repose; and I am convinced, that this exemption from a scourge, to which they saw the inhabitants of neighbouring countries exposed, was what conciliated them to our rule more than every other consideration. The distinction of manners, of language, of

religion, all were forgotten, or at least ceased to be objects of dislike and abhorrence, in the contemplation of that comparative security they enjoyed under our government. Nearly forty years had elapsed since any of the Company's territories in the south of India had suffered so dreadful a calamity. The invasion of the Carnatic by Haidar Ali was a tale which old men told to incredulous hearers; but the excesses and cruelties of Haidar were far exceeded by the horrid outrages of the Pindaris. The scene of these outrages was limited, but the impression made extended to far-distant provinces, and that has been completed by the irruption of another body of these freebooters into Ganjam, in 1816. I speak with full knowledge of the state of opinion when I assert, that in the south of India such has been the consequence of these events, that the best disposed of our subjects have had their minds shaken in the opinion they before entertained of the superiority and permanence of our power, while the disaffected and the turbulent rejoice in this change of sentiment, and look forward with expectation to the further progress of a system which revives their subdued hopes of opposing the British government, every moment of whose forbearance to avenge the deep insult and injury it has received is naturally construed by this class into inability to meet the danger. At such a period, to talk of defensive measures as in any way calculated to meet this evil, is to betray a total ignorance of the character of our rule, and the foundation upon which the British government in India rests. Besides the narrow object of this policy, the saving a temporary expenditure would soon be disappointed. The employment of troops occupying posts and lines of defence, and in suppressing rebellion, the inevitable result of such a policy, added to the serious defalcations of the revenue of our plundered provinces, would amount to more than the expenses of war; and could we afford the loss of character, and with it almost all that supports us in our present greatness, and reduce this question to a mere money account, even in that view we should be losers by any measures that did not strike at the root of an evil, which is one that demands for its suppression all the energies of the British government.

Before I offer an opinion on the mode in which these are to act, and the legitimate grounds we may assume as the basis of

our proceeding, it will be useful to say a few words on the state of our own power and that of our allies, and on the conduct and actual condition of the different rulers and chiefs who are likely to be involved either as friends or as enemies, from any measures we may adopt.

The state of the British government in India could not be more favourable for a great exertion than it is at this moment. The successful termination of the war in Nepal, and the reduction of Hatrass, have added greatly to our reputation, and have given recent exercise to the discipline and valour of our army in Bengal, which never was in a condition more fit for service. The raising of a number of local corps has rendered a large proportion of the effective force disposable; and the means of prosecuting such a war as that in which we are likely to be soon engaged have been considerably increased by the embodying, under European officers, corps to an aggregate of upwards of 6000 irregular horse. The situation of our troops in Bengal is favourable for their assembling, within a very short period, at the points where they are likely to be required: and, independent of its political importance, the conclusion of the subsidiary alliance with Nagpur has, by giving us a military position along the banks of the Narmada, that connects Bundelkhand with Berar, added in an incalculable degree to our military strength in that quarter.

The armies of Fort St. George and Bombay are in the most efficient state, and, including the advanced corps in the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwa, and Gaikwar, and that lately assembled near the Tungabhadra, we may assume that upwards of thirty thousand troops belonging to these presidencies are already in full equipment, and have been so for some years past. The advanced position of a great part of this force is favourable to the adoption of offensive operations at the very opening of the season. The state of public credit, of the treasury, and of the revenues, is every way encouraging, as it promises that no operations in which we can contemplate being involved are likely to produce any financial embarrassment.

The actual condition of the territories of the Nizam is not favourable: the character and conduct of that prince has compelled us to an interference in his internal administration (which

is managed by a Hindu minister whom we support) that is calculated to increase both his discontent and that of his chief nobles and principal officers. It has also the effect of impoverishing the country, and of depressing, if not destroying the energies of the government. Something like this must always be the consequence of an alliance which, as it annihilates the political independence of a country, may with propriety be deemed a half conquest of it; but peculiar circumstances have aggravated these effects in this instance; and though the force we maintain in the territories of the Suba of the Deccan places us beyond the fear of immediate danger, a crisis is approaching at which we must either usurp further upon this state, or endeavour, by reviving its energies, to render it more capable of governing itself.

The last measure, if it were practicable, would be most for our interests; but of this we may be assured, that we can attempt nothing, and affairs will grow hourly worse in this country, until we can subdue the predatory hordes in its vicinity. These freebooters have, for the last ten years, annually plundered the Nizam's dominions, and our inability to defend them, while it has sunk our character in the estimation of the peaceable part of the population, with whom our alliance was at first popular, as it promised them security from foreign attack, has had the effect of reanimating the hopes of all the discontented, among whom I fear we may class nearly the whole of the Mahomedan inhabitants of this kingdom, who are almost all military, and who have been gradually thrown out of employment as our power has advanced. Fortunately for us, this class of men are an unprincipled and divided race. The nobles can have no attachment to a prince who accelerated his own fall by an eagerness to destroy them, that he might enjoy the revenue of their estates. They have been compelled to disband their adherents and embodied troops. The latter may unite in a sentiment of hatred to us, but they want all principle of union in action, and are almost incapable of combination; but their temper and condition render them dangerous to the internal peace of the country, and they are admirable materials to swell a band of freebooters. That many of them have joined the Pindaris, and aided in their expeditions, there can be no doubt, and we may account it as certain, that, unless we can destroy or suppress

these plunderers, the contagion of their example will spread over the Deccan, where every unemployed soldier, with a horse and a sword, will be against us. Measures of prevention have already been taken, several corps of regular infantry, and some *Rassela*hs of irregular horse, have been, at our suggestion, raised by the minister. These corps are placed under the command of European officers, and hopes are entertained that they may be efficient. Thus far is certain, that in giving employment to men of the military tribes, we prevent that total despair which the too sudden introduction of our system has invariably the effect of producing.

At Poona we had a right to expect the most favourable operation of an alliance which placed and supported the prince with whom it was made upon the throne; but we had early cause to apprehend embarrassment from the perverseness of the personal character of the Peshwa, and his proneness, like all his tribe, to a crooked course of policy. Every step was taken to conciliate him; his subjects were compelled to obedience, his tributaries to render him his just dues. The interposition of the British government was employed to mediate the adjustment of his claims upon other states, and all interference with his internal administration was avoided as much as possible. Affairs went on tolerably smoothly till three years ago, when the elevation of Trimbakji, a menial servant, of a bad and intriguing character, to the office of prime minister, excited some suspicion of the Peshwa's sentiments, and in 1815 the murder of Gangadhar Shastri, minister of the Gaikwar, who had come to Poona under the express guarantee of the British faith, to adjust the accounts between his master and the Peshwa, obliged the British residents to demand the surrender of Trimbakji, the perpetrator of this atrocious deed. The reluctance with which he was given up tended to confirm the first suspicion, that he was the instrument of the Peshwa's crime; and after he escaped from Tana,<sup>7</sup> that prince not only made no effort to seize him, but gave in secret every support to the rebellion which Trimbakji raised in his dominions, expecting no doubt, by this conduct, to intimidate the English government into the grant of a pardon of his favourite. His views, however, have been disappointed by the experience and firmness of the resident.<sup>8</sup> A series of measures

of the most spirited and decided character have reduced him to complete submission. An arrangement has been made which gives us, at a most critical period, the greatest advantages, both of impression, and of resources. Throughout the whole of this transaction, aid appears to have been expected from the Pindaris; the resident with Sindhia<sup>9</sup> very early reported a correspondence between these freebooters and Trimbakji, and subsequently stated that orders had been given by the chiefs of these freebooters not to plunder the Peshwa's dominions. The fact is that it is natural in the present condition of India for every prince or chief who cherishes plans hostile to the English, to court a body of allies, who glory in proclaiming themselves the open enemies of that nation. This is in itself a serious and recurring danger, and no state can have a right to calculate on its being always averted with that wisdom and energy which has been recently displayed at Poona.

The court of Nagpur is very unwarlike; the present ruler sought our alliance, to fix him on a disputed throne, and he will value it, as it gives him security in the power he has attained; but this is a court in which the habits of intrigue have taken a deep root, for it is more to the efforts of its policy than of its arms, that it has for many years past owed its existence. This disposition, and the disputes of the different factions among its leading nobles, will no doubt, in the course of the alliance, cause us frequent and serious embarrassments, but no danger of any consequence is to be apprehended; and let us suppose all that is likely to happen at the very worst, and contrast it with what would have been our situation had the alliance not been formed, and we shall obtain a pretty fair estimate to enable us to strike a balance of the benefit of such connexions. Had the Bhonsla been hostile, or even neutral, in a contest like that with which we are threatened, the successful application of the greater part of our force could not have been expected to do more in one campaign than to give us what we now possess, the command of the Nagpur country for our operations and supplies, and we should have obtained that under circumstances of violence and irritation, which would probably have left us no option but that of seizing upon the government. Every person acquainted with the relative local position of the territories of Nagpur

to the possession and haunts of the Pindaris, and who is aware of the actual necessity, in every attack we make upon them, of opening and preserving the communications between our troops in Bundelkhand and the Deccan, must be sensible there is no possibility of escaping this conclusion.<sup>10</sup>

As connected with Nagpur, the petty states of Saugar and Bhopal become of importance. They may be said to cover the north-eastern frontier of its territories; and the nature of these countries, and those of the petty rulers intervening along the right bank of the Narmada, renders their friendship quite essential to the complete protection of eastern Berar, and to guard the common road, through which plunderers must pass to the attack of our provinces in Bundelkhand, Bengal, or the Northern Circars. The chief of Saugar, who was until lately a nominal dependant upon the Peshwa, is disposed, as well as the ruler of Bhopal, to enter into any arrangement we can desire, that leaves him the possession of the country, and emancipates him from the necessity of purchasing the forbearance, or resisting the attack of the freebooters with whom he is surrounded. The forming of any treaty with the Nabob of Bhopal has been prohibited by the Court of Directors, but the subsequent conclusion of a subsidiary alliance with the Raja of Nagpur, and the necessity we are now under of attacking the Pindaris, leave us altogether without option on this point. To protect the countries of the Bhonsla, and to expel the Pindaris from their present haunts, it is alike indispensable we should either possess by conquest, or through the friendship of its chief, the advantage of the position and resources of Bhopal. What was before a question of speculative policy, has become a measure of positive necessity; and it is to be remarked, that the treaty with Nagpur has rendered the task of protecting this country easy. It is no longer an insulated spot in Malwa we shall have to defend, but a strong point, connected with the military positions we have formed on the Narmada.

Jaipur, which, from its local position, is to us the most important of the Rajput states, has, since the peace of 1806, been more than once on the very brink of ruin, and we have had the alarming prospect of seeing a dangerous horde of Pathan plunderers occupying a country which would give them increased

means of invading our richest provinces in Hindustan, and of maintaining a direct and constant intercourse with the most turbulent part of the populations of our territories in that quarter, who are of the same tribe, and, indeed, generally speaking, their near kindred. The apprehension of this danger has led the Indian government in England to authorize a defensive treaty being concluded with the ruler of Jaipur, and though some obstacles have interrupted the negotiation, it had the effect of averting a recent danger from that state. This negotiation will no doubt be revived, for unless this state is supported by us, it must fall, and so sensible are its principal nobles of this fact, that they evinced great dissatisfaction against their ruler allowing any considerations to prevent the speedy conclusion of the alliance.<sup>11</sup> Contemplating the approaching crisis, the necessity of altering our relations<sup>12</sup> to Jaipur is too imperative to admit of delay. We must command the territories of this state both for operations and supplies, or they will furnish our enemies with means of attacking us in a very vulnerable quarter.

The Rajas of Udaipur and Jodhpur have been a prey to the armies of Sindhia and Holkar ever since the peace of 1806, and Amir Khan would almost appear to have settled himself and army upon Man Singh.<sup>13</sup> We must, from these circumstances, conclude that the forces of this prince have been in a great degree subdued, and his resources exhausted; but should the conduct of the principal predatory powers ever force us to extend our operations in Mewar or Marwar, or even to the vicinity of these provinces, I can have no doubt that we should find it easy to rouse their indolent but brave inhabitants, and that there are embers still left, which, if kindled into a flame, would aid essentially in the destruction of those plunderers by whom these states have been so cruelly oppressed.

Zalim Singh, Raja of Kota, has attained a power, through the influence of his personal character, far exceeding either his military means or the limits of his possessions: wise, consistent, and politic, he manages his own affairs and interferes with those of others with equal prudence: he pays tribute<sup>14</sup> when protection is necessary, but his character causes him to be treated with comparative moderation. His territories are an asylum to distressed princes and offending subjects; he is a



general arbitrator of disputes, and all concur in granting him a respect and confidence which they refuse to each other. His country, though situated in the vortex of anarchy and confusion, is usually exempt from the misery of surrounding districts; but within the last few years it has suffered from lawless bodies of Pindaris; and he may from this circumstance, as well as his character, be supposed to be ready to combine (as far as his political prudence will permit him) in any plan for the extinction of this class. The local position of his country will probably bring him within the circle of our first operations; and if that is the case, he must either act as a friend or an enemy. If we appear in strength, there can be no doubt which part he will take; and we may eventually be compelled to extremes, in which this popular and able ruler might be used with great advantage as an instrument to restore order and tranquillity.

There are many petty Hindu chiefs, besides those that have been mentioned, who, since 1806, have been obliged to submit to the most powerful freebooters of the moment, but who are only half subdued, and still possess some means of asserting and maintaining their independence. If we enter the approaching contest on the principle of establishing general tranquillity, and I know no other upon which we can act with any prospect of success, we shall find those chieftains our best and most natural allies. A connexion with them is not exposed to those embarrassments which attend that with states of a higher rank. Accustomed to own a superior, they are proud of dependence on a great government; and though in the habit of improving their possessions by cultivation and commerce, they maintain, to the extent of their means, armed adherents, which are taken from the ranks of freebooters, and are, when it becomes their interest, the active defenders of order. Whenever our policy may lead us to establish a connexion with the principals of this class, a moderate tribute, or the service of a quota of men (if not both) should always be exacted. I am quite satisfied, from personal experience, that our generosity on former occasions, in demanding neither, was quite misunderstood, and instilled suspicions instead of inspiring confidence. They saw no permanent bond of mutual interest, and doubted the continuance of such disinterested protection.

I shall now proceed to take a short view of the condition and conduct of the predatory powers, or, in other words, those rulers and chiefs whose habits of government and life cherish and support that predatory system which constitutes our present danger, and against which we are at this moment compelled to direct all the efforts of our policy and of our arms. The predatory powers may be divided into three classes: the first, Sindhia and Holkar; the second, Amir Khan; and the last, the Pindaris. Though the whole of these are alike promoters of that predatory system which it is our object to subdue, there is a considerable difference between the first and the others, and even some shades between the two last. It is important, therefore, to examine their conduct separately, both as it relates to their internal and foreign policy. This will enable us to come to a correct conclusion on two very important points: first, the right we have to proceed against each or all of them; and secondly, the course which appears most likely to obtain success in those measures which necessity may lead us to adopt.

The empire founded by Mahdaji Sindhia in Malwa and Hindustan rested for a long period on no basis but that of a foreign conquest of a predatory power, which exacted from the natives a large proportion of the annual revenue of their country, as a boon for leaving the remainder unplundered. The establishment of a disciplined army (under French officers) of infantry, with cannon, gave some shape and solidity to this power. Strong holds were subdued, petty rebellions suppressed, tribute coerced, new conquests made, and the mass of the population rendered more obedient to authority. The plans of Mahdaji appear to have been: full of wisdom; but the pride of increased strength filled the mind of his successor, Daulat Rao, with immeasurable ambition, and ultimately led him, in 1803, to provoke a war with the British nation, which terminated, in a few months, in the destruction of his regular troops, the capture of his artillery, and the loss of all the countries he possessed in Hindustan. Though the peace concluded in 1803, the cessions of Gwalior in 1806, and the seizure of Ambaji Ingha's territories about the same period, combined with the destruction, or rather the dissolution of the Holkar government, left Daulat Rao Sindhia with ample possessions, and with every means of improving at the same

time that he enlarged them, he has deliberately pursued a contrary course, and from doing so he is justly stated to be one of the chief causes of all the danger to which we are now exposed. Every year of the history of this chief since 1806 presents the same uniform and disgusting picture of rebellion in his government, mutinies in his army, and the recurring necessities of a petty, plundering warfare; all his hostility has been directed against those weak Hindu states whom our forbearance left at his mercy, and whose habits of order and good rule gave their territories a prosperity which he has destroyed. Though Sindhia has increased, by these small conquests, his revenue and his individual wealth, his country has become every day more impoverished, his government more embarrassed, and his nobles and his army more disobedient and disorderly. The Pindaris alone, whom he has systematically encouraged (in spite of his occasional professions to us), have flourished, their numbers are increased, they have grown bold on the assurance of his protection. He has granted them a home in his dominions; and when they have returned laden with the plunder of our provinces, and soiled with the blood of our subjects, he has not only not refused them an asylum, but shared in their spoil, and no doubt rejoiced in their success.<sup>15</sup> I make the last assertion from the positive conviction of its truth. Sindhia, who cannot be expected to forget or forgive the loss of empire, naturally considers us as his greatest enemies, and contemplates with satisfaction every attack upon our power.

It has been, since the conclusion of the war in 1805, a favourite opinion with the Mahrattas, that we can yet be opposed by a predatory system of warfare, and that our power may be reduced like that of the successors of Aurangzeb, by the incessant attacks of plunderers upon our territories and resources, and the Pindaris have been for some years past considered as one of the great means of accomplishing this object. Sindhia, when alarmed by our preparations, summoned<sup>16</sup> these freebooters round his standard, and nothing but the impression of their eventual use in a contest with us could have induced him to tolerate their insolence, their occasional plunder of his provinces, and, above all, the danger of drawing upon his own head, by persevering in his connexion with them, the vengeance of the British government.

The conduct of Sindhia, on the occasion of a representation being recently made to him on this subject, must prove the impossibility of placing the slightest reliance on his professions. He has lately, it is true, shown a great desire to preserve a good understanding with the British government, but this is the consequence of alarm at its imposing state. His tone was very different two years ago, and even now, when goaded by our reproaches to send a force to attack the Pindaris, a friendly correspondence is opened between one of the principal officers and the leader of these freebooters against whom he is to act. In any plan we may determine upon for the suppression of a predatory system, it would, as far as I am able to judge, be as great weakness, after what has passed, to place any confidence in the professions, promises, or engagements of Sindhia, without very adequate security, as it would be waste of time to seek for more proof than is already on record, of his interests being identified with those freebooters,—of his being their patron, and of their considering themselves, however loose the ties, as his subjects and soldiers. This is proved by the letters of their leader to his minister, and by a thousand facts; but that of their continued residence in his country is of itself sufficient to establish our right to treat him (if it suits our policy to do so) as an enemy. We must either do this, or continue to suffer a neutrality, or rather a system by which Sindhia carries on a harassing war against us, without exposing himself to any of the distresses and dangers of that condition. His troops, most of which are similar in dress, in cast, and in habits to the Pindaris, swell the bands of these freebooters, when they proceed on their plundering excursions; and the latter, when they desire to elude our pursuit, take shelter in his country, and melt into his army. Under such circumstances, it appears almost impossible to form any plan for the extinction of this evil, which does not commence by making Daulat Rao Sindhia a friend, on whom we can depend, or an enemy that we have to encounter. It has been urged in palliation of the conduct of this prince, that he does not possess the power, either to suppress or expel the Pindaris; but this supposition, if a fact, though it alters his situation, does not alter ours. The distinction between want of inclination and want of ability, in such a case, is not easily made; and if our

safety is endangered by the hostile attacks of a military people living in his provinces, it matters little whether they derive their power of waging war upon us from his weakness or his support. We are bound to treat him as sovereign of the country. And considering him as such, we must make him responsible for the conduct of its inhabitants; besides, if this really be Sindhia's condition, he will rejoice in the opportunity which our policy will afford of co-operating in the destruction of hordes that are always above his authority, and who must, if not reduced, make rapid strides to the subversion of his power.

The possessions of the Holkar family in Malwa and Khandesh, are now in a state of singular confusion and anarchy. Ever since the insanity of Jaswant Rao Holkar, this government has been verging to dissolution. It has been, in fact, a prey to contending chiefs; and their jealousy of each other, the force of habit, and that devotion to usage which is characteristic of the natives of India, has alone preserved it from complete destruction. Though Tulsa Bai, the mother of the young prince,<sup>17</sup> had been acknowledged Regent, the military power of the state was usurped by Amir Khan, while Balaram Seit, who was a favourite of Jaswant Rao, and employed by him to negotiate with the English government, in 1806 became the principal minister. Year after year, the weakness and anarchy of this state increased; Amir Khan exclusively employed the means which his influence gave him to promote his plans of personal aggrandizement. His adherents (mostly Pathans of his own tribe) were distinct from that force which was commanded by leaders who had an hereditary attachment to the family of Holkar; the latter were however reduced to a small number, not exceeding eight or ten thousand horse, with a few undisciplined corps of infantry; and as the government was unable to pay even this remnant of his former army, these troops have, for ten years past, subsisted by plundering their own country, by joining the Pindaris, or by extorting, through the means of mutinies, advances from a weak and usual distracted court. On a late occasion the Regent Tulsa Bai, with her son and Ganpat Rao, a rival of Balaram Seit, fled from her mutinous army to a fortress, and placed herself and the young prince under the safeguard of Zalim Singh, chief of Kota. She remained in this voluntary exile four months,

when, having obtained the means, by the seizure and plunder of one of the chief officers of the government, of satisfying the troops, she returned to the camp, where one of her first acts was to imprison, plunder, and put to death Balaram Seit, whose enemy, Ganpat Rao, was now declared minister. The next object of plunder was a widow of the late Jaswant Rao Holkar. Severe torture<sup>18</sup> made this lady produce a sum of 50,000 rupees, which only whetted the avarice of her enemies. Her further torture and death, and the plunder of all her property was the consequence. The nephew of Jaswant Rao Holkar, and several other chiefs, who were attached to the late minister, were seized and murdered. These events, which took place in the beginning of this year, have excited equal horror and astonishment.

Amir Khan is still at Jodhpur, and the state of his affairs in that quarter, combined with the clamours of his own troops for pay, have prevented him from repairing to Malwa, where his representative Ghafoor Khan, has hitherto, in vain, endeavoured to oppose the measures of Tulsa Bai, who, on his placing himself at the head of her mutinous infantry, made an application for aid to Daulat Rao Sindhia, which that ruler has granted; and the struggle for supremacy at the durbar of Holkar, which has long existed between him and Amir Khan, would seem likely to be soon decided; but there are so many interests involved, and so many intrigues on foot, as to render it impossible, at any one stage of the action, to anticipate the conclusion. We can, in fact, be positive of nothing but the continuance, whichever way it terminates, of anarchy and confusion.

The events that have been described would be of no consequence to us, further than as a beacon to warn us from a scene of trouble, did they not connect, and that most nearly, with the Pindaris. The ranks of these freebooters are filled with the soldiers of Holkar, and the state of government and possessions of that family, not only afford them continual supplies of men, of money, and of food, but of retreat and security. This assertion cannot be controverted by the circumstances of the occasional disputes between this state and the Pindaris. Such disputes are ever the fruit of that aid and encouragement which weak states grant to freebooters of this class. There exists in the present government of Holkar no tangible authority from which we

can expect any redress of the injuries we suffer from these causes. The settlement of this state, or rather of its territories, therefore, in some shape or other, becomes essential in any plan for the extinction of the evil which now compels us to arm: whether this is done directly by ourselves through Sindhia or Amir Khan matters not, so the object is affected. It is a mere question of expediency. To talk of our faith or our treaties with a government which has been virtually extinct, or at all events incapable of maintaining any of the relations of friendship for ten years, appears to me a mockery of terms. I do not, however, mean to say it would be just, to deprive the family of Holkar of their possessions, provided they, or those that act for them, were disposed to join cordially in our plans for the suppression of the predatory system; and under every course I am aware that it would be an outrage upon opinion, that nothing but an extreme case could justify, to set aside altogether the pretensions of this family. The different branches of the Mahratta nations are hastening by stages sufficiently rapid to decay; their rule beyond the limits of their native country had never any solid basis. They are everywhere else but recent conquerors, and their power, in most instances, has preserved its original shape. They have, under the denomination of kings, continued to be leaders of predatory hordes, and when engaged in foreign expeditions, their usual habits have found sufficient exercise in plundering and chastising those tributaries and inferior chiefs, whom their intolerable oppression continually drove into rebellion. To subdue the system under which this class has flourished is, in part, to subdue them; but satisfied of this, we should avoid, as much as we can, any measures which, by exciting their fears, or shocking their prejudices, might dispose them (from a sense of common danger) to unite. The dissolution of their authority, under every course, is certain; but the more gradual, the less likely it is to be attained with any serious convulsion.

The state of Amir Khan's power in 1809 has been already mentioned; he was then at the head of a predatory force, of between thirty and forty thousand men, and compelled the British government to adopt the expensive measure of forming (as has been noticed) an army in the Deccan, and a considerable

corps in Bundelkhand, to keep him in check. The Pindaris who had joined this chief, from the same feeling they would any other, because he promised to lead them to plunder, fell off from their allegiance as his views became more limited. This certainly was the zenith of Amir Khan's greatness, and had he possessed that genius and ambition which numbers believed he did, he might have made a great effort for power; but he showed on this occasion, as he has on many others, that he is merely a brave partisan chief. The crisis, however, that gave him the chance of being greater, evinced in a most forcible manner the danger to which we are hourly exposed, from the rise of a leader of higher qualities and more daring enterprise. A Sevaji, or Haidar Ali, would, with the means which he at that moment possessed, have carried fire and sword to the furthest regions of our possessions in India. The life of Amir Khan since this period has passed between efforts to maintain his authority over the distracted councils of the family of Holkar, expedients to satisfy the clamours of his army, attacks on the country of Jaipur, and the establishment of his influence and power over the court of Man Singh, Raja of Jodhpur. The latter appears to have been throughout his leading object; and as he not only exacts a considerable tribute from that prince, but has obtained valuable grants of territory, which he desires to render hereditary in his family, the greatest proportion of his troops is generally in that country; and it is evident from every account, that nothing but their presence maintain his oppressive authority. The utmost jealousy exists between him and the Raja, and it has been conjectured that he means to depose Man Singh, and put his son on the throne; and the recent murder of one of the principal ministers at Jodhpur, shows he will hesitate at no measure, however violent, to maintain his interests in that quarter.

The preservation of his influence over the family of Holkar is left, as has been stated, to an agent, attended by a small body of men. The care of the conquests he has made from the state of Jaipur is committed to one of his leaders; and his jagir of Seronge, and other possessions that he holds of the Holkar family, are in a great degree unprotected. He reposes great confidence in Zalim Singh, Raja of Kota, who pays him,<sup>19</sup> as has been mentioned, the tribute due to Holkar, and who grants his family



a place of refuge. Amir Khan, in return for this friendship, is the avowed supporter of the Raja of Kota, who derives considerable strength from the reputation of such an ally.

The connexion between Amir Khan and the Pindaris was more intimate some years ago than it is at present, but they still look up to him, and are associated with his followers by similarity of condition and habits of life; and in any contest we may engage in, it will be very difficult to separate one class of free-booters from another, unless the followers of Amir Khan remain engaged, as at this moment, in a scene distant from that of our first operations. Even in this case, the Pindaris we expel from Malwa would find protection in Marwar, and return the moment our efforts relaxed. This makes it impossible to exclude from our consideration Amir Khan and his adherents, as it is obvious that any settlement will be incomplete that does not, in some way or other, embrace them. The whole conduct of this chief since 1806 certainly gives us the right which Lord Minto assumed, to consider him as distinct from the family of Holkar, and in this view he stands the leader of a formidable predatory band, without any legitimate claims to power, and whom we may in consequence treat as expediency shall dictate. It may, however, eventually be for our advantage to recognise him in the character he still assumes, of a servant of the Holkar family. His actual force consists of about 12,000 horse, several indifferent corps of disciplined infantry, and between two and three hundred pieces of cannon. His artillery, if my account is correct, is by far more formidable than that of any other native power in India, and it has been represented to be in tolerable order; but this, considering the distracted state of his army, seems hardly credible.

Amir Khan is so far different from a Pindari chief, that his ascendancy has taken a more settled shape; and he possesses resources that are, in a certain degree, competent to meet his expenditure, consequently is not forced, as they are, to make incursions upon us or our allies for his support. But though there is this shade of distinction, his condition is in other respects the same. His army lives by plunder, though that is within a defined sphere, but the countries on which they now subsist must become exhausted, and the bands which he commands

are in training for a wider range. We have more than once been compelled to make preparations against their threatened ravages, and though circumstances may dictate some delay, there is no doubt that ultimately the reform or dispersion of this force is essential to our interests. There is reason to conclude that the age<sup>20</sup> and disappointed ambition of this leader have inclined him to connect himself with the British government. His late overtures to the resident at Delhi<sup>21</sup> upon this subject, are in a very different strain from any he has ever before made. He appears anxious for our protection, and to gain that, he professes himself ready to be an instrument in forwarding our plans, particularly as these may relate to the Holkar family. The government have kept this negotiation open,<sup>22</sup> and there is no doubt but Amir Khan, if sincere, may be of great use; and as both he and many of his principal followers are natives of our own provinces, that circumstance may afford us additional means of effecting such an arrangement. I confess that, in the present state of India, I have no alarm at the increase of a Mahommedan power in any regular shape; and all my experience inclines me to consider that race to be much more manageable in intimate connexions with us than the Mahrattas. They may be more bold and turbulent, but they are neither so artful nor so restless. Their propensity to dissipation and to the enjoyment of every luxury within their grasp incline them to an indolence, a very short indulgence in which, though it may leave their sentiments the same, destroys those habits which render them dangerous. The simplicity of the Mahratta soldier preserves him from such change; his clothes, his diet, his manners, are fixed by the rules of the class, or caste, to which he belongs; he yields like the reed to the storm he cannot resist, but it is only to resume his shape the moment it is past. On the whole, I should conclude that, in our future connexion with these two races of men, we shall complain most of our Mahommedan allies; we shall suffer most from the Mahrattas.

It remains, in treating this branch of the subject, to say a few words on the actual condition of the Pindaris. The numbers of this class of freebooters in Malwa were, three years ago, estimated by an intelligent officer<sup>23</sup> at 30,000 horse. In a very sensible paper,<sup>24</sup> full of information regarding this people, I find their numbers stated at 41,000. Both may be right, for it is evidently

impossible, as I have elsewhere observed,<sup>35</sup> to fix any standard for a force that is daily changing—whose ranks are recruited when there is a prospect of plunder from those of Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan, and who dissolve on the occurrence of reverses into the armies of these chiefs. There are, however, a certain number of leaders who have always a body of attached adherents, who possess territories and forts, and even some infantry and cannon. Hiroo, Karim Khan, and Chitu are the principal. Hiroo has long been the prisoner of Sindhia. Karim Khan at first shared his fate, but obtained his release by paying a large ransom, immediately after which he summoned his old followers to his standard, and began to revenge himself, by plundering the possessions of the prince whose avarice had restored him to liberty. A junction between Chitu and this leader spread alarm in every quarter,<sup>36</sup> as their combined force amounted to 25,000 men; but the policy of the Bhonsla, whose country first felt their depredations, divided them, and Chitu soon afterwards aided one of Sindhia's generals in an attack upon his late ally, Karim. The latter was completely routed, and compelled to throw himself upon the mercy of Amir Khan, who delivered him over to the Regent Tulsa Bai, by whom he is still kept in confinement. These events have thrown the principal command of the Pindaris into the hands of Chitu, whom Sindhia rewarded for his aid against Karim by a grant of lands, in addition to those he already possessed, of the value of five lacs of rupees per annum. But this chief of freebooters has since abandoned this territory, as inadequate to his support, and inconsistent with his views, which led him to desire a place of security for his family and wealth, and to collect his revenue from fields that others have toiled to render fruitful. The character of Chitu seems well qualified for the prominent part he has lately had to act. He is described as a man who adds prudence to courage, enterprising but cautious, and as possessing not only great artifice, but political sagacity. This chief is not without enemies among his own race: the most prominent are the near relations of Karim; though, when there is a prospect of booty, these quarrels cease. The two great divisions of Sindhia Shahi, and Holkar Shahi, which used to separate this class, have, we are told, in their late incursions into the Deccan and our provinces, been quite forgotten: all

parties have joined; but the scene will change when they are attacked, and as their condition alters from that of prosperity to distress, former differences will revive, and each leader will find, in the recollection of old grievances and the resentment of past injuries, an excuse for pursuing that course which suits best with his interest or safety.

The indisputable fact of the number of the Pindaris having considerably increased within the last seven or eight years, completely confutes the idea that they are entirely formed of men whom our conquests drove to despair. Though many of the irregular horse of India might, on the extinction or reduction of the governments they had served, have been compelled to join them, it is very evident that if those had found it (as they must have done had the rulers in Malwa been inclined to maintain tranquillity) a life of hardship and danger, their numbers would have soon lessened; they would have resorted to another course of life; and as those who had originally embraced this line left it, died, or lost their horses, the ranks of these freebooters would have thinned, and recruits would not have been found to supply their place. Under such circumstances we might conclude that, as the Pindaris are not held together by any of those ties which unite nations of plunderers, but are formed of adventurers and freebooters of every class and denomination, early dissolution must have been certain. Yet how different is their condition from that which has been supposed. The encouragement given to them by the chiefs of Malwa, the impunity with which they have hitherto made invasions into other countries, the plunder they have obtained with a very moderate share of enterprise, and with comparatively little danger, added to their exemption from rigid authority and discipline, and a licence to indulge to excess in the gratification of their passions, must render their life the most attractive that it is possible to conceive, for all descriptions of the military classes; but their lawless habits, and their want of those bonds which preserve union in adversity, though it is a cause of their increase, will facilitate their reduction. It is against their resuscitation we have to guard, for we must never forget that it is worse than profitless to destroy those vermin, while the substance that produces them is left in its rotten and corrupt state to engender more.

The Pindaris are not without confidence in the strong holds in which they have lodged their families and wealth,<sup>27</sup> and to which they retire when the season is unfavourable for their operations, or when they dread attack. These holds are almost all situated upon or near the great range of Vindhya mountains, between which and the right bank of the Narmada there intervenes a strip of fertile country, interspersed with ridges of low hills and forests, in some places twenty, in others only two miles in breadth, which they appear to deem of great importance, as it facilitates their incursions into our country and those of our allies, the Bhonsla, Nizam, and Peshwa. The near approach of our troops stationed in the Nagpur country to this tract, has evidently excited the greatest alarm; and we observe, that in all their consultations upon the mode of defence against the expected attack, they are no longer at ease with regard to the safety of their baggage and families. Chitu, in a late letter to Hindu Rao Ghatkeah, one of Sindhia's chief officers, laments that that prince should not consider the present time as proper to break with the English, and promises to do alone (provided he receives secret aid) all that is possible. "But (the Pindarie chief adds) until a place of refuge for the families of your slaves is in our hands, we are helpless; but having this, it will then rest with me to carry to the garrison of Calcutta rapine and devastation."<sup>28</sup> The same leader, in a subsequent letter to Amir Khan, expresses a fear that Sindia will be deterred, by apprehension of the British government, from complying with this request. "To the many petitions (he observes) that I sent to the Huzoor<sup>29</sup> of Dowlut Row Sindia, the replies have been to the following purport:—At this time my friendship with the English is strong and undivided; to break it now is not advisable, but covertly and in time of need my exertions shall not be wanting: but to give a place for your families would be the cause of immediate rupture with them."—"There is (Cheetoo continues) no help for this; what is to be done? Hindoo Row, to the extent of his abilities, is using every effort, and on his exertion lies my expectation: at present I am looking for a place of strength and difficult access, and, being unsuccessful elsewhere, have addressed the Rajah, Maun Singh. I am confident that, on this subject, you will also address him to this effect,—that the place which was

formerly assigned for the residence of the Maharajah Holkar should be appointed for us;<sup>30</sup> and that you will soon intimate to me its success, that from it my heart may be set at ease, and that I may face the English with confidence. Then, for once, by the blessing of God and the fortune of the exalted, the tumult shall be spread to the environs of Calcutta, the whole country shall be consigned to ashes, and to such distress shall they be reduced, that the accounts will not fail to reach you; but at present this must be delayed for want of a place of refuge. To whatever extent you can aid me with a force in horse, do send—this will be proper and necessary. . . .”

In an address to Man Singh, Raja of Jodhpur, Chitu observes, “To Maharajah Dowlut Row Sindia, who is our master, I have sent several successive letters on this subject; to which the replies have been, that the present was not a fit season to break the bonds of friendship and alliance which existed, but by concealed methods, and in every possible manner, every assistance and exertion should be made for us. But without a place of refuge and safety for our families, our minds cannot be at ease. The Maharajah Sindia cannot give the wished-for place, as his intentions towards us would then be obvious to the English; for this reason, considering our necessity for a place of refuge, I have hopes that from your favour the place you assigned for the residence of Jeswunt Row Holkar’s family may now be bestowed for the families of your slaves; then it will reach your ear to what straits and difficulties I have reduced the English, for the whole of their country, even to Calcutta, shall be consigned to devastation and plunder. Let the Huzoor<sup>31</sup> have reliance on us, and we your slaves shall always be at your command. But if this is not to be your pleasure, recollect this tribe (the English) are wise and full of penetration, and by slow and imperceptible degrees will root out every chief of Hindustan. Do not forget these words of your slave: my vakeel,<sup>32</sup> who resides in the victorious army (Sindia’s,) will send you by the hircarrah<sup>33</sup> accounts of all that concerns me. I remain in expectation of a reply, and trust that it will be favourable.”

I have quoted these genuine documents, as I am confident the present condition, feelings, and views of the Pindaris cannot be better explained than in the words of their principal leader.

In a recent letter<sup>34</sup> from Hindu Rao Ghatkeah to Chitu, which the resident at Sindhia's court concludes to have been written with the knowledge of that ruler, he bids him "to let his heart rest satisfied;" and after informing him that the remonstrances of the British resident have compelled Sindhia to detach a force against him, adds "whatever else is decided on shall be duly and fully communicated to you."

Though the Pindaris have been successful in passing and re-passing our strong corps upon a frontier, to a degree that has exposed most fully the folly of attempting to check this evil by a defensive system, the activity and great exertions of our troops have on several occasions reached, and severely punished these freebooters, but not one of our successes, however, is ever mentioned in any of the native Akhbars, or newspapers of Malwa; while the exploits of the Pindaris in plundering our territories, defeating our troops, and murdering European officers, are blazoned on every occasion. These reports, however exaggerated and false, are believed by the parties for whom they are written, and prove a sufficient antidote to dispel any impressions that might arise from an occasional reverse in a distant expedition.

We may conclude from what has been stated, that though the Pindaris consider themselves at war with the English, and are disposed to make every exertion they can against that nation and its allies, they continue to believe that a similarity of interest and of habits will secure to them the aid of the predatory powers in Malwa, but the latest accounts prove that at a moment when unanimity seems so essential to the safety of this body, they are distracted by internal disputes, which have been lately aggravated by their alarm, and the consciousness of how little they can depend upon each other on the occurrence of any serious emergency.

From what has been said of the predatory powers in Malwa, it will be seen that though distinct in other respects, they are from necessity, from habits, from common motives of action, and from a communion, or rather confusion of interests, so connected with each other, and have their possessions so inter-sected, and their policy so interwoven, that it is impossible, while they remain in their present condition, to separate them from each other; and when we see, as we have done, for several

years past, our provinces and those of our allies annually plundered, our subjects slaughtered, and our revenues exhausted, by defensive measures, and a display of our strength; when the only result of our forbearance is to make our friends lose confidence in our protection, and our enemies exult in our anticipated ruin: what consolation can it afford us to discriminate with nicety the respective share of the wrongs done us that belongs to each of the different parties, whose conduct has produced this effect. There can be no doubt that the course pursued by Daulat Rao Sindhia for ten years, has contributed, and that most materially, to the state of danger in which we stand. That of the government of Holkar has had the same effect; Amir Khan is a declared predatory chief, and the whole are so blended with the Pindaris, that we must refrain from offensive operations, or be prepared to encounter all. Of our right to adopt that proceeding upon this occasion, which a consideration of our honour, our interests and our safety, so imperatively demand, there cannot, I think, be a question. We are fully justified, if it suits our policy to do so, to declare to both Sindhia and Holkar that their conduct has rendered invalid the peace of 1806, and that the situation in which they have placed the British government has absolved it from those ties which it then contracted, and that their future relations must be determined by their compliance or otherwise with the demands which we felt ourselves authorized to make upon them.

With Amir Khan we can, as far as matter of right is concerned, have no difficulty; the question, as far as relates to him, is one of expediency, and with regard to the Pindaris, our reputation forbids any negotiation. In the contests we are engaged in with them, particular chiefs may by their actions recommend themselves to clemency, and even reward; but after what has happened, it would, till they are subdued, be degrading to enter into any parley or contract with the principal leaders of this tribe.

It is far from satisfactory to be obliged to engage in a contest in which the enemy is so intangible, and the interests that may be effected so various, that it is alike impossible to determine the limits of the scene of action, as the scope of measures in which we may become involved; but unfortunately we have no option, and to establish the necessity we are under of proceeding



(whether we are disposed or not) to the remedy of this evil, whatever may be the consequences that attend the effort, two questions only need be asked—First, is it possible after the events that have occurred, for the British government to delay the most active operations against the Pindaris? Secondly, is it possible to carry on these operations without being aided by the decided friendship, or opposed by the open hostility of the predatory powers in Malwa, with whom the Pindaris have been shown to be so connected and so blended, that nothing but their complete amalgamation or separation can afford us the means (with all our commanding force) of obtaining more than a mere temporary exemption from dangers.

There can be only one answer to these questions; there indeed appears to me to be no longer any ground to argue (as far at least as this point is concerned,) regarding the two opposite systems of policy alluded to in the beginning of this letter. For let us suppose that the one adopted by Marquess Wellesley was radically wrong, and that the contrary course was wise and politic; still that does not alter the actual state of affairs, which is all that we have to discuss. Events have occurred that were not, perhaps, to be anticipated, which have disappointed all the views we had indulged of remaining at peace; while those powers, from all connexion with whose affairs we had carefully abstained, “were waging war against each other, and wasting their resources in interminable conquests.” The sphere of disorder has gradually enlarged; the predatory bands that this system cherished and encouraged have taken a wider range, and our territories, and those of our allies, have been made the scene of their cruel rapine and devastation. Compelled to punish this aggression, and to prevent its recurrence, we must be guided more by a consideration of our own situation, and the actual condition of those whose conduct has forced us into the field, than by attention to any rules of a particular system. It is no doubt the duty of the Indian government to attend not only to the orders but wishes of the controlling authorities in England; but these can only at a crisis like the present prescribe generally the line they wish to be pursued. Their sentiments (as far as relates to this question) may be anticipated: they will, no doubt, be the same as they have been on similar occasions: though averse to

any extension of our political relations that can be avoided, and deprecating war, they never will shrink from the sacred duty of protecting their subjects, nor hesitate to approve of measures which have no object but to punish gross and violent aggression, and to prevent its recurrence. Though desirous to discourage all plans of ambition, however likely to be attended with remote and contingent advantages, and justly apprehensive of financial difficulties from increasing disbursements, it would be calumny upon the wisdom of these authorities to suppose that they would approve of any policy which sacrificed the safety of their subjects, the peace of their territories, the confidence of their allies, and the reputation of their government, to obtain a short respite from evils which are inevitable, and of a nature which entail difficulty, and an expenditure proportioned to the delay incurred in meeting them.

Having thus given my sentiments in the fullest manner, on the condition of the different states of India, of our actual relations to each of them, and the right we have acquired, and the necessity we are under of attacking the Pindaris, and of settling, in a mode that will secure the peace of our territories and those of our allies, the predatory powers in Malwa, I shall proceed, after a few general observations on the character of the measures we should adopt, to offer my opinion on the extent of our military preparations, the positions we should immediately occupy, the demands we should make from Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan, and conclude by some general observations on the probable conduct of these chiefs.

In commencing this part of the subject I shall only, in this place, refer to the opinion I before gave, relative to the course we should pursue, if compelled to attack the Pindaris, that I may remark on the events which have since occurred. Two successive invasions of our territories by these freebooters, their open and declared intention to repeat these invasions, the support they have indirectly received from Daulat Rao Sindhia, the evasions and inattention with which that prince has treated our repeated remonstrances; and, above all, the accession of the Raja of Nagpur to the general defensive alliance, have substantially altered this question. I consider that there are now more imperative causes than then existed, for our interfering with a ]

strong hand in the reduction or settlement, not only of the Pindaris, but of the predatory powers in general, and that our prospect of success in effecting this object is much greater. We may, I conceive, pursue this end by any one of three causes. First, we may instantly declare war upon the Pindaris, and those predatory powers whom we consider as their supporters and protectors; and unless the latter instantly submit to the terms we propose, we may conquer their country, and add it to our possessions. Secondly, we may limit our exertions to the mere expulsion of the Pindaris from their present haunts, and trust to the check which the advanced position of our troops will impose on them, to the apprehensions of Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan, for our future security; and, lastly, we may, if compelled to war, restore or grant the countries we subdue to our allies, contenting ourselves with such arrangements as are necessary to defray the charges we incur in the support of troops, for the establishment of tranquillity.

The first of these plans cannot be entertained, if it is at variance with the principles of policy which are prescribed for the government of our Indian empire, and, as far as I can judge, in opposition to our true interests. Territorial possession will, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary, come too fast upon us; and besides the general reasons which oppose this policy, the present habits of the population of Malwa are not favourable to such a change as an immediate transition to the rule of the British government, which would be compelled to maintain for some years an army in that province. It is also no slight objection to this plan, that its adoption would, in a considerable degree, deprive us of the means of rewarding those who may aid us in the contest in which we are about to be engaged. The fact is, should Sindhia or Holkar venture to provoke hostilities, their possessions present us with the best of all materials for destroying their power, and raising other native authorities more calculated to preserve tranquillity. To seize the territory in Malwa for our own use, therefore, would be every way impolitic; and though it is probable we should be obliged to extend our protection to those who obtained it, there is a wide difference between the exercise of a general control through the means of our influence and the direct establishment of our government.

Of the second proposition, which goes to the mere expulsion of the Pindaris, and to trust to our advanced positions, and the apprehensions of Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan, for our future security, I shall only observe, that it would be (after what has recently occurred) at once the most insecure and expensive of all plans of offensive operations we could pursue; better, indeed, persevere in our useless lines of defence, or arm our villages, and bid them to resist the Pindaris, than make a parade of encircling the weak and divided predatory powers of Malwa with the British armies, and conclude on driving a few Pindaris for a season from their petty forts and mountain fastnesses. This course could have no result but of diminishing our reputation, encouraging our enemies, and placing us at the end of one year, or at the utmost two, under the necessity of renewing our preparations to revenge fresh aggression, and to recover the impression of an abortive campaign.

The last course, which proposes to restore or to grant the countries we may subdue to our allies, contenting ourselves with such arrangements as are necessary to defray the charges we may incur, in the support of troops for the establishment and maintenance of tranquillity, appears to me on every ground the best we can adopt. It places our proceeding upon its true ground. Our conduct will show all India that, while we indulge in no schemes of ambition,—cherish no desire to extend our possessions, we are resolved not only to resist aggression, but to prevent its recurrence, and determined to compel those whose bad faith or bad rule have contributed to produce this state of affairs, to aid with their resources, both of men and revenue, in its remedy, or to share in the evils and hazards of that war which this systematic policy has brought on us; and in the latter event, this course will furnish us, as I have before stated, with ample materials for their reduction.

It is quite impossible to propose any plan of operation, before the conduct of Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan shall have so far developed their intentions, as to enable us to discover the quality and number of our enemies. We can at present only consider ourselves at war with the Pindaris, and we may perhaps have none else to contend with; while, on the other hand, it is possible that all the predatory chiefs may combine to save

their brethren from destruction; and we should be prepared for the worst: besides, in exact proportion to the force we exhibit, and the imposing attitude it assumes, will be our chance of avoiding war with those powers, or if it should occur, of bringing it to a speedy and honourable issue.

From the troops already in the Deccan, and the corps which may be added to them, three forces of nearly equal magnitude might be formed, either of which would be equal to meet any army that the utmost combination could bring against us. One of these forces should, as soon as possible, occupy a position at or near Hindia, on the Narmada.<sup>35</sup> This would advance it to the verge of the scene of intended operations, and place it in complete communication with Colonel Adam's corps in the Nagpur country, while it would be supported by the force at Ellichipur. The latter would, on the advance corps crossing the Narmada, occupy its position, join, and co-operate with it, in the event of circumstances rendering such a measure prudent or advisable. The force in the Poona territory could not advance to aid in any general plan of operations in Malwa, till the policy of Sindhia and Holkar was decided, as it would be required to reduce the territories of these chiefs in Khandesh, if they provoked hostilities. It is of consequence this point should be decided some months before the Narmada is fordable, in order (should these chiefs be against us) that this corps might be at liberty, after having reduced Asirgarh, Chaudore, and Galna, to occupy an advanced position near Chouly Mohyseer, on the Narmada, which is in every view important, as it covers the left of the corps at or near Hindia, connects that with the frontier possession of Gujarat, and could move on the centre of Malwa.

Corps would be required at the capitals of Hyderabad and Poona, and some troops must be left to aid in the protection of the provinces of our allies, lest parties of freebooters should pass the advanced line, and ravage them. But with all the preparations we could make, we should not be able to guard every danger; and I completely join in the opinion, that we ought, even at the hazard of petty disorders in our own territories or those of our allies, to direct our chief exertion to the immediate settlement of the contest in which we are engaged; and I should act in this manner, from the conviction that our success in that can alone

give permanent security to our subjects. I do not, however, mean by this to recommend any neglect of preparation, to guard against an evil which it is likely we may have to encounter, but only to class it as secondary to the great object, of striking at the root of the power of our enemies.

The government of Bombay, after furnishing such further aid as may be required for the corps in the territories of the Peshwa, should, I conceive, equip an efficient field force from the remainder of the disposable part of its army, to occupy an advanced position on the frontier of Gujarat, which, while it covers that country, approximates, by a communication along the banks of the Narmada, the corps near Chouly Mohyseer, and by the Chambal, with any force that may advance on that river from Hindustan. This corps would be also able to grant protection to the Rajput princes of Udaipur and Jodhpur, should events dictate such a course of policy.

I feel some diffidence in extending these general remarks on the outline of our preparations to those necessary on the frontier of our territory in Hindustan; but as far as my experience, and the opinions I have seen in the several documents I have been furnished with, enable me to judge, I think that political, as well as military reasons, recommend that one corps should be stationed on the frontier of the territory of Jaipur, while another should occupy a position near Saugar: the first corps would have its communication with Delhi through Rewari, while it was supported by a strong reserve near Agra; and the latter, in conjunction with the reserve in Bundelkhand,<sup>38</sup> would completely keep Sindhia in check, if he remained (which he probably will unless he is decidedly hostile) in the position which he has occupied for the last five years, near Gwalior.

The strength and composition of the different corps that have been proposed, must depend upon circumstances. I should conceive a force consisting of a regiment of Europeans, six battalions of sepoys, and two regiments of cavalry, with a proportion of light artillery, and a body of irregular horse, as quite efficient to protect itself, or to defeat (if it could bring them to action) any body of troops which our enemies, supposing them all combined, could bring against it. But such a corps would be too deficient in the essential branch of cavalry, to expect much success against

the hordes of predatory horse to which it might be opposed. It could reduce forts, occupy posts, and force its way in any direction it chose; but while it toiled after such an enemy as the Pindaris, or their allies, it would always be liable to be harassed, and have its supplies cut off. Its sphere of action, therefore, if it was actually opposed, must be limited to the circle of its depots. We may collect, and it will probably be policy so to do, the principal part of our light force into one or two corps, and allot to them the more active operations. But still every effort must be made to remedy the defect of this branch. If no more regiments of cavalry are to be raised, the depots should be increased, and men should be sent as fast as they are drilled, to supply the casualties that must be expected to occur. It has been proposed (and the suggestion is excellent) to mount a proportion of our infantry on tattoos, or small horses, the common animal of burden in the Deccan (in Hindustan the camel is better for this purpose); and this plan will no doubt, in some degree, remedy the defect which has been stated, by giving to an additional body of our troops the power of rapid movement. Another mode of palliating this evil is, an increased proportion of irregular horse. I have before stated my sentiments fully on the wisdom of adding to their numbers, and I rejoice to see that this policy is completely adopted. They may be contemptible in comparison with our regular cavalry, but they are equal, and, when well managed, superior, to the enemy; besides, they are taken from the class with whom we have to war, and I continue of opinion that every effort should be made, both before, and during the contest, to add to this branch of our strength, which is the only one in which we can expect aid from our allies. It is, I am satisfied, in a great degree through this species of force that we must expect complete success, and with the means we possess, and those we shall obtain, we shall, I trust, be able to compel plunderers to subdue plunderers, and to make those who have hitherto promoted anarchy and confusion, the instruments of restoring order and peace. But this part of our plan requires more delicate management than all the rest. These bands, when attached to our army, or cooperating with it, must not be judged on mere military principles; we cannot expect they will emulate our troops in either their courage or their discipline. The constitution and habits

are altogether opposite, and it is sufficient if we can bring them, by kindness and encouragement, to perform cheerfully, though in a very loose and, to us, an unmilitary manner, those duties for which alone they are fitted. The services of this class, on any terms, may, politically speaking, be deemed a benefit, for it prevents their being against us, which they would probably be if unemployed; but from what I have seen of this description of troops, in every part of India, I am confident that they may be rendered of the greatest utility to our operations. But, to effect this, their habits must be studied and their temper preserved, and every measure adopted that can encourage them to activity and exertion. Plunder is their legitimate reward: it is not that of our soldier; and though he becomes often entitled to it, his discipline is never in such hazard as when it occupies his attention.

Before I state my sentiments respecting the policy we should pursue towards Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan, it will be necessary to remark that their conduct has been one of the chief causes which has compelled us to arm; and as our preparations are from necessity on a scale calculated to meet their combined hostility, we must consider ourselves as past that stage at which it would not be either wise or safe to enter upon any negotiations. Experience indeed shows that such could have no fruit but procrastination, deception, and disappointment. We must therefore determine upon our course of proceedings, and, having fixed that, make such demands as we are in reason, in faith, and in justice entitled to do; and if they are rejected, the non-concurring party must be considered in a state of war. Our demands must be as reasonable as attention to our security and that of our allies will permit; and they must have upon the face of them that character of moderation, but firmness, which makes it alike impossible to mistake our object and our resolution to effect it.

After all the consideration I have been able to give this subject, I conceive that such a proceeding is the only one that can be adopted with the least prospect of avoiding a war with Daulat Rao Sindhia. It is vain to expect we can pursue our plans against the Pindaris without involving ourselves with that chief, unless he is pledged too deep to make it easy for him to forsake our alliance. In a contest like this, all his habits, his prejudices, his wishes are against us; we have nothing in our favour but his fears.



His faith and his promises cannot be relied on for a moment. He will, if unshackled, be our secret enemy, and probably take the first opportunity a casual reverse affords him of acting more openly; but we must not suffer a line of action which would cramp all our operations, and though it might end in the destruction of this ruler, would inevitably lead to increased embarrassments, hazard, and expenditure.

The ground of our proceeding with Daulat Rao Sindhia is already laid; he has been told, "that the Pindaries can be no longer tolerated; all India demands their suppression, and all India shall be put in motion to effect it. "Were (which God avert)," this public despatch adds, "the Maharajah to afford the Pindaries refuge, or to give shelter to their families, in order to let the armed body have free scope, it would amount to an open declaration of war against every power in India which has suffered from the unprovoked and horrible outrages of those wretches."—"The British government," a subsequent paragraph of this letter adds, "seeks no advantages beyond the security of itself and its allies against future outrages. The lands possessed by the Pindaries Jaidad from Dowlut Row Sindia, as usurped by them from His Highness, would revert to him; any portion of territory wrested by them from other states would fall again to those states respectively. The British government aims not at any aggrandizement, and only desires the suppression of an evil, which would speedily become as dangerous for Dowlut Row Sindia as it has been injurious to all his neighbours."

This communication appears to have excited some alarm in his mind; but the measures which he proffered to take against the Pindaris have only furnished further proof of his continued evasion, and must tend to confirm, if any confirmation were wanting, the right we possess to proceed to any extremes against him. Under such circumstances Sindhia might be called upon, not only to grant us his cordial aid in the suppression of the Pindaris, but to give the British government fair and reasonable security that he would do so. The grounds upon which this demand was made should be fully stated: the tone of it should be decided, and a very limited period should be given for an answer. The security to be demanded is the chief point for consideration: it should be of a nature that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for

this prince to deviate from the line he has taken. Nothing but the temporary cession of some forts or tracts of country to which he attached great value could bind him in a way that would admit of our placing implicit confidence in his faith; and it is obvious that, unless we can place such confidence, we should be compelled to incur more hazards in the war with the Pindaris, and have less prospect of bringing it to a satisfactory conclusion than if Sindhia was our declared enemy. Reasoning on such grounds, I feel the positive necessity of demanding security, but at the same time consider that such demand should be as moderate as possible, consistent with the object in view; and I would rather incur some risks, than drive him to despair by propositions that were calculated to give him alarm for his future safety and independence.

We might require Sindhia to make over, till the Pindaris were subdued, or for a period of three or five years, the fortress of Asirgarh and the town and district of Burhampur. It could, however, be settled that his own officers should collect the revenue everywhere, except in the Pettah, or suburbs of Asirgarh; but that such revenue was to be paid to the English government, which, after deducting a fair sum for the payment of the troops necessary to garrison the fort and protect the town of Burhampur, should disburse the remainder in paying a body of Sindhia's horse, to be employed, under the direction of the British officer commanding, in protecting the country and in aiding the general operations against the Pindaris.

The grounds of this demand are obvious. The possession of Asirgarh as a depot<sup>37</sup> is very essential to the communication with that line of corps which we must form upon the Narmada; and its being in the hands of Sindhia, should he be hostile, or pursue a doubtful line, or secretly encourage the Killadar of this fortress to act in pretended opposition to his orders (which would be quite consonant to Mahratta policy), might prove a very serious obstacle to our operations, and force us at a very inconvenient season to detach a corps to take it. We may with justice assert that this position, though of great importance to us in the expected campaign, can be of none to Sindhia. We may add that we have the power of taking it before he could possibly afford it any relief, and that our situation and his conduct would fully justify

such a measure; but that we consider its voluntary cession for a short period will convey to other powers an impression of his friendship to the British government which no professions ever can. We can urge that nothing short of his compliance with our demands can restore that confidence which his repeated evasions have forfeited; and we may add, that as far as these respect Asirgarh, we are the more positive, as experience has shown that we cannot trust the officer whom he places in command, the Killadar of that fortress having on a former occasion openly given protection to the Pindaris.

It has been suggested,<sup>38</sup> the several other strongholds should be demanded from Sindhia as security for his conduct. I am not sufficiently acquainted with their local importance to offer an opinion on this point, which can only be judged by two considerations—their value to us, and their value to him. Asirgarh has consequence in both views, and it is an additional reason for this demand, that should Sindhia's Killadar, in the event of its cession, refuse to comply with his master's mandate, which he might do either from a view of his own interests or from secret instructions, we possess the means of its immediate reduction. If Sindhia consent to add to the temporary cession of Asirgarh that of one, or at the utmost two more strongholds, we can require no further security of that description. It remains to speak of the other demands which policy dictates to be made of this prince. He should, I conceive, be required to assent to our taking under our protection the Raja of Jaipur and Bundi, and the Nabob of Bhopal, on the plain ground that, under that state of affairs which his conduct had chiefly produced, attention to the future security of our subjects, and those of our allies, compelled us to these measures. Sindhia should be required to employ the most efficient and obedient part of his irregular horse in co-operation with our troops, for the reduction and extinction of the Pindaris. He should engage never to shelter any of the principal chiefs of those freebooters, and not again to admit into his service, or to employ troops of that class, that is, bodies of armed men, who receive no pay, and avowedly subsist by spoil.

An English officer should be attached to each separate corps employed by Sindhia on this service, whose duty it should be to communicate with the commander of any British army or

detachment whom they might be near, or with whom they might co-operate, and should any of Sindhia's tributaries, chief officers, commanders of corps, Killadars, or heads of districts or villages, give aid to the Pindaris, or neglect to supply with provisions, or support, as far as they had the power, the conjunct efforts of that prince and the British government, or of either separately, they should be treated as rebels and enemies.

The sum of seven lacs and eighty-five thousand rupees, which the British government is bound by treaty to pay annually to Sindhia, should, during the ensuing contest, be paid in such portions and such periods as Sindhia may desire, to the commanders of different corps of his horse co-operating with the British troops, provided the conduct of these troops shall be such as to merit it.

As Daulat Rao Sindhia has resided in his present encampment near Gwalior for five years, he should engage neither to leave it without the consent and concurrence of the Governor-general, nor to assemble any greater portion of his army than he usually has at that point.

The British government might engage to restore to Sindhia all possessions formerly belonging to him, which they may recover from the Pindaris; and further, that, if forced into war with any other state, they will, in the event of success, and supposing the complete fulfilment of his engagements, make the most liberal arrangements for the consolidation and increase of his territories, having themselves no view beyond that of security.

In proof of the sincerity of the British government, it may be proper to engage, that at any period of the war, or after it is over, it will grant Daulat Rao Sindhia the aid of a corps, for the safety of his person or the settlement of his territories, on conditions that shall be made as light as possible upon his resources, and his employment of this corps (which shall act under the usual terms of other subsidiary forces) shall, if he object to a permanent arrangement, be limited to a period of three, five, or seven years. The sole object of the British government being to aid, by any means, however foreign to its usual principles of policy, the settlement of his government, on a basis that shall separate an ally from those predatory hordes with whom he is connected, and a continued association with whom must tend to the downfall of his family and government.

The above is a sketch of a treaty which, I think, gives us the only chance we can have of the aid of Daulat Rao Sindhia. If he agree to it, he will soon be too far committed to retract. Of his agreement it is not easy to form a conclusion. Some of the terms certainly appear harsh and degrading to a proud and independent prince, but as they will not be proposed unless we are determined to insist upon them, what option has he but that of complying with our demands, or complete ruin, supposing him to refuse. The fall of his forts and territories in Khandesh, Gujarat, and all he possesses on the left bank of the Narmada, is certain, before that river is fordable, and consequently before he can give them any relief, and the moment the season admits of operations to the northward, a few months would see him stript of his strongholds,—of his revenues, surrounded by rebellious tributaries, and a mutinous army. While the conquest of his country would afford us (as has been before stated) the ready means of completing his ruin, Sindhia, thus reduced to the condition of a freebooter, might still possess means of harassing us, and of protracting that settlement which it is our interest to make, but he could cherish no hopes of being restored to the height from which he had fallen; and we may rest satisfied he contemplates such a reverse of fortune with too great horror to incur the hazard, if it can possibly be avoided. On these grounds I think we may indulge a reasonable expectation that Sindhia, when he sees our troops assembled, and assembling from every quarter,—when he discovers from that, and our altered tone, that we are determined to be no longer trifled with, and when all his attempts at evasion or procrastination are foiled, by a prompt and energetic policy, will agree to the terms proposed: and I am quite satisfied that our coercing him into this agreement, is the only measure that can save him from ruin. For it is easy to foresee that, under any other course, we shall be easily involved in a war with this prince, which must terminate in his destruction.

An offer should be made to the Holkar family to join in the league against the Pindaris, but the situation of that family renders a negotiation difficult. Powerless themselves, they incline alternately to Amir Khan, Sindhia, and the Raja of Kota, in the hope of maintaining a consequence through

the jealousy of those who are rivals, for the exclusive direction of their councils, or rather for the use of the name of a minor prince, whose authority is still in some degree recognised over a great part of his possessions. If, at the period when the demands of the British government are made on this family, Sindhia has established (as seems at present not improbable) his influence with Tulsa Bai, the regent, or has possession of the person of the young prince, there can be no objection, provided he agrees to our terms, to his being made the medium of negotiation. If, on the other hand, Amir Khan should have been able to re-establish his power, we might accept his proffered services as negotiator for the Holkar family; and we could perhaps find no better means of connecting the attachment of this chief to our interest, with the encouragement of his ambition, and the support of his military followers. Should neither of these plans be practicable, we might open a direct communication with Tulsa Bai, through the means of a political agent, who might proceed to Kota, or to her petty court, which probably will remain in the vicinity of that city.

The basis of a treaty with the Holkar family should be similar in principles to that with Sindhia, the assent to our alliance with the Raja of Jaipur, Bundi, and the Nabob of Bhopal. The temporary cession of Tonk-Rampura as a depot; of one or two of the fortresses in Khandesh,<sup>39</sup> and the appropriation, under the control of the British government, of the revenues of the Holkar family in the latter quarter, to the support of such bodies of horse as the regent Tulsa Bai should direct, to act with our armies in the prosecution of operations against the Pindaris, and the re-establishment and maintenance of tranquillity; the revenues of Tonk-Rampura, during their temporary alienation, might also be appropriated for the same purpose, of supporting a body of troops belonging to this family: but their relative situation to our advanced corps, and the territories of Jaipur, would make it dangerous to leave them in the possession of a power which might be hostile, and which, under any circumstances, is too weak to prevent their falling at any stage of the war into the hands of freebooters. A reference to the map will show that the same consideration will apply, with still more force, to a great part of Holkar's possessions in Khandesh. To expel plunderers

from which, when the affairs of this government were not so distracted as at present, we have already had to employ our troops.

Tulsa Bai might be invited to place herself and the young prince under our protection by proceeding either to Khandesh or Tonk-Rampura, or she might repair to Indore, or Chouly Mohyscer, when our troops advanced to the Narmada, and act in direct communication with the commander-in-chief of our army in that quarter. Such a step on her part might lead to a more intimate alliance. It is sufficiently evident that this family must either be strongly supported, or allowed to perish. The settlement of the disorders and distractions of the Holkar government, is one which no desire of refraining from the concerns of our neighbours can admit us to evade; for supposing we were contented that those parts of its territories which are situated in Malwa should become, even more than they have been for some years past, a source of contention between Amir Khan, the Pindaris and Sindhia, we are prepared to allow the more southern possessions of this family, which are full of strongholds, and which command, at very vulnerable points, the entrance to our own rich district of Attavery and the countries round Surat, as well as some of the most fertile provinces of the Nizam and Peshwa to share the same fate? We cannot allow such a condition of affairs, and I have no hesitation in stating my conviction, that unless the family of Holkar agree to the demands we make upon it, and afford us a fair security that its resources will not be employed against us, we shall be compelled, by military as well as political considerations, to occupy, or at least to establish a control over the greatest part of the countries belonging to it in Khandesh.

It has been before stated that Amir Khan has made overtures, which there is some reason to think sincere, to place himself under the protection of the British government, his professed object being to obtain its guarantee for his several jagirs in Marwar and Malwa. Any interference with the former is impossible, as the English government possesses no right to mix in the concerns of the Raja of Jodhpur; but if the guarantee of Seronge, and (in the event of our forming a connexion with the government of Holkar through his means) the estates he holds from that family in Malwa, could procure us the friendship of

that chief, it might be desirable to endeavour to make an arrangement with him upon that basis.

The negotiation might be opened with Amir Khan on the ground that he must either, in the approaching contest, act the part of a friend or an enemy to the British government; and he might be told, that if he chose the former, Seronge, and such of his actual possessions as lay within the limits of our operations, should be protected, provided his officers in charge of them, granted us such aid in supplies, as might be occasionally required by the British troops in their vicinity, and refused shelter to the Pindaris, or their supporters; Amir Khan might also be requested to send a body not less than one thousand of his choicest horse, (natives of the Company's provinces,) to co-operate with our army, and he might be promised their pay should be provided from the revenue of Tonk-Rampura. With respect to any further encouragement, this chief might be informed the future conduct of the British government towards him, would depend upon the part he acted during the war, and that his further recompense would be proportioned to his services.

There could be no objection to make the son of Amir Khan a party in all these engagements. Indeed, this seems the point on which he is most anxious: it would however be desirable that the effect of this arrangement should be to secure us the friendship of Amir Khan, as chief of a predatory army, not to detach him from his followers, and leave them loose to swell the ranks of the Pindaris, or to elect a younger and more enterprising leader. No plan (as has been observed) would be more likely to answer this end than the one which made him the mediator of an agreement with the Holkar family, but this must depend upon events regarding the occurrence of which it is at this period useless to speculate.

Whatever proposition it may suit our policy to make to Amir Khan, to induce him to join us, we should, without reserve, inform him that we could keep no terms with any one, who directly or indirectly aided or favoured the Pindaris, and that his either joining them, or allowing any of his troops to do so, or giving them or their families shelter, would be deemed a direct act of hostility against us, and expose his possessions to be seized, and his adherents treated as enemies to the British government.



Amir Khan must, if this proceeding is adopted, be called upon to evacuate that part of the territories of Jaipur, which he has seized, and to refrain from any further attacks or interference with the possessions of the Raja of Bundi or Nabob of Bhopal. We may however, if satisfied of this chief's friendly disposition, insist upon the Raja of Jaipur, making him some indemnity either in money or land for this cession, and our being a guarantee to such an arrangement, would be an additional tie upon his uncertain fidelity.

With the Rajas of Jaipur and of Bundi, should our military operations make it advisable to occupy a position in their territories, and, consequently, make us in some degree dependant upon them for supplies and aid, we must conclude a decisive arrangement. We cannot again abandon these states, and in the relations in which we shall be placed to them, it is not to be anticipated that there will be much difficulty in settling the terms of our connexion. They will naturally fall into a dependence upon our protection which will put it out of their power, as it ought to be, to reject any engagement that is formed on liberal and equitable principles. It may be generally observed, that we cannot perhaps leave such states, too much at liberty in their internal rule, nor limit them too strictly on all subjects of foreign policy; they must indeed subject their councils on such points to our control, or there can be no safety in the connexion.

The death of the Vizier Mahmmd,<sup>40</sup> the actual ruler of Bhopal, may be deemed a misfortune; he appears to have been endowed with singular wisdom and courage, and to have saved by unparalleled fortitude, that wreck of the fortunes of his family,<sup>41</sup> which he was called to protect. His son Nazir Mahmmd Khan, who has succeeded to his power, is said also to be the heir of his good qualities. This chief has renewed his application to us for protection, and the actual situation of affairs places us under the necessity of attending to his solicitations, for it is not to be expected this petty ruler will grant us any aid, unless secured from the consequences to which such conduct will expose him, and our operations at the commencement might be liable to the most serious obstructions by his hostility, or even by his neutrality.

The substance of the proposals made by Nazir Khan, through

an accredited agent to the English resident at Nagpur, were, to deliver up the fort of Nazir Garh, or Golgoon, to the English as a depot. To aid in obtaining supplies of every description for the British troops—to abstain from all intercourses with the Pindaris, or other plunderers—to enter into no correspondence with any of the principal states of India, and only to communicate with the petty chiefs around him, relative to measures affecting the internal rule of his possessions.

Nazir Mahammad pleads his extreme poverty as alone preventing him from making an offer of a pecuniary subsidy, but stated that with the fort of Nazir Garh, several villages would be ceded, and that future prosperity, through the aid of the English government, would, he hoped, enable him to do more.

The character of these propositions show that the chief of Bhopal is sincere in his desire to obtain our protection. His object, no doubt, is the recovery of the former possessions of his family; our first operations will put him in possession of those districts now occupied by the Pindaris, and in the event of Sindhia placing himself in the condition of an enemy, we may be able to give further scope to his ambition. The troops of Bhopal, though few in number, are reported among the bravest in Malwa, and in any agreement we form with this chief, it may be (as long as the war continues) more easy for him to furnish us with a small body of good horse, than to contribute a money-payment, and it may be of equal if not more benefit for us to receive his aid this way than in any other.

It would perhaps be sufficient to make at first only a general engagement with Nazir Mahammad, by which he should agree to place at our command the resources of his country, and to give us, as he has offered, a depot, should we require it, and to furnish us with a certain quota of troops to be increased, or pecuniary payment substituted in the course of the war if his resources were enlarged. We should on our part grant him protection, and promise that our future favour and liberality should be proportioned to his exertions. With the chief of Saugar and other petty rulers that may hereafter be similarly situated, I would recommend similar engagements leaving the settlement of more minute points to a final arrangement. We should, by such means, obtain more complete information of their condition

before we were too deeply involved in their concerns, but we should keep alive every motive that will stimulate them to exertion and promote our views.

With the Raja of Udaipur, Jodhpur, and Kota, we can enter into no negotiation until Sindhia and Holkar have taken a decided line; but should that be against us, we must leave no effort untried to obtain the active assistance of these states. The Raja of Udaipur has recently solicited our protecting alliance, and the others must prefer it to the intolerable oppression and continued wrongs to which they are now subject. The Raja of Kota's character has been described; a fitter instrument for the establishment of good order could perhaps nowhere be found, and in the event of our being compelled to destroy or limit the powers of the Mahratta chiefs, we cannot do better than extend that of the Rajput princes, but particularly of one whose rule may comparatively be deemed a blessing in every province over which it is established. It need hardly be added, that in the event of any such result to the approaching contest, it would be but justice to our own interests to make arrangements that would repay our disbursements, and maintain that force which was necessary to ensure our future tranquillity. This could be done as the policy of the moment dictated, by the pecuniary payments, or the occupation of territory contiguous to our own.

It has been before stated, that Chitu has applied to Man Singh, Raja of Jodhpur, for a place of refuge for the families of his tribe; it may be necessary to inform that ruler and all others of his condition, that granting protection or countenance to these freebooters, in any shape, will make them decided enemies of the British government, who will consider them as substantively responsible for such conduct, and punish them without reference to their connexions or dependence upon other states.

If we are aided by the sincere friendship of Sindhia, Holkar, and Amir Khan, in the impending contest with the Pindaris, there can be no doubt of its speedy termination; but upon this we can hardly calculate. It is therefore of more importance to speculate upon the consequences, if we are attacked by one or all of these predatory powers: should Sindhia be sincere in his co-operation, we should soon terminate the contest, as our own troops, aided by his irregular horse and those of our allies,

would quickly expel the Pindaris from their present fastnesses, and pursue them until they were destroyed or dispersed, when arrangements could be made to prevent their again taking shape as a body of freebooters, which is throughout to be considered as our chief object. The aid Amir Khan might give them would, in this case, not protect their fate for any long period, while it would be almost certain to involve his own ruin, for he could not bring his army to act against us, without abandoning many of the positions from which he draws those resources that keep them together; and though, under such circumstances, they might swell the ranks of plunderers, they would soon lose that strength and comparative consequence which they at present enjoy from their union under one chief.

If Sindhia was to declare war against us, and Amir Khan, with the family of Holkar, were to take an opposite point, the ruin of Sindhia would be certain and sudden. The possessions of this prince would be easily reduced; and past events, combined with his actual condition, give us a right to expect that even his own chiefs would soon become as anxious as others to share in the spoil.

We will now suppose the improbable case of the whole of the military bands in Malwa being led, by a common interest, to defend that system by which they are supported, and being induced by a jealousy of our increasing power, to unite against us, and examine the danger we would have to encounter. The following may be deemed a rough estimate of their collected forces: Sindhia has perhaps 30,000 horse and 15,000 infantry of all descriptions, with an inconsiderable artillery. Holkar 10,000 horse and 4000 or 5000 infantry, with a proportion of cannon. Amir Khan 10,000 horse, with some corps of infantry, and a considerable train of artillery; and the Pindaris 30,000 horse, with two or three corps of very indifferent infantry, and a few guns. There are, besides these, several bodies of infantry who can hardly be said to be dependant upon any ruler, but subsist themselves amid this chaos of authority, by levying contributions on those parts of the country that are the most unprotected.

The aggregate of these may be estimated at 80,000 horse, of which not above 40,000 at the very utmost can be deemed deserving of that name, the rest being more like followers mounted

on ponies than efficient horsemen. The whole of the infantry collected would perhaps be 25,000, and when we consider the change that has taken place in this class of troops since 1803, and the great deterioration of their discipline and equipment, it is not too much to assume that, if they were all assembled at the same spot, any one of the corps, of the strength which I proposed, would be capable of defeating them. It would be against a predatory war we would have to guard; and suppose (which I shall soon show is quite impossible) that the whole of this body of 80,000 men were to act in perfect concert, in offensive operations against us, what would be the consequence? We should have on the Narmada, and in the Deccan, and the Peshwa's territories, and on the frontier of the Madras territories, well-equipped corps supporting each other, amounting, in the aggregate, to upwards of 40,000 troops, of which 6000 or 7000 are irregular cavalry, besides a body of from 15,000 to 20,000 irregular horse belonging to our allies, but attached to our armies. On the frontier of Gujarat there would be assembled a corps of 6000 or 7000 men, with a proportion of cavalry; and in Hindustan we should, on such an extreme, be able to bring into the field at least 40,000 regulars, including 6000 or 7000 cavalry, and a body of irregular horse, that cannot be estimated<sup>42</sup> at less than 20,000 men. Can there be a doubt but that these great armies are quite competent to subdue any force which could be brought against them. If the enemy acted in large bodies, the necessity of providing resources for their support would soon enable us to come up with them, and if they divided we should divide also, and subdue them in detail; but it is time to show the total impossibility of such a combination.

The country near which the authority of these predatory powers is spread may be computed to be upwards of six hundred miles in length, and in some parts nearly four hundred in breadth; it is intersected everywhere with high ranges of mountains and deep rivers, and the character of the ruler under which it has been oppressed has had the effect not only of multiplying forts, but of making every village a stronghold. The natives, from the Rajput prince, who resides within his fortified capital, and the Grasiah<sup>43</sup> lord, who still maintains an independence amid his inaccessible mountains, down to the Poteil, or

head man of a village, pay neither tribute nor revenue to his Mahratta or Mahomedan lord, except when the latter sends a force powerful enough to extort it. The consequence is, that the armies of Sindhia, of Holkar, and Amir Khan, and of the Pindaris, when not on distant expeditions, are constantly scattered over this tract, collecting and enforcing their real or pretended rights. There is a petty war in every district, sometimes with the chief against his vassal, at others between the troops of the two chiefs whose claims upon the same person come in collision, and not unusually between the troops of the same ruler whose leaders are at variance, and whose feuds and quarrels he cherishes as a source of his strength. Precarious as resources collected in this manner must be, they are all the state has to depend upon for its support; and the mutinous and disorderly armies which are employed on these expeditions, look to their success as the only hope they have of their arrears being liquidated. The consequence of this state of affairs is, that each of the commanders of these corps is compelled to form a separate connexion of his own with every petty ruler or chief; whom he is either directed to support or subdue and this spreads through the whole, not only a variety of distinct interests, but renders systematic the principles of discordance and insubordination among the higher, as well as the lower classes of these armies.

We may conclude from this exposition, of the truth of which I imagine there cannot be the slightest doubt, that the predatory powers in Malwa, from Sindhia down to the Pindari chief, are so divided by their constant differences with each other, not on points of speculative or remote interest, but regarding their actual subsistence and that of their adherents, from day to day, that they are quite incapable of any such combination as has been stated; besides, let us suppose this combination determined upon, how will they proceed to carry it into execution, when every part of those territories which they rule, or from which they exact plunder, will revolt the moment the presence of force is removed.

Where troops are withdrawn from countries in such a state revenue must cease. Should Sindhia recall his corps from the vicinity of Jaipur, Kota, Jodhpur, and Udaipur, Amir Khan would, in his own name or Holkar's, collect all the tribute.

Should he also abandon his position, these Rajput princes would pay no one. This rule is applicable to every other petty state, and indeed to every head man of a village; and who can contemplate the elements that have been described, and suppose that they can ever blend in friendly union, or that chiefs like Sindhia, Holkar, Amir Khan, and all the host of lesser freebooters, should stifle their feelings of hostility to each other, and, sacrificing every personal consideration and interest, incur the hazard of immediate destruction, in order that they may combine on the general principle of opposing our aggrandizement; or, in other words, that they should abandon all the substance of their power, for a shadow so unattractive as that of a contest with the British government. Of a combination like this they are quite incapable, even if we were to drive them to despair by declaring our intention to conquer the whole of their possessions; and, under present circumstances, when they see us reluctantly brought into the field, by the most daring and repeated oppressions,—when they cannot misunderstand the motives upon which we proceed, their union, even in profession, cannot be anticipated; in fact it is, I conceive, quite impossible.

Though, from the reasons above stated, I do not expect we shall ever have to encounter the combined force of the predatory powers, I by no means intend to state we may not, before this contest terminates, be partially involved with each of them. In the last Mahratta war the Raja of Nagpur was not displeased at the defeat of Sindhia's army at Assye, and the ministers of the latter prince, from a sense of this feeling, rejoiced when the Bhonsla suffered a similar misfortune at Argham. Holkar kept his hordes of plunderers aloof till he saw the power of his rivals reduced, and he then ventured to provoke a war, in which he sustained a similar fate. Under present circumstances, should Sindhia, in whose territories our operations must commence, and who from this circumstance alone we are compelled to force to an early declaration of his intentions, pursue so desperate a course as to act against us—it is not improbable that the family of Holkar may endeavour to avoid mixing in the contest, leaving their territories to be occupied by the strongest, whilst Amir Khan may remain at a distance in Marwar, promising friendship and support to both, while he remains neuter, but

collects around him such a body of plunderers as would oblige us, after we had subdued Sindhia, and driven the Pindaris from Malwa, to attack him. This I deem the very worst shape affairs can take, and even this presents no danger, which, with the commanding means we possess, we might not conquer in one, or, at the farthest, two years.

Though I have expressed myself in a strain of confidence, and though I must believe that our success is certain, I feel that we should not commence a contest of this nature without being prepared for reverses. Unforeseen difficulties may arise, and the pressure upon our finances may be greater than is at present calculated; but it is a scene on which we should not enter without a resolution to persevere till it is brought to an honourable conclusion. It is probably the last war with any native power of consequence in which we shall be engaged; and to be foiled, or to have our purpose incompletely executed, might produce a re-action of no common nature.

I think I may assert, after a careful perusal of the voluminous documents written upon this subject, within the last four or five years, that there is hardly a plan I have proposed, or a suggestion I have offered, that has not, within that period, been brought forward in some shape or other to the notice of the supreme government. The similarity of sentiment of the political residents, whose situations gave them, beyond all others, the means of judging this question in a very remarkable fact; and though these public officers were fully aware of the earnest desire of the government they served to abstain from all interference with the predatory powers in Malwa, they have continued to represent the baneful consequences of such a course, and to recommend the most active exertion of our policy and our arms to avert the dangers with which we were threatened. They have differed slightly as to the mode of interference, but they are completely agreed as to the imperative nature of those circumstances which call for this proceeding; and though these public officers<sup>44</sup> are alike distinguished for their intelligence and independence of mind, the remote stations at which they reside, the difference of scenes in which they are placed, of their personal characters, the opposite views which men of talent often take of the same subject, and, above all, when that is one of speculative



policy, renders it impossible to account for their extraordinary arrangement on this point on any ground but one, "its plain and obvious necessity." I certainly think that the communications which these able officers have made on this subject, whether we consider the information they have collected, or the light thrown upon that by their experience and judgment, form a body of the most conclusive evidence that it is possible any government could require, to form its decision upon a political question of magnitude.

With respect to myself, I can only say that I brought a mind to the consideration of this question that had no bias but that which it had recently imbibed from a knowledge of the anxious desire of the public authorities in England to avoid war, and if that, from the outrages of the Pindaris, should become inevitable, to narrow its sphere as much as possible, and to bring it to a conclusion as soon as we could, consistently with our honour and security. I could not but concur in the general principles which dictated this desire, as no one was ever more aware than I am of the positive evil that must result from any measures that produce even a temporary derangement of our finances. Under such impressions, nothing could have induced me to recommend the vigorous course of proceedings I have done, but the persuasion that it affords the only rational hope we can entertain of avoiding war with those powers who, from the character of their government, are likely to support the Pindaris; or, if that proves inevitable, of bringing it to speedy and honourable conclusion. After all, it is not unlikely my opinions may be erroneous—I can only say, that every fact and argument upon which they are grounded has been freely stated, and that I have communicated my sentiments with that sincerity and freedom, which Your Lordship's kindness and confidence, and the nature and importance of the subject demanded.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient  
humble servant,

J. MALCOLM.

Fort St. George,  
July, 12, 1817.

## APPENDIX V

# *Proceedings of Brigadier-General Malcolm*

FROM the 16th of January till the 20th of June, 1818, including those connected with the SUBMISSION and ABDICATION of the Peshwa Baji Rao.

To render this narrative more clear, it is necessary to preface it with some short remarks on the condition of Central India, which had been recently subdued and occupied by the British troops.

After the peace with Malhar Rao Holkar, which took place on the 6th of January, 1818, the Commander-in-chief, Sir Thomas Hislop, proceeded south, leaving Brigadier-general Malcolm in command of all the troops of the Madras army north of the Tapti. That officer first employed himself in efforts to promote the tranquillity of the western frontier of Marwar. Jaswant Rao Bhow, the rebellious chief of Jowud, submitted to him, when encamped at Nimahera, upon the 14th of February; and Karim Khan, the celebrated Pindari leader, gave himself up on the following day. Brigadier-general Malcolm, on the 23rd of February, sent the principal part of his force to Mahidpore, and proceeded himself with a light detachment to the court of Malhar Rao Holkar. After the object of his visit to that court was completed, he marched to Mahidpore, and joined the division. From that he moved to Ujjain, where the Bombay troops, under Major-general Sir William Kier, were then encamped. On the 12th of March the latter force moved for Gujarat, leaving Brigadier-general Malcolm a strong native brigade, and some battering guns. The Brigadier-general immediately made arrangements for restoring tranquillity to the country, which continued to be infested by loose bands of freebooters, and by those hereditary bodies of plunderers who, driven from their lands by the Mahrattas, had taken shelter in forests, mountains, and strongholds, and for half a century had

continually disturbed the peace of the country by a petty and harassing warfare upon its inhabitants. The most dreaded of these tribes in this part of Malwa were the Sondees, or inhabitants of Sondwarrah, the name given to the tract which stretches from Aggur to the Chambal, east and west, and from near Bampura to Ujjain, north and south. The position of this tract, and the numbers<sup>1</sup> and fame of these plunderers, required that a serious effort should be made to reduce them. The country they infested belonged to Holkar, Sindhia, Zalim Singh, Raja of Kota, and Tukoji Puar Raja of Dewass. Every arrangement was made to secure the benefit of a combined and simultaneous attack on these freebooters. The few troops Holkar could give to this service were at our disposal. From Sindhia, who fortunately had only one province in Sondwarrah, (that of Aggur,) much was not to be expected: but Brigadier-general Malcolm looked for every assistance from Zalim Singh, Raja of Kota, who possessed several of the finest of those districts that were to be rescued from the predatory incursions of the Sondees, and who had prepared a most efficient force, under one of his bravest officers, for co-operation in this object. The Raja of Dewass was alike destitute of power either to obstruct or forward this measure; but his disposition was quite friendly.

Brigadier-general Malcolm assigned the reduction of Sondwarrah, and of those chiefs in the vicinity by whom its plunderers were likely to be assisted, to the Bombay brigade, with six hundred irregular horse under Lieutenant-colonel Corsellis, who was directed to move down the Chambal from Nolye, and to attack, if they were not given up, the strongholds on and near the banks of that river; while a detachment, consisting of a battalion of Madras sepoy, commanded by Major Moodie, after being joined by some battering guns, moved from Mahidpore on the 11th of April, in co-operation with Mehrab Khan, the commander of the troops of the Kota Raja, against those fortresses which were more in the centre of the province. Lieutenant Low, first political assistant to Brigadier-general Malcolm, with a troop of cavalry, one company of sepoy, and 1000 of Holkar's horse, was sent to aid in these operations, and to negotiate amicable settlements with such of the chiefs as were disposed to submit. The principle upon which these settlements were

directed to be made, is distinctly stated, in the letter from Brigadier-general Malcolm, to the Governor-general, under date the 10th of May. "The engagement," he observes, "entered into through our mediation, by Holkar and Zalim Singh with the chief of Lalghur, the principal of the freebooters, I deem the most important, not from its reducing that formidable leader from a state of dangerous power, but as it exhibits the consideration with which we are disposed to treat those, whose habits, however indefensible in an abstract view, are to be in a great measure attributed to the general condition of that lawless society of which they formed a part. Where the ruler that claimed his obedience drew his resources from acts of violence and rapine, opposition became legitimate, and retaliation could hardly be condemned. It was the practice of the superior government, whenever it had the power, to plunder and destroy all those who had usurped upon its weakness, while the latter waited a moment of returning imbecility or division in its councils to take their revenge. I found, when I first contemplated the settlement of Sondwarrah, our allies anxious that we should become the instruments of extirpating a tribe whom they represented to be (and who actually were upon the principles they acted towards them) incorrigible; but I have endeavoured, and not, I trust, without success, to instil into their minds the seeds of a better system, which, while it punishes hardened offenders with unrelenting rigour, throws wide the door to those who are disposed to change their habits, and to partake of the benefits which are offered to all, in the prospect of general and permanent tranquillity."

The various attacks upon the Sondees who refused to submit were attended with complete success. In the space of six weeks thirteen strongholds were taken, and five of them razed to the ground. The freebooters had no safety but in flying to a distance, but wherever they went they found themselves proscribed as enemies to the English government, and to protect them was to provoke its vengeance. This produced such misery, that they came in one after another, giving up their horses, according to the terms prescribed, and obtaining leave to cultivate those fields which they had so long left sterile, to follow what they had found, in troubled times, the more profitable pursuit of plunder.

This service, on which the English displayed their usual discipline and courage, was marked by a most gallant achievement of the troops of Zalim Singh, the Raja of Kota, in an attack upon the village and fortress of Narrulla. They had very light artillery,<sup>2</sup> and the breach was very imperfect, but their brave and veteran commander, Mehrab Khan, fearing the garrison might escape during the night, ordered a storm. The resistance was desperate, the breach proving almost impracticable; but the attack was continued for two hours, and all obstacles at length overcome by the persevering courage of the assailants, more than two hundred of whom, with several officers of rank, were killed and wounded. Nearly the whole of the garrison were put to the sword.

Qadir Baksh, the principal of the Holkar Pindaris, with several of the other chiefs of that tribe, had given themselves up to Brigadier-general Malcolm, and had been sent with Karim Khan to Hindustan, to be settled in Gorakhpur, far from their former haunts and adherents. Accounts had been received that Chitu and Rajan, the two only remaining leaders of any consequence, had gone to Bhopal, to deliver themselves up; but this was soon followed up by intelligence that, not liking the terms, they had fled, and returned to the woods and fastnesses on the banks of the Narmada. Brigadier-general Malcolm considering that their re-assembling any followers would be attended with the worst consequences, moved south, on the 1st of April, with three battalions of sepoy, a regiment of cavalry, and two thousand irregular horse. He advanced himself on Banglee, directing Colonel R. Scott, with a strong detachment, on Indore, from whence, as well as Banglee, detachments were pushed into the forests in all directions. Rajan gave himself up, while Chitu succeeded with great difficulty in escaping across the Narmada, with ten or twelve adherents.

The chiefs who rule the tribes, or rather the robbers that inhabit the banks of the Narmada, from Hindea to Mohyseer, had long aided the Pindaris, and the army of Sir Thomas Hislop had been attacked as it passed their hills. On its march to the southward every pains were taken at this period by Brigadier-general Malcolm, and the officers under him, to conciliate their chiefs and these followers; at the same time they were threatened

with exemplary punishment if they continued to protect the Pindaris, or committed the slightest outrage, either upon the camp followers or the inhabitants of the country. The success of these measures was complete. Many of the Pindaris, whom they had concealed, were delivered up with their families and horses; and though our troops and convoys traversed this country in every direction, and in the smallest parties, not one instance occurred of attack or even robbery, and every chief came into Brigadier-general Malcolm's camp, to endeavour to cultivate his friendship, and to establish the claim of early submission to the British government.

The extinction of the Pindaris, the great success of our arms, the change made in the predatory government of Holkar, the expulsion or conversion into peaceable subjects of the Sondees, and the complete intimidation of the plunderers on the Narmada, had raised the reputation of the British government in this quarter as high as it was possible; and the return of the inhabitants to villages which had been deserted for many years, and the commencement of cultivation in every quarter, proclaimed the character of that confidence which had been established.

The dispersed plunderers, and the discontented part of the military population were at this period (the beginning of May) gratified by a report, apparently on a good foundation, that the Peshwa, aided by Ram Din, a rebel chief of the Holkar government, and many others, meant to enter Malwa. Brigadier-general Malcolm immediately reinforced the convoy that was marching to the Deccan from Hindia with the guns captured at Mahidpore, and the remaining sick and wounded of the Commander-in-chief's army; and, at the same time, sent a battalion of sepoy, under Lieutenant-colonel Smith, to Mundlesir, a small fort (belonging to the Peshwa) on the Narmada, within three miles of Chouly Mohyseer, directing him to take possession of it, and place posts at the fords in its vicinity. This service was effected without opposition, and gave strength at an essential point. Though certain accounts had been received that Baji Rao's army was retreating in a north-westerly direction, Brigadier-general Malcolm directed the escort with the guns, which he had strengthened to twelve companies of native infantry, four field pieces, and sixteen hundred irregular horse,

to proceed by Burhampur to Jaulnah. He considered that in the state the Peshwa's army must be in after their defeat and flight, they could not venture to attack such a corps. The event proved that the conclusion was correct. Baji Rao was within a short distance of this force on the 6th of May, but evidently too solicitous for his own safety to think of endangering that of others; and the distance which in his rapid flight he had gained upon Brigadier-general Doveton's force, placed him for the moment at ease, and he encamped near Dholkote,<sup>5</sup> where he began to refresh and to recruit his broken and dispirited troops. Brigadier-general Malcolm received this intelligence on his arrival at Mhow, a place twelve miles south-west of Indore, which he had fixed upon for his principal cantonments during the remaining part of the hot season and the approaching rains. He immediately ordered Lieutenant-colonel Russell, with a regiment of cavalry, to proceed to Hindia, meaning him, after being joined by eight companies of the battalion in garrison at that fort, and three hundred Mysore horse, to form a detachment ready to act as circumstances might direct. Six companies of sepoys were at the same time moved to Onchode, a commanding spot on the top of the Ghat: two sent to reinforce Hindia; one to guard the pass of Peepulda, about thirty miles to the west of Onchode; while a detachment of three companies was ordered to guard the Ghats in the Dhar country, and a ford at Chikulda, on the Narmada, about fifty-five miles west of Mohyseer.

These arrangements, and the state of alertness in which Brigadier-general Malcolm kept the remainder of his force, made it almost impossible that Baji Rao could enter Malwa in force at any point on this line, without being attacked; and to secure against his making an attempt to cross the Narmada to the eastward, Brigadier-general Watson was requested to send what he could spare of his light troops. The general complied with the requisition, and an efficient light corps, under Major Cuming, advanced to Kotra, a place about forty miles west of Hoshangabad, completed the defensive arrangements to cover the southern frontier of Malwa, from the eastern parts of Bhopal to the west of the territories of Dhar.

The revived hopes of the freebooters who, though subdued, were still scattered over Malwa—the discontent which the late

changes had created in numbers—and, above all, the uncertainty of the line of policy that Sindhia might pursue, and the knowledge that the greater part of his provincial governors, and almost every Mahratta officer either in his or Holkar's government, cherished sentiments hostile to our interests,—rendered it of the utmost importance that every effort should be made to prevent the Peshwa entering a country in which his presence was certain to spread again the flame of discord and war.

Brigadier-general Malcolm received accounts that vakils or envoys from the Peshwa, with overtures for peace, were within two marches of his camp. He immediately directed that he should be permitted to advance, and Anand Rao Jaswant, and two other vakils, charged with a letter from Baji Rao, reached the Brigadier-general's camp at Mhow, late at night on the 16th of May. This letter was expressive of the Peshwa's wish for peace, and requesting particularly that General Malcolm (whom he styled one of his oldest and best friends) would undertake the office of re-establishing a good understanding between him and the British government.

Brigadier-general Malcolm had a long private conference with the vakils, in which they chiefly endeavoured to persuade him that the Peshwa personally had always been averse to the war, and next to urge as much as possible that the Brigadier-general would comply with Baji Rao's request, by going to see him in his camp. With this the Brigadier-general refused to comply, because, in the first place, he thought that his doing so might give an impression of a solicitude on our part for peace, which would have an injurious tendency; and, in the second, it would prevent his being able to direct those dispositions of his troops that were necessary, either to intimidate Baji Rao into submission, or to pursue his army with success, in the event of the negotiation being broken off. With the view, however, of showing due consideration for this prince's feelings, and of giving him confidence to act upon the overture, as well as to gain the best information that could be obtained of the actual state of his army, he determined on sending Lieutenant Low, his first, and Lieutenant Macdonald, his second, political assistant, to the Peshwa's camp. He had distinctly informed the vakils that their master must prepare himself to abandon his



throne, and to quit the Deccan, as what had occurred, and particularly the proclamation which had recently been issued (and under which we had occupied his country), put it out of the power of the English government to recede from a measure quite essential to the peace of India. Brigadier-general Malcolm wrote to the Peshwa that he had communicated fully with his vakils, and requested him, if he was sincere in his professed wish for peace, to come forward immediately with Lieutenant Low towards the Narmada, accompanied only by his principal chiefs, and promising that, on his doing so, the Brigadier-general would meet him unattended, if he required it, and discuss all matters respecting the terms which the British government were willing to grant to him.

The chief object of Lieutenant Low's mission was to ascertain the actual condition of the Peshwa, and the sincerity of his professions, and to endeavour to hasten his advance to meet Brigadier-general Malcolm; but that officer was directed to state in the fullest manner to Baji Rao the principles upon which alone the Brigadier-general could agree to negotiate. These were, first, that Baji Rao should abandon his condition as a sovereign prince: secondly, that he could not be allowed to reside in the Deccan.

It was also to be stated that he would be expected, as a proof of his sincerity, to give up (if he had the power to do so) Trimbakji Dinglia, and the murderers of Captain Vaughan and his brother, two officers who had been inhumanly massacred at Telligaum.<sup>5</sup>

Lieutenant Low proceeded on the 18th of May, accompanied by the vakils. He took the route of Mundlesir, in order to have an opportunity of taking a small escort from the battalion of that place, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Smith.

On the night of the 18th intelligence reached Brigadier-general Malcolm of Appa Saheb (the ex-Raja of Nagpur) having escaped from confinement; and conceiving it very likely that this event might make some alteration in the Peshwa's intentions, further instructions were sent on the 20th instant to Lieutenant Low, directing him to send Baji Rao's vakils, accompanied by one or two native agents, in advance, and only to go on to his camp in the event of the vakils returning within a short period

and inviting him, on the part of their master, to do so. Lieutenant-colonel Smith was also directed to cross the Narmada with his battalion and some native horse; and Lieutenant Low was ordered to accompany that detachment by easy stages, instead of taking only a few men, as was at first intended. The object of this change was to enable Lieutenant-colonel Smith to co-operate with Brigadier-general Doveton and Lieutenant-colonel Russell, in pursuing and destroying Baji Rao, in the event of his resolving again to try his fortune in the field. Brigadier-general Malcolm, in the meantime, having completed some military arrangements for preventing Baji Rao's entering Malwa, moved with a small detachment to Mundlesir, where he arrived on the 22nd of May.

Sir John Malcolm, in the event of Baji Rao's advancing, proposed to remain near Mundlesir, and keep his other corps (except Lieutenant-colonel Smith's) in the positions they then occupied; but he was soon convinced, by the delays of the vakils and the evasions of the Peshwa, that this course must be abandoned. He had heard of Brigadier-general Doveton's arrival with a considerable force at Burhampur, within fourteen miles of Baji Rao, and of the consequent alarm of that prince; who, however, instead of moving at once, as was expected, in the direction of Mundlesir, had only marched a few miles, to induce Subedar Saed Husain<sup>e</sup> (Sir John's native aide-de-camp) to forward a letter to Brigadier-general Doveton, requesting that officer, in the event of the Peshwa's moving towards Brigadier-general Malcolm, to refrain from attacking him. These circumstances made the latter officer determine to advance; and he at the same time directed Lieutenant-colonel Russell to move from Charwah (the position he first occupied) to Borgham, meaning his corps to guard against any attempt of Baji Rao at escape to the north-east.

Early on the morning of the 27th of May, Sir John Malcolm reached Bekungong, by a forced march, the day after the arrival of Baji Rao's vakils, who had been sent in advance, and had returned with assurances of their master's sincerity, and of his anxiety that Lieutenant Low should proceed to his camp. This the Brigadier-general directed that officer to do immediately, and after repeating what he had before stated to the vakils, he

told them they might see from his proceeding that there was no time for delay, and that, as a sincere friend, he warned Baji Rao to come to a resolution at once, either to continue the war, or to throw himself upon the clemency and generosity of the British government, as, under the circumstances in which he was placed, any middle course was destruction.

Lieutenant Low, in an interview he had with Baji Rao on the 29th of May, the day of his arrival in that prince's camp, found he continued to expect much better terms than it was possible to grant to him. He was still, to all appearance, confident of being permitted to retain the name at least of Peshwa, and of being allowed (though with very circumscribed power) to reside at Poona. He appeared in a state of great alarm about his own personal safety in the proposed meeting with Brigadier-general Malcolm, and entreated most earnestly that the troops of the latter might all be withdrawn to a considerable distance; but finding the Brigadier-general's resolution to refuse compliance with these demands was not to be shaken, he at last consented to come to Khairie (about half a mile on the plain to the north of the mountain-pass of that name) on the 1st of June,<sup>7</sup> on the following conditions:—

That he was to bring two thousand men; that Brigadier-general Malcolm was only to bring a small escort, leaving his force at Metawul, about ten miles off; and that he (Baji Rao) should be permitted to retire again in safety to his own camp after the meeting, if he should wish to do so.

These conditions were acceded to, and Baji Rao reached his tents at the place appointed about five o'clock in the evening. Brigadier-general Malcolm arrived soon afterwards, accompanied by the officers of his family, and an escort of two companies of sepoy.

The party were received in open Durbar, where little passed beyond the complimentary inquiries usual on such occasions. After a few minutes Baji Rao requested Brigadier-general Malcolm would retire with him to another tent. This conference lasted between two and three hours, during which the Peshwa dwelt upon his misfortunes, and the situation to which he was reduced, and used all his eloquence (which is considerable) to excite pity in the mind of Sir John Malcolm, by appealing to

their former friendship. "He alone (he observed) remained of his three oldest and best friends: Colonel Close was dead, and General Wellesley in a distant land. In this hour of difficulty and distress, flatterers (he said) fled, and old adherents even were quitting him: a real friend was, therefore, his only stay. He believed (he added) he possessed that treasure in General Malcolm, and that he had sought a meeting with him on the present occasion with an anxiety proportioned to the importance that it had in his mind!" General Malcolm's reply to his address went, in the first place, to explain to him personally (as he had done before through others) the only terms which could be granted, using every argument to satisfy his judgment that his acceptance of these terms was the wisest course he could pursue. He at the same time stated that the decision of the British government, as to his abandoning all claims to sovereignty, was irrevocable; and that it would be completely inconsistent with the character of a true friend, if he was to flatter Baji Rao's hopes with prospects which could never be realized. Brigadier-general Malcolm, after remarking "that this was a crisis in his life when Badjerow must show to what degree he possessed the courage and virtues of a man, by resigning himself to the situation to which he had reduced himself," concluded by distinctly informing him that no further delay whatever could be admitted.

The limits of this narrative do not admit of a full detail of this conference; suffice it to say that every point was discussed, and it ended in Baji Rao's entreating that they might meet again next day. This was resisted by Brigadier-general Malcolm, who perceived from it and other expressions that the Peshwa's mind was not yet made up to submission; and this circumstance, added to the fact of his having the day before sent the whole of his property into Asingarh,<sup>8</sup> satisfied the Brigadier-general that not a moment was to be lost in bringing matters to a close.

Brigadier-general Malcolm returned to his tent about ten o'clock p.m., and the Peshwa immediately re-ascended the ghat, where he had some guns placed to protect his retreat. So strong were his fears of an attack, notwithstanding all the endeavours that had been made to set his mind at rest on that point.

Brigadier-general Malcolm immediately sent to Baji Rao the following schedule of an agreement for his signature:

"1st. That Badjerow shall resign, for himself and successors, all right, title, and claim over the government of Poonah, or to any sovereign power whatever.

"2nd. That Badjerow shall immediately come with his family, and a small number of his adherents and attendants, to the camp of Brigadier-general Malcolm, where he shall be received with honour and respect, and escorted safe to the city of Benares, or any other sacred place in Hindustan that the Governor-general may, at his request, fix for his residence.

"3rd. On account of the peace of the Deckan, and the advanced state of the season, Badjerow must proceed to Hindustan without one day's delay; but General Malcolm engages that any part of his family that may be left behind shall be sent to him as early as possible, and every facility given to render their journey speedy and convenient.

"4th. That Badjerow shall, on his voluntarily agreeing to this arrangement, receive a liberal pension from the Company's government, for the support of himself and family. The amount of this pension will be fixed by the Governor-general; but Brigadier-general Malcolm takes upon himself to engage that it shall not be less than eight lacs of rupees per annum.

"5th. If Badjerow, by a ready and complete fulfilment of this agreement, shows that he reposes entire confidence in the British government, his requests in favour of principal jahgeerdars and old adherents, who have been ruined by their attachment to him, will meet with liberal attention. His representations, also, in favour of Brahmins of remarkable character, and of religious establishments founded or supported by his family, shall be treated with regard.

"6th. The above propositions must not only be accepted by Badjerow, but he must personally come into Brigadier-general Malcolm's camp within twenty-four hours of this period, or else hostilities will be recommenced, and no further negotiation will be entered into with him."

These propositions were forwarded to Baji Rao early on the morning of the first of June, with a message that no alteration could take place, and not the slightest delay could be permitted.

As twenty-four hours only were granted to Baji Rao to come to a final resolution, every arrangement was made to attack him

at the expiration of that period, in the event of his breaking off the negotiation.

This day (the 2nd of June) passed in constant messengers from the Peshwa, and from his principal officer. The latter, as the crisis approached, became anxious about their individual interests, attention to which, Sir John Malcolm informed them, could alone be given on their promoting the great object, the submission of the Peshwa, and the termination of the war.

The state of affairs at this period is described in Brigadier-general Malcolm's despatch to Mr. Secretary Adam, of the 4th of June, in which he also gives an account of Baji Rao's submission. "It would fill a volume", he observes, "to detail the particulars of all the intrigues which occurred. I have never, in the course of my experience, witnessed a scene in which every shade of the Indian character was more strongly displayed. It is honourable to the Vinchoor Jahgeerdar, to the Purrender chief, and the manager of the interests of the Gokla family, that, though they professed themselves hopeless of every success, and were convinced by my arguments that Badjerow had no choice but submission, they took care to make me distinctly understand (when I informed them that their only claim rested on the success of their influence in promoting this measure,) that though they would use every means of persuasion and remonstrance to effect the end, harshness or coercion they would never resort to.<sup>9</sup> I told them such conduct was not required of them; I respected, I added, their spirit of allegiance, but the moment was come when their interests and those of their prince alike required that an end should be put to a ruinous and ineffectual struggle, and that if their passiveness allowed the counsels of those worthless and wicked men, who had brought Badjerow to his present state, to complete his destruction, their delicacy would be termed imbecility, and that they could henceforward neither expect gratitude from their prince, nor consideration from us; and, to conclude, I told them plainly, that unless he came to my camp next day, I desired never to know more of them or their claims. As individuals they were nothing, as attached adherents to a fallen prince, who might by their firmness save him and themselves from total ruin, they had importance for a moment, but that, if lost, would never return. As the vakeels of the

Vinchoor chief and Abba Purrender were leaving me at eleven o'clock, on the night of the 2nd, I told them I knew Badjerow had sent some of his most valuable property into Asseerghur the day after I arrived at Metawul, which was no proof of confidence. Report said he meant to take refuge there. If he did it was his last stake, and if they permitted him to adopt such a course, they and their families would merit all the ruin that would fall upon their heads. When these vakeels left camp, I permitted one of my writers to give them, secretly and as from himself, a copy of my letter of the day before to Badjerow, and of the propositions I had offered for his acceptance. They perused them, he told me, with eagerness, and the knowledge of the consideration meant to be given to them, in the event of a settlement, appeared to quicken their zeal in no slight degree. When I dismissed these vakeels, I sent for an agent of Badjerow, whom I had on my first arrival at Metawul invited to my camp, and permitted to lay dawks<sup>10</sup> and send hirkarrals<sup>11</sup> in every direction, in order to allay the fears and suspicions of Badjerow, with regard to my intended movements and attacks, for there was no ground on which I had from the first more fear of failure than his excessive timidity. I now told this man that he must return to his master, he could no longer remain in my camp, but that he might write or say that I did not mean to move till six o'clock next morning. I should then march to near Khairee, and Badjerow, if he intended to accept the terms, must leave the hills, and encamp near my force by twelve o'clock. I at the same time told him to inform Badjerow, that Colonel Russell had moved to Borgham, to attack any of Trimbuckjee's followers in that quarter, and that Brigadier-general Doveton, whom I had informed of Badjerow's wish for that freebooter being destroyed, would no doubt march against him tomorrow.

"I had just heard from my assistant, Lieutenant Low, whom I had, to facilitate my communication, kept a few miles in advance, that the messengers he had sent with the letter and propositions had returned and represented Badjerow as full of professions, but in a very vacillating state of mind, and anxious beyond all description for another day's delay, as the 3rd of June was, he said, an unlucky day, and he had religious ceremonies to perform of the most indispensable nature, before he could come

to my camp. I affected to be very indignant at this conduct; I desired Lieutenant Low not only to send away, but turn back any person desiring to communicate with him from Badjerow's camp. I at the same ordered parties of horse to occupy the roads to my camp, to prevent the approach of any messenger whatever. Having adopted these steps, about two o'clock of the morning of the 3rd, in a manner so public that I knew they would reach Badjerow through many channels, I marched at six o'clock, and reached this ground<sup>12</sup> about nine.

"Soon after Anund Row Jeswunt came near me, in a state of much trepidation; I asked him where were his promises of sincerity, and bade him return. He said 'This is an unlucky day.' I replied, it would prove a most unlucky one for his master, if he did not come in. 'I mean every thing kind,' I added, 'to Badjerow, but he forces me to these extremities, and from his character, nothing short of them will bring him to a resolution that is so obviously for the interest of him, and all that are personally dependant upon him.' He begged me to send some person to assure his mind, 'for he is at this moment,' he added, 'in the greatest alarm.' 'At what is he alarmed,' I asked, 'at the propositions?' He replied he would consent to them. 'Does he suspect me of treachery?' I demanded, with some degree of anger. 'No!' he said, 'but the orders of the Governor-general might compel you to put guards and sentries over him, and then he would be disgraced for ever.' 'You may return,' I replied, 'to Badjerow, and tell him from me, that I have no such orders; that the settlement I had ventured to make, in anticipation of the Governor-general's approbation, was too liberal to make me think it possible any human being, in Badjerow's situation, would ever attempt to escape from it, and if he did, he would forfeit all future claims whatever, and the English government would be freed from a large disbursement which it has agreed to increase, more from a feeling of what was due to its own dignity, than to any claims which he had to its consideration.' Anund Row seemed pleased with this answer, and galloped off. I sent a respectable Brahmin to hasten Badjerow; and, at the same time, to desire that the Mahratta sirdars alone should accompany him to the ground near my camp. This was complied with, and Ram Dun and a body of infantry were directed to encamp in



the rear. The firing of some guns in the quarter of Asseer (probably from Brigadier-general Doveton's attack of Trimbuckjee)<sup>13</sup> served not a little to quicken the march; and at eleven o'clock Badjerow came near my camp. Lieutenant Low went to meet him, and reported him in better spirits than he had yet seen him. I meant to pay my respects in the evening, but was prevented by a very violent storm."

The force that accompanied Baji Rao to Brigadier-general Malcolm's camp was between four and five thousand horse, and about three thousand infantry; of these twelve hundred were Arabs, whose numbers were increased two days afterwards to nearly two thousand, by the junction of parties that had been left to guard the passes in the hills. Sir John Malcolm was determined, as he wrote to the Governor-general,<sup>14</sup> "not to disturb by harsh interference the last moments of intercourse between a fallen prince and his remaining adherents." His experience led him to expect that this force would gradually dissolve, and he knew in its actual state it possessed no means of combined action.

Baji Rao proceeded towards the Narmada with General Malcolm's force for several marches, without anything very particular having occurred, beyond that of some of his followers leaving him, to return to their homes in the Deccan. A large body, however, still remained, in spite of the friendly remonstrances of Sir John Malcolm, who pointed out the imprudence of keeping together such a number of armed men; the great proportion of whom must, from their situation, be discontented. He particularly adverted to the Arabs, from whose violence and desperation the worst consequences were to be dreaded. The Peshwa and those about him, to whom this advice was addressed at different times, always admitted its truth, but little attention was paid to it; Baji Rao seemed to cling to the shadow of that power he once possessed. He appeared as if afraid to own to himself, or to others, his actual condition; and this conduct was still further influenced by that suspicion and timidity which marks his character, and which Sir John Malcolm knew he could alone overcome by an absence of solicitude, and a conduct that showed that no apprehensions were entertained of his acting contrary to his engagements. If Baji Rao had real fears of treachery, such a course was the only

way to remove them. If he cherished plans of deceit, his pursuit of them was not likely to be encouraged by an indifference which he could alone refer to a consciousness of strength. Acting upon these considerations Brigadier-general Malcolm indulged Baji Rao in his hours of marching, and in his desire to encamp at some distance from the English force, always giving his opinion, as a friend, of the dangers to which he exposed himself, by continuing to repose in the mercenaries by whom he was accompanied. An occasion soon occurred that made the Peshwa sensible to all the value of the councils he had neglected, and threw him completely upon the protection of the Brigadier-general.

The Arabs, amounting to about two thousand, who had been hired some months before by Trimbakji Dinglia, demanded their arrears from Baji Rao. That prince was willing to pay them for the period during which they had been actually with his camp, but the Arabs insisted upon pay from the date they were hired by Trimbakji; and on his refusing compliance with this demand, they surrounded his tent, and would not allow him to move. This occurred on the 9th of June, on which day a march had been ordered, and a considerable part of Sir John Malcolm's force, with the whole of the baggage, had gone on to the next stage. The Brigadier-general himself had, as usual, remained behind to see Baji Rao off the ground; and he had this day, in the apprehension that something might occur, kept with him a regiment of cavalry, two gallopers, and six companies of infantry. From the first accounts of this mutiny he was led to expect Baji Rao would be able to settle the matter himself. The whole day, however, passed without any prospect of affairs being brought to a conclusion. The Arabs seemed determined to insist upon their original demands, nor was it certain they would be satisfied with them; and to make affairs worse, their example had excited mutiny among some Rohillas, and, indeed, all the infantry in camp. Baji Rao's alarm for his life was excessive, but while he continued to call on Brigadier-general Malcolm for relief, he sent message after message to entreat that not a man should be moved, as he thought that the least stir in the English camp would be the signal for his murder.

Under these circumstances, Sir John Malcolm directed that

part of his force which had marched, to return to Scone. He had some communications, in the course of the evening, with the chiefs of the mutineers. These appeared reasonable, but said they could not control their men. He sent to Baji Rao to entreat he would compose himself during the night, assuring him that he should be relieved early in the morning. Brigadier-general Malcolm also sent messages to the Arabs and Rohillas, warning them, as they dreaded extirpation, from proceeding to violence; and at the same time stating that he would guarantee that those promises which had been voluntarily made to them by the Peshwa should be faithfully performed. These measures kept all quiet for the night.

At daylight Brigadier-general Malcolm had intelligence of the troops which had proceeded in advance being on the return, and within a very short distance. He had already personally reconnoitred Baji Rao's camp, which was irregularly pitched along a nullah (or ravine), the banks of which were very uneven, and covered with trees and bushes that were favourable for the irregular infantry that he had to coerce. The country to the west, however, rose gradually from the ravine, and he found on that side a commanding ground, upon which he drew up his force, within three hundred yards of the front of Baji Rao's camp. He had only, when all were assembled, four hundred native cavalry, seven hundred sepoy, three brigades of six-pounders, and six hundred irregular horse; but his confidence in the tried courage and discipline of this small body of men was too complete to leave a doubt upon his mind as to the result, should matters have come to an extremity. He was, however, very desirous to avoid such a result. The troops were ordered to take the most open distance, and the cavalry to form in single rank, that the extended appearance of the line might intimidate into submission those to whom they were opposed.

The moment was one of great anxiety: the object was to reduce the mutineers to order, without coming to action; for if that took place, it seemed next to certain that Baji Rao, whose tent their position encircled, must have lost his life, either by accident or from their violence. The latter, from the character of the Arabs, was the most probable: it was, besides, obvious that almost all his family, and a great number of defenceless

persons (including women and children), would have been killed. The mutineers calculated on the strength they derived from this circumstance, and would not allow a single person to move from their camp.

Though the guns were loaded with grape, and matches lighted, the strictest commands were given not to fire till ordered. The Arabs, who advanced near to the right of the line, opened a fire and wounded<sup>15</sup> some sepoys. The troops, though eager to attack, remained steady and obedient to their orders, which were repeated by the Brigadier-general in person when the casualties were reported. At this moment Syed Zeyn, the principal Arab chief, who was evidently alarmed at the formidable appearance of the line, came in advance to request a parley. Sir John Malcolm, before he would listen to him, commanded him to stop the fire, at the hazard of an instant assault. He despatched one of his attendants to do so, and came forward himself with an earnest entreaty that matters should be settled. Baji Rao had, he said, paid the greater part of their demands: there were remaining but a few trifling points, which if Brigadier-general Malcolm would only inquire into, all parties would agree to abide by the award of his justice. The required promise was given, and Syed Zeyn galloped back to his men to remove them from Baji Rao's tent. He returned, without effecting this purpose, accompanied by all the leaders of the Arabs. "These men," he said to the General, "must have each your hand given to them that you will not attack them after they have released the Paishwah." Sir John Malcolm gave his hand to every Jemidar, and the assurance they asked. They returned, and the Arab flags were immediately seen moving towards their own tents. A few minutes afterwards, Baji Rao, attended by some horse, came in front of the English line; Brigadier-general Malcolm complimented him with a general salute. This was done to increase the effect which it was hoped what had passed would have upon his mind, and to strike deeper the contrast between the disgrace and danger of the situation from which he had escaped, and that safety and honourable treatment which he secured by relying solely on the protection of the British government.

Never was a result more happy than that which attended the

events of the day. Baji Rao was profuse in his expressions to Brigadier-general Malcolm, who was, he said, the friend decreed to save his honour and his life. He had erred, he added, for the last time, and would now do anything the General wished. He was desired to move on immediately ten miles on the route to the Narmada, with those adherents that were to accompany him, while Brigadier-general Malcolm stayed behind to grant passports to the remainder, and to see that the Arabs, Rohillas and others, fulfilled their engagements of departing towards their respective homes. All this was effected with the most perfect good temper in a few hours, and the chiefs of the mutineers were hardly less grateful than Baji Rao for the manner in which they had been treated. Their astonishment was greatly excited by the forbearance of the English troops, who, indeed, behaved admirably.

Sir John Malcolm, in the Division Order which he afterwards issued, thus expressed the sense he entertained of the conduct of the force under his command, on this trying occasion: "Brigadier-general Malcolm congratulates the force under his command upon their recrossing the Nerbudda, and the termination of a campaign rendered glorious by great political events and splendid military achievements. The corps which compose this force obtained in the beginning of this war the highest applause for their distinguished gallantry, and during the last six months that they have been incessantly employed in restoring order and tranquillity to countries long subject to anarchy and oppression, they have shown all the qualities of good soldiers. Fortune has given them a part in the last operations of the campaign, and they have had the gratification of witnessing the submission of the Paishwah Badjerow, the only enemy that remained to the British government. The course of this service has afforded no opportunity for signalizing their courage, but in all the measures which Brigadier-general Malcolm thought it his duty to adopt, and particularly in those of the 10th instant, when he had to quell a dangerous mutiny in Badjerow's camp, he proceeded with a confidence that nothing but complete reliance upon those under his command could have inspired. The awe with which their order and appearance struck a lawless soldiery, was increased by that coolness which ever

accompanied determined intrepidity. The moment was critical—a body of insubordinate men whom they could easily have destroyed, opened a fire, which, had it been returned, might have involved consequences injurious to the British fame, and distressing to humanity. The troops saw their comrades wounded and remained unmoved—they attended only to orders. The result was all that could be wished, and on this occasion discipline obtained a triumph far beyond the reach of valour!”

Baji Rao, subsequent to this event, complied with every wish expressed by Brigadier-general Malcolm, with respect to his marching, place of encampment, and indeed on all other points. His attendants were reduced to between six and seven hundred horse, and two hundred infantry, and he himself became daily more reconciled to his condition. There was indeed every reason why he should be so. The provision made for him was most princely, and far beyond what he had, from his treacherous conduct, any right to expect, but the considerations which led to this arrangement had little reference to his personal character or merits; it was grounded, first, on the policy of terminating the war, which included the necessity of paying an adequate price for the submission of a sovereign, who, while he continued in opposition, kept all India agitated and unsettled. The second consideration referred to what was due to the dignity of the British government, whose conduct on all similar occasions had been marked by the utmost liberality; and, lastly, it appeared an important object to make an impression, that while it reconciled all ranks to the great change that had occurred, left a sentiment of grateful feeling, in the minds of the Peshwa's former adherents, towards a government which, in the hour of victory, forgot its own wrongs, and respected their prejudices in its treatment of their fallen prince.

With respect to the effect this liberality is likely to have upon Baji Rao himself, though gratitude cannot be looked for from a prince towards the power which has dethroned him; yet he must be expected to act even in his reduced state from motives that are influenced by the treatment he receives, and the better his condition, the less he will be inclined to hazard a change. The annual sum granted to Baji Rao, though princely for the support of an individual, is nothing for the purposes of ambition; but

supposing his habits of intrigue so inveterate, and his ambition so unconquerable, that he should make another attempt at sovereignty—what hopes can he entertain of success? He has, by becoming a voluntary exile, emancipated his subjects from their allegiance. His former and oldest adherents, released from their duty to him, have been left to form new ties, and to pursue the path of their individual interests. Were he even of a different character, success in such an effort would be impossible; as it is, there can be no hesitation in concluding with Brigadier-general Malcolm, "That Badjerow has unstrung a bow which he never can re-bend."<sup>16</sup>

## APPENDIX VI

### *Speech of Sir John Malcolm*

*Delivered at a General Court of Proprietors of East-India  
Stock, on Friday, July 9th, 1824*

SIR J. MALCOLM rose and said—"It certainly was not my intention to have spoken, unless personally alluded to in the course of the debate. What the honourable proprietor (Mr. Kinnaid) has said regarding my sentiments on publication in England, would not have made me depart from the resolution I had taken; but I cannot sit patiently and hear the abuse (I must call it so) that has been lavished upon Mr. Adam. The honourable proprietor has given high eulogiums to Mr. Buckingham, and he has closed them with a profession, that all he thought of that gentleman's character from his writings and actions, had been confirmed by his personal acquaintance since his arrival in England. I can speak of Mr. Adam on an intimate knowledge of thirty years: he is as remarkable for mildness and humanity as for firmness and judgment; he is from birth and education a lover of the free constitution of his country, and all he has done in the case now before us has, I am assured, proceeded solely from an imperious sense of public duty. It is, however, trifling with the great subject before us, to waste our time in discussing the respective merits of Mr. Adam and Mr. Buckingham; but even to understand this small part of the question, we must first consider the scene in which they acted. Let us commence by looking at the character of our Indian government, and then determine how far such a free press, as that which is the boast of England, can be transplanted to that distant possession. This is the real question and it should be met openly and decidedly. The facts appear to me only to require to be fairly and boldly brought forward, to convince every reasonable man of the nature of the measure proposed. To enable us to judge of the probable operation of this measure, we must take a near view of the component parts of that body called the Public, in England, whose



character makes the good outweigh the evil of a free press. Will the honourable proprietor (Mr. Kinnaird) who has made the motion, or him by whom it was seconded, (Mr. Hume,) admit that officers of His Majesty's army and navy, that secretaries, under-secretaries, and clerks in public offices, or men immediately dependent on the favour of government, or upon that of the paid servants of the state, are essential parts of that body? Certainly not: but I will go further; I assert that those noblemen who form the House of Peers, and the gentry of England who sit in the House of Commons, though they are a part, are not the most essential one, of the public of whom I speak. They must, in some degree, be swayed by their connexions, their interests, and their political parties. Far less can we number, as men who ought to have superior weight in this body, the lowest orders of this community, who are too uninstructed to judge political questions, or the demagogues who lead them, or those daily periodical writers who gain popularity and profit by flattering the self-love and the passions of the lower orders, as well as that of the party feelings and pride of the higher. All these mix with, and are parts of, what I understand by a British public: but the essential component part of that body, that which gives gravity and steadiness to the whole, lies, as the ballast of the vessel ought, in the centre. It is that numerous class who occupy the middle ranks of life, whose education and knowledge places them above being misled like the lower order, and who are, from their occupation, free from many of those motives which influence the servants of the state, and all who can be benefited by its favour, or injured by its displeasure; and who are also in a great degree removed from the passions and feelings which gives so strong a bias to the lowest and highest orders of society. It is the minds, and the character of this middle class, which give them that decided weight they have in a British public. Though less forward and much less heard than the other classes, they govern them: it is their moderation and good sense, combined with their habits of thinking and of forming a judgment, on all points connected with the constitution and the prosperity of their country, that enables it to have a press free, in a degree unknown to other nations! Without this class, it would be a curse instead of a blessing. Now, I will ask, have

we one of the class I have described in India? (I speak now of the English in that country:) there is not an individual. The English community, I will not call them a public (in the sense that term has been used,) are almost all in the employ of government, and the few that are not, are persons who reside there for a period by licence, under the covenants and legal restrictions which we have just heard read, and the value of which was well explained by an able proprietor (Mr. Impey). If it is wrong, from considerations of state policy, to deprive these persons of any of the privileges which they would have enjoyed had they remained in their native land, why, it is assuredly the law that it is wrong, not those who act under its authority. Let, therefore, this subject be taken up on its true grounds; let an effort be made to alter the law; but this is not the place. There are present those who have the power to bring it before the parliament of the country, where it will be fully discussed; and, in my opinion, the more discussion it receives the better. The good sense of the people of England will not be slow to decide, whether a free press, such as they enjoy, can be established and exist in a country governed, as British India, by absolute power. But there are parts of this subject on which I must not be mistaken; I have stated that the English community in India neither are, nor ever can be, a body resembling the public in England: but it is a happy effect of our constitution, that a portion of that spirit of liberty and independence, which gives life and vigour to the mother-country, is spread to her most distant colonies; and all, even to her armies, partake so much of the blessing as is consistent with their condition, and with the safety of the state. Though such communities may be so situated as to render a free press dangerous both to themselves and government, they have a right to expect from the latter as much of information and of free communication as is consistent with the public safety: the tone and temper of an English society can be preserved in no other mode. I am, and ever have been, the advocate of publicity in all affairs of government; I hate concealment and mystification: good and wise measures will ever gain strength from daylight. For such reasons, though a decided opponent to a free press in India, by which I mean one, that, being restrained only by the laws made for the

press in England, could publish a series of such articles as we have heard read from the *Calcutta Journal*; which, though not punishable by law, must, if permitted, prove deeply injurious to the reputation and strength of the local government. Though I am, I say, an enemy to such a press, I am friendly to any publication that refrains from those subjects that have been properly prohibited. We have had these prohibitions read, and the honourable mover of the question has depicted them as calculated to degrade all to whom they apply; but this is not their operation. There have been no complaints but those found in the pages of Mr. Buckingham's paper, which it has suited the case of the honourable proprietor to represent as the exclusive organ of the public. This gentleman, from the moment he landed in India, became, according to him, the solitary upholder of English liberty in that enslaved country, and this arduous task he is represented to have undertaken and performed from the most pure and disinterested motives! He found the office of censor removed, and the restrictions which were imposed when it was done away he considered as waste paper. These restrictions, however, which were orders of government, were, in my mind, more severe on the press than the censorship. I decidedly prefer the latter; for where it is established, its responsibility rests where it ought, with those who have the actual power to restrain and to punish; while, in the other case, it is left to those who may have less knowledge and discretion, and who are more likely, through indiscretion, inadvertence, or from motives of feeling, or of interest, to offend against the government. There is something, no doubt, odious in the name of censor; but it signifies not, if it is necessary; and if the law authorizes such a check upon publication, it cannot, for the good of all parties, be too openly and too decidedly exercised. As for myself, I have, from all the knowledge I have of the scene and of the society, no fear of any harsh or unwise exertion of this power: but to be satisfied that we are safe upon this and all other matters affecting the rights and privileges of our countrymen abroad, let us pause to look at the actual condition of those tyrants and despots (as they have been termed) under whose authority they live. The Governor-general of India, and governors of the different settlements are either noblemen or gentlemen sent from England, or persons

who have raised themselves by their services in India, and the latter fill all the high offices under government. The race of nabobs who are said to have once existed (I never knew any of them) are extinct. Those who fill the highest situations in India are seldom, if ever, elevated to any forgetfulness of their character as English gentlemen. They proceed to the execution of their important duties, as men go in this country to those of an office; their minds are neither corrupted by intrigues, nor disturbed by dreams of irrational ambition. They enjoy, it is true, great, and in some cases, as I have said, absolute power: the situation of the country they govern requires it, and the law of England sanctions it: but there never were men who exercised power under such checks. Leaving out of the question that natural desire to stand well with the community of their countrymen, over whom they are temporarily placed, and not adverting to their views of returning as early as they can to their native land, and of enjoying that fair esteem and consideration in England to which any cruel or unnecessary exercise of arbitrary powers would be fatal; leaving, I say, these motives (powerful as they must be in the breast of every Englishman) out of the question, let us examine what are the other checks under which they exercise power: first, their measures in detail are submitted to the Court of Directors; we all know the composition of that court; assuredly it is not probable it will support despotic acts; but suppose it was to do so, its proceedings, whenever called for, must be laid before the Court of Proprietors, and, judging from the two last meetings of that body, those who exercise power in India must expect rough handling in it. Their next ordeal is the Board of Control, which, though associated with the Court of Directors in the administration of our eastern empire, is, by one of those happy anomalies which characterize every part of our constitution, composed of persons whose situations and views must lead them to judge questions on very different grounds from the Directors; but their confirmation even of the measures adopted by the Indian governments is not final; the vigilance of Parliament, the unbending severity of the law (should they have offended against its letter), and the freedom of the English press, all hang over them, and form a combination of checks that could exist in no other country. I do

not enumerate these checks to complain of them; on the contrary, I recognise their utility, even when carried to an extreme,—they may pain, and sometimes inflict temporary injury on an individual, but their tendency is to benefit the public. Power is always intoxicating, and though I will not allow that those who exercise it in India are like sultans of the east, who require the flappers (which an honourable proprietor mentioned) to remind them they are men, I will readily admit that the oftener they are reminded they are Englishmen the better. But while I admit this, it is with a full conviction, that if those appointed to your governments abroad should ever permit these checks to have an undue influence on the performance of their public duties, if they act under dread of responsibility, or seek popularity, your danger from their measures will be greater than any that could result even from tyranny; the latter can be checked and punished, but that weakness which, in considering its own safety or gratification, forgets the interests of the state, evades all remedy, and the mischievous effect is produced before the cause can be removed. It is useful, nay, most essential, that the checks I have noticed should remain in full vigour; but they must dwell in England—they cannot be co-existent with absolute power in India. We have heard much of the press in that country being first restricted by Lord Wellesley establishing the office of censor. To understand whether this is the fact or not, it is only necessary to take a short retrospect of the history of its newspapers. These have been known in India little more than half a century. About forty-five years ago, when His Majesty's courts of law had an extended jurisdiction in Bengal (which it was soon found indispensable to limit), some of the judges came in violent collision with the local government, and the free press, as it is termed, which in such a society is exactly suited to create and support such divisions of authority, became very licentious. A paper edited by a Mr. Hickey was put down, as that of Mr. Buckingham has now been; and its editor, like him, declined to go to law. Many years afterwards, when Secretary to the Marquess Wellesley, it became my duty to peruse and abstract a petition from this individual, who represented himself as a martyr in the cause of liberty, and he complained, as Mr. Buckingham has done, of Englishmen being ruined by oppres-

sion and tyranny. Amongst others he charged with having denied him justice, was that wise, moderate, and great man, the late Lord Cornwallis. "I applied to the Noble Marquess for redress," said Mr. Hickey in his petition, "but he only advised me, if I thought myself aggrieved, to go to law. The Noble Marquess," he added, "might, in his condescension, have as well advised me to fight one of the Company's elephants, as to go to law with their government." The fact probably was in that case as in the present,—Mr. Hickey published what compelled the local government to suppress his paper, and as he could prove no malice or illegal exercise of authority, he could obtain no redress at law. After this period I never heard of their existing anything like a free press. Articles were occasionally published, more, I imagine, through inadvertence than design, which called for censure on the publishers; and it was an imprudence or inadvertence of this character which led to Lord Wellesley's orders, that the proofs of the newspapers should be submitted to the secretary of government. But though opinions might differ, as to whether that was the best mode of attaining the desired end or not, it is only of very late years that it has been supposed a free press could exist, to any good or useful purpose, in the European community of India. I do not say that, so far as that society alone is concerned, its existence would immediately endanger the safety of our empire. I am satisfied it would excite dissensions, cherish insubordination, and weaken authority, and produce evils a hundred times greater than any good it could effect. But its effects on the European part of the community is a very small part of this question. Amongst that increasing part of the population called half-caste, the sons of European fathers and native mothers, it would do infinite harm. This class must be viewed and treated as an infant society, and all the hopes we entertain of their advancement, through the adoption of gradual measures for their instruction, will be disappointed, if we adopt the free press as the means of effecting that object. I have for many years given all the consideration I could to the unfavourable and depressed condition of this class. I entertain opinions (which this is not the moment to state) regarding the policy of their introduction to particular branches of the service, but I entertain no doubt as to that of every effort being made for their

improvement,—of every avenue that can be opened being opened, for the encouragement of that industry and talent which many of them possess in a very eminent degree. There are men in this class of society, whom I hold as dear as any friends I possess—amongst those, many in this court share the regard I have for Colonel Skinner, who has so long commanded a large body of native horse, with honour to himself and advantage to government. But with every desire to see this part of the population encouraged and advanced, I deem it essential for their good that their progress should be gradual, in order that they may be fitted for the place they are destined to occupy in our empire in the east. Much has been of late done for them, and particularly by those regulations which entitle them to possess land in every part of our territories. There are many of this class, however, who are prone to impatience and discontent at their condition; and these, who naturally seek to make converts to their opinion, will be found amongst the loudest of the advocates for a free press. But both these classes of the European inhabitants of India sink into comparative insignificance, when we contemplate the effect of such a press upon a native population of eighty millions, to whom the blessings or the evils that it may carry in its train are to be imparted. Passing over the impossibility of establishing, or at least maintaining for a short period, a press really free, in an empire governed by foreigners who have conquered, and who have not, and cannot, from the difference of language, habits, and religion, amalgamate with the natives,—let us examine the character and condition of the latter, that we may discover what would be the effect of the boon it is proposed to grant them. They are divided into two great classes, Mahomedans and Hindus; the higher ranks of the former, who possessed almost all India before our rule was introduced, are naturally discontented with our power. They bear, however, a small proportion to the Hindus, whose condition and character it is of more consequence to examine. From the most remote period till the present day, we find the history of this unchanged people the same; and there is one striking feature in it—all the religious and civil classes are educated, and as prompt and skilful in intrigue as they are in business. From their intellectual superiority they have ever influenced and directed

the more numerous, ignorant, and superstitious classes of their countrymen. These instructed classes (particularly the Brahmins), who have already lost consideration, wealth, and power, by the introduction of our power, fear, and justly, that its progress will still more degrade them. They must, from such causes, have a hostile feeling towards us, and this is not likely to decrease from the necessity they are under of concealing it. They will seize every opportunity of injuring our power, and many must be afforded them. They are, to my knowledge, adepts in spreading discontent, and exciting sedition and rebellion. They know well how to awaken the fears, to alarm the superstition, or to rouse the pride of those they address. My attention has been, during the last twenty-five years, particularly directed to this dangerous species of secret war against our authority, which is always carrying on, by numerous, though unseen hands. The spirit is kept up by letters, by exaggerated reports, and by pretended prophecies. When the time appears favourable, from the occurrence of misfortune to our arms, from rebellion in our provinces, or from mutiny in our troops, circular letters and proclamations are dispersed over the country with a celerity that is incredible. Such documents are read with avidity. The contents are in most cases the same. The English are depicted as usurpers of low caste, and as tyrants, who have sought India with no view but that of degrading the inhabitants, and of robbing them of their wealth, while they seek to subvert their usages and their religion. The native soldiery are always appealed to, and the advice to them is, in all instances I have met with, the same—"Your European tyrants are few in number, murder them!"

The efforts made by the part of the Indian population I have mentioned, and their success in keeping up a spirit which places us always in danger, are facts that will not be denied by any man acquainted with the subject. Now I will ask, if we can rationally indulge a hope, that a dislike and hostility to our rule would not be cherished and inflamed by men, whose consideration, wealth, and power, must be ruined by our success? Is it likely to abate? and if not, is it politic, is it wise, to put such means as a free press (such as has been described) into their hands? It could only be used towards one object, that of our destruction; but that, when effected, would be but a prelude to



a greater evil—the destruction of themselves. Every fair hope that can be formed of rendering this vast population worthy of the blessings that may be gradually imparted, would perish, and they would be replunged into a worse state of anarchy than that from which we have relieved them. That this will be the result, if we give them, in their present stage of society, the baneful present that has been proposed, I conscientiously believe. But it is here necessary to ask, for what are we to increase such hazards, both to the European and native community of India? The object, we are told, is to promote knowledge. Do we mistrust our local governments? do we mistrust those under whose orders they act, and those by whom they are controlled, that we are to take from their hands the accomplishment of that great object, that we should place it in the hands of editors of papers and of periodical publications? Are we to confide almost exclusively to the latter, and to their anonymous correspondents, the reform of abuses and the improvement of our eastern subjects? The eloquence of the honourable mover has been powerfully exerted to make us do so. The general tendency of his arguments has gone to express a belief, that those who are educated for public duties in India, and who have superadded, to the early instruction they received, long and approved service, are not the fittest instruments for this great and good purpose. To bring their knowledge and local experience to a level with the comparative ignorance of others, who have not the same advantages, the make-weight of prejudice has been thrown into the scale, and they have been represented as having forgotten all the lessons of their youth, and having become dead to the feelings of British liberty, in order to furnish arguments to prove their incompetence to the higher stations of government. This is a convenient doctrine; it exalts ignorance to a par with knowledge: it has been urged, in the present instance, to suit the case. That high and respectable body of men, the civil servants of India (with whom, I am proud to say, the principal duties of my life have associated me), have been held light and depreciated, that a most distinguished member of their service might be proved unfit for the station of Governor-general. The prejudices Mr. Adam had imbibed by his long residence in India, were alluded to as the cause of his maltreatment of Mr.

Buckingham. But what comes next? Lord Amherst, a nobleman who is admitted to be as amiable as he is sensible and just, and whom all knowledge to be deeply imbued with the feelings and sentiments of an Englishman, hardly arrives in India before he finds himself compelled to adopt the same principle upon which his predecessor had acted, and to send to England Mr. Arnott, who had succeeded Mr. Buckingham as editor of the *Calcutta Journal*. For this act of authority Lord Amherst is, we are told, worse than a tyrant; he has allowed himself to become the tool of tyrants, who have taken the advantage of his want of experience. What does all this mean? one Governor-general is declared unfitted for his office because he has local knowledge, and the other because he wants it.

It appears to me that it is the abstract name of Governor-general, or rather the person who exercises, to the best of his judgment and conscience, an absolute power which the law has vested in him, that is the object of the attack which we have heard this day. If so, let this system be arraigned, not the individuals. I have shown the checks under which they act; their probable motives, and their means of knowledge: but these are not, we are told, to be relied upon, to prevent evil or to promote good purposes. No; for such we must look to men like Mr. Buckingham. They are, on their first touch of the soil of India, to start, as if by inspiration, into a virtue and knowledge, which is to control, to reform, and to improve the society, white and black, of India!

Let us inquire the means of the individual who has been brought forward as an example of what has and may be done by such characters. When he came first to India, and published the prospectus of his *Travels in Palestine*, and at the same time commenced a newspaper on an improved plan to any then existing, I deemed him, as many others did, a man of enterprise and talent: but in a very short period, several paragraphs appeared in his paper which satisfied me of the course he meant to pursue; and I early gave an opinion on the probable termination of his career, which has been verified by the result. I shall not go into the detail of the offences he committed, his apologies, and his promises of amendment; nor shall I inquire into the exact character of that offences which compelled Mr. Adam to withdraw his licence. It was the aggregate of his offences, and

the principle upon which he continued to act, that caused the severe but necessary measure of which he complains. He knew Mr. Adam's sentiments, he knew his resolution; but instead of benefiting by such knowledge, to avoid that ruin in which we are told he is involved, he persevered in the same bold and contumacious course he had so long followed. He chose, no doubt, for the first trial of strength with the new Governor-general, a popular subject. He judged that Mr. Adam, though pledged to arrest his career on the first departure from the restrictions, would hesitate before he acted, in a case where he was or might be thought to be personally interested; but he showed little discernment in his appreciation of the character with whom he had to deal, or he would have known that no personal consideration would induce him to evade a public duty. Mr. Adam, vested with the highest authority in India, was forced, by this course of conduct, to appear in contest with Mr. Buckingham, the self-created champion of British liberty, while not only the English community, but the natives, were lookers on at this trial of strength. Was the issue of such a contest to be left doubtful for a moment?

It has often been said, and it has been repeated today, that your empire in India is one of opinion. It is so, but it is not an opinion of your right, but of your power. The inhabitants of India see that limited by law and regulations, and the spectacle increases their confidence; but show them the person, who exercises an authority they deem supreme, braved and defeated by those under him, and the impression which creates the charm will be broken. This, at least, is my view of the subject; I am, however, I confess, rendered timid by experience. It has made me humble, and I look with awe and trembling at questions which the defenders of a free press in India treat as mere bugbears, calculated to alarm none but the weak and prejudiced. The honourable mover of the resolution now before Court has asked, if the press is restricted in the manner it is at present, how we are to obtain information of the merits and character of our servants. I had before thought that might be found on the records of the governments—in the opinion of those under whom officers acted; but these are, it would seem, imperfect sources, as are all papers of documents published under the restrictions now placed upon the Indian press. It

is from the pages of the *Calcutta Journal*, and the comments of an editor who has been three or four years in India, and never beyond the precincts of a presidency—it is from his able and disinterested view of men and measures, and from that of his anonymous correspondents, that we can alone derive full and impartial information on this important point. But enough on this part of the subject.

We have heard a petition, said to be written, and I have no doubt it is, by that respectable native, Ram Mohun Roy, whom I know and regard. I was one of those who earnestly wished his mind could have been withdrawn from useless schemes of speculative policy, and devoted to giving us his useful aid in illustrating the past and present history of his countrymen; for that knowledge (of which we are yet imperfectly possessed) must form the basis of every rational plan of improvement. We have had comments from the honourable mover of the question, on those parts of the regulations by Mr. Adam that relate to native newspapers, which might lead to a belief that he had robbed the natives of a freedom they had long enjoyed, of a free press; but there never was, until very lately, any native newspaper printed in India, and they are now only subject to the same licence and regulations as those in the English language.

I could say much more upon this subject, but feel I have already intruded too long upon your indulgence. Allow me, however, to repeat my sentiments of Mr. Adam, who is an individual not more distinguished by his temper and virtue in private life, than by his zeal, integrity and talent as a public servant. He is incapable of malignity to any human being. On the present occasion he has come forward to expose himself to obloquy, to save the public. The best testimonies to the wisdom and necessity of his conduct will be found in the corresponding sentiments of those he is associated with; in the measure of the same character which Lord Amherst has found himself compelled to adopt; in the approbation of the Court of Directors; in that of the Board of Control. It only remains that he should receive, as I am assured he will, the support of this Court, who, I can have no doubt, will show, by their vote on the present occasion, that they will never give up to clamour, or abandon, in any shape, a public officer, who has performed his duty in an able, faithful, and conscientious manner.

## APPENDIX VII

# *Proclamation Previous to the Nepalese War*

THE BRITISH government having been compelled to take up arms against the Nepalese, his Excellency the Right Honourable the Governor-general has judged it proper to make known to the powers in alliance and friendship with the Honourable Company, the origin and progress of the transactions which have terminated in this crisis, in the full conviction that the exposition will establish beyond dispute the extraordinary moderation and forbearance of the British government, and the injustice, violence, and aggression of the state of Nepal.

The course of the Gurkha conquests having approximated their frontier to that of the Honourable Company, and of its ally the Nabob Vizier, and the protected Sikh chieftains, throughout an extent of country stretching from the eastern border of Morung to the banks of the Sutlej, it was scarcely to be expected that differences should not occasionally arise between the inhabitants of the contiguous districts belonging to the two states, and even among the local public officers of each government; but a just and firm line of conduct on the part of the two governments, combined with a sincere disposition to maintain uninterrupted the relations of amity, and to respect the rights of each other, could not have failed to arrest the progress of those unhappy disputes, which have terminated in war.

While the conduct of the British government has been uniformly regulated in its relations with the Nepalese by the most scrupulous adherence to the principles of justice and moderation, there is scarcely a single district within the British frontier, throughout the whole of the extensive line above described, in which the Gurkhas have not usurped and appropriated lands forming the ascertained dominions of the Honourable Company.

Questions originating in the usurpations of the Nepalese have

arisen in Purnea, Tirhut, Saran, Gorakhpur, and Bareilly, as well as in the protected territory between the Sutej and the Jumna; and each case might be appealed to in proof of the moderation and forbearance of the British government, and the aggressive and insolent spirit of the Nepalese. It will be enough, however, to advert in detail to two instances only, namely, those which have occurred in Saran and in Gorakhpur, which more particularly demonstrate the systematic design of the Nepalese to encroach on the acknowledged possessions of the Honourable Company, and have, in fact, been the proximate causes of the war.

In the former district, they have at different times established their authority over portions of the territory of Betteah; but the British government, abiding by those principles of moderation and forbearance so conspicuous in all its transactions with the Nepalese, contented itself for a considerable period with remonstrances and representations, trusting that the justice of its cause would become apparent to the Nepalese government, and produce its proper effect on the mind of the Raja and his ministers. The repeated complaints of its subjects, and the occurrence of a new instance of encroachment in the Tappa of Nunnoar, forming a portion of Betteah, which led to an affray, in which Suba Luchingir, an officer of the Nepalese government, was slain, at last induced the British government to depute one of its civil officers to the spot, where he was met by deputies from the state of Nepal, in concert with whom proceedings were held and evidence taken, for the purpose of ascertaining the claims of the parties. The result left no doubt of the right of the British government, and of the unjust and violent procedure of the Nepalese.

A more striking proof of the spirit of rapacity and unjust aggression by which the Nepalese were actuated cannot be adduced, than the fact that, after having agreed to the investigation referred to above, and after the actual deputation of officers by each government, the Nepalese suddenly seized an additional tract of country belonging to the Company, at a very short distance from the scene of their former aggressions.

This violent and unjust procedure would have warranted an immediate demand for restitution, or even the actual reoccupation

of the lands by force; and it may now be a subject of regret to the British government, that this course was not pursued. Far, however, from resenting or punishing this daring outrage as it deserved, the British government resolved to persevere in the amicable course which it had pursued in other cases, and permitted Mr. Young, the gentleman deputed to meet the Nepalese commissioners, to extend his inquiries to the lands newly seized, as above stated, as well as to those which formed the original object of his deputation.

The pretext by which the Nepalese attempted to justify their occupation of the lands in Nunnore, which consisted of no less than twenty-two villages, was, that they were included in the Tappa of Rotchut, forming a division of Pargana Sunnawn, which Tappa was restored to the Nepalese in the year 1783, with the rest of the Terai of Muckwanpore, which had been conquered by the British arms under Major Kinloch. The utter groundlessness of this pretext was proved by the evidence taken by Mr. Young, which clearly established that the disputed lands were situated in the Tappa of Nunnore, a portion of Pargana Simruwun, which had been reserved by the Company at the time of the restitution of Rotchut, and the remainder of Muckwanpore. But had it been otherwise, the tacit acquiescence by the Nepalese in our possession of those lands for a period of thirty years, would have amounted to a dereliction of their claim, however well founded it might originally have been. The abrupt and violent manner in which the Nepalese have invariably possessed themselves of those portions of the Honourable Company's territory to which they have at any time pretended a right, will not allow the supposition that they would have refrained, during so long a period, from doing themselves justice in the present case, if they had felt conscious of the validity of the claim. It is evident, from the whole tenour of their proceedings, that they acted on that premeditated system of gradual encroachment, which, owing to the unexampled forbearance and moderation of the British government, they had already found to be successful; and that the assertion of the twenty-two villages having been included in the Tappa of Rotchut, was merely brought forward to give colour to the unwarrantable act which they had committed, when it became necessary to assign a reason for their conduct. ;

The Nepalese have attempted to fix on the subjects of the Honourable Company the guilt of the murder of Suba Luchingir, and have stated as matter of complaint against the British government, that the Raja of Betteah and his followers have not been punished for that act; and they have endeavoured to found on this charge a justification of their own subsequent proceedings. It has been ascertained, however, by incontestable evidence, that Luchingir had, previously to the occurrence of the affray in which he died, possessed himself of some villages in Betteah, and was preparing to extend his encroachments. Whatever degree of culpability therefore may attach to the subjects of the Honourable Company, for forcibly opposing his proceedings, their offence was towards their own government alone; and the Nepalese could not, with any colour of justice, demand the punishment of those persons, for an act produced solely by the misconduct of their own officers, or charge the British government with a culpable omission of what would have been, under different circumstances, due to a state professedly on friendly terms with it; still less can they found on this transaction any justification of their own conduct in other instances.

As the final resolution of the British government, with respect to the usurped lands in Betteah, was in part influenced by the conduct of the Nepalese, relative to the disputed territory of Bootwul and Sheoraj in Gorakhpur, it will be proper to advert to the circumstances of that transaction in this place.

It is notorious, and has also been proved by reference to authentic records, and by the unimpeached testimony of living witnesses, that the whole of Bootwul, to the very foot of the hills, with the exception of the town of Bootwul alone, was held by the Rajas of Palpa, from the Nabob Vizier, for a considerable period antecedent to the Treaty of Cession in 1801; and that it was transferred to the Company by the terms of that treaty, being specifically included in the schedule thereunto annexed. It is no less matter of notoriety, that the district of Bootwul actually came into the possession of the British government by virtue of the cession, and that a settlement was made by the collector of Gorakhpur with the agent of the late Raja of Palpa, at that time a prisoner at Kathmandu, for an annual rent of thirty-two thousand rupees, without the semblance of an objection on the



part of the Raja of Nepal. So it remained until the year 1804, when the Nepalese commenced that system of gradual encroachment below the hills, which terminated in their occupation of nearly the whole district of Bootwul. The Tappa of Sheoraj was occupied by the Nepalese antecedently to the cession; but it is no less certain that it was a part of the territory of the Vizier, and, together with the rest of the lowlands skirting the hills in the district of Gorakhpur, included in the cession.

The Nepalese pretended to found their claim to Bootwul and Sheoraj, and to the other portions of the lands below the hills, on the circumstance of their having formed the terai, or lowlands, of the hill countries of Palpa, Gulmi, Pentaneh, Kamchee, etc., which the Nepalese have conquered. Admitting that the lowlands were possessed by the chiefs of the neighbouring hill-principalities, the admission does not affect the question, since it is perfectly ascertained that, for a considerable period before the Gurkha conquest, they formed a part of the dominions of Oudh; and the conquest therefore of the independent hill-principalities cannot give to the conquering power any just claim to other lands, which, though in the occupation of the same chiefs, were held on dependent tenures from another state.

To show the little confidence that the Nepalese had in their claim of sovereignty over these lands, it is sufficient to observe, that soon after their usurpation of them, they actually made an offer to hold Bootwul in farm from the British government, on the same terms as the Raja of Palpa, a proposition to which this government did not think proper to accede.

The system of gradual, and at times almost imperceptible encroachment pursued by the Nepalese, was calculated to deceive the British government with respect to their ultimate views, and, combined with the just and moderate course of proceedings which the British government has pursued in all its intercourse with the Nepalese, prevented it from resorting to those means which would at once have repressed the outrage of the Nepalese, and re-established its own authority in the usurped lands. The remonstrances and discussions which followed the first usurpation of the Nepalese in this quarter, continued, with frequent interruption, for a period of some years, during which the Nepalese continued to avail themselves of every favourable

occasion of extending their encroachments. At length a proposition was made by the Raja of Nepal, that commissioners should be appointed to meet on the spot, and investigate and decide the respective claims of the parties, under the express condition that, whatever might be the issue of the inquiry, both governments would abide by it. Notwithstanding its perfect conviction of the justice of its own claims, the British government did not hesitate to submit to the delay and expense necessarily attending the proposed investigation, confiding in the ultimate, though tardy, admission of its rights by the Nepalese, and anxious to afford an unequivocal proof of the moderation of its conduct and the justice of its cause. The proposition of the Raja of Nepal was accordingly acceded to, and Major Bradshaw was directed to proceed to Bootwul, and enter on the investigation, in concert with commissioners to be appointed by the Nepalese government.

The commissioners of the two governments met, and, after much delay and procrastination on the part of the Nepalese agents, the proceedings were brought to a close, and the right of the British government to the whole of the lowlands confirmed by the most irrefragable proofs, both oral and documentary.

The Nepalese commissioners, unable to resist the force of this evidence, and clearly restrained by the orders of their court from admitting the right of the British government, pretended that they were not authorized to come to a decision, and referred the case to the Raja's government for orders.

The advanced period of the season when the commissioners closed their proceedings, rendered it impracticable to take any steps founded on them, until the ensuing year. The immediate procedure of the British government was therefore confined to a communication to the Raja, stating in general terms the conclusions necessarily resulting from the proceedings of the commissioners, and requiring the Raja to give up the lands, according to the condition on which the investigation was acceded to, on the grounds of conclusive proof of its right, established by those proceedings. To this just and fair demand the Raja of Nepal replied, by repeating all those arguments in favour of his own claim, which had been entirely overthrown by the evidence adduced to the commissioners, and refused to restore the lands. In this state the affair necessarily remained until the ensuing season, 1813-14.

In the meanwhile Major Bradshaw proceeded, as soon as the state of the country admitted of his marching, to the frontier of Betteah, where he was to be met by commissioners from Nepal, empowered to adjust in concert with him the depending claims in that quarter; no practical measures having yet resulted from the inquiry conducted by Mr. Young.

Major Bradshaw, soon after his arrival, renewed a demand which had been made by the British government, but not enforced at the time, for the restoration of the twenty-two villages of Nunnore, previously to any examination of the question of right. This demand was acceded to by the Nepalese, and the villages were re-occupied by the officers of the Honourable Company, subject to the ultimate disposal of them according to the issue of the intended inquiry.

The refusal of the Nepalese government to abide by the result of an inquiry sought by itself in the case of the encroachments in Gorakhpur, notwithstanding the full and complete establishment of the rights of the British government to the disputed lands in that quarter, now led the Governor-general-in-Council to pause before he consented to incur the loss, inconvenience, and anxiety, attendant on a new investigation of the claims of the respective governments to the usurped lands in Saran. On duly reflecting on all that had passed; on the actual proof of the claim of the British government established by Mr. Young's inquiry, conducted in concert with Nepalese commissioners, an inquiry, which embraced the testimony on oath of all those persons who could be supposed to possess the best local knowledge, and which had, moreover, this advantage over every subsequent investigation, that it was held at a period so much nearer to the time of the transaction, and on the presumptive proof of our right, arising out of the fact acknowledged by the Nepalese themselves, of our uninterrupted possession during thirty years; the mind of the Governor-general-in-Council was perfectly satisfied that a further investigation *de novo* would be an unprofitable waste of time, and that the utmost that the Nepalese government could in fairness expect, was, that the commissioners of both governments should meet for the purpose of discussing the question on the basis of the investigation actually closed, and of supplying any defects which might be discovered in that investigation by further inquiry on the spot.

When this result of the deliberations of the Governor-general-in-Council was notified to the Nepalese commissioners by Major Bradshaw with an offer to meet them on the purpose stated, and to produce documents which he had obtained, confirming the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence formerly taken, the commissioners declared, that they would not meet him, nor hold any communication with him; and, revoking the conditional transfer of the usurped lands, demanded that Major Bradshaw should instantly leave the frontier. They immediately afterwards returned to Nepal.

This insulting and unprovoked declaration could be referred to no other cause than a previous determination not to fulfil the obligations of justice towards the British government, and left to it no course, but to do itself that right which was refused by the government of Nepal. Acting on this principle, the Governor-general addressed a letter to the Raja of Nepal, reviewing the conduct of his commissioners, and claiming the full renunciation of the disputed lands; adding, that if it were not made within a given time, the portions of these lands still in the hands of the Nepalese would be reoccupied, and the twenty-two villages, which had been conditionally transferred to the British government, declared to be finally reannexed to the dominions of the Honourable Company. This demand not having been complied with, the resumption of the lands was carried into effect, and the authority of the British government re-established throughout the tract in dispute.

While these occurrences were passing in Saran, the British government, perceiving from the tenour of the whole conduct of the state of Nepal, and from the answer to its demand for the restitution of Bootwul and Sheoraj, that no intention existed on the part of the Raja to restore those lands, was compelled to prepare to take possession of them by force, if that necessity should arise. Previously, however, to ordering the troops to advance into the disputed territory, the Governor-general-in-Council made one more effort to induce the Raja to restore them, by renewing the demand, founded on the result of the investigation, and declared at the same time, that if the orders of surrender were not received within a limited time (which was specified) the British troops would proceed to occupy the

lands. The specified period having expired without the adoption of any measure on the part of the Nepalese government towards a compliance with the just requisition of the British government, the troops were ordered to march; and the Nepalese forces, and the public officers of that government, retiring on the advance of the British troops, the civil officers of the Honourable Company were enabled to establish their authority in the disputed lands.

The commencement of the rainy season shortly rendered it necessary to withdraw the regular troops, in order that they might not be exposed to the periodical fevers which reign throughout the tract in that part of the year. The defence of the recovered lands was, of course, unavoidably intrusted to the police establishments. The apparent acquiescence, however, of the Nepalese, in what had taken place, left no room for apprehension; especially as no real violence had been used in obliging the Nepalese to retire from the district. On the morning of the 29th of May last, the principal police station in Bootwul was attacked by a large body of the Nepalese troops, headed by an officer of that government, named Munraj Foujdar,<sup>1</sup> and driven out of Bootwul, with the loss of eighteen men killed and six wounded. Among the former was the Darogah, or principal police-officer, who was murdered in cold blood, with circumstances of peculiar barbarity, in the presence of Munraj Foujdar, after surrendering himself a prisoner. Another police thana<sup>2</sup> was subsequently attacked by the Nepalese troops, and driven out, with the loss of several persons killed and wounded. In consequence of the impracticability of supporting the police thanas by sending troops into the country at that unhealthy season, it became necessary to withdraw them; and the Nepalese were thus enabled to reoccupy the whole of the disputed territory, which they have since retained. The British government had not ceased to hope that an amicable adjustment of its differences with the state of Nepal might still be accomplished, when the perpetration of this sanguinary and atrocious outrage, by which the state of Nepal at once placed itself in the condition of a public enemy of the British government, put an end to the possibility of any accommodation, except on the basis of unqualified submission and atonement.

Still the Governor-general would not proceed to actual hostilities, without giving to the Raja of Nepal one other opening for avoiding so serious an issue. Therefore His Excellency wrote to the Raja of Nepal, to apprize him of what must be the consequence of the insolent outrage which had taken place, unless the government of Nepal should exonerate itself from the act, by disavowal and punishment of the perpetrators. This letter received an answer wholly evasive, and even implying menace.

The requisite submission and atonement having thus been withheld, the British government had no choice left but an appeal to arms, in order to avenge its innocent subjects, and vindicate its insulted dignity and honour. The unfavourable season of the year alone prevented it from having instant recourse to the measures necessary for chastising the insolence, violence, and barbarity of the Nepalese, whose whole conduct, not only in the particular cases above detailed, but in every part of their proceedings towards the British government, for a series of years, has been marked by an entire disregard of the principles of honour, justice, and good faith, aggravated by the most flagrant insolence, presumption, and audacity, and has manifested the existence of a long-determined resolution on the part of the court of Kathmandu to reject all the just demands of the British government, and to refer the decision of the questions depending between the two states to the issue of a war.

Ever since the murder of the police-officers in Bootwul, and during the unavoidable interval of inaction which followed, the Nepalese, with a baseness and barbarity peculiar to themselves, have endeavoured to destroy the troops and the subjects of the Company on the frontier of Saran, by poisoning the water of the wells and tanks in a tract of considerable extent. The fortunate discovery of this attempt baffled the infamous design, and placed incontrovertible proof of it in the hands of the British government.

The impediment to military operations, arising from the season of the year, is now removed, and the British government is prepared, by the active and vigorous employment of its resources, to compel the state of Nepal to make that atonement which it is so justly entitled to demand. The British government has long borne the conduct of the Nepalese with unexampled patience, opposing to their violence, insolence, and rapacity, a

course of procedure uniformly just and moderate. But forbearance and moderation must have their limits; and the British government having been compelled to take up arms in defence of its rights, its interests, and its honour, will never lay them down, until its enemy shall be forced to make ample submission and atonement for his outrageous conduct, to indemnify it for the expense of the war, and to afford full security for the future maintenance of those relations which he has so shamefully violated.

If the misguided councils of the state of Nepal shall lead it obstinately to persist in rejecting these just demands, it will itself be responsible for the consequences. The British government has studiously endeavoured, by every effort of conciliation, to avert the extremity of war, but it can have no apprehension of the result; and it relies with confidence on the justness of its cause, and on the skill, discipline, and valour of its armies, for a speedy, honourable, and decisive termination of the contest in which it is engaged.

By command of His Excellency the Governor-General,

(Signed)

J. ADAM

Secretary to Government.

Lucknow,  
November 1st, 1814.

#### APPENDIX VIII

### *Sir John Malcolm's Instructions and Orders to Officers*

THESE INSTRUCTIONS are grounded upon principles which it has been my constant effort to inculcate upon all officers acting under my orders; and, at a period when I am leaving Central<sup>1</sup> India (perhaps not to return), I feel it a duty I owe to them, to myself, and to the public service, to enter into a more full explanation of my sentiments upon the subject of our general and local rule, than could have been necessary under any other circumstances.

Almost all who, from knowledge and experience, have been capable of forming any judgment upon the question, are agreed that our power in India rests on the general opinion of the natives of our comparative superiority in good faith, wisdom, and strength, to their own rulers. This important impression will be improved by the consideration we show to their habits, institutions, and religion,—by the moderation, temper, and kindness, with which we conduct ourselves towards them; and injured by every act that offends their belief or superstition, that shows disregard or neglect of individuals or communities, or that evinces our having, with the arrogance of conquerors, forgotten those maxims by which this great empire has been established, and by which alone it can be preserved.

The want of union of the natives appears one of the strongest foundations of our power; it has certainly contributed, beyond all others, to its establishment. But, when we trace this cause, we find it to have originated in the condition in which we found India, and the line we adopted towards its inhabitants: that it will continue to operate when the condition of that country is changed, and under any alteration in our course of proceedings, is more than can be assumed. The similarity of the situation of the great proportion of the people of this continent now subject



to our rule, will assuredly make them more accessible to common motives of action, which is the foundation of all union; and the absence of that necessity for conciliation, which changes have effected, will make us more likely to forget its importance. Our power has hitherto owed much to a contrast with misrule and oppression; but this strength we are daily losing: we have also been indebted to an indefinite impression of our resources, originating in ignorance of their real extent; knowledge will bring this feeling to a reduced standard. We are supported by the good opinion of the lower and middling classes, to whom our government is indulgent; but it has received the rudest shocks from an impression that our system of rule is at variance with the permanent continuance of rank, authority, and distinction in any native of India. This belief, which is not without foundation, is general to every class, and its action leaves but an anxious and feverish existence to all who enjoy station and high name;—the feeling which their condition excites, exposes those, who have any portion of power and independence, to the arts of the discontented, the turbulent, and the ambitious: this is a danger to our power, which must increase in the ratio of its extent, unless we can counteract its operation by a commensurate improvement of our administration.

Our greatest strength, perhaps, and that which gives the fairest hopes of the duration of our rule over India, arises out of the singular construction of the frame of both the controlling and the executive government. Patronage in all the branches of the local government of India is exercised under much limitation and check : favour effects less in this country, and competency more, than in any other scene of equal magnitude. There is an interminable field for individual exertion; and, though men high in station are almost absolute, (and the character of our rule requires they should be so, there is, in that jealousy of such power which belongs to our native country, a very efficient shield against its abuse. This keeps men from being intoxicated with their short-lived authority; and the fundamental principles which discourage colonisation, prevent public servants taking root in the soil, and make them proceed to the duties of government, as they would in other countries to the routine of an office, which employs their talents, without agitating their personal

feelings and interests, in any degree that can disturb or bias their judgment. This absence of baneful passions, and of all the arts of intrigue and ambition which destroy empires, produces a calmness of mind that can belong alone to the rulers of a country situated as the English employed in India now are, and gives them an advantage which almost balances the bad effects of their want of those national ties that usually constitute the strength of governments.

Our successes and moderation, contrasted with the misrule and violence to which a great part of the population of India have for more than a century been exposed, have at this moment raised the reputation of the British nation so high, that men have forgotten, in the contemplation of the security and prosperity they enjoy under strangers, their feelings of patriotism; but these are feelings which that very knowledge that it is our duty to impart must gradually revive and bring into action. The people of India must, by a recurring sense of benefits, have amends made them for the degradation of continuing subject to foreign masters; and this can alone be done by the combined efforts of every individual employed in a station of trust and responsibility, to render popular a government which, though not national, has its foundations laid deep in the principles of toleration, justice, and wisdom. Every agent of government should study and understand the above facts. He should not content himself with having acquired a knowledge of the languages, and of the customs, of those with whom he has intercourse. All his particular acts (even to the manner of them) should be regulated by recurrence to the foundation of our rule, and a careful observation of those principles by which it has been established, and can alone be maintained. Of the importance of this I cannot better state my opinion, than by expressing my full conviction, that, independent of the prescribed duties which every qualified officer performs, there is no person in a situation of any consequence who does not, both in the substance and manner of his conduct, do something every day in his life, which, as it operates on the general interests of the empire through the feelings of the circle he controls or rules, has an unseen effect in strengthening or weakening the government by which he is employed. My belief that what I have assumed is correct, will be my excuse for

going into some minuteness in my general instructions to those under my orders.

The first, and one of the most important points, is the manner of European superiors towards the natives. It would be quite out of place, in this paper, to speak of the necessity of kindness, and of an absence of all violence; this must be a matter of course with those to whom it is addressed: there is much more required from them than that conciliation which is a duty, but which, when it appears as such, loses half its effect. It must, to make an impression, be a habit of the mind, grounded on a favourable consideration of the qualities and merits of those to whom it extends; and this impression, I am satisfied, every person will have, who, after attaining a thorough knowledge of the real character of those with whom he has intercourse, shall judge them, without prejudice or self-conceit, by a standard which is suited to their belief, their usages, their habits, their occupations, their rank in life, the ideas they have imbibed from infancy, and the stage of civilization to which the community as a whole are advanced. If he does so with that knowledge and that temper of mind which are essential to render him competent to form an opinion, he will find enough of virtue, enough of docility and disposition to improvement, enough of regard and observance of all the best and most sacred ties of society, to create an esteem for individuals, and an interest in the community, which, when grounded on a sincere conviction of its being deserved, will render his kindness natural and conciliating. All human beings, down to the lowest links of the chain, inclusive of children, are quick in tracing the source of the manners of others, and, above all, of their superiors;—when that is regulated by the head, not the heart—when it proceeds from reason, not from feeling, it cannot please; for it has in it, if at all artificial, a show of design which repels, as it generates suspicion. When this manner takes another shape, when kindness and consideration appear as acts of condescension, it must be felt as offensive. Men may dread, but can never love or regard, those who are continually humiliating them by the parade of superiority.

I have recommended those foundations of manner, towards the natives of India, upon which I feel my own to be grounded. I can recollect (and I do it with shame) the period when I

thought I was very superior to those with whom my duty made me associate; but as my knowledge of them and of myself improved, the distance between us gradually lessened. I have seen and heard much of our boasted advantages over them, but cannot think that, if all the ranks of the different communities of Europe and India are comparatively viewed, there is just ground for any very arrogant feeling on the part of the inhabitants of the former: nor can I join in that common-place opinion, which condemns, in a sweeping way, the natives of this country as men, taking the best of them, not only unworthy of trust and devoid of principle, but of too limited intelligence and reach of thought, to allow of Europeans, with large and liberal minds and education, having rational or satisfactory intercourse with them. Such impressions, if admitted, must prove vital as to the manner of treating the natives of India: I shall therefore say a few words upon the justice of the grounds upon which they rest. The man who considers them in this light can grant little or no credit to the high characters, and the eulogies which are given to individuals and great bodies of men, in their own histories, traditions, and records. He must then judge them by his own observations and knowledge, and his opinion will, in all probability, be formed, not comparatively with Europeans of their own class of life, but with the public servants of government—a class of men who are carefully educated, whose ambition is stimulated by the highest prospects of preferment, and whose integrity is preserved by adequate salaries through every grade of their service. Before this last principle was introduced (which is little more than thirty years), the European servants of government were in the habit of making money in modes not dissimilar to those we now reproach the natives in our employ with doing; and it may here be asked, “If the same endeavours have been made to alter the habits of the latter as the former?” I believe the exact contrary to be the fact, and that the system since introduced has not operated more to elevate the European, than to sink and depress the native character: but this is not the place for the discussion of this large question.

Many of the moral defects of the natives of India are to be referred to that misrule and oppression from which they are now, in a great degree, emancipated. I do not know the example of

any great population, in similar circumstances, preserving, through such a period of change and tyrannical rule, so much of virtue and so many good qualities as are to be found in a great proportion of the inhabitants of this country. This is to be accounted for, in some degree, by the Hindu institutions, particularly that of Caste, which appear to have raised them to their present rank in human society, at a very remote period; but these have certainly tended to keep them stationary at that point of civil order to which they were thus early advanced. With a just admiration of the effects of many of their institutions, particularly those parts of them which cause in vast classes, not merely an absence of the common vices of theft, drunkenness, and violence, but preserve the virtuous ties of family and kindred relations, we must all deplore some of their usages and weak superstitions; but what individuals, or what races of men, are without great and manifold errors and imperfections? and what mind, that is not fortified with ignorance or pride, can, on such grounds, come to a severe judgment against a people like that of India?

I must here, however, remark, that I have invariably found, unless in a few cases where knowledge had not overcome self-sufficiency and arrogance, that in proportion as European officers, civil and military, advanced in their acquaintance with the language and customs of the natives of India, they became more sincerely kind to them; and, on the contrary, ignorance always accompanied that selfish pride and want of consideration which held them light, or treated them with harshness.

I am quite satisfied in my own mind, that, if there is one cause more than another that will impede our progress to the general improvement of India, it is a belief formed by its population, from the manner of their English superiors, that they are viewed by them as an inferior and degraded race: but, on the contrary, if the persons employed in every branch of the administration of this great country, while their conduct marks those rigid principles of virtue and justice, under the check of which they act, comport themselves towards the people whom it is their duty to make happy, with that sincere humility of heart which always belongs to real knowledge, and which attaches while it elevates, they will contribute by such manner, more

than any measures of boasted wisdom ever can, to the strength and duration of their government.

It is of importance, before I conclude this part of the subject, to state my opinion, that in our manner to the natives, though it is our duty to understand and to pay every proper deference to their customs and usages, and to conform with these as far as we can with propriety, particularly on points where the religious prejudices or the rank of those with whom we have intercourse require it, yet we should always preserve the European; for, to adopt their manners is a departure from the very principle on which every impression of our superiority that rests upon good foundation is grounded. We should take a lesson on such points from what we see occur to native princes and others, who ape English habits and modes: they lose ground with one class, that to which they belong, without gaining with the other, that to which they wish to approximate. The fact is, they ultimately lose with the latter; for even their attachment is useless, when they cease to have influence with their own tribe. The European officer, who assumes native manners and usages, may please a few individuals, who are flattered or profited by his departure from the habits of his country; but even with these, familiarity will not be found to increase respect; and the adoption of such a course will be sure to sink him in the estimation of the mass of the community, both European and native, among whom he resides.

The intercourse to be maintained with the natives within your circle is of two kinds,—private and official. The first should extend as much as possible to all ranks and classes, and be as familiar, as kind, and as frequent, as the difference of habits and pursuits will admit.

There is a veil between the natives of India and their European superiors, which leaves the latter ignorant, in an extraordinary degree, of the real character of the former. He can only judge his own domestics by what he sees of their conduct in his presence; of the manner in which they perform their other duties in life, he is, if not ignorant, but imperfectly informed: so many minute obstacles, grounded upon caste, usages, and religion, oppose an approach to closer acquaintance, that it can never be generally attained; but in private intercourse much may be

learned that will facilitate the performance of public duty, and give that knowledge of the usages and feelings of the various classes of the natives, which will enable its possessors to touch every chord with effect. In joining with them in field-sports, in an unceremonious interchange of visits with the most respectable, and in seeking the society of the most learned, the European public officer will not only gain much information, but impart complete confidence, and lay the grounds of that personal attachment which will ever be found of the greatest aid to his public labours. He will also obtain, by such habits of private intercourse, the means of elevating those he esteems by marks of notice and regard; but, in pursuing this course, he must beware lest he lose his object, by falling into the weaknesses or indulgences of the persons with whom he thus associates. It is in the performance of this part of his duty, when all the pride of station is laid aside, that he must most carefully guard that real superiority which he derives from better knowledge and truer principles of morality and religion; for it is from the impression made by the possession without the ostentation of those higher qualities, that he must expect the benefits I have described as likely to result from a familiar and private intercourse with the natives under his direction and control.

In all official intercourse with the natives, one of the first points of importance is, that these, whatever be their rank, class, or business, should have complete and easy access to personal communication with their European superior. The necessity of this arises out of the character of our rule, and of those over whom it is established. It is sufficiently galling for the people of India to have foreign masters: the impression this feeling must continually excite, can only be mitigated or removed by recurring sense of the advantages they derive from the wisdom and justice of their European superiors; and this can alone be effected by direct communication with them. Though native servants must be employed and trusted, and though it is quite essential to behave to all with kindness, and to raise the higher classes of them by a treatment which combines consideration and respect, yet they can never without hazard be used as exclusive mediums of communication: their real or supposed influence will, under whatever circumstances they are allowed frequent

approach to an European officer in the exercise of authority, give them opportunities of abusing his confidence, if they desire it; and as our servants, who are seldom selected from the higher classes, cannot be supposed to have even the same motives with native rulers for good conduct, much less the same title to regard men under our power will have, in aggravation of the feeling arising out of subjection to foreign rule, that of being, to a certain extent, at the mercy of persons of their own nation, whom they neither trust nor respect. There is no remedy for such an evil, except being completely easy of access; but this, however much the superior may desire it, is not to be established without difficulty and perseverance. It affects the interest and consequence of every man in his employ, from the highest to the lowest; but, in proportion to their efforts to counteract it, so must his be to carry this important point, on which, more than all others, the integrity of his personal administration and the good of the country depend. No native servant, high or low, must be allowed the privilege of either introducing or stopping an applicant or a complainant: all such must come with confidence to the European superior, or to such assistant as he may specifically direct to receive or hear them. It requires much temper and patience, constant activity, and no slight sacrifice of personal comfort, to maintain an intercourse with the natives upon this footing; but, unless it be done, (I speak here from the fullest experience,) the government of control now established<sup>2</sup> in Central India cannot be carried on for any period, and the changes which must ensue from relaxation in this particular will be brought about in the manner most unfavourable to our character and reputation.

In establishing this direct personal intercourse, it is perhaps better, when the habits are so formed as to admit of it, that the natives of all classes and ranks should have admission and be heard, at whatever hour of the day they come, except those of meals; but, where such constant intrusion is found to interrupt other business, as it may with many, certain portions of every day must be set aside to hear representations and complaints, and to see those who desire to be seen. The establishment of direct intercourse is, in my opinion, a primary and indispensable duty,—one no more dependent upon the inclination or judgment of the individuals to whom the charge of managing or



controlling these countries is intrusted, than it is to an officer whether he shall attend his parade, or to a judge whether he shall sit a certain number of hours in his court: indeed, I consider that late events have so completely altered our condition in India, that the duties of almost every officer in the political department have become, in a great degree, magisterial, and, as such, must be more defined, and subject to more exact rules, than they formerly were.

Our right of interference (as will be shown hereafter) is so limited, that it is not in one case in a hundred of those that are brought forward, that an officer can do more than state calmly and clearly, to the party who seeks redress, the reasons and principles which prevent him from attending to his representation or complaint. He will have to repeat this perhaps fifty times in one day; but he must, in contemplating the good that will be ultimately produced, be content to take this trouble. The natives of India cannot persuade themselves that, possessing as we do the means of establishing our direct rule, we shall long refrain from doing so. This impression weakens those princes, chiefs, and ministers, whom it is our policy to support, in a degree that almost unfits them for being instruments of government. We can only counteract its bad effects by making ourselves understood by all, even to the lowest, upon this point: it is one on which they will never trust to a communication from any native agent or servant, nor indeed will they be convinced of our sincerity till they observe for years that our words and actions are in unison; and they must, to satisfy them that there is no prospect of those fluctuations to which they have been so habituated, see that everything originates with and is known to the superior. This knowledge, added to the right of approaching him at all moments, will gradually tranquillize their minds, and place them, as far as they can be placed, beyond the power of being made the dupes of artful or interested men.

It has been before said, that native servants of all classes should be treated with that attention and respect to which they were from their station and character entitled. These will, of course, have at all times the freest intercourse with the superior, but they should never have the privilege of coming to any conference between him and other natives, to which they were

not specifically called. But these servants (whatever might be their inclination) will have little power of doing harm when a direct intercourse (such as has been described) is well established, and its principles and objects generally understood. Indeed, one of the best effects of that intercourse is the check it constitutes on all nefarious proceedings of subordinate agents, and persons of every description; as such must act in hourly dread of discovery, when every man can tell his own story to the principal at any moment he pleases.

The next important point to be observed in official intercourse with the natives, is "publicity". There can be no occasion to expatiate, here, upon the utility of this principle. It is the happy privilege of a state so constituted as that of the English in India, to gain strength in the ratio that its measures, and the grounds on which they are adopted, are made public; and this is above all essential in a quarter of India where we are as yet but imperfectly understood. There are, and can be, no secrets in our ordinary proceedings, and every agent will find his means of doing good advanced, his toil lessened, and the power of the designing and corrupt to misrepresent his actions or intentions decreased, in the proportion that he transacts affairs in public. He should avoid, as much as he possibly can, private conferences with those in his employ or others. These will be eagerly sought for; they give the individual thus admitted the appearance of favour and influence; and there is no science in which the more artful among the natives are greater adepts, than that of turning to account the real or supposed confidence of their superiors. I know no mode of preventing the mischief which this impression, if it becomes general, gives men the power of effecting, but habitual publicity in transacting business. This will, no doubt, be found to have inconveniences, which will, be purposely increased by those who have their game to play, and indeed others; for natives of rank and station, even when they have no corrupt views, are from habit and self-importance attached to a secret and mysterious way of conducting both great and small affairs.

A public officer, placed in your situation, must always be vigilant and watchful of events likely to affect the peace of the country under his charge; but no part of his duty requires such

care and wisdom in its performance. He cannot rest in blind confidence, nor refuse attention to obvious and well-authenticated facts; but he must be slow in giving his ear, or in admitting to private and confidential intercourse, secret agents and informers, lest they make an impression (which will be their object) upon his mind; for there is no failing of human nature to which the worst part of the natives of India have learned (from the shape of their own government) so well to address themselves, as any disposition to suspicion in their superiors. From the condition of Central India, abounding as it must with discontented and desperate characters, intrigues, treasonable conversations and papers, and immature plots, must, for some time, be matters of frequent occurrence and growth; but such will, in general, be best left to perish of neglect. Established as our power now is, men cannot collect any means capable of shaking it, without being discovered; and it is, I am convinced, under all ordinary circumstances, wiser and safer to incur petty hazard, than to place individuals and communities at the mercy of artful and avaricious agents and spies, or to goad unfortunate men to a state of hostility by continually viewing them with an eye of torturing and degrading suspicion.

In the intercourse with the natives of your circle, it is hardly necessary to advert to the subject of giving and receiving presents. The recent orders upon this subject, which have been communicated to you, are very defined and strict; but there is a necessity, in this government of control, for every agent to maintain, on a high ground, not only the purity, but the disinterestedness of the English character; and you will avoid, as much as you possibly can, incurring any obligation to local authorities. These will sedulously endeavour to promote your convenience and comfort, and will press favours upon you, both from design and good feelings; but there is a strength in preserving complete independence on all such points, that must not be abandoned. Our political superiority, to be efficient, must be unmingled with any motives or concerns, either connected with our personal interest or that of others, that can soil or weaken that impression on which its successful exercise depends.

The forms of the official intercourse between European agents

and natives of rank were, before we obtained paramount power, a matter of more moment, and one on which we could less relax than at present, because our motives were at that period more liable to be mistaken. Though it is essential, in our intercourse with nations who are attached to and give value to ceremonies, to understand such perfectly, and to claim from all what is due to our station, that we may not sink the rank of the European superior in the estimation of those subject to his control; it is now the duty of the former to be much more attentive to the respect which he gives than what he receives, particularly in his intercourse with men of high rank. The princes and chiefs of India may, in different degrees, be said to be all dependent on the British government: many have little more than the name of that power they before enjoyed; but they seem, as they lose the substance, to cling to the forms of station. The pride of reason may smile at such a feeling; but it exists, and it would be alike opposite to the principles of humanity and policy to deny it gratification.

In official intercourse with the lower classes, the latter should be treated according to the usages of the country, as practised by the most indulgent of their native superiors. It will be found that they require personal notice and consideration in proportion as their state is removed from that knowledge which belongs to civilization; and it is on this ground that the Bhil<sup>s</sup> must have more attention paid him than the Ryot. It is more difficult to give confidence to his mind, and to make him believe in the sincerity and permanence of the kindness with which he is treated, because he is in a condition more remote from the party with whom he communicates; and, before he can be reclaimed, he must be approximated.

The interference of agents employed in this country with native princes, or courts, or their local officers, cannot be exactly defined, for there will be shades of distinction in every case, that will require attention; but all must be subject, and that in the strictest degree, to certain general and well-understood principles, founded on the nature of our power, our objects, our political relations with the different states, the personal conduct of their rulers, their necessity for our aid and support, and their disposition to require or reject it in the conduct of

their internal administration. The leading principle, and the one which must be continually referred to, is grounded on the character of our controlling power and its objects. It is the avowed, and I am satisfied it is the true, policy of the British state, while it maintains the general peace of the country, to keep, not only in the enjoyment of their high rank, but in the active exercise of their sovereign functions, the different princes and chiefs who are virtually or declaredly dependent on its protection. The principal object (setting aside the obligations of faith) is to keep at a distance that crisis to which, in spite of our efforts, we are gradually approaching—of having the whole of India subject to our direct rule. There is no intention of discussing here the consequences likely to result from such an event. It is sufficient for executive and subordinate officers to know, that it is the desire of the government they serve, to keep it at a distance, to render it their duty to contribute their whole efforts to promote the accomplishment of that object; and on the manner and substance of their interference the local success of this policy will greatly depend.

On all points where we are pledged by treaty to support states, or to mediate or interfere between them and others, we must of course act agreeably to the obligations contracted; and, in such case, no instructions can be required. It may not, however, be unuseful to remark, that, on all occasions where they are referred to, treaties and engagements should be interpreted with consideration to the prince or chief with whom they are made. There is often, from opposite education and habits, much difference between their construction and ours of such engagements; but no loose observation, or even casual departure from the letter of them, ought to lead to serious consequences, when it appeared there was no intention of violating the spirit of the deed, or of acting contrary to pledged faith. When any article of an engagement is doubtful, I think it should be invariably explained with more leaning to the expectations originally raised in the weaker than to the interests of the stronger power. It belongs to superior authority to give ultimate judgment upon all points of this nature which come under discussion; but that judgment must always be much influenced by the colour of the information and opinion of the

local agent. My desire is to convey how important every subject is that connects in the remotest degree with that reputation for good faith, which can only be considered our strength while it exists unimpaired in the minds of the natives: in this view the most scrupulous attention should be paid to their understanding of every article of the agreements we make with them; for no local advantage, nor the promotion of any pecuniary interest, can compensate for the slightest injury to "this corner-stone of our power in India."

With the government of Daulat Rao Sindhia<sup>4</sup> (a great part of whose possessions are intermixed with those of our dependent allies in this quarter) we have only general relations of amity; and, however virtually dependent events may have rendered that prince, we can (except insisting upon the exact performance of those settlements which we have mediated between him or his delegated officers and some of his tributaries) claim no right of interference in any part of his internal administration; nor should there, unless in cases of unexpected emergency which threatened the general peace of the country, be any disposition shown to interference, except on specific requisition from the resident at Gwalior.<sup>5</sup> Without interfering, however, we have hitherto, and shall continue to exercise a very salutary control both over Daulat Rao Sindhia and his local officers, by the terms on which we communicate and act with the latter. When these are men of good character, and study the happiness of the inhabitants and the improvement of the country, we can, by the cordiality and consideration with which we treat them, and the ready attention we give to the settlement of every petty dispute they have with the subjects of our allies, as well as other friendly acts, grant them a countenance and aid which will promote the success of their local administration. The same principle leads to abstinence from all communication, and to our keeping aloof (except where the general peace is at hazard) from all intercourse with those of Sindhia's managers who are noted for misrule or bad faith. This line of conduct towards the latter, grounded, as it publicly should be, on the avowed principle of keeping our character free of soil from their proceedings, will increase our local reputation, while it has the effect of rendering the employment of such men inconvenient and unprofitable

to the state, and thus constitutes one of the chief means we have of working a reform in its internal administration: nor is it a slight one; for the impression of our power is so great, that the belief of a local officer possessing our good opinion and friendship, is of itself sufficient to repress opposition to his authority, while his forfeiting our favour is sure to raise him enemies, both in his district and at Gwalior.

With the courts of Holkar,<sup>6</sup> Dhar, Dewass, and almost all the petty Rajput states west of the Chambal, our relations are different. These have been raised from a weak and fallen condition, to one of efficiency, through our efforts. But, though compelled, at first, to aid them in almost every settlement, we have, as they attained the power of acting for themselves, gradually withdrawn from minute interference on points connected with their internal administration, limiting ourselves to what is necessary for the maintenance of the public tranquillity.

There is so strong a feeling in the minds of the princes and chiefs above alluded to, and in those of all their officers (from their prime minister down to the lowest agent), of their actual dependence upon the British government, that it is almost impossible to make them understand that they are, in the conduct of their internal administration, desired and expected to act independently of it. Their difficulty of comprehending and trusting the policy which dictates our conduct in this particular, arises out of its being opposite to all their habits and knowledge. Time alone, and the most minute care of every European agent employed, can impart to them that confidence which is essential to their becoming competent functionaries of rule. To effect this object, the principles hitherto inculcated and acted upon must be steadily pursued, and we must decline all interference, except in cases where Grassias,<sup>7</sup> Bhils, or other plunderers are concerned. These, from their situation and strength, can only be kept in order by the power of the British government; but we must, in such cases even, have the limits of our interference exactly defined, that no belief may exist of our possessing the power of departing from the restrictions we have imposed upon ourselves; for on such impressions being general, and being confirmed by scrupulous consistency of action, depends our success in giving that efficiency to the various native authorities subject.

to our control, which is necessary to enable them to perform the different duties allotted to them.

In cases of interference with lesser rulers, such as the reformed Rajput plunderers and Bhil chiefs, we may be compelled to enter more minutely into their affairs; but the principles observed should be the same; and while we take care to repress every disposition to a return to predatory habits, and see that men who have long cherished such possess themselves of honest means of livelihood, we must respect their prejudices, and not hastily break in upon the rude frame of their internal rule; but leave (down to the Turwee, or head of the Bhil Para or cluster of hamlets) the full exercise of his authority over those under him, according as that is grounded on the ancient prejudices and usages of the tribe to which he and his family or followers belong.

The feelings of irritation and hatred with which almost all the princes and chiefs of this quarter regard the Grassias and Bhils, and the total want of confidence of the latter in their nominal superiors, have and will continue to render calls for our interference very frequent: but however high the character and condition of the one party, and however bad and low that of the other may be, we must never grant our name or support to measures of coercion or violence, without fully understanding the merits of the case, nor without having had direct communication with the party or parties inculpated; otherwise we may be involved in embarrassment, and become unconsciously the instruments of injustice and oppression.

Many questions will occur, deeply connected with our reputation for good faith, which cannot be decided by any exact rules; but whenever that is concerned, the tone of our feeling should be very high. It is the point upon which the moral part of our government of this great empire hinges; and in these countries, where our rule and control are new, and in which the inhabitants cannot yet understand any explanations that do not rest upon broad and obvious grounds, the subject requires much attention. There are many cases in which our faith, though not specifically, is virtually pledged to individuals: ministers, for instance, of minor or incompetent princes or chiefs, who have been brought forward or recognised by us in the exercise of authority, have a claim upon our support and



consideration, which nothing but bad conduct on their part can forfeit. We should, no doubt, be most careful of any interference that leads to such obligations. They are only to be incurred when a necessity that involves the peace and prosperity of the country calls for them: but they must be sacredly observed; for, with a people who look, in all questions of government, more to persons than systems, the abandonment, except from gross misconduct, of any individual who had been raised or openly protected by us, would excite stronger feelings than the breach of an article of a treaty, and locally prove more injurious, as it weakens that reliance upon our faith which is the very foundation of our strength.

We may rest satisfied, while we pursue the course I have stated (and it is the one to which our faith is almost in every case, either directly or by implication, pledged), that we have, from our paramount power, a very efficient check over states and tribes, whose rulers, officers, and chiefs will soon discover that they can only gain our favour and support by good conduct, or forfeit it by bad. With such knowledge and with means comparatively limited, we cannot expect they will be disposed to incur displeasure, when the terms on which they can gain approbation are so easy; at least no men possessed of common sense and discernment (qualities in which the natives of India are seldom deficient) can be expected to act in such a manner; but we must not conceal from ourselves, that their conduct in this, as in all other particulars, will rest chiefly on the value of that condition in which they are placed, or rather left; and in proportion as we render it one of comfort and dignity, so will their care be to preserve our good opinion and to merit our confidence. It is, indeed, upon our success in supporting their respectability, that the permanence of a system of control over great and small native states, such as we have established in this quarter of India, will depend. We have no choice of means in the performance of this delicate and arduous part of our duty. Though the check must be efficient, it should be almost unseen: the effect ought to be produced more by the impression than the exercise of superior power. Our principal object must be to elevate the authorities to whom we have left the administration of their respective territories; we must, in all

cases of interference, bring them forward to their own subjects, as the prominent objects of respect and obedience; so far from the agent attracting notice to himself, he should purposely repel it, that it may be given to the quarter where it is wanted, and to which it belongs.

When we aid any prince or chief against his own subjects, his name should be exclusively used; and we should be most careful in making our native agents and servants pay the full measure of respect to every branch of his administration, and continually be on the watch to check that disposition which is inherent in them, to slight local authorities, that they may, in the name of their master, draw that attention to themselves, which it is quite essential should belong to the officers of the native government. It is evident that our control can only be supportable, to any human being who has the name and appearance of power, so long as it is exercised in a general manner, and regulated by the principles above stated. When it descends to minute checks and interference in the collection of revenue, the administration of justice listens to the complaints of discontented, or even aggrieved individuals, and allows, upon system, its own native agents to interfere and act in the name of the paramount state; the continuance of independent power, in any shape, to either prince or chief, is not only impolitic but dangerous, as his condition must be felt by himself, and by all attached to his person or family, as a mockery and degradation; and the least effect of such feelings will be the extermination of all motive to good or great actions. For when control is divested of its large and liberal character, and takes a more minute shape, whatever merit belongs to the administration becomes the due of the person by whom it is exercised, or his agents, and the nominal prince and his officers are degraded into suspected and incompetent instruments of rule.

In this general outline of our interference with the rulers, great and small, of this part of India, I have dwelt much upon the political considerations upon which it is grounded; because I am convinced, that there is no part of the subject that requires to be so deeply studied and so fully understood, as this should be, by every subordinate agent; for there is no point of his duty which is at once so delicate and arduous, or in which success or

failure so much depends upon individual exertion. He will be prompted to deviate from the course prescribed, by the action of his best feelings, and by hopes of increasing his personal reputation; but he will be kept steady in that course by a knowledge of the importance of those general principles on which the present system rests. It is in the performance of this part of his duty, that all which has been said regarding manner and intercourse must be in his memory; for men in the situation in which those are, with whom he must in all cases of interference come in contact, are not to be conciliated to their condition, nor kept in that temper with the paramount authority which it is necessary for its interests they should be, by mere correctness or strict attention to justice. The native governments must be courted and encouraged to good conduct, and the earnest endeavour of the British agent must be, to give their rulers a pride in their administration: to effect this object, he must win to his side, not only the rulers themselves, but the principal and most respectable men of the country. In his efforts to gain the latter, however, he must beware of depriving the local authority of that public opinion which is so essential both as a check to misrule and a reward to good government, but which would cease to be felt as either, the moment the ties between prince and subject were seriously injured or broken.

Where the public peace, of which we are the avowed protectors, has been violated, or where murders or robberies have been committed, we have a right to urge the local authorities (whom we aid with the means both for the prevention and punishment of such crimes) to pursue, according to their own usages, the course best calculated to preserve the safety of persons and of property. In other cases connected with the administration of justice, though there is no right of interference, it will be for their interest, and for our reputation, to lose no opportunity of impressing generally the benefit and good name that will result from attention to ancient institutions, particularly to that of the popular courts of Panchayet, which have never been discontinued, but in periods marked by anarchy and oppression.

The practice of Sati<sup>a</sup> is not frequent in Malwa, and that of infanticide is, I believe, less so. The first is a usage, which, however shocking to humanity, has defenders among every class of

the Hindu community. The latter is held in abhorrence by all but the Rajput families, by whom it is practised, and to whom it is confined; yet many of the most respectable chiefs of that tribe speak of this crime with all the horror it merits. You cannot interfere in the prevention of either of these sacrifices, beyond the exercise of that influence which you possess from personal character: indeed, to attempt more, would be at the hazard of making wrong impressions, and of defeating the end you desired to attain. Praise of those who abstain from such acts, and neglect of those who approve or perpetrate them, is the best remedy that can be applied. It is the course I have pursued, and has certainly been attended with success.

That the line of interference which has been described is difficult will not be denied; but what course can we discover for the future rule and control of the different native states in India, which does not present a choice of difficulties? Men are too apt, at the first view of this great subject, to be deluded by a desire to render easy, and to simplify, what is of necessity difficult and complicated. Moral considerations come in aid of the warmest and best sentiments of the human mind to entice us to innovation; we feel ourselves almost the sharers of that crime and misrule which we think our interference could mitigate or amend; and, in the fervour of our virtue, we are too apt to forget, that temporary or partial benefit often entails lasting and general evil,—that every plan, however theoretically good, must be practically bad, that is imperfectly executed. We forget, in the pride of our superior knowledge, the condition of others; and self-gratification makes almost every man desire to crowd into the few years of his official career the work of half a century. Thus measures have been, and continue to be, brought forward “in advance of the community” for whose benefit they are intended. Of what has passed, it is not necessary to speak: the future is in our power, and I cannot conclude this part of the subject, which relates to an interference that is calculated, according as it is managed, to hasten or retard the introduction of our direct rule, without impressing upon every officer employed under my orders the importance of a conduct calculated to preserve, while it improves, the established governments and native authorities of the country. To these it is his duty to give such impulse as he

can, without injuring their frame, towards an amendment suited to their situation, to the character of the rulers, and to that of the various classes under their rule. I consider, and the opinion is the result of both experience and reflection, that all dangers to our power in India are slight in comparison with those which are likely to ensue from our too zealous efforts to change the condition of its inhabitants, with whom we are yet, in my opinion, but very imperfectly acquainted. A person who entertains such sentiments as I do on this question, must appear the advocate of very slow reform; but if I am so, it is from a full conviction that anything like precipitation in our endeavours at improvement is likely to terminate in casting back those we desire to advance: on the contrary, if instead of overmarching, we are content to go along with this immense population, and to be in good temper with their prejudices, their religion, and usages, we must gradually win them to better ways of thinking and of acting. The latter process, no doubt, must be one of great time; but its success will be retarded by every hasty step.

There are few points on which more care is required than the selection and employment of native servants for the public service. The higher classes of these, such as Moonshees,<sup>9</sup> Moot-suddies<sup>10</sup> and Writers, should be men of regular habits of life, intelligent, and of good characters in their own tribes. There is no objection to an officer continuing to keep in service a person he has brought from a distant province, who has been long with him, and on whose fidelity and competence he can repose; but, generally speaking, it is much better to entertain respectable natives or old residents of the country in which he is employed; such may have looser habits and be less attached, but the former his vigilance will check and correct, and attachment will soon be created by kindness and consideration. Their advantages over foreigners are very numerous. The principal are, their acquaintance with the petty interests of the country, and their knowledge of all the prejudices and the jealousies of the different classes of the community to which they belong. On all these points the superior should be minutely informed, and, if he employs men not personally acquainted with the disposition and condition of those under his charge or control, his information on such subjects must come through multiplied mediums,

which is in itself a serious evil. But, independent of this, the employment of the natives of a distant province is always unpopular, and they are generally viewed with dislike and suspicion by the higher and more respectable classes of the country into which they are introduced. This excites a feeling in the minds of the former, which either makes them keep aloof from all connexion with the inhabitants, or seek the society of, and use as instruments, men who are discontented or of indifferent character. It is difficult to say which of these causes has the worst effect. The one gives an impression of pride, if not contempt, and the other of design and an inclination to intrigue; and both operate unfavourably to the local reputation of the master.

I have observed, that the natives who are least informed of the principles of our rule, are ready to grant respect and confidence to an English officer, which they refuse to persons of their own tribe; but they are apt to form an unfavourable opinion of his disposition and character from any bad conduct of his native servants, if foreigners: on the contrary, when the latter are members of their own community, the exposure of their errors or crimes, while it brings shame and conveys a salutary lesson to the class to which they belong, is attended with the effect of raising, instead of depressing, the European in their estimation. To all these general reasons might be added many, grounded on the particular condition of Central India. The oppression the inhabitants of this quarter have recently suffered, both from Hindu and Mahomedan natives of the Deccan<sup>11</sup> and Hindustan<sup>12</sup> makes them naturally alarmed at these classes. There is also, in the impoverished state of many of the best families of the country, a strong additional reason for our giving them, in preference to strangers, what little we can of salary as public servants.

In the above observations there is no desire to exclude any member of Deccan or Hindustan families, who have settled for life, or for several generations, in Malwa; such objection would proscribe from our employ some of the most intelligent and respectable inhabitants of that province.

It has been before mentioned, that "publicity" in our transaction of business is most essential, chiefly as it puts at repose an alarmed and agitated population, and, beyond all, their princes and chiefs. We may greatly promote this object by the selection

of servants. I early observed a very serious uneasiness, if not alarm, in Holkar's ministers, regarding the course I meant to pursue towards that court; and as one means of removing it, I chose as a principal native writer an intelligent Brahmin, whose family was attached to that of Holkar, in whose employ I found him; and who could, I knew, from his connexions, have no permanent interests separate from his duty to that state. I was conscious of having nothing to conceal, but I knew the importance of Tantia Jogh<sup>13</sup> and others being satisfied that this was the case. No measure I have adopted has tended more to tranquillize their minds; and I state the fact, because its application may be suited to cases of daily occurrence.

In the employment of the higher classes of native servants, they should, as much as possible, be restricted to their specific duties, and no one should be allowed to take a lead, or mix (unless when directed) in the occupation of another. The keeping of these persons in their exact places will be found difficult, from the habits of the natives being opposite to such rules; but it is essential; for errors, if not guilt, will be the certain consequence of a confusion of duties, which destroys that pride which good men feel from possessing confidence, and enables bad to evade that personal responsibility which constitutes the chief check upon their conduct.

The employment of the lower classes of public servants requires much attention. These should be selected on the same principles that have already been stated, with reference to the duties they are to perform, which ought always to be exactly defined, and their conduct vigilantly watched. It will indeed be found useful to render as public as possible the nature of their employment, and to call upon all local authorities to aid us in the prevention of those unauthorized and odious acts of injustice and oppression towards the inhabitants of the country which this class will, in spite of all our efforts, find opportunities of committing.

I speak from the fullest experience when I state, that, though the natives of India may do full justice to the purity of our intentions, and the excellence of the principles of our rule, they are undisguised in their sentiments regarding those parts of our administration in which the very dregs of their own community

are employed. They cannot, indeed, but see with feelings of detestation and resentment a man raised from the lowest of their own ranks, and decorated with the official badge or stick of a civil or political English officer, become the very next moment insolent to persons to whom he and his family have been for ages submissive, or turn the extortioner of money from those tribes, among which he has before lived as an humble individual.

The power of this class of servants to injure our reputation is everywhere great, but more so in proportion as the natives of the country are ignorant of our real character, and where their dread of our power is excessive. Of the mischief they have done, or rather tried to do, in Malwa, I can speak from a perfect knowledge. I have endeavoured with unremitting solicitude to counteract their impositions and oppressions, by publishing proclamations, and giving high rewards to all who informed against or seized any of my servants, when attempting the slightest interference in the country, or affecting to have any business beyond that of carrying a letter, or some specified or limited duty; but I have, nevertheless, been compelled within three years to punish publicly and discharge one Munshi, two Mootsuddies or Writers, three Jemadars,<sup>14</sup> and upwards of fifty Harkaras;<sup>15</sup> and almost an equal number of the same class belonging to other public officers have been taken and punished, or banished the country.

These examples will show the danger of being tempted, by any convenience of service, or a desire to accelerate the accomplishment of our objects, to employ such instruments with any latitude of action.

The importance of encouraging the dependent states of India to do their own work, and to learn, on points of internal administration, as little as possible upon us, has been before noticed; and as long as we manage to keep clear of that species of interference which weakens and unsettles, without any proportionate good to balance its evil effects, we shall have credit in general opinion for all the good measures which the state under our protection adopts, and our reputation will be benefited (from the comparisons that are drawn) even by its acts of folly and injustice. But the latter advantage will be lost by any half and impolitic mixture in its concerns, and there is no mode in which this



will be found so injurious as that of granting it the aid of native servants in our employ. Allowing the higher classes of these to enter into the affairs of such governments in any shape, would be destructive of every principle that has been inculcated; but the giving their rulers, ministers, or local officers, the aid of lower servants, would be still more to the injury of our reputation; for among the higher classes we might find men of virtue and firmness of character beyond what could be expected from the others, when exposed, as they would be, to such temptation. They would be used for purposes of coercion, if not oppression; and there would be sufficient art in those who thus employed them, to throw, when that was their object, the odium of what these instruments did upon the English government. But, in general, their desire would be limited to have the aid of the British name to alarm into compliance with their demands, individuals or communities. They would be aware that the Harkara or servant sent to assist their authority was a check upon their proceedings, and this would lead to his being bribed; and, if he did not become an instrument of violence, it would only be because he received higher wages from the party he was sent to oppress. I have seen such manifold instances of the bad effects resulting from the employment of this class in the manner described, that I have for more than three years peremptorily refused any such aid to native chiefs, and must require all those under my orders to do the same. The best answer to all applications upon this subject is, that compliance is at variance with the system ordered to be pursued; and that the usage of granting such aid, though it might be found convenient, and in some cases accelerate the accomplishment of good measures, must in the end produce much evil, and be attended with loss of reputation to the British government, whose good name could not be intrusted to low agents and menials acting beyond the strict and vigilant observation of the European officer.

The right we have to act, when the public peace is threatened or disturbed, has been generally noticed under the head of interference; but it will be useful to say a few words on the mode of exercising that right, particularly as it relates to points which are connected with the internal administration of police and criminal justice.

In countries which have been long in the condition of Central India, there is a connexion formed between the most powerful and those who are apparently the most insignificant of the disturbers of the public peace, which will for some time require a vigilant attention to every act of the latter to prevent the revival of a disorderly or predatory spirit. In common cases we shall only have to prompt the local authority to exertions. But when our aid is required, and troops or any persons acting under our orders apprehend delinquents, they should invariably be given over to the ruler or chief in whose countries the crimes were committed, by whom they will be examined, and punished according to established custom. I have usually limited my interference in this part of the administration of the native states of Malwa to two points. The first is, that in cases of robbery, but particularly cattle (the common booty of Bhils and other plunderers), there should be restitution to the owners the moment the property was proved; leaving those persons through whose hands it has passed, by real or pretended sales, to have their disputes and recriminations settled, and to recover from each other, according to usage. This practice is now general, and its enforcement for the last two years has done more to put an end to Bhil and other robberies than all the other measures that have been taken. The second point on which I have endeavoured to make a change in the practice of the administration of justice in the native states of Malwa, is that of preventing the crime of wilful murder being commuted for the payment of a pecuniary fine; but in all cases of this nature, where circumstances compel us to interfere, it is desirable that no execution should take place till guilt has been clearly proved. The observance of this rule is more necessary, as in cases where the criminals are of a plundering tribe, such as Bhils and Bagris,<sup>16</sup> the native ruler or chief will be disposed to deem the mere accusation enough to warrant the punishment; whereas, it is exactly with such classes it is of importance to us to be more particular, lest we lose the impression we desire to make upon them, by becoming in any way accessories to acts of violence or injury.

On all occasions when the local power is sufficient, it is most desirable to bring it into action, that it may cease to be dependent upon us for the maintenance of the internal peace. This is

particularly advisable where excesses are committed, that have, either as their real or professed causes, superstitions or religious feelings. In such cases, except where the mixture of political motives is manifest and avowed, or the danger imminent, we should call upon the native government, by its duty and allegiance to the paramount state, to put down all disturbers of the peace, particularly when fanatics, like those at Pratapgarrhs,<sup>17</sup> combine with their atrocities the avowal of sentiments hostile to our rule. The actual condition of Central India makes it likely that such efforts as those above alluded to may be repeated, and they will always (however contemptible they may seem) require to be treated with much delicacy. It should be deemed a guiding principle not to act, if we can avoid it; and when absolutely compelled to do so, it is essential that we should appear, not as principals, but in support of the local government: for the spirit that engenders such excesses, whether they proceed from intrigue or fanaticism, will only attain strength by opposition; and any violent measures on our part, however justified by crime or outrage, might make the most unfavourable impressions upon an ignorant and bigoted population, who, while they confess all the benefits of our general rule and control, are easily excited to a dread of our success ultimately leading to attempts at changing the religion and institutions of their forefathers.

In cases of rebels or plunderers collecting in such force as to require British troops to suppress them, you will (if the emergency prevents reference to superior authority) make a requisition for aid from the nearest commanding officer that can furnish it.

The rules for such requisitions have been generally notified: the political agent will give the fullest information of the service to be performed, the nature of the country, the character of the enemy and his resources, leaving the military officer, when possessed of such knowledge, the selection of the force, both as to number and equipment, that is to be placed at his disposal. But it is to be strongly impressed upon both, that in a country like Central India, the means employed should always be above the object to be accomplished, as failure or defeat in any enterprise or action would be attended with very bad consequences.

It is almost superfluous to repeat what has been sedulously inculcated upon you as a primary duty during the last three years, the adoption of every preventive measure to avert the necessity of the employment of force. Its appearance has hitherto been almost in all cases sufficient to produce the required effect; and in the few instances where it has been employed, the moment of success has been succeeded by that of conciliation. To act differently, and to pursue those wild tribes who are the common disturbers of the peace with retaliation of outrages beyond what is necessary to evince our power, is to confirm them in their habits, and to add to their other motives of hostility those of resentment and despair. When engaged in warfare with such classes, we should be cautious how we inflict summary punishment on the individuals who fall into our power. These are often the mere instruments of crime, and act in its commission under as strong an impulse of duty to their superiors as the soldier in our ranks; and it is as unreasonable to expect their habits can be changed by making examples of such men, as it would that we could subdue the spirit of a nation by putting to death every soldier belonging to it that we found fighting against us in action. The increased danger in which this placed individuals would only strengthen that powerful feeling by which they were attached to their leaders, while it added that of revenge against those who treated them with what they deemed cruelty and injustice. It is the duty of all agents of the British government to direct their efforts to effect a change in the frame of these savage communities; instead of commencing, in imitation of unprincipled and despotic native rulers, an unprofitable and interminable warfare upon individuals, who can hardly be termed guilty when they act by the express order of chiefs to whom and their predecessors they and their fathers have given implicit obedience for centuries. The nature and strength of the ties which subsist in these societies were fully discovered in the trial of Nadir Singh,<sup>18</sup> the celebrated Bhilala chief of the Vindhya range. No one has questioned the justice of his punishment; but that of the persons who committed by his order the barbarous crime for which he was exiled, would have been deemed an act of oppression.

One of the most effectual means that you have to maintain

the peace, is that of exerting yourself to render all (even the poorest and wildest classes) sensible of the benefits they derive from your protection. There is no point in which this is more required than against the excesses of our troops, camp-followers, merchants who have passes, and, in short, all who on any ground use the British name. The governments of the different presidencies have been long sensible of this evil, and have endeavoured, by the strictest orders and proclamations, to correct it. The pressing of begaris<sup>19</sup> and hackeries<sup>20</sup> has been positively forbidden; but these orders must be enforced with a rigorous and uncompromising spirit by the civil and political authorities, otherwise they will prove unavailing. This is a point of duty in which I consider those under my orders to have no option or latitude. In the present condition of Central India, it is one of too much importance, both as it relates to the temper of the inhabitants and the reviving prosperity of the country, to warrant any deviation, either for the accommodation of individuals or the public service. The former, when no longer encouraged by improper or unwise indulgence to trust in any way to the country, will soon learn to be independent of its aid; public departments will in like degree become, from providing for their own wants, more efficient; and when the inhabitants are satisfied that it is not in the power of any person, whatever be his rank, to press them or their cattle, they will be inspired with a confidence that will lead to their furnishing more resources to troops and travellers, from a desire of profit, than has ever yet been extorted by an oppressive system; which, according to all natives I have heard speak upon the subject, has been carried to as great, if not greater lengths, in countries subject to our rule and control, than in the worst of their own governments.

There are, I fear, many omissions in these notes of Instructions; but an anxiety to render them complete has already made them far longer than was at first intended. One of my chief objects has been to impress, in the most forcible manner, the great benefits which are to be expected from a kind and conciliating manner, and a constant friendly intercourse with those under your direction and control. It is the feelings and knowledge which such habits on your part will inspire, that can alone give effect to the principles of action that have been pres-

cribed for your observance. You are called upon to perform no easy task: to possess power, but seldom to exercise it; to witness abuses which you think you could correct; to see the errors, if not crimes, of superstitious bigotry, and the miseries of misrule, and yet forbear, lest you injure interests far greater than any within the sphere of your limited duties, and impede and embarrass, by a rash change and innovation that may bring local benefit, the slow but certain march of general improvement. Nothing can keep you right on all these points but constant efforts to add to your knowledge, and accustoming your mind (as I have before urged you) to dwell upon the character of the British power in India, and that of the empire over which it is established. The latter, comprehending numerous tribes and nations, with all their various institutions and governments, may truly, though metaphorically, be viewed as a vast and ancient fabric, neither without shape nor beauty, but of which many parts are in a dilapidated state, and all more or less soiled or decayed; still it is a whole, and connected in all its parts; the foundations are deep-laid, and to the very summit arch rests upon arch. We are now its possessors; and if we desire to preserve, while we improve it, we must make ourselves completely masters of the frame of the structure to its minutest ornaments and defects: nor must we remove the smallest stone till another is ready, suited to fill the vacant niche, otherwise we may inadvertently bring a ruin on our own heads, and those of others, on the spot where we too eagerly sought to erect a monument of glory.

JOHN MALCOLM

Camp Dhooliah, 28th June, 1821.



# Notes and References

## CHAPTER 8

- <sup>1</sup> The first factory was established at Masulipatam in 1611.
- <sup>2</sup> See Grant; *History of the East India Company*, p. 172.
- <sup>3</sup> The greater part of Lord Clive's fortune was at this period in the hands of the Dutch East India Company, through whom he had remitted it to England.
- <sup>4</sup> This privilege was granted to the East India Company by the Mughal Emperor in 1717. This, however, did not extend to the private trade of the Company's officials. The *firman* provided that "all goods and necessities which the Company's factors bring or carry away either by land or water" were to be free from Customs duties.
- <sup>5</sup> August, 1760.
- <sup>6</sup> September, 1760.
- <sup>7</sup> Mir Kasim.
- <sup>8</sup> Mir Jafar being a protege of Clive the adherents of Clive opposed the change; the most vocal of them were Verelst, Smith, Amyatt and Luis.
- <sup>9</sup> The Company's officials and their native agents indulged in internal trade without paying duties to the State. Mir Kasim was eager to stop this abuse as revenues from internal trade were dwindling every day.
- <sup>10</sup> 7th July, 1763.
- <sup>11</sup> See letter from Kasim Ali to Major Adams, 9th September, 1763.
- <sup>12</sup> At Buxar the three major Muslim powers of North India, viz., the Mughal Emperor, the Nabob of Oudh and the Nabob of Bengal, opposed the British. This was the first and the last combination of the Muslim powers against the British.
- <sup>13</sup> The treaty of Allahabad.
- <sup>14</sup> Mir Jafar died in the beginning of 1765.
- <sup>15</sup> Shah Alam was to be paid Rs. 26 lakhs in lieu of the grant



of Diwani. Clive's intention was to gain legality for the usurpation of the Bengal revenue.

- <sup>16</sup> By the engagements with the Nabob of Bengal (1757), the Company had the privilege given them of coining money in the name of the emperor of Delhi.

In the same year, the lordship of twenty-four districts, adjacent to Calcutta, was granted to them in perpetuity, and their facilities of trade were greatly extended. In 1760, the rich provinces of Midnapore, Burdwan, and Chittagong were made over to them by Kasim Ali, for the payment of a specified subsidiary force—500 European cavalry, 2000 infantry, and 800 sepoys.

In 1763, at the restoration of the Nabob Jafar Khan, the above provinces were ceded in perpetuity. In 1764, a grant from Shah Alam, emperor of Delhi, gave them the countries of Benares and Ghazipur; and in the following year, 1765, the same authority made them nominal administrators, but real rulers of the rich and fertile provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.

Considerable cessions of territory were made to the Company, at this period, on the coast of Coromandel, in addition to some valuable lands made over in 1763, by the Nabob Mohammad Ali Khan. A jagir or estate, was granted in 1765, which included some of the most fertile districts in the Carnatic. A grant of the northern circars had been obtained from the Suba of the Deccan by Bussy; but when Masulipatam was taken, and the French were expelled from this possession, in 1759, by the English, the circars were transferred to them, and their right to this territory, as well as to the lands ceded by the Nabob of the Carnatic, was confirmed in 1765, by a deed from the emperor of Delhi.

Bombay, the most ancient of the territorial possessions of the Company, was, in 1765, the most limited; but it had importance from its fine harbour, and its numerous dependent factories, among which it numbered Surat. This town and island, originally ceded by the Portuguese to King Charles II, as a part of the dowry of his Queen, the Infanta Catherine, was made over by the King to the Company in 1668. (M)

<sup>17</sup> September 30, 1765.

<sup>18</sup> Letter to the Court of Directors, September 30, 1765.

<sup>19</sup> "Peace", Lord Clive observes, in a letter to Mr. S. Law, dated 29th December, 1758, "is the most valuable of all blessings, but it must be made sword in hand in this country, if we mean to preserve our present possessions. There is no alternative; either everything in India must be reduced to their first principles, or such a standing force kept up as may oblige the Mussulman literally to execute their treaties." —*Clive MSS.* (M)\*

<sup>20</sup> In Lord Clive's letter of the 21st of August, 1757, to Mr. Mabbot, one of the Directors, after giving an account of the revolution he had effected, he adds—"I have the pleasure to acquaint you, that the greatest success at Golconda could not have equalled the present one for advantages, either to the Company or myself. Indeed", he concludes, "there is nothing but the good of the service can induce me to stay in this unhealthy climate." In all his letters to his attorneys, to his friends and relatives, we find the amount of this donation represented as great; and he distinctly states in one letter, that he had no desire whatever to conceal the Nabob's liberality, which he evidently thought was as honourable to that prince as to himself. (M).

<sup>21</sup> A remarkable instance of this mode of paying those concerned in such great transactions is afforded in the treaty of peace with Tipu Sultan, concluded by Lord Cornwallis in 1792. Thirty lacs of rupces were demanded and given, as *Durbar Kharch*, or Durbar expenses, avowedly to be distributed amongst the officers concerned in settling the treaty. Lord Cornwallis, it may be observed, obtained no share of this money; but it may be answered that, while a commander in Lord Clive's situation had not £3000 per annum of direct salary, and could cherish no expectation of pecuniary reward in England, Lord Cornwallis had £30,000 per annum, besides a donation of £100,000 from the government he so honourably served.

The opposite principle, now established for the reward of services, will be noticed hereafter. It is alluded to here, to

\* (M) Indicates notes appended by Malcolm.

guard against opinions which we are too apt to form of the superior virtue of our own times, grounded, as that is in the present instance, upon a totally different state of circumstances. (M)

- <sup>22</sup> Lord Clive, in his letter to the committee, dated 7th May, 1765, when he took charge for the second time of the government of Bengal, observes:

“I shall now repeat what you have often heard me declare, that I totally disclaim any emolument to myself; I will not add to my fortune one single rupee by the opportunities I might have as Governor.

“On the other hand, be assured, that every advantage to others, consistent with my idea of the Company’s honour and interest, shall be promoted to the utmost of my power here, and my influence at home.”

This pledge was faithfully kept, for he returned to England five thousand pounds poorer than he left it. Of his great liberality many instances might be adduced, amongst which none is more prominent than his willingness, and, indeed, desire, to give up part of his received donation at the elevation of Mir Jafar, to make up the share to which he deemed Admiral Watson so justly entitled. To such an arrangement, however, the members of the committee refused their assent. (M)

- <sup>23</sup> 30th March, 1767.

- <sup>24</sup> See letter from the Committee to Colonel Clive.

- <sup>25</sup> The author has stated in the preface his obligations to Lord Powis, who has given him free access to all the letters and papers of his father, the late Lord Clive. These are numerous, and many of them very interesting; they will furnish excellent materials for a memoir, that will alike serve to illustrate the character of that great man, and the rise of the British power in India.. (M) Malcolm later on wrote a biography of Clive which was the first biography of Lord Clive based on his private papers.

- <sup>26</sup> Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Scrafton, and Colonel Ford.

- <sup>27</sup> See Wilkes’s: *Southern India*, ii, p. 16.

- <sup>28</sup> In 1814 Mr. Hastings was called before the House of Commons to give his evidence on points connected with the

renewal of the Company's privileges. All the members rose as if by one impulse when he entered the House. (M)

<sup>29</sup> General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis.

<sup>30</sup> See Hastings's Memoirs.

<sup>31</sup> Dated November 30, 1779.

<sup>32</sup> Mr. James Anderson, the able resident at the court of Mahdaji Sindhia, gives, in his communications with the acting Governor-general, Sir John Macpherson, and with Lord Cornwallis, the completest account of the progress and character of the power of that ambitious chief. After expatiating (See Mr. Anderson's Letter to Lord Cornwallis, November, 24, 1786.) upon the just grounds we had to expect that Sindhia would better have appreciated the motives of our conduct in not obstructing, as we easily might have done, the progress of his ambition, he adds, "I am sorry, however, to observe, that the behaviour of Madhajee Sindia has been in many respects very unsuitable to the delicacy of our conduct towards him: in some instances he has presumed too much on the moderation of our conduct, and in all his transactions with the other powers he has laboured to interpret the delicacy of our behaviour towards him into a complete submission to his power. In short, it has become evident, that whatever reliance we may have formerly placed in his disposition must now be totally transferred to the circumstances of his situation."

After describing Mahdaji Sindhia's actual condition; his progressive efforts to make himself master of all Hindustan, under the name of the powerless emperor Shah Alam; the difficulties he had still to encounter from the numerous chiefs who were yet unsubdued; from the constitution and temper of a great proportion of his army; and from the dissatisfaction excited amongst his new subjects by his "various acts of treachery, cruelty, and rapacity," Mr. Anderson observes, "From this detail your lordship will perceive that Sindia's situation is yet in some degree precarious, and that at all events much time must necessarily elapse before he can realize his prospects. He has, undoubtedly, many advantages in his cunning and intrigue, and his persevering management, which he often uses successfully to supply the want of

real power and other defects in his situation; but, on the other hand, he is frequently prompted by his avarice to act with little policy or foresight. From this latter circumstance, I was for some time inclined to think that his views in this quarter were rather of a temporary than permanent nature. It is, indeed, most likely that the expectation of treasure was at first his principal object in this undertaking, but that his views opened and enlarged themselves with the favourable events which afterwards fell out. It seems now almost as certain as any political point can be, that his object is, by connecting his own provinces of Malwa and Ajmere, with those of Agra and Delhi, to erect an independent empire of his own, and to shake off all subjection to the Paishwah." Mr. Anderson then expresses his opinion, that, after the dangerous ambition which Sindhia has displayed, and the abuse he has made of the delicacy with which we have acted towards him, it will be "extremely necessary we should watch him narrowly;" and he concludes by stating, that, "on some occasions, perhaps it may be necessary for us to check him in his progress, where we may have favourable opportunities of doing it, without the actual commission of hostilities against him. (M)

<sup>33</sup> Vol. i, p. 206.

<sup>34</sup> Letter from Lord Minto to the Resident at Poona, November 11, 1811.

<sup>35</sup> Though the Home authorities realised the necessity of annihilating the Pindaris, they were reluctant to sanction a revision of the existing political alliances. To this extent Malcolm does not seem to be correct.

<sup>36</sup> There is one remarkable exception in the case of the late Lord Londonderry, who differed from Lord Wellesley as to the principles upon which the treaty of Bassein was concluded. The arguments on both sides are fully given in the body of this work: but the whole lies in a narrow question. Was it possible, after the conquest of Mysore, and the treaty of Hyderabad, for the British government, governed according to its established principles and usages, to remain without collision with the Mahrattas, whose system was predatory? If it was not, the only difference of opinion that could arise

was, as to the measures which could render the existence of these two great powers compatible with each other. The only mode of effecting this, with any hope of avoiding war, was through alliances (of which Bassein was the first) that divided the interests of the great chiefs of this nation of plunderers. (M)

## CHAPTER 9

- <sup>1</sup> A large number of British officials in India including Charles Metcalfe and John Malcolm viewed the territorial expansion of the Company with a sense of skepticism.
- <sup>2</sup> It was this feeling which influenced the advocates of the policy of non-interference towards Indian States.
- <sup>3</sup> See Courtney Ilbert: *The Government of India*, pp. 72-9.
- <sup>4</sup> When we consider the nature of this right of recall, and the constitution of the Court of Directors, we are not surprised that it has never been exercised; but though they have, even when dissatisfied with the high functionaries in India, shrunk from the responsibility of recalling them in opposition to ministers, their possessing the power to do so must have influence on the conduct of ministers. (M)
- <sup>5</sup> The Company cease to have the right of recalling in cases where the vacancies to the offices of Governor, Governor-general, or Commander-in-Chief, in India, has been filled by the ministry, in consequence of the Court of Directors not nominating within the prescribed period. Vide 33 Geo. III., cap. 3, sec. 36. (M)
- <sup>6</sup> This Act did not include military officers dismissed by a court-martial; such cases were provided for by the 51 Geo. III., cap. 75, sec. 4 and 5. The latter Act was passed in consequence of doubts whether the Act of 1793, 33 Geo. III., cap. 52, sec. 69, did not absolutely interdict the restoration of an officer dismissed by a court-martial. (M)
- <sup>7</sup> For details of the growth of administrative institutions during the East India Company's rule, see B.B. Misra: *The Central Administration of the East India Company*.

- <sup>8</sup> The charter of the Company is perpetual. The Act of 1813 renewed, to a further term, certain territorial and commercial privileges of the chartered Company, but the charter does not expire with that term. This is a distinction not unimportant, in reference to any arrangement that may be contemplated for altering the system. (M)
- <sup>9</sup> The first of these passed in 1784, 24 Geo. III., cap. 25, sec. 29. The second in 1793, 33 Geo. III., cap. 25, sec. 23. (M)
- <sup>10</sup> Malcolm was among the first group of officers to receive this honour.
- <sup>11</sup> Sir Thomas Munro and the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone.
- <sup>12</sup> Vide Mr. Canning's letter to the chairman of the Court of Directors, dated the 21st September, 1818.
- <sup>13</sup> This history closes with the administration of Lord Hastings, or it would have been the duty of the author to have noticed the measures of the late Mr. John Adam, who, while acting Governor-general, previous to the arrival of Lord Amherst, evinced a mind every way suited to the discharge of the duties of that high station. (M)
- <sup>14</sup> After Sir George Barlow, with the exception of a temporary appointment of Charles Metcalfe, Company's servants were not appointed to the high office of the Governor-general.
- <sup>15</sup> One of the most effectual of the checks under which a Governor in India acts is that publicity consequent on the positive necessity of making every act, however unimportant, a written record to be transmitted to England. (M)
- <sup>16</sup> Macaulay graphically described this indifference. He said that a war in India in which thousands of soldiers were killed did not stimulate the same concern in the Parliament as a death by accident in a London street.
- <sup>17</sup> The changes that have occurred in the political condition of India, within the last twenty-five years, have lessened, in a great degree, those opportunities which persons in the service had of distinguishing themselves.  
Those now employed in the highest stations are seldom called upon to exercise their discretion regarding measures of importance. Their duties have almost become those of routine, and the tendency of the actual system is, to place

them as much under minute check and control as a collector of the revenue of a small district.

The effect of this system will be remarked upon elsewhere: it is noticed here, merely to establish the fact, that the civil and military officers of India have not the same means they before enjoyed of bringing themselves forward to public notice. (M)

- <sup>18</sup> There are several others, inclusive of the principal ministers; but all, except the president and two members, may be deemed honorary, as they neither receive salary nor perform any duty. (M)
- <sup>19</sup> The Board of Control established by the Pitt's India Act consisted of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and one of the Secretaries of State and four other Privy Councillors appointed by the King and holding office during pleasure. There was to be a quorum of three and the President was to have a casting vote. They were unpaid, and had no patronage, but were empowered to superintend, direct and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in anyway relate to the civil or military government or revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies.
- <sup>20</sup> The first Board of Commissioners, appointed on August 31, 1784, consisted of Lord Sydney, Foreign Secretary of State, William Pitt, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Henry Dundas, William W. Granville, Lord Mulgrave and Lord Walsingham. Of the six Commissioners Walsingham resigned and for the first two years, Lord Sydney and Pitt rarely attended the Board's meeting. As a result, the business of the Board became the exclusive concern of Henry Dundas, the Senior Commissioner, who normally took the chair, organised its establishment and took an active interest in Indian affairs.
- <sup>21</sup> From the passing of the Act 24 Geo. III., 1784, the following secretaries of state of the Home Department, were presidents of the India Board, ex-officio, and without salary: Lord Viscount Sydney; Lord (then Mr.) Grenville; Lord Melville (then Mr. Dundas).

The system was changed in 1793, when the presidentship was made a separate appointment, with a salary; since



which it has been filled by Henry Viscount Melville (then Mr. Dundas); 1801, Lord Viscount Lewisham (afterwards Earl of Dartmouth); 1802, Viscount Castlereagh; 1806, Earl Minto; Mr. Thomas Grenville; Mr. Tierney; 1807, Mr. Robert Dundas; 1809, Earl of Harrowby (about three months); Mr. Robert Dundas (now Viscount Melville); 1812, Earl of Buckinghamshire; 1816, Mr. Canning; 1820, Mr. Bathurst (about a year); 1822, Mr. Williams Wynne. (M)

<sup>22</sup> The late Lord Buckinghamshire.

<sup>23</sup> The Right Honourable John Sullivan.

<sup>24</sup> Lord Macartney, who was nominated Governor of Fort St. George in 1782, was the first appointment of any British subject, not a Company's servant, to such a station.

<sup>25</sup> The salary of a political resident of the first class, which is one of the highest in India, does not exceed £3500 per annum, and, though his establishment and expenses are paid to a certain extent, he cannot calculate on a less disbursement from it than £1000, which leaves him an annual saving of £2500, in a station which he is not likely to have attained before a service of from twenty to twenty-five years. (M)

<sup>26</sup> It is difficult to make those who are locally unacquainted with India understand the vital importance of the preservation of this high tone in all who fill prominent political situations in that country; but in no government is the truth of the Persian adage more applicable, which says, "If the King takes an egg, there will not be a fowl left in the land." (M)

<sup>27</sup> Malcolm was perhaps the first to agitate this question and continued to do so till the end of his life. But this was not accepted in principle.

<sup>28</sup> Discontinued in 1807.

<sup>29</sup> Not one commander-in-chief has been chosen from the Company's army since Mr. Pitt's Bill. On an occasion when the Court of Directors sought to do away with this injustice, they brought forward the name of one of their oldest officers who had not served for many years; his character was highly respectable; but the objections taken against such a recommendation were just and unanswerable. (M)

- <sup>30</sup> According to the Pitt's India Act the Court of Directors or their Secret Committee were the only medium of communication between the Board and the Supreme Government in India. But the Governors-general generally corresponded with the Presidents in their private capacity.
- <sup>31</sup> This committee is formed of the chairman and the senior Director, not filling one of the chairs. If the latter, from illness or other cause, is absent for any period, his place is filled by the next senior Director. (M)
- <sup>32</sup> Vide Geo. III. cap. 3, sec. 19, 20, 21.
- <sup>33</sup> The public despatches are framed by the Court of Directors, and approved or altered by the India Board. If the Court of Directors delay, after requisition from the Board, to frame despatches upon any subject connected with their civil or military government, the Board have the power to frame them; and they must be forwarded by the Directors. Vide Geo. III. cap. 3, sec. 15. (M)
- <sup>34</sup> "The scheme of reconciling a direction really and truly deliberative," said Mr. Burke, "with an office really and substantially controlling, is a sort of machinery that can be kept in order only a short time. Either the Directors will dwindle into clerks, or the secretary of state, as has hitherto been the case, will leave everything to them; often through design, and often through neglect. If both should affect activity, collision, procrastination, delay, and, in the end, utter confusion, must ensue." (M)
- <sup>35</sup> The inferior committees are divided into classes, and the Directors succeed to them also by seniority, without reference to qualification: they are numerous, and embrace every department connected with the commerce and property of the Company. (M)
- <sup>36</sup> Those six ex-Directors must be re-elected; they form what is termed the house list; their re-election, except in extraordinary cases, is almost certain: it is most desirable it should be so, for where it otherwise, the situation of a Director, which it is politic to raise, would be greatly decreased in value. Many respectable and highly qualified individuals are deterred, by the nature of the first canvass, from seeking a seat in the direction. If this canvass was to be repeated every

six years, some of the most useful members might be lost to this body; and among those that remained, a greater spirit of conciliation towards their constituents might be introduced than was consistent with the impartial performance of their public duties. (M)

- 37 During the renewal of the Charter Act in 1813 the Company was fighting a losing battle for the preservation of their trade monopoly. Warren Hastings and a large number of eminent servants of the Company dwelt upon the danger of unrestricted European emigration into India which would follow the opening of trade. The Act preserved the Company's monopoly of Chinese trade, but threw open to all British subjects the export and import trade with India, with the exception of tea.
- 38 The exclusion of such persons from being Directors was continued by a bye-law, which has been lately expunged, as being contrary to the provisions of the legislature, from which it appears there is no restriction against officers so situated as commandants of regiments residing in England entering the direction. The only pretext on which an objection could be raised is, their liability to be called upon for foreign service; but every officer of His Majesty's service, in civil or political employ in England, is in the same situation, and the usage of the Company's service since 1796, when colonels of corps were entitled to live in England, establishes, that their return to India is deemed optional. (M)
- 39 There are several situations in England in which the employment of officers, who continue in the Indian army, would be alike honourable to the service and beneficial to government. (M)
- 40 The liberal measures lately adopted are so far a benefit, as they prevent men fixing in India, and accelerate promotion; but their utility stops here; and it will probably be found, that measures will be hereafter necessary to regain services which will be lost by the effect of this liberality, unless some objects are held out to lead men of talent to continue to serve their country in India after they have attained a title to return on a competence to England. (M)
- 41 It has been sometimes stated, that men generally return from India at an age when they are more fit to retire than

to enter on new scenes of public employment. This assertion is not supported by facts; besides, the employment to which it is proposed to turn their attention would not be new, but an useful continuance of the labours of their past lives. (M)

- <sup>43</sup> The duties of the subordinate officers at the Board of Control and the India House are quite distinct from those of any other offices in England. The great application and study necessary to attain that competent knowledge which it is essential the heads of departments should possess must withdraw the persons filling such stations from all other studies and views. This consideration demands that such functionaries should be placed on as high a footing as the nature of their situation will permit. Their elevation, while it rewards their efforts, will stimulate that of others, and be every way productive of public benefit. (M)
- <sup>43</sup> There is no service in which pay is so good, and the means of retirement so liberally provided for, as that of the Company. The nature of this service requires that it should be so. Money long constituted the only reward to which those who went to India could look; and it still constitutes the leading object of the great majority. The desire of attaining this object produces many ungrounded accusations against the Court of Directors, all of whose economical measures are invariably ascribed to narrowness of commercial feeling, from their being a commercial body. (M)
- <sup>44</sup> The Court of Proprietors met four times a year—in March, June, September, and December. Nine Proprietors could, however, requisition a meeting of the Court to consider emergency matters. In 1661 the joint-stock principle was recognized by giving each member one vote for every £500 subscribed by him to the Company's stock. The Charter Act of 1693 changed this by giving the subscriber one vote for each £1000 stock held by him, up to £10,000. The Act of 1698 reverted to the earlier position by reducing the qualification for a single vote to £500 with a proviso that no single member could have more than five votes. The Regulating Act once again increased the minimum qualification to £1000 and restricted to those who had held their stock for twelve months.

- <sup>45</sup> The usage of secret ballot, which is that resorted to on such occasions, is not limited to the Court of Proprietors. It continues to be practised by the Directors whenever they are divided in opinion, and must tend to diminish in that body the personal responsibility which it is desirable to impose upon every man having such public duties to perform. (M)
- <sup>46</sup> Malcolm was an ardent supporter of the Company's rule in India. After his retirement in 1830 he entered the Parliament to advocate its cause during the Charter debates.
- <sup>47</sup> It was on the question of patronage that the Company and the ministers of the Crown often clashed. The failure of Fox's India Bill is an example.

## CHAPTER 10

- <sup>1</sup> The Regulating Act of 1773 had vested in the Governor-general-in-Council very limited powers of supervision and control over the Presidencies. According to this Act, the Presidencies were not to commence hostilities or conclude treaties without the previous consent of the Governor-general-in-Council, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties until the arrival of their orders and except also in cases where special orders had been received from the Company. However, in commercial matters the Presidencies were independent of the Governor-general-in-Council and directly corresponded with the Court of Directors, thereby introducing a duality of control. The Presidencies did not readily act according to the spirit of this new provision, either deliberately or by failure to appreciate the import of the Act. As a result, the Presidencies and the Supreme Government took antagonistic views on certain issues to the great embarrassment of both. The events leading to the first Anglo-Maratha war is a case in point. The Pitt's India Act sought to remedy this by providing sterner control over the subordinate Presidencies. It laid down that the Governor-general-in-Council "shall have power and authority to superintend, control and direct

the several Presidencies and governments in India in all such points as relate to any transactions with the country powers, or to war, or peace, or to the application of the revenues or forces of such Presidencies and settlements in time of war, or any such points as shall, from time to time, be especially referred by the Court of Directors . . . to their superintendence and control." The Presidencies were also required to send for the information of the Governor-general-in-Council true and exact copies of all their orders, resolutions or acts.

- <sup>2</sup> See Geo. III. cap. 3, sec. 47; by the same clause a similar power is vested in the Governor of Madras and Bombay. (M)
- <sup>3</sup> According to the Regulating Act all decisions of the Governor-general-in-Council were to be taken by the majority with a casting vote to the Governor-general. The opposition of a majority of the Councillors reduced the Governor-general to the position of an ordinary member. The Pitt's India Act partially remedied this by reducing the strength of the Governor-general-in-Council and giving the Governor-general a casting vote. The Amending Act of 1786 further strengthened the hands of the Governor-general by investing him with power to override the decision of his council and to act without its concurrence in extraordinary cases involving in his judgment the interests of the Company or the safety and tranquillity of British possessions in India. See B.B. Misra: *The Central Administration of the East India Company*, pp. 18-41.
- <sup>4</sup> It would, for instance, be a much more responsible exercise of the power committed to him, to disapprove an act of a Governor and council of Bengal, than it is at present to exercise his prerogative of adopting a measure from which his council dissent. (M)
- <sup>5</sup> High and respected names might be here adduced of persons who have filled these offices; but men like those could never suffer from the field of competition being enlarged. (M)
- <sup>6</sup> This is perceptible not only in the measures of government; it is to be found in almost all the writings published from observation of particular provinces, but rendered general in their application, either by the ignorance or the vanity of the authors. This spreads to England, where we have

printed accounts of the habits, manners, customs, religious usages, and character of the inhabitants of India, specifically true, but which, if taken generally, are as remote from truth as a description of Europe would be if drawn from an account of France or Spain. (M)

- 7 The expense necessary to form what would be viewed by many as a new establishment would not be great. It would include but little beyond the pay of a Governor or Vice-President of Bengal, equal probably to that of the other presidencies. With regard to other parts of the arrangements, as the same duties would only have to be done in a different mode, it would be little more than a transfer of offices, with some increase of pay to those at the head of each department. (M)
- 8 During the third Anglo-Mysore War, Lord Cornwallis proceeded to Madras to supervise the conduct of the war. This was an unprecedented situation and there was no provision in the earlier Acts for the Governor-general to leave his Presidency and exercise when alone the powers of his government. The Council, therefore, authorised him to proceed to Madras and there use all such executive powers as were collectively vested in it. This also agitated two other issues: First, the Governor-general's position in relation to the local council at Madras and secondly, the conduct of the business of the Bengal Presidency in the absence of the Governor-general. The Act of 1793 made provision for both these problems. The Act empowered the Governor-general "to nominate from among the members of his council a Vice-President and Deputy Governor of Fort William to act when and so often as the Governor-general shall on any occasion be absent from his own government of Bengal," which government in his absence "shall be exercised by such Vice-President or Deputy Governor and the other members or member of the said council in like manner . . . as the government of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay may be exercised by the Governors-in-Council there." During such absence the powers of the supreme government were to be exercised by the Governor-general and the council of either of the Presidencies of Madras or Bombay where he decided

to stay. The Governor in that case was to sit and act as a member of the council of such Presidency. See B.B. Misra: *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

\* See *Central India*, i. p. 271.

<sup>10</sup> Malcolm was recommended by Lord Hastings for this office.

<sup>11</sup> A similar plan to that proposed for Central India, might be introduced with good effect into the Deccan, inclusive of the Nagpur territories, and north-western parts of Hindustan Proper. Mr. James Stuart, in a very able paper on the police, (vide *Fifth Report*, p. 586) suggests a subordinate government for the latter country. (M)

<sup>12</sup> Mr. James Stuart, in the report before alluded to, treats this part of the subject with great ability. "Are the natives of Hindustan (he asks) a different order of beings, that they are to be stinted into honesty, and degraded into principle?"—(*Report V.* p. 581.) The same able public officer, after remarking on the importance of gradations in society amongst the natives, and the necessity, if we mean improvement, for building our plans on the existing basis of their ancient institutions, and to adopt them to their habits and manners,—comments upon the probable result of the existing system, and forcibly observes: "As we proceed, these provinces will soon present the singular spectacle of a great empire, the government of which rigidly excludes its subjects from every object of fair ambition which in the pursuit could stimulate men to cultivate their faculties or, in the possession, enlarge their understanding, and elevate their minds."—*Fifth Report*, p. 584. (M)

<sup>13</sup> This refers to the criminal law: the civil law has regard to the religion and usages of all classes of our native subjects; the forms and habits of our courts are borrowed from those of the Mahomedan rulers of India. (M)

<sup>14</sup> There was, it is true, a Mahomedan Qazi in almost every town and village, but where the Hindu population prevailed, his duties were limited to his own tribe. This, on investigation, appears to have been the general rule; the exceptions to it were cases of oppression. (M)

<sup>15</sup> A Bengal civil servant of experience and reputation remarking on the code of criminal law we have adopted from the



Mahomedans, observes: "As to the Hindus, not one in a thousand of their pundits (domestic teachers, or learned men) can read Persian, much less Arabic; and, added to this, when these persons would consider it a defilement to peruse the books wherein alone the law can be found, it is easy to credit the fact, that the whole Hindu race has been, and ever will continue, ignorant of those rules which determine their liberty and existence."—Letter from Mr. Fortescue, officiating judge at Benares, to Chief Secretary Bayley, dated Jaunpur, February 17, 1816. (M)

<sup>16</sup> Vol. i, p. 324.

<sup>17</sup> The alleged defects of our present system are, that it excites a spirit of litigation; that its delays are great; that the expense attending suits is considerable; that the laws, from their original narrow basis, and from being framed more as expedients to meet particular cases than on general principles, have become so voluminous and complicated that a complete knowledge of them is hardly attainable; that they are, consequently, understood by few; and that among the natives who study them, many have no object but to take advantage of their complexity to screen guilt, or as the means of involving or defrauding others with impunity. (M)

<sup>18</sup> The native law officers should be educated at public institutions founded and supported on principles calculated not merely for the professional, but general improvement; and no individual should receive a licence to practise, who did not add good character to the necessary acquirements. We should also create some objects of profit and distinction, to which men of talent and integrity might aspire: the natives, who devoted themselves to this branch, would, from their efforts to obtain such honourable rewards, rise in the estimation of their countrymen; and, from such a change, we might expect great benefit to such a system of judicature. (M)

<sup>19</sup> In 1821, the jurisdiction of the native commissioners was extended to suits of 500 rupees. The success of this experiment will probably cause a greater extension of their power, and we may, perhaps, anticipate a period when the English zila judge will have few causes but those of appeal from the native courts. (M)

- <sup>20</sup> It is often stated by those that are adverse to the extension of the judicature of Panchayat, that the records of the government of India prove that they are not a popular court, because they are not so much resorted to by the natives as the courts of Adalat. The cause of this has been elsewhere stated. "Under a native prince, when complaints were made or accusations brought forward, and he, instead of a despotic award, directed, in a spirit of justice or moderation, that a punchayet should assemble to investigate them, can any man, acquainted with the principles upon which such states acted, and the feelings of those subject to their authority, believe that the defendant or complainant (though each had the privilege of a fair challenge) deemed himself at liberty, whatever nominal forms might exist, to refuse to submit his case to the tribunal ordered to investigate it? He could not but know that such conduct would be deemed contumacy, and subject him to all the hazard of a summary and violent proceeding. Under the British government men can have no such apprehension, and, unless the rule is made absolute for trial of certain cases in these courts, it would not be in one out of a hundred that the two parties would assent. Both the plaintiff and defendant would calculate whether they had the best chance of gaining their suit by applying to a punchayet or zillah; and whenever they did not agree, the latter court, in which the forms are compulsory, would be that in which the case was at last tried. But this result must not be brought forward as a decided proof of its superior popularity. Before such a fact can be admitted, it must be established whether the preference to it is given by the honest men or the rogues."—See *Central India*, ii, p. 296. (M)
- <sup>21</sup> Such a commission would, of course, be aided by the information and opinions of the ablest natives from the different parts of our dominions. (M)
- <sup>22</sup> See *Central India*, ii p. 246.
- <sup>23</sup> The proportion of the Mahomedans to the Hindus, in Central India, has been computed as one to twenty-one and a half. It is still less in the neighbouring country of Rajputana. (M)
- <sup>24</sup> The system introduced by Cornwallis in 1792 was as

follows: The districts were divided into thanas of about twenty to thirty square in extent. To each of these was appointed an officer of Government, called daroga of police with an establishment consisting generally of muharrir, a jamadar and ten barkandazes. The daroga was to act under the immediate authority of the Magistrate. The rural police like chaukidars, dusadhs, pasbans, and nigahbans who earlier constituted the primary organ of the zamindari police were subjected to the orders of the daroga, but their payment and control remained vested in the zamindars. Every daroga was required to keep a register of their names, but on the death or removal of any of them the zamindar alone could fill up the vacancies so caused.

- <sup>85</sup> Lord Minto, in a despatch dated in May, 1810, states that the evidences lately adduced, exclusive of a multiplicity of other proofs, establishes, beyond a question, the commission of robberies, murders, and the most deliberate cruelties; in a word, an aggregate of the most atrocious crimes: nor let it be supposed, he adds, that these offences were of rare occurrence, or confined to particular districts; they were committed, with few exceptions, and with slight modifiations of atrocity, in every part of Bengal.

Mr. Dowdeswell, chief secretary to government, in an able report on the police, observes, "Were I to enumerate only a thousandth part of the atrocities of the decoits, and of the unjust sufferings of the people; and were I to soften that recital in every mode which language would permit, I should still despair of obtaining credit, solely on my own authority, for the accuracy of the narrative. . . Volumes might be filled with the atrocities of the decoits, every line of which would make the blood run cold with horror."

Mr. Edward Strachey, judge of circuit, whose opportunities of observing the extent of this evil were ample, gives his opinion on this subject very fully in a letter, dated June, 13 1808, to Mr. Bayley, register of the Nizamut Adalat. "That decoity," he observes, "is very prevalent in Rajeshahye has been often stated; but if its vast extent were known,—if the scenes of horror, the murders, the burnings, the excessive cruelties, which are continually perpetrated here, were properly

represented to government, I am confident that some measures would be adopted to remedy the evil: certainly there is not an individual belonging to the government who does not anxiously wish to save the people from robbery and massacre; yet the situation of the people is not sufficiently attended to. It cannot be denied that, in point of fact, there is no protection for persons or property; and that the present wretched, mechanical, inefficient, system of police is a mere mockery."—See *Fifth Report, and Collection of Revenue Papers*. (M)

- <sup>26</sup> This question was a point of major controversy among the Company's administrators. In 1772 when the office of the Collector was instituted he was in charge of revenue collection, civil justice, and supervision over faujdari adalat. In 1793 Cornwallis effected a complete separation of executive and judicial powers, as a result the Collector was deprived of even the powers to try cases arising out of revenue matters. The Cornwallis structure was first altered in Madras in 1816 under the aegis of Thomas Munro. Bombay and North Western Provinces followed suit in 1819 and 1822. Bengal, however, took more time to depart from the Cornwallis system. It was in 1831 during the administration of William Bentinck, magistracy was combined with the office of the Collector in Bengal. See B.B. Misra: "Evolution of the Office of the Collector," *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, July-September 1965.
- <sup>27</sup> Thomas Munro, a strong advocate of investing the Collector with magisterial powers, wrote as follows in a minute of January 22, 1821: "We should form a very erroneous judgment of the important influence of the office of Collector, if we supposed that it was limited merely to revenue matters instead of extending it to everything affecting the welfare of the people. In India whoever regulates the assessment of the land, really holds in his hand the mainspring of the country." Holt Mackenzie supported unification from a different point of view: "... to disjoin the several parts of a government in a country, which is not self governed, is like placing different members of the body in charge of different physicians, severally acting with their respective limbs according

to individual theory, without reference to the treatment of other parts, and each holding in his hand the power of destroying life, but helpless to save, from the blunders of his brethren."

- <sup>28</sup> Another member of the paternalist school, Charles Metcalfe, expressed a similar view: "Every functionary from the highest to the lowest ought to strive to make the administration of government beneficial and paternal; much or rather most would depend on the superintendents of districts; and the happiness of the people would be greatly influenced by the degree of benevolence and effect felt by those officers towards them." Eric Stokes: *The English Utilitarians and India*, p. 153.
- <sup>29</sup> Fortescue to Bailey, February 18, 1816.
- <sup>30</sup> Lord Hastings, Thomas Munro, Charles Metcalfe and a large number of other officers held the same view. Lord Hastings arguing against the combination of the office of the magistrate and civil judge wrote in a minute dated October 2, 1815: "The duties of a magistrate can perhaps never be so properly executed as while he is engaged in a personal visit to every part of the district. The administration of civil justice requires the patient and cool deliberation of mature age. The preservation of the peace of a district calls for all the active energy of early youth. A judge should perhaps be abstracted from all private powers with the natives. A magistrate must maintain a most intimate communication with them and carry his researches into the most inmost recesses of their privacy. Justice should be blind, but the police requires the eyes of Argus."
- <sup>31</sup> Letter from Bengal, January 11, 1822.
- <sup>32</sup> The Court of Directors, in a letter to Bengal, dated November 8, 1818, desire government to take into "early consideration the best mode of employing a certain number of the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates in the Bengal police establishments, to be taken either from the invalid or pension lists, or such as government might think proper to allow to be withdrawn from the regular service for that particular purpose." The Court trusted that "a considerable saving might be made by the employment of native officers and soldiers in the discharge of

police duties; as, notwithstanding a considerable inducement ought to be held out to the native police officer and soldier to stimulate him to exertion in such situations, some deduction might be made, say one-third, for the allowance he would continue to derive from his military service."

The Court did not enter into any specification of the particular posts in the police establishments to which they wished to see deserving native officers and soldiers appointed; but they observed, that they "confidently trusted that no minor objections or particularities would be allowed to frustrate or obstruct so great a political object as the proposed arrangement had in view." (M)

- <sup>33</sup> This is an establishment for providing for old soldiers by grants of land. (M)
- <sup>34</sup> Several military officers have been employed in this line, and particularly at Madras, where the success that has attended this limited experiment warrants the most sanguine anticipations of its success on a more extended scale. (M)
- <sup>35</sup> The rights of the native hereditary officers of a village are much respected in Central India; and never did a country afford such proofs of the imperishable nature of this admirable institution. After the Pindari war, every encouragement was held out for the inhabitants to return to their desolate homes. In several districts, particularly those near the Narmada, many of the villages had been waste for more than thirty years. The inhabitants, who had been scattered, followed all occupations: many poteils, who had been obliged to leave their lands, had become plunderers, and remained at or near their ruined villages; some of their relations and friends followed their example; others cultivated grounds at a distance of several hundred miles from their homes; while a great majority went to the large towns, where they found a temporary asylum, and obtained subsistence by labouring in gardens or fields. But there is no people in whose hearts the love of the spot where they were born seems more deeply implanted than the Hindus; and those of Central India, under all their miseries and dispersion, appear never for a moment to have given up the hope of being restored to their homes. The families of each village, though remote from

each other, maintained a constant communication; inter-marriages were made, and the links that bound them together were only strengthened by adversity. When convinced that tranquillity was established, they flocked to their roofless houses. Infant poteils (the second and third in descent from the emigrator) were in many cases carried at the head of these parties. When they reached their villages, every wall of a house, every field, was taken possession of by the owner or cultivator, without dispute or litigation amongst themselves, or with government; and in a few days everything was in progress, as if it had never been disturbed. There was seldom any difficulty from the claims of other occupants; for local authorities, which appeared to hesitate at no means that promised profit, rejected the most advantageous offers from new settlers, while a hope remained that an hereditary officer or cultivator, who had claims to the management or cultivation of its lands, was likely to return. The worst of these rulers are not insensible to the necessity of preserving from injury this admirable and well-constructed foundation of their civil government and revenue system.—See *Central India*, ii., p. 20. (M)

- 36 Colonel Wilks, the able historian of South India, has devoted a chapter to the examination of the nature of landed property in India; his opinions, confirmed and illustrated as they are by the labour of research, and the soundness of his judgment, are entitled to the greatest attention: his work was the first which treated this subject in a manner worthy of its importance, and none of the facts it contains, or the general principles it has laid down, have ever been successfully controverted. We are also indebted to the same intelligent author for the first full and clear account of village institutions, and courts of Panchayat. See Mark Wilks: *History of South India*, i, c.v. (M)
- 37 A recent work which discusses in detail the circumstances which prevented the extension of the permanent settlement to other provinces—S.C. Gupta: *Agrarian Relations and Early British Rule in India*.
- 38 The term zamindar, literally landholder, is sometimes used in the provinces of India to describe a person holding a small

property in land, but oftener as the head or representative of the agricultural class in a district. Such persons were in general employed by the Mogul governors of provinces as collectors of the revenue; and as such, established fees, and nankar zameen, or land for their support, was assigned to them. Of this assigned land, which was proportioned in extent to their duties, they had only the government share. These officers become, according to Hindu usage, hereditary; and in the decline of the Mahomedan empire, they usurped on its weakness, and many of them used the force allowed them for the purpose of maintaining the police, to defend their zamindaris, now converted into principalities, from the authority they or their ancestors had served. But even when their usurpation succeeded, they had only the right to the government share of the soil, unless, perhaps, to some small lands of which their family were original possessors. For the particulars of the rights and occupations of zamindars, See *Central India*, ii., p. 7. (M)

<sup>39</sup> The permanent settlement was introduced in Bengal in 1793.

<sup>40</sup> Lord William Bentinck, Governor of Madras, in consequence of those doubts, prepared and circulated a set of queries, for the purpose of obtaining further information for his guidance in the settlement of the districts not yet alienated. The result of this investigation, afterwards recorded on the proceedings of the government, strengthened the opinions which he had previously formed, and induced His Lordship to make a journey to Calcutta, for the express purpose of obtaining the sanction of the Governor-general for suspending the further operation of the zamindari system. See Wilks's *History of South India*, i, p. 176. (M)

<sup>41</sup> Though a decision was taken in 1805 to extend the zamindari settlement to North Western Provinces, it was revised in 1811.

<sup>42</sup> This was the main argument used against the extension of the zamindari settlement to Madras where zamindars of Bengal type never existed.

<sup>43</sup> Mahalwari settlement in which the proprietor of mahal or estate was made responsible for payment was the system which ultimately came into force in the North Western Pro-



vinces. See Imtiaz Hussain: *Land Revenue Policy in North India*.

- 44 The Kulwar or Ryotwari settlement is one made by government immediately with the Ryots individually, under which the government receives its dues in the form of a money-rent fixed on the land itself in cultivation, and not being a pecuniary commutation for its share of the produce, varying as the extent of the produce may vary in each year. (M)
- 45 For details of Ryotwari settlement and its effects in Madras, see Neelmani Mukherji: *Ryotwari System in Madras*.
- 46 Malcolm here again asserts like other paternalists the need for moulding the administrators to suit the local tradition and the genius of the governed.
- 47 That will arise, though more gradually, under a Ryotwari system, whenever the assessment is moderate, and fixed upon principles that are understood, and deemed subject to no variation. But it is the principles upon which the collection is made that require to be understood and fixed, more than the land-tax or government share which it regulates. (M)
- 48 The province of Gujarat has been surveyed with as much minuteness as a gentleman's estate; but it never has been asserted that this has led to any vexatious or oppressive conduct towards the inhabitants; on the contrary, there is no part of our dominions where they are more content or prosperous. The measurement of the land was, with some exceptions, general throughout India, under the Mogul government. Almost every village had a record of its measurement, and where that is lost, our reviving this usage is more likely to be considered by the mass of the cultivators as a proof of our disposition to be just than to become extortionate. It creates discontent and alarm amongst zamindars and others, who manage or rent lands, from which they extort to the last rupee, but of the precise value of which they desire we should remain in ignorance. The measurement of the lands should not be enforced in countries where it never has been an usage, unless with consent of the cultivators. The right of resisting it was claimed and admitted upon this ground by the inhabitants of some districts in Central India. (M)

- <sup>49</sup> For the truth of this assertion, let the reader refer to the voluminous collections of judicial and revenue papers recently published. He will find that as inquiries proceed, new and important facts are daily discovered, affecting, from their relation to usages and rights, every question connected with claims to property in the soil. (M)
- <sup>50</sup> This remark, as far as relates to a knowledge of the native languages, applies more to Madras and Bombay than Bengal, in which, from the earliest time, many civil servants were conversant in the dialect of the country, and some were accomplished Persian scholars. (M)
- <sup>51</sup> During the early period of the Company's administration Indian institutions and officials were preserved with due to the mutual ignorance of the governor and the governed.
- <sup>52</sup> The college of Fort William was established in 1800, and its first session began in November 1800. Though the college was controlled by the supreme government, its immediate administration was in the hands of a college council. It consisted of Provost, Vice-Provost and three other members nominated by the Governor-general who acted as the ex-officio patron. The college was intended not only to promote a knowledge of oriental languages, but also to maintain and unhold the Christian religion in India. Its rules clearly provided that no person could hold any superior office in the college or be admitted as professor or lecturer in it until he should have taken an oath of allegiance to the King's Majesty and declared that he would not teach or maintain publicly or privately any doctrines or opinions contrary to the Christian religion, or the doctrine or discipline of the Church of England, as by law established. The Court of Directors, however, did not approve of the plan of Wellesley and in a letter of January 27, 1802, ordered the abolition of the college.
- <sup>53</sup> The college at Madras is upon a principle wholly different from that at Calcutta. It educates and supplies native instructors, and the young civilians who study at their homes are subject to an annual examination. At Bombay, they must qualify themselves, and pass certain examinations in the languages, before they can receive any increase of allowance or employment. (M)

- <sup>54</sup> The college of Fort William is only mentioned here, as a place for the instruction of civil servants on their arrival in India. This excellent institution has other and high claims to distinction, from the numerous works which the combined labours of the learned Europeans and natives attached to it have given to the public. This college should always be considered by government as much, if not more, a seat of learning, founded and liberally endowed for the purposes of diffusing useful knowledge over an empire, as a school for youth. (M)
- <sup>55</sup> This regulation has repeatedly been made, but never rigorously enforced: the causes of which are obvious. There is nothing so adverse to the feelings of an English government as any measure that wears the appearance of inquisition into the private conduct or concerns of a public servant; but the performance of this duty must not be evaded, when called for by considerations associated with the reputation and interests of our country. (M)
- <sup>56</sup> It has often been stated as matter of complaint, that in the college of Haileybury, as student of sixteen, if indisposed to go to India, has it in his power to cast away all his prospects in life by an act of boyish mischief, which commits an offence against its institutions; and it is admitted that there may be some reason why a government, that is compelled to be so strict regarding those whom it admits into its service, should relax from its rules, in consideration of extreme youth: but this lenity should not extend to the man who is confirmed in habits of idleness or dissipation. The objection, that some would seek that mode of effecting their return to England, supposes a depraved mind in a maturer age, precluding every hope of amendment. (M)
- <sup>57</sup> All lesser expedients than those recommended have been tried, and have failed. A regulation has been often suggested, rendering debts incurred by young men, under a certain age and circumstances, not recoverable by law; but while such debts are no bar to employment, other pledges and securities would be proffered and accepted. The premium on advances would no doubt, be increased; but this would be no obstacle to unreflecting youth, whose embarrassments would only be

- augmented by such insufficient efforts to prevent them. (M)
- <sup>58</sup> If such a change was ever made, it would be but justice to allow to persons now filling these stations the full term of five years, if they chose to remain. (M)
- <sup>59</sup> To the objections which may be made from the probable abuse of this patronage, there cannot be a better answer than reference to the list of civil servants who have been recommended by the local governments to seats in council. (M)
- <sup>60</sup> There is one point which merits special consideration, connected with the condition of this and other classes of public servants in India—the serious loss on remittance to England: this, if it continues, may have results, both as to the education of their children and their own retirement, which are unfavourable to the fundamental principle of binding public servants by every means to their native country. (M)
- <sup>61</sup> The revolt of 1857 proved this opinion to be correct.
- <sup>62</sup> The natives alone of the Company's army are now 232,366 rank and file.
- <sup>63</sup> Letters from Cornwallis to Dundas, November 7, 1794.
- <sup>64</sup> Lieutenant-colonels twenty-six years; majors twenty-three; captains eighteen; and cornets and ensigns six.
- <sup>65</sup> The commander-in-chief he recommends to have the power, should he think fit to exercise it, of permitting an officer, not in the regiment in which the vacancy occurs, to purchase; but this power not to authorise him to introduce any officer who is not senior to the person in the class who is ready to purchase. (M)
- <sup>66</sup> See *Negotiation for the Renewal of the Company's Privileges*, p. 37.
- <sup>67</sup> There is no part of their duty that requires such constant attention from officers high in command as the employment of the different branches of the service under their orders in a manner that shall at once promote their union and add to their efficiency. The separate employment of King's and Company's troops, or the corps of the different establishments, when on the same service, should ever be avoided; it is pregnant with evil, exciting jealousy and bad temper; while emulation and harmony are certain to be the result of men sharing the same hardships and dangers, and being alike associated in failure and success. (M)

- <sup>68</sup> Such exchanges would require, in the officer entering the native branch, a competence in knowledge of the languages and a period of service in India proportionate to his rank. (M)
- <sup>69</sup> Officers with whom the climate of India disagreed, or who had acquired or succeeded to fortune, but desired to remain in the army, would exchange into King's corps, and their places would be supplied by men willing and able to pass their life on foreign service. (M)
- <sup>70</sup> This discretionary power might safely be intrusted with the commander-in-chief of India. (M)
- <sup>71</sup> This particularly applies to that most important of all military departments, the Commissariat. The difference of principle in that of Bengal, and those of Madras and Bombay, is such, that it becomes almost impossible to employ the troops together during any long period of operations. (M)
- <sup>72</sup> Malcolm continuously fought against the discrimination shown towards the Company's service and urged for parity with the King's officers, especially in matters of honours and titles.
- <sup>73</sup> Various modes have been proposed to effect this object. The most practicable appears, the formation of corps of officers without men, from whom vacancies caused by appointments to the staff could be filled; who might be employed on the staff; and who could join corps with whom their services might be required; who should, in short, be disposable in any way, but should rise in unattached corps. There are fewer objections to this plan than any other, for it could, in no degree, disturb the regular rise of other corps, or produce those inequalities of promotion that must result from filling the vacancies made by nominations to the staff from the regiments to which they belonged. These unattached corps would be formed, in the first instance, as an augmentation. (M)
- <sup>74</sup> A correct general view of the rise and progress of the native armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay will be found in the *Quarterly Review*, xviii., p. 385.
- <sup>75</sup> This was first realized during the first Carnatic war, 1746-48. In the battle of Adayar a small French force consisting of 230 Europeans and 700 Indians commanded by Paradis

completely routed the large army of Anwar-ud-din consisting of about 10,000 soldiers. The military success of the East India Company is nothing but a repetition of this story. The sepoy army of the Company, disciplined and trained on European lines and commanded by European officers, defeated the large armies of the Indian rulers, ill-disciplined, ill-trained, and ill-equipped.

<sup>76</sup> Mahadaji Sindhia and Maharaja Ranjit Singh proved that the Indian army, properly disciplined and trained, could be more than a match to that of the Company.

<sup>77</sup> They were frequently detached in small parties into different parts of the country, from the inhabitants of which they obtained money on various pretexts. (M)

<sup>78</sup> These selections were made from the captains in the regiments of Europeans in the service of the Company; and it often happened that officers who had neglected to acquire the languages of the country, and who, from violence of temper, were, judged unfit to command natives, remained subordinate in an European corps, till they reached the rank of field officers. Ten subaltern officers were attached to every battalion under this system. (M)

<sup>79</sup> He had the off-reckonings of his corps, and, in general, the command of a station, with further emoluments. (M)

<sup>80</sup> The most beneficial measure of this nature recently adopted, is the appointment of a subedar-major to each corps. (M)

<sup>81</sup> The last returns of the native army made that amount to 232, 366, rank and file. (M)

<sup>82</sup> This is the pay of a subedar of cavalry at Madras. A subedar of cavalry at Bengal has 105 rupees per mensem. (M)

<sup>83</sup> The conduct of the native officers at Vellore, in 1806, and of those in the recent mutiny at Barrackpore, was nearly similar: they acted in both cases like men who, while desirous of not forfeiting what they possessed, were without adequate motives to make them perform with spirit a difficult and dangerous duty. (M)

<sup>84</sup> The Bengal native soldier is an exception.

<sup>85</sup> Amongst those who have been most happy in exciting such feelings in the minds of our native troops may be enumerat-

ed the names of Lord Clive, Sir Eyre Coote, Lord Cornwallis, General Meadows, Lord Lake, and the Duke of Wellington. In the article of the *Review* (vol. *xviii*, page 392), to which we have before alluded, we find a just compliment to that excellent officer, the late General Sir John Floyd, which very fully illustrates the effects of attention to this point. "The distinguished commander," the reviewer observes, "of that gallant regiment (the 19th dragoons) had, from the day of its arrival in India, laboured to establish the ties of mutual and cordial regard between the European and the native soldiers. His success was complete; his own fame, while he remained in India, was promoted by their combined efforts; and the friendship which he established, and which had continued for many years, was, after his departure, consummated upon the plains of Assaye. At the most critical moment of a battle, which ranks amongst the hardest fought of those that have been gained by the illustrious Wellington, the British dragoons, when making their extremest efforts, saw their Asiatic fellow-soldiers, 'keep pace for pace, and blow for every blow.' A more arduous task awaited the latter, when the battalions of native infantry which formed the garrison of Vellore were led, by the infatuation of the moment, to rise upon and murder the Europeans of that garrison. The fidelity of the native cavalry did not shrink from this severe trial; and after the gates of the fortress were blown open, their sabres were as deeply stained as those of the English dragoons with the blood of their misguided and guilty countrymen." (M)

- <sup>86</sup> The nomination of natives to situations in the police department appears to be a patronage on which the judge or magistrate, from the absence of all ties with those who fill them, can place little value; but these appointments are great objects to men under such functionaries, and all their influence with their superiors will be exerted to prevent any change in the system. (M)

## CHAPTER 11

- <sup>1</sup> The total numbers of English in India, not in the public service, has been computed at three thousand, of which two

thousand are given to Bengal, five hundred to Madras, and five hundred to Bombay. This calculation is probably beyond the actual numbers, including even those in the shipping of the country. (M)

- <sup>2</sup> Supreme Courts were established in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay in 1773, in 1800, and in 1823, respectively.
- <sup>3</sup> Vide Act 53 Geo. III cap. 155, sec. 104.
- <sup>4</sup> In Bengal the Company's adalats and the Supreme Court had concurrent and coterminus jurisdiction. Moreover, they administered justice by two different systems of judicature which differed fundamentally both in principle and organisation. A conflict between the two was therefore inevitable. For details see B.N. Pandey: *Introduction of English Law into India*.
- <sup>5</sup> Malcolm himself was involved in a controversy with the Chief Justice of Bombay when he was the Governor. See Kaye: *Life of Malcolm*, ii, pp. 508-20.
- <sup>6</sup> The idea has often been suggested of extending the jurisdiction of His Majesty's courts in India; but it is difficult to believe that any man of enlarged mind, who understands the history and present state of English law, and who surveys any eastern or foreign country, would recommend a transfer of the one to the other. What all Englishmen adore is the principle of English law, the freedom and security to person and property on which it is bottomed. But the forms of English law, or its proceedings, are not a necessary part of this principle; on the contrary, except in England, where they have grown up accidentally and from peculiar circumstances, they would only be an evil and an embarrassment; and in an Indian community they would come into collision with its most ancient usages. (M)
- <sup>7</sup> There has been much discussion regarding the name by which this race ought to be distinguished, and latterly some amongst them have thought that of Half Caste, by which they have been long known, is opprobrious. It certainly is not so, any more than Creole, or men of colour, when applied to persons of mixed race in the West Indies; amongst names chosen by themselves, that of Anglo-Indians appears to be the most descriptive and unexceptionable. (M)
- <sup>8</sup> Vide Vol. ii, p. 90.



- <sup>9</sup> There is no one regulation of our government that impresses reflecting natives with so high an opinion of our public virtue as the self-denying ordinance which prohibits Europeans from being proprietors of land. Colonel Wilks, in a communication upon this subject, states that Napoleon Buonaparte appeared never to have heard of this regulation, and could scarcely believe the Colonel to be serious when he assured him that it not only existed but was rigidly observed: although sufficiently chary of his admiration of any thing English, Colonel Wilks adds that he did not suppress it on this occasion. (M)
- <sup>10</sup> No British subject is allowed to reside more than ten miles from the presidency, unless leave is given by a certificate signed by the chief secretary of government, which certificate must specify the place at which he is to reside, and the period for which such leave is granted. Vide 53 Geo. III., cap., civ sec. cviii. (M)
- <sup>11</sup> These manufactories are usually for indigo or sugar. (M)
- <sup>12</sup> All Europeans, except British subjects, are amenable to the provincial criminal courts; but British subjects can, at present, only be prosecuted on any criminal charge before the King's court at the presidency, and the same jurisdiction must be referred to before any penalty beyond a fine of five hundred rupees, or, in failure of payment, two months' imprisonment, is awarded. This is often a great hardship upon natives who have to prefer charges against them, but who cannot afford either the time or money necessary for a prosecution at such a distance. (M)
- <sup>13</sup> It is believed that no correct census has ever been taken of this part of the population. (M)
- <sup>14</sup> This population consists of the descendants of the Portuguese and native converts. (M)
- <sup>15</sup> The most famous of them was James Skinner, who organised a cavalry which formed a part of the British army under the title Skinner's horse.
- <sup>16</sup> Strong objections have been taken to the measure of allowing the Anglo-Indians to hold lands. It has been represented as opening an indirect road to colonization, as the fathers would often be the real proprietors of land bought in the

name of their illegitimate children; and it has been further stated, that the latter through marriage might become the progenitors of colonists who would be very proximate to Europeans. It has been answered to such arguments, that subjecting this class, as we do, to the same laws as the natives, we could not easily refuse them the right of attaining property in the soil, where that could be purchased by the wealth they inherited, or gained as the fruits of their industry; that, by this boon, we gave them a valuable stake in the general welfare of the empire, and one of all others most likely to attach them to our government; and that, although they might approximate to their European forefathers in language, manners, and religion, they were, from complexion, from habits, and from being excluded from the civil and military branches of the service, sufficiently distinct to prevent that alarm on the part of the natives of India which would be produced by European colonization; and it has been assumed, from this last circumstance, that they were likely to prove the safest of all mediums through which we might gradually introduce knowledge and improvement into India. (M)

- 17 The chief cause of the decline of this nation in India was, the fall of their power in Europe; but there is no doubt that it was hastened by their bigotry. (M)
- 18 The laws both of the Mahomedans and Hindus are completely incorporated with their faith. The Qazi and Pundit are at once the expounders of their religion and law, both of which are deemed of divine origin. (M)
- 19 The example of the celebrated Swartz has been adduced as a proof of efforts at conversion being aided, and the confidence of the natives being increased, by the notice and support which a missionary received from government; but the character of that pious and able man was as extraordinary as the circumstances under which he was placed; his influence with the natives, from princes to peasants, was established by his personal conduct, and Swartz may be said to have given more aid to government than he ever received from it. Besides, the condition of our power in India, at the period he lived, was so very different from what it is at present that, supposing the unlikely occurrence of a man

of as rare talents and virtue entering upon the same field of action, we should have no right to anticipate the same results from his efforts in such altered circumstances. (M)

<sup>20</sup> The mutiny of Vellore, the first of its kind in the Company's army, was caused by certain reforms introduced by William Bentinck in the Madras army which affected the religious sensibility of the soldiers. The introduction of a new cap and the prohibition of the use of caste marks and ear-rings were looked upon as attempts to interfere in their religious beliefs.

<sup>21</sup> The following remarks were made in a despatch from the Governor-general-in-Council to the Secret Committee, dated December 7, 1807:—

“The practical effect of this sanguinary spirit of bigotry, as exemplified in the mutiny of Vellore, and in the events which succeeded it, can hardly escape observation. For, although Mr. Buchannan, on the ground of his personal communications with some of the natives on the coast, is of opinion that the insurrection at Vellore had no connexion with the Christian religion, directly or indirectly, immediately, or remotely, we are compelled to form a different judgment, from the mass of authentic evidence and information on that unhappy event recorded in the public proceedings of government; and we are satisfied that a persuasion (a most erroneous one, indeed, but a firm and sincere persuasion) in the breasts of a great proportion of the sepoys who were thus betrayed into the execution of the massacre of Vellore, and of those who subsequently manifested a spirit of insurrection, that a design existed on the part of the British government to operate a general conversion of the inhabitants of India to Christianity, was one of the most efficient causes of that horrible disaster.” These opinions of the supreme government were in concurrence with all whose public duty obliged them to investigate the causes of that catastrophe. Those who instigated the sepoys to mutiny, and to murder their officers, could never have found in the lesser causes which combined to produce this result, sufficient motives to excite these hitherto faithful men to such atrocity. They succeeded in persuading them that their religion was in danger; and they brought forward the removal of marks of caste and slight alterations

of dress as evidence to the truth of those general and false assertions, which were circulated at this period throughout the coast army. (M)

<sup>22</sup> May 29, 1807.

<sup>23</sup> According to the statements of the missionaries, the most violent passages, and those which had given most offence, were inserted by the zeal of a new convert who had been employed to translate a tract from the Bengali into the Persian language; which translation was stated to have been printed without examination. (M)

<sup>24</sup> The press of the Baptist missionaries was only placed at Serampore for their convenience. There was no employment for it at that small town, though it was useful, as the Danish Governor stated, in publishing advertisements of public and private sales. All the books it printed were for distribution in the English territories. The pious and respectable missionaries were English subjects. Mr. Carey, the chief member of the society, held the situation of Sanskrit and Bangali professor in the college of Fort William, and the press was chiefly supported by the aid of the college. (M)

<sup>25</sup> See Lord Minto's letter, November 2, 1807.

<sup>26</sup> Vol. *i*, p. 319.

<sup>27</sup> Were there no other impediment to the progress of conversion, the difference in the tenets of the numerous persons now preaching the gospel in India must of itself be a great one. (M)

<sup>28</sup> This was the motive which prompted Christian missionaries to propagate education in India. Their efforts later turned out to be of great advantage to Indians.

<sup>29</sup> See a very full account, by Mr. Charles Lushington, of the institutions for education now existing in Bengal. The principal of these is the Bishop's College, which chiefly owes its foundation to the late Bishop Middleton. Its object is "the instruction of Christian youth in sacred knowledge and sound learning, and in the principal languages in India, that they may be qualified to preach among the heathen." Among the lesser institutions which have the instruction of the natives in view, that founded by the late Rev. Mr. May, at Chinsura, merits particular attention. Its object is not

change, but improvement; and in making the village schools the medium of conveying knowledge, and cautiously abstaining from all mixture of religious subjects with his course of instruction, this pious and sensible man adopted the best and safest course by which the end in view can be obtained. (M)

- 30 Malcolm did not share the zeal of the evangelicals for religious propaganda in India. He, in fact, opposed any connection between the missionaries and the Company's government in India. He believed that the Company's patronage to the missionaries would endanger its future. Malcolm's attitude towards this problem earned him the animosity of Charles Grant, one of the most powerful Directors of the Company and a staunch evangelical.
- 31 It may be stated generally, that no country in which our government has not been established fifty years is safe for such experiments. Beyond these limits, knowledge will slowly spread itself through channels in which there is no danger; but its progress will be more likely to be obstructed than facilitated by our direct open efforts to promote it. (M)
- 32 Satis have decreased, and, indeed, are almost unknown in many of the southern parts of India; and in the countries of the Deccan, Malwa, and Hindustan, they are of rare occurrence. In Bengal Proper this shocking usage is more prevalent than in any part of India. It appears that in 1819, 650 had taken place within the Company's territories in Bengal; of these, 421 were in the Calcutta division. In 1820, the number was 597; those in the Calcutta division, 390. (M)
- 33 For an account of infanticide, see *Central India*, ii p. 208. This cruel practice, which is limited to some Rajput families, has been most unjustly attributed to the whole of this race of men, of whom there are about 100,000 in the ranks of our army; and, in the whole of that numerous and gallant body, there cannot be found one example of this horrid usage. (M)
- 34 The British administrators had looked upon these practices with disgust and disapproval. But in the beginning they were hesitant to interfere as they feared that it might hurt the religious sentiments of Hindus. The cruelty of those rites were,

however, universally recognized and by the first quarter of the 19th Century the ways and means for terminating them were discussed. The utilitarians urged the efficacy of legislation as the best means for effecting changes. But others, like Malcolm, believed that all reforms to be effective should come from within the society.

<sup>35</sup> Even an ardent advocate of the eradication of these practices like Raja Ram Mohun Roy opposed legislation to put an end to them. Malcolm's objection to sweeping reforms was based on the possible dangers to the security of the empire.

<sup>36</sup> The following details of a sati are given by Diodorus Siculus in his *History* (lib. xix), and cited by Rollin, vol. ix. "After the battle between Antigonus and Eumenes, the latter obtained permission from the former to bury his dead. During this ceremony a singular dispute occurred. Among the dead was an Indian officer, who had brought with him his two wives; one of whom he had but recently espoused. The law of India permitted no woman to survive her husband; if she refused to be burned with him on the pile, she was for ever dishonoured, and obliged to remain a widow during the rest of her life, not being allowed to be present at sacrifices or any other religious ceremony. The law mentioned only a single wife; here were two, each of which claimed the preference. The eldest alleged her right from antiquity; the youngest replied, that the law itself excluded her rival from the pile, because she was pregnant; and so it was decided. The former retired in grief, bathed in tears, rending her clothes and tearing her hair, as if some great calamity had befallen her. The other, on the contrary, in triumph, attended by a numerous body of relatives and friends, decked in her richest ornaments, as on her wedding-day, advanced with firmness to the place of the ceremony: there, after distributing her jewels and trinkets among her relations and friends, and bidding them a last farewell, she was placed on the pile by her own brother, and expired in the midst of the applause and acclamations of nearly all the spectators!" This account will be recognized by every one who has witnessed a sati to be, in every particular, in exact conformity with the feelings and usages of the Hindus of the present

day—a circumstance not more worthy of attention, as it shows the deep-rooted prejudice on which this barbarous practice rests, than as an example of that strong and almost invincible tenacity of usage which characterizes this ancient and extraordinary people. (M)

- <sup>87</sup> Vide examination before the House of Lords in 1813, and *Sketch of Political India*, p. 468.

- <sup>88</sup> The following extract of a letter, dated Camp Mhow, 7th November, 1818, to the Reverend Mr. Marshman, who had requested the author, on the part of the Baptist Missionary Society of Serampore, to become a patron of their college, was written amid scenes which gave him a full opportunity of judging every part of these important questions.

“I am flattered by your letter of the 1st September; any man must be gratified by possessing so much of the good opinion of a society like yours at Serampore. I should, however, ill deserve the sentiments you express, if I were to have any reserve in my reply; I shall be proud to become one of the patrons of your college, and to add my subscription to its support, if you think me worthy of the honour, after the following explanations. Though most deeply impressed with the truths of the Christian religion, and satisfied, were that only to be considered in a moral view, it would be found to have diffused more knowledge and more happiness than any faith man ever entertained; yet I do think from the construction of our empire in India, referring both to the manner in which it has been attained, and that in which it must (according to my humble judgment) be preserved, that the English government in this country should never directly or indirectly interfere in propagating the Christian religion. The pious missionary must be left unsupported by government, or any of its officers, to pursue his labours, and I will add that I should not only deem a contrary conduct a breach of faith to those natives whom we have conquered, more by our solemn pledges given in words and acts, to respect their prejudices and maintain their religion, than by arms, but likely to fail in the object it sought to accomplish; and to expose us eventually to more serious dangers than we have ever yet known. The reasons for this opinion I have more than

once had occasion publicly to state; I shall not therefore trouble you with the repetition.

“I come now to the second part of the subject, and your more immediate concern, that of spreading knowledge.

“In contemplating the probable future destiny of our extraordinary empire in Asia, it is impossible not to think but that the knowledge we are so actively introducing may in the course of time cause great changes, but how these may affect our power, is a question that the wisest of us will find it difficult to answer. I must ever think that to impart knowledge is to impart strength to a community, and that, as that becomes enlightened, the love of independence, combined with a natural pride in self-government, which God appears to have infused into the spirit of man and of nations, will be too strong for all the lessons of duty, of meekness, and of gratitude to their intellectual benefactors, that we can teach our Indian subjects, but I am not deterred by the possibility (nor should I be by the probability) of such consequences from being the advocate for their instruction in all the arts of civil life. We live in an age which is above such policy, and we belong to a country which has recently made itself too conspicuous for destroying the fetters which had for ages enslaved the body, to tolerate arguments in support of a system for keeping the human mind in ignorance of any knowledge that is calculated to promote its happiness; but the question here assumes its most difficult shape. It is the nature of the knowledge, and the mode we pursue in imparting it, that is likely to make the difference between its proving a curse or a blessing to India—between its supporting (at least for a long period) our power over that quarter of the globe, or accelerating its downfall; enthusiasm or over-zeal is quite competent to effect the latter, while the former requires for its accomplishment a steadiness of purpose, a clearness of head, and a soberness of judgment, that are seldom found united with that intentness on the object which is also quite essential. I wish, my dear Sir, I could be certain, that your successors in the serious task you propose would have as much experience as you and your fellow-labourers at Serampore;—that they would walk, not



run in the same path;—I would not then have to state one reserve. I should be assured that it would be considered as safer to commence by giving a good deal of knowledge to a few than a little to many;—that efforts would be limited to countries where the people are familiar with our government, and would understand the object;—that men, in short, would be satisfied with laying the foundation-stone of a good edifice, and not hazard their own object and incur danger, (for in all precipitate or immature attempts of this nature there is danger) by desiring to accomplish in a day what must be the work of a century.

“I have given you my sentiments as fully as I can in this short letter. I really have not time to enter more into details. I hope this explanation will be satisfactory, but it is a justice due to you and to myself to declare, that while I shall be proud to be a patron, and to support the plan now proposed, I shall steadfastly and conscientiously oppose (as far as I have the power) any deviation from the original principles, or any departure from that moderate spirit of gradual and rational improvement in which it has originated, and in which I trust it will be conducted.”

The above communication was received and acknowledged in terms flattering to the feelings of the writer, who was elected a patron of the college. (M)

- <sup>39</sup> Bengal Gazette was first published in 1780. It is also called Calcutta General Advertiser, but is popularly known as Hicky's Gazette.
- <sup>40</sup> Hicky had directed his criticism on some prominent members of the European community, even Warren Hastings and Sir Eligah Impey did not escape his notice. The Gazette was compelled to discontinue after two years.
- <sup>41</sup> Mr. Hicky.
- <sup>42</sup> Hicky's Bengal Gazette.
- <sup>43</sup> Mr. William Duane, Editor of the Bengal Journal.
- <sup>44</sup> Lord Minto's exercise of his authority upon this occasion was represented by the Rev. Mr. Buchannan, then a clergyman at Calcutta, to be contrary to the practice of former Governors-general; but His Lordship, in a despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, (7th November 1807),

fully repelled this attack upon the measures of government. He adverted to the proceedings, already noticed, of Lord Wellesley relative to the proposed thesis of disputation at the college of Fort William. He also adverted to the recent massacre at Vellore, and to the sentiments which the Court of Directors had expressed on hearing of that disaster. With regard to publications, he observed, "that the existing restrictions upon the press in India had been in force many years, and that it could not be supposed that any former administration would have deemed it consistent with the public safety, or with the obligations of the public faith, as pledged to the native subjects of the Company for the unmolested exercise of their religions, to permit the circulation of such inflammatory works as those which had been brought to notice." Lord Minto, in reference to the discussions with the missionaries at Serampore, observes "that no innovation has taken place in the principles and practice of this government relative to the control of the productions of the press, that no new and specific imprimatur has been established for works on theology; but that the restrictions which virtually existed with regard to publications in general, were practically applied to theological works only when works of that class, containing strictures on the religions of the country in terms the most irritating and offensive, by being circulated among our native subjects, exposed the public tranquillity to hazard." (M)

- <sup>45</sup> The editors of the newspapers were censured, in 1807, for publishing intelligence about the distribution of His Majesty's fleet, such articles being contrary to orders; and these restrictions were directed to be observed at Madras and Bombay. (M)
- <sup>46</sup> The reference here is to Lord Hastings, who was responsible for abolishing the Department of Censor of Newspapers.
- <sup>47</sup> In 1799.
- <sup>48</sup> Letter from Dr. Bryen, editor of the Mirror, dated February, 1817.
- <sup>49</sup> These regulations were as follows:—  
 "The editors of newspapers are prohibited from publishing any matter coming under the following heads:—

"1. Animadversions on the measures and proceedings of the honourable Court of Directors, or other public authorities in England, connected with the government in India; or disquisitions on political transactions of the local administration; or offensive remarks levelled at the public conduct of the members of council, of the judges of the supreme court, or of the lord-bishop of Calcutta.

"2. Discussions having a tendency to create alarm or suspicion among the native population of any intended interference with their religious opinions.

"3. The republication, from English or other newspapers, of passages coming under any of the above heads, or otherwise calculated to affect the British power or reputation in India.

"4. Private scandal and personal remarks on individuals, tending to excite dissension in society." (M)

- <sup>50</sup> Lord Hastings, in his reply to the address from the inhabitants of Madras, observes, "My removal of restrictions from the press has been mentioned in laudatory language. I might easily have adopted that procedure without any length of cautious consideration, from my habit of regarding the freedom of publication as a natural right of my fellow-subjects, to be narrowed only by special and urgent cause assigned. The seeing no direct necessity for those invidious shackles might have sufficed to make me break them—I know myself, however, to have been guided in the step by a positive and well-weighed policy. If our motives of action are worthy, it must be wise to render them intelligible throughout an empire, our hold on which is opinion. Further, it is salutary for supreme authority, even when its intentions are most pure, to look to the control of public scrutiny: while conscious of rectitude, that authority can lose nothing of its strength by its exposure to general comment. On the contrary, it requires incalculable addition of force. That government which has nothing to disguise wields the most powerful instrument that can appertain to sovereign rule. It carries with it the united reliance and effort of the whole mass of the governed; and let the triumph of our beloved country in its awful contest with tyrant-ridden France speak the value of a spirit to be found only in men accustomed to indulge and express their honest sentiments." (M)

- <sup>51</sup> Mr. Buckingham.
- <sup>52</sup> Mr. Humphries. He made his escape from on board the ship in which he was embarked. (M)
- <sup>53</sup> Sir Henry Gwillim.
- <sup>54</sup> Mr. Fair.
- <sup>55</sup> See Appendix No. 6.
- <sup>56</sup> At the courts of most of the native princes, papers of news, termed Akhbars, are produced; which are court-gazettes, giving a statement of occurrences, true or false, as matters of fact, without comment or opinion. From the situation of the writers under such governments, it will easily be conceived that these Akhbars bear no affinity to an English newspaper. (M)
- <sup>57</sup> The estimated numbers of all the Europeans in India, not in the civil or military service, is about 3000. (M)
- <sup>58</sup> This is an impression which most British officers maintained during this time. Mughals being their immediate predecessors, Muslim antagonism was taken for granted. It was because of this the revolt of 1857 was described by many British officers as the result of a Muslim conspiracy.
- <sup>59</sup> It may be affirmed, from the most authentic documents, that, for the last thirty-five years, there has been, in different parts of India, a most active circulation of inflammatory papers, in the form of proclamations, letters, and prophecies, directed to the subversion of the British power. These have, in almost all cases, been addressed to the interests and passions of our native troops. They have too often made deep impressions; but the difficulty of multiplying copies, and the fear of detection, has limited their circulation to particular parts of the country, and, in a great degree, prevented the mischiefs which such efforts of our enemies were calculated to produce. (M)
- <sup>60</sup> Malcolm was an extremely practical man. All policies he advocated and pursued had one aim—the perpetuation of the British empire in India. His opinion about the freedom of the Press in India is only one of the examples.
- <sup>61</sup> No individual in authority can have a right to act upon his personal feeling or discretion for the toleration of departure from established regulations. The moment the rule ceases to

be imperative in all cases, its application in particular ones becomes invidious or unjust. The temptation to pass the line of demarcation will always be great. Profit and popularity will attend the person who outsteps it, and his example will soon have followers. Checks will be daily more difficult, and the effects of injudicious forbearance and lenity may even cause an abridgement of the latitude now given to useful publications. (M)

- 62 This opinion was contrary to the opinion of the utilitarians who stood for a total reconstruction of Indian society by legislation. Malcolm's assertion of this idea, though in a different context, is significant, as it was expressed at a time when utilitarians had decisive say in the affairs of the Company.
- 63 There is no consideration of more consequence than the manner as well as conduct of every public servant towards the natives of all classes and ranks. This subject has been carefully treated in the instructions which the author gave to his assistants before he left India in 1821. These instructions form Appendix 8. (M)

## APPENDIX 1

*Notes and references to the appendices are those of Malcolm as given in the original*

- <sup>1</sup> The Idgah is an open temple, where the sacrifice of Isaac and other public festivals of the Mahomedan religion are annually celebrated.
- <sup>2</sup> He said the hollow part of the pole of the palankeen (bamboo) was filled with gold lace and jewels.
- <sup>3</sup> Persian secretary to the Governor-general and Commander-in-Chief. Upon Lord Cornwallis's return to Europe, in 1794, he was appointed resident at Lucknow, and subsequently agent to the Governor-general at Benares. On the occasion of announcing to Vizier Ali, the Ex-Nabob of Oudh, the orders of government for his removal to Calcutta, he was barbarously murdered by the adherents of that prince. He was much beloved and esteemed as a valuable and zealous servant of the East India Company.

- <sup>4</sup> After the taking of Seringapatam, in 1799, papers found in the palace proved that Mir Alam had carried on, all this time, secret correspondence with Tipu.
- <sup>5</sup> Eighty miles.
- <sup>6</sup> Thirty miles.
- <sup>7</sup> A species of litter carried by men called bearers.

## APPENDIX 4

- <sup>1</sup> Memoir of the Pindaris, delivered to Mr. Canning, September 1816.
- <sup>2</sup> Vide Col. Wilkes' Report, 1806.
- <sup>3</sup> Major-general Sir John Doveton.
- <sup>4</sup> Lord Minto, in a minute, dated the 12th of December, 1809, after remarking on the positions of our subsidiary forces in the countries of the Nizam and Peshwa, and the necessity of having one within the Nagpur territories, observes—"It is probable that these three forces might be so stationed as not only to enable two to form a junction to the eastward, to the westward, or in centre, in a short space of time, but also to connect with Bombay and Gujerat on one side, and with Bundelcund on the other."
- <sup>5</sup> This army consisted of seventeen thousand regulars, an excellent train of artillery, and contingents of irregular cavalry, from our allies the Nizam and Peshwa. This estimate does not include a large co-operating force in Bundelkhand, under Colonel Martindale.
- <sup>6</sup> The late Major-general Sir Barry Close, Bart.
- <sup>7</sup> Thana is a small fort in the island of Salsette, about twenty miles from Bombay.
- <sup>8</sup> The Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone.
- <sup>9</sup> Captain Close's letter to Mr. Adam, November 23, 1816.
- <sup>10</sup> This was the opinion of Sir Barry Close.
- <sup>11</sup> The present state of Jaipur may be imagined, when we are informed that its troops are at this moment employed in plundering that part of their own country which is in the occupation of Amir Khan.
- <sup>12</sup> The Raja of Bundi should be included in our arrangements with the Raja of Jaipur.

- 13 The Raja of Jodhpur.
- 14 Besides the tribute Zalim Singh pays Sindhia, he rents several districts from that prince as well as Holkar, who is paid through his friend and ally, Amir Khan, to whose family he gives protection, and on whose aid and support he can always rely.  
Malcolm wrongly describes Zalim Singh as the Raja of Kotah. He was only the prime-minister. (Ed.)
- 15 Captain Close's Correspondence, 1816 and 1817.
- 16 The minister at the court of Nagpur did not hesitate to state this fact to the resident.
- 17 She is not the real mother of the prince, but having adopted him, was always called so.
- 18 She was placed on a plate of heated iron.
- 19 Captain Close's letter to Lord Moira, April 23, 1816.
- 20 He is sixty-five years of age.
- 21 Letter from Mr. Metcalfe to Mr. Adam.
- 22 Letter from Mr. Adam to Mr. Metcalfe.
- 23 Captain Sydenham.
- 24 Memoir of the Pindaris, by Captain Tod.
- 25 Memorandum on the Pindaris, dated London, 1818.
- 26 Captain Tod's Memoir.
- 27 Captain Tod's Memoir.
- 28 Captain Close's letter to Mr. Adam, January 23, 1817.
- 29 Huzoor means presence, and is the common term used in speaking or writing of princes.
- 30 In 1805, when Holkar was pursued into the Punjab by Lord Lake, he sent his family to Malwa.
- 31 Presence.
- 32 Agent.
- 33 Messenger.
- 34 Vide Captain Close's letter to Mr. Adam, March 19, 1819.
- 35 Hindia is about sixty miles from Hoshangabad, one of the principal positions of Colonel Adam's forces, about ninety miles from Ellichipore, and about one hundred miles from Chouly Mohysir, and about sixty miles from Bhopal.
- 36 Captain Close has recommended a position on the river Sind, near Chandpur, which is within the territory of our dependent, the Raja of Duttia, and only thirty miles from Gwalior.

- <sup>37</sup> The lower fort of Asirgarh is well calculated for a depot.
- <sup>38</sup> Captain Close's Correspondence.
- <sup>39</sup> Galna is tolerably well adapted for a depot, and was used as such in 1804. It is favourably situated to cover and receive supplies forwarded to the Deccan from Surat, by Sonagarh and Nunderbar.
- <sup>40</sup> Died in March, 1816.
- <sup>41</sup> Vizier Mahommed, though belonging to the family of Bhopal, never assumed the name of Nabob.
- <sup>42</sup> The Mysore horse amount to 4000, those of the Nizam, under European officers, to 6000, and the Poona government, under the recent treaty we have concluded with it, will furnish a still more numerous quota, and these are independent of the force of irregulars which the nobles of these governments are obliged to furnish, and which, though not so available, may be calculated as at least double in number to the corps stated. This calculation is made on the supposition that, besides 7000 or 8000 irregular horse, under English officers, we could command the immediate services of at least 12,000 belonging to petty rulers and chiefs under our protection.
- <sup>43</sup> The Grasials are, like the Bhils, original inhabitants, who, when driven from their lands by Mahommedan and Mahratta invaders, subsist by plunder, or by exacting, on the ground of their power to plunder it, a portion of the revenue from each village. Their rights and sphere of action are usually limited to the countries that once belonged to them.—See *Central India*, i., p. 508.
- <sup>44</sup> The Honourable Mr. Elphinstone, Mr. Russell, Mr. Jenkins, Mr. Metcalfe, Mr. Strachey, and Captain Close, are the public officers here alluded to.

## APPENDIX 5

- <sup>1</sup> The Sondees could assemble nearly two thousand horse, many of whom were remarkably well mounted.
- <sup>2</sup> The largest calibre was a four-and-a-half pounder.
- <sup>3</sup> Dhalkote, a place six or seven miles west of Asirgarh, and twelve or thirteen north of Barhampur.
- <sup>4</sup> They carried this argument to the extreme of adducing his



cowardice, as a proof of Baji Rao's aversion to fight the English.

- <sup>5</sup> Telligaon is a village within fifteen miles of Poona.
- <sup>6</sup> This gallant and sensible native officer is now Subedar-major of the body-guard at Madras.
- <sup>7</sup> This meeting was first fixed for the 31st of May, but afterwards put off by mutual consent.
- <sup>8</sup> Jaswant Rao Bhow, the governor of Asirgarh, had aided the Peshwa throughout, and evinced at this period a very forward zeal in his cause.
- <sup>9</sup> The vakil of the Vinchoor chief said, that his master's family had served that of the Peshwa for five generations, and had always spoken boldly to him and his ancestors, but now, he added, that fate (Bukht) is upon him, "we must be silent, unmerited reproaches even have remained and must remain unanswered."
- <sup>10</sup> Posts.                      <sup>11</sup> Messengers.                      <sup>12</sup> Near Kairee.
- <sup>13</sup> The detachment sent to intervene between Baji Rao and Asir was fired upon by the fort, but no one was hurt.
- <sup>14</sup> Letter to the Governor-general, June 19, 1811.
- <sup>15</sup> Two or three of the grenadiers of the 14th native infantry were wounded. A native officer of the Company asked General Malcolm, as he was riding past, whether he would allow his sepoys to be shot, without returning the fire? "If I permit you to fire," said the General, "the Company's good name may suffer injury." "Let twenty grenadiers die," said the fine fellow in an animated tone, "it is for you, General, to take care of the Company's good name."
- <sup>16</sup> Letter to Mr. Adam, June 19, 1818.

## APPENDIX 7

- <sup>1</sup> Commander of the army.                      <sup>2</sup> Post.

## APPENDIX 8

- <sup>1</sup> These Instructions were published in the Appendix of *Central India*." They are republished from a belief of their

- utility, in which the author is confirmed by the extract of a minute in the Revenue Department, under date the 29th of March, 1825, of the Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas Munro, directing their circulation, and expressing a hope that every public officer, for whose use they are intended, will be guided by the spirit which pervades them.
- <sup>2</sup> Central India, so denominated from its comprising those provinces which, lying in the centre of India, may be said to extend from seventy-one to seventy-five degrees north latitude, and seventy-three to eighty east longitude. It comprehends all that extent of country which was known in the time of the emperors of Delhi, under the denomination of the Suba or government of Malwa. See *Memoirs of Central India*, i, p. 1.
  - <sup>3</sup> In consequence of the success of the Pindari war in 1818 and 1819, our power was established over almost all the country called Central India; but, with the exception of a few districts, its provinces remained with the native princes and chiefs who before possessed them. These, with hardly what can be called an exception, became, under different treaties and engagements, dependent on the protection and subject to the control of the British government.
  - <sup>4</sup> The Bhils are mountain-robbers. For a particular account of this remarkable race, see *Memoirs of Central India*, i. pp. 116, 550, and ii. p. 179.
  - <sup>5</sup> This Mahratta prince (for a particular account of whose family and possessions, see *Memoirs of Central India*, i. p. 116) is the only one who maintains a nominal independence of the British government; but he, in fact, now relies as much on that power as those chiefs who can claim its protection by treaty.
  - <sup>6</sup> Gwalior is the capital of Daulat Rao Sindhia, with whom a representative of the British government resides.
  - <sup>7</sup> For an account of the Mahratta families of Holkar, Dhar, and Dewas, see *Memoirs of Central India*, i, pp. 142, 97, and 112. A detailed account of the Rajput chiefs here alluded to is given in p. 463 of the same volume.
  - <sup>8</sup> The Grassiahs are Rajput chiefs, who subsist by extorting, through force or intimidation, a part of the produce of those districts they once possessed, but from which they have been

expelled by Mahratta invaders. For a particular account of these chiefs, see *Memoirs of Central India*, i, p. 508, and ii, p. 244.

- <sup>9</sup> Sati is a Hindu term for the self-sacrifice of a female at the funeral-pile of her husband.
- <sup>10</sup> Munshi—Mahommedan secretary or writer.
- <sup>11</sup> Mootsuddie—Hindu writer.
- <sup>12</sup> The term Deccan means South, and is given to the southern parts of India; but, in a limited sense, is now applied to the territories of the Nizam or Prince of Hyderabad, and to those above the mountains which formerly belonged to the Peshwa or head of the Poona government.
- <sup>13</sup> Hindustan, in its local and limited sense, comprehends the large and rich provinces which form the western parts of India, from Lucknow to the Punjab, and from the country of Rajputana to the Himalaya mountains.
- <sup>14</sup> Tantia Jogh, the minister of the minor prince Malhar Rao Holkar.
- <sup>15</sup> A Jemadar is the head or principal of the harkaras.
- <sup>16</sup> Harkara means literally "a man of all work," but is commonly applied, as in the text, to messengers who are distinguished by particular dresses, by bearing a stick or pike, and by wearing badges which denote the names of those by whom they are employed.
- <sup>17</sup> Bagris, a tribe of robbers.—See *Memoirs of Central India*, ii, p. 182.
- <sup>18</sup> The name of a town, which is the capital of a small principality. The fanatics here alluded to, under the direction of a female who declared herself an incarnation of one of the gods, committed several murders; and while these were perpetrating, she exhibited to her superstitious followers a mirror, in which was reflected the triumph of the Rajputs and the defeat of the English.
- <sup>19</sup> For a particular account of this remarkable chief of robbers, see *Memoirs of Central India*, i, p. 550.
- <sup>20</sup> Bagris are a class of natives of low tribe, whose occupation is labour.
- <sup>21</sup> Hackeries are a species of carts.

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